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This volume originated from the proceedings of the three-day international 
seminar “Islamic Ethics and the Genome Question”, organized by the Research 
Center for Islamic Legislation & Ethics (CILE) in Doha, Qatar, between 3rd 
and 5th April 2017.1 This seminar makes part of the CILE series of interdisci-
plinary seminars which solicit contributions from researchers, scholars and 
experts in various fields in order to address key ethical questions from an Is-
lamic perspective. Like other seminars in the series, this seminar was preceded 
by a Call-For-Papers (CFP), espoused with a background paper explaining its 
main themes and key questions.2 All submissions were reviewed by an inter-
nal committee and a limited number of the submissions was selected. Besides 
the submissions coming from the CFP, direct invitations were sent to some 
participants, whose published research shows their ability to cover topics that 
were not addressed by the CFP submissions. Throughout the three days of the 
seminar, the two groups, coming from the CFP and direct invitations, present-
ed their papers and feedback on each other’s papers and exchanged ideas and 
insights on many issues related to the main themes of the seminar. Benefiting 
from the intensive discussions during the seminar, the authors worked on re-
vising their papers. Finally, a few new papers were written after the seminar in 
order to cover some lacunas revealed by the discussions during the seminar. A 
post-seminar internal review was made inside CILE then the selected materi-
al went through the peer-review process managed by Brill. The papers which 
successfully went through these various layers of review are included in this 
volume.
Throughout the long journey, which started by mere proposals of rough 
ideas about the seminar up until this publication, I have received invaluable 
help and support from a great number of people whose list is too long to be 
included here. Every researcher is well aware that working on refining the lan-
1 The research-related activities conducted before, during and after the seminar, which result-
ed in this publication, were made possible by the NPRP grant “Indigenizing Genomics in 
the Gulf Region (IGGR): The Missing Islamic Bioethical Discourse”, no. NPRP8-1620-6-057 
from the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF), a member of The Qatar Foundation. The 
statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors. In my capacity as the 
Lead Principal Investigator (LPI) of the IGGR project, I submit my due thanks to the QNRF 
for their generous and continuous support. 
2 Both the call-for-papers and the Background Paper were published on the CILE website 
(www.cilecenter.org) in both English and Arabic. The English version was also advertised via 
the Times Higher Education. 
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guage and unifying the referencing style of pieces written by different authors 
is time-consuming and laborious. Most of this work was accomplished by two 
of our brilliant students of “Islamic Thought and Applied Ethics” specialization 
in the College of Islamic Studies, namely Mariam Taher and Reem Al-Sahlawi. 
Furthermore, a splendid job was achieved by the two competent and hard-
working Research Assistants, Noha Abdel Ghany and Shaimaa Moustafa, who 
assisted me in my current two research projects funded by the Qatar Nation-
al Research Fund (QNRF). Additionally, all colleagues working in CILE were 
very supportive throughout all the elevations and depressions of this extensive 
journey.3 Finally, my due thanks go to Dr. P.S. Van Koningsveld, who worked 
temporarily as the Managing Editor of this series. His advice and wisdom were 
crucial for bringing this publication to light.
I keep the last word here for my dear family, to whom I remain indebted my 
whole life. My wife, Karima, has always been far and beyond the ideal woman 
I could have ever imagined in my dreams. Personally, my children, the twin 
Maryam and Khadija, Mustapha, Aisha and Hamza have practically demon-
strated that “pure innocence” exists and I hope they will be up to the challeng-
es ahead in their life, while keeping their precious innocence intact. My moth-
er, Fawiza, is an example of the simple villager whose strength lies in her ability 
to selflessly give without waiting for a reward in return. My late father, Mustafa, 
is the great personality in my life whom I miss dearly. I say to these great figures 
in my life: “I am related to you all not only through a shared genome, but also 




3 For the full list of the CILE team, please check https://www.cilecenter.org/en/staff/ 
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Introduction
Mohammed Ghaly1
Addressing the deep ontological and ethical questions raised by the field of 
genomics, named here “the Genome Question” (GQ) represents one of the key 
challenges that both religious and non-religious ethical traditions face in the 
modern time. This holds true to the Islamic tradition; one of the main and 
fastest-growing world religions. The international library is now replete with 
academic publications which address the GQ from secular bioethical perspec-
tives. When it comes to the religious perspectives, the list of available publica-
tions considerably declines. When it comes to genomics and Islamic ethics in 
particular, one can hardly come across any distinct publication. This volume 
is meant to fill in this gap, without claiming to be all-inclusive, and to open up 
new venues for future studies and publications in this field.
Before reviewing the various chapters included in this volume, it is perti-
nent to explain what we mean by the “Genome Question” and how it should be 
addressed from an Islamic bioethical perspective. The GQ widely includes, and 
certainly not limited to, a set of ethical questions raised by the cutting-edge 
technologies of genomics, which the Islamic tradition would ordinarily re-
spond to by providing immediate and short-term answers through judging 
specific applications, like genomic testing, DNA paternity and selective abor-
tion, through the lens of ethics. This usually happens by employing tools from 
the discipline of Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh). The authors who contributed to 
this volume could strongly argue that the GQ goes much further and deeper 
than exploring how far certain technologies in particular situations are (in)
compatible with specific ethical traditions. The GQ is much broader in scope 
than these direct ethical questions which appear on the surface. The field of 
genomics itself needs to be critically examined, because the very birth and 
further progress of genomics are, implicitly or explicitly, indicative of certain 
perceptions we hold about ourselves as human beings (including individuals, 
families and societies) and the ways through which we answer questions like: 
1 Professor of Islam and Biomedical Ethics, Research Center for Islamic Legislation & Eth-
ics (CILE), College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar, mghaly@
hbku.edu.qa 
© Mohammed Ghaly, 2019
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC License at 
the time of publication.
| doi:�0.��63/978900439��37_00�
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What makes us distinctively human? Are genome and soul related? If yes, in 
what way? Is our human identity fixed and we must keep it intact, or is it evolv-
ing in nature and we can/should always try to improve it, this time through 
“fixing” or “enhancing” our genome? What kind of individuals, families and 
societies would result, dominate or die out because of the genetic/genomic 
technologies which (will) allow choosing the sex of the children in addition to 
certain physical and cognitive characteristics? 
The breadth and depth of the GQ, we argue, should be coupled with a par-
allel breadth and depth in the Islamic ethical discourse for two main reasons. 
The first reason deals with the complex and multidimensional nature of the 
GQ itself. The larger and deeper questions of genomics, even some of the di-
rect and specific questions, cannot be properly addressed by depending exclu-
sively on the discipline of fiqh. The second reason attends to the nature and 
scope of the field of Islamic Bioethics, as we envisage it. As it is the case with 
the field of mainstream bioethics, Islamic Bioethics is to be characterised with 
interdisciplinarity. Besides the discipline of fiqh, Islamic bioethical discourse 
should truly reflect the richness of the Islamic tradition by incorporating in-
sights from a broad spectrum of other disciplines including philosophy, the-
ology, Sufism, Qurʾān exegesis, Hadith commentaries, belles-lettres (adab), … 
etc. Alongside these disciplines, usually imprecisely called “religious” sciences, 
Islamic Bioethics should also benefit from the critical perspectives developed 
by social sciences and their interaction with biomedical sciences, like medical 
anthropology and medical sociology. By incorporating social sciences in the 
Islamic bioethical discourse, people can reach more comprehensive and in-
formed conclusions in which not only the “ought” aspect will be examined, but 
also the “is” aspect, sometimes called in Islamic literature as people’s realities 
(aḥwāl al-nās). Exploring aḥwāl al-nās and incorporating them into the con-
temporary Islamic bioethical discourse, in our view, cannot be made through 
conducting surveys only. What is needed is a much more sophisticated analy-
sis, which takes into consideration the nuances of lived experiences, power 
imbalances, and the particularities of certain (sub-)communities, … etc. The 
more difficult question to study here is how the perspectives and insights com-
ing from social sciences will be integrated in the Islamic religious discourse 
on making moral judgement and determining the ethically acceptable and 
objectionable choices.2 There is, however, another layer of interdisciplinarity 
that needs to be considered for Islamic Bioethics, viz. engaging with bioethical 
2 For critical remarks on the interplay of social science and bioethics, see Callahan 1999, 275-
294. 
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deliberations from outside Islamic tradition, including both the religious (e.g. 
Jewish and Christian) and secular discussions. 
Striking a well-justified balance between these different layers of interdisci-
plinarity will remain a real challenge for those who want to engage in seminal 
contributions in the field of Islamic Bioethics. It is not so difficult to uncritical-
ly adopt/reject bioethical perspectives developed outside the Islamic tradition 
and justify their supposed (in)compatibility with Islam just by quoting passag-
es from the foundational scriptures of Islam, namely the Qurʾān and Sunna.3 
On the other hand, it can hardly be methodologically justified to approach 
ethical questions triggered by biomedical technologies, which were produced 
outside the Islamic tradition, by focusing exclusively on one discipline within 
the Islamic tradition, namely fiqh. This position, however, does not mean that 
all these levels and dimensions of interdisciplinarity should always be integrat-
ed in the Islamic discourse on any bioethical issue. Undoubtedly, this is not 
feasible as various factors (e.g. the nature of the issues at hand, the (un)avail-
ability of experts, and the different settings of the discussions) should be con-
sidered before deciding to what extent the interdisciplinary the Islamic bioeth-
ical discourse should be. While preparing for the seminar whose proceedings 
are published in this volume, we tried to solicit contributions which guarantee 
as much interdisciplinarity as possible. This explains the inclusion of chap-
ters which analyse insights from ethical traditions outside Islam. During the 
seminar, these contributions were fully integrated in the deliberations. Over 
and above exchanging ideas and critical remarks throughout the seminar, the 
authors of these chapters were asked to prepare written responses on other 
chapters, which address genomics from an Islamic perspective. Additionally, 
the other participants were asked to prepare written responses on these chap-
ters and to present them during the seminar. These procedures did improve 
the cross-fertilization of ideas and insights among all participants, which will 
hopefully be reflected throughout this volume. As for the chapters which ap-
proached the GQ from an Islamic perspective, interdisciplinarity was also un-
derscored. Although we completely defend the centrality of Islamic Jurispru-
dence (fiqh) in developing an authentic Islamic ethical discourse, we equally 
problematize the proposition which reduces Islamic ethics to fiqh only. As ex-
plained above, many other disciplines, as well as fiqh, should be employed and 
operationalized in order to produce a rigorous and productive Islamic ethical 
discourse on genomics. The contributions included in this volume explored 
how insights from disciplines like philosophy, theology and Qurʾān exegesis 
3 For some illustrative examples of this approach when principlism was examined from an 
Islamic ethical perspective, see Ghaly 2016, 6-27. 
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can be of added value in this regard. Unfortunately, some disciplines, such as 
Sufism, are not covered in this volume. This is due to the fact that we could 
not find experts in Sufism with interest in exploring genomics-related issues. 
Moreover, the volume does not include contributions from social scientists. 
This is partially because the field of genomics has just recently found its way 
into the Muslim world and thus there is still no concrete “social reality” of ge-
nomics research to be explored.4 We anticipate that these and other missing 
aspects will be attended to in future studies.
Part 1: Collective Ijtihād and Genomics
In order to put the discussions on the interplay of Islamic ethics and genom-
ics in their proper context, the first part of this volume fathoms out the con-
temporary Islamic bioethical discourse by highlighting some of its distinctive 
features. In order to develop an ethical position rooted in the Islamic tradition, 
one needs to consult its two main scriptural sources, namely the Qurʾān and 
Sunna. Like many other topics, one cannot expect finding direct answers to 
the questions raised by the field of genomics by surveying the content of these 
two Scriptures. Thus, developing an Islamic ethical position necessitates ex-
erting extra intellectual and scholarly efforts guided by a set of methods and 
principles developed throughout the Islamic history. The whole process, com-
mencing from the point of understanding the question or the issue at hand 
leading to deducing the religious ruling (ḥukm Sharʿī) or developing the ethi-
cal position, is known in the Islamic tradition as ijtihād, which literally means 
exerting one’s utmost effort (Weiss 1978). For various reasons, some of which 
are explained in the chapters included in this part, Muslim religious scholars 
collaborated with biomedical scientists and thus the process of ijtihād became 
collective in nature (Ghaly 2015).5
The first chapter in this part, “Sharia Scholars and Modern Biomedical Ad-
vancements: What Role for Religious Ethics in the Genomic Era”, presents a 
historical review of contemporary Islamic Bioethics, which goes back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Unlike the field of mainstream bioethics 
where religion gradually lost its central role, in this chapter, Mohammed Ghaly 
explains how Muslim religious scholars continued to play a central role in con-
structing and shaping the Islamic bioethical discourse. Building upon the the-
4 For the status quo of genomics in the Muslim world and more particularly in the Gulf region, 
see Ghaly 2016a. 
5 For more information on the concept of ijtihād, see Weiss 1978.
5Introduction
sis “Sharia is valid for all times and places”, shared by Muslim religious scholars, 
they acquired the challenge of demonstrating how the religio-ethical system 
of Islam (Sharia) is still viable enough to address the vexing questions raised 
by modern biomedical technologies. Ghaly also highlights the difficulties that 
these religious scholars encountered in this regard because of their education-
al background. This usually focused exclusively on mastering the Arabic lan-
guage and the disciplines of knowledge that help these scholars understand 
the Islamic Scriptures, namely the Qurʾān and Sunna. Because of this genre of 
“religious” education, Muslim religious scholars had no access to updated bio-
medical information, and most of them could not read first-hand sources. This 
situation necessitated employing an interpretive mechanism through which 
Islamic Scriptures will be approached collectively, rather than individually, 
through a group of people who will collaborate to deduce religious rulings and 
ethical judgments compliant with Sharia. The chapter explains how this mech-
anism, known as collective ijtihād, functioned within the field of Islamic Bio-
ethics, and what developments this mechanism went through from the begin-
ning of the twentieth century up to the current genomic era. The chapter also 
raises some critical remarks about how the very term “Sharia” is to be defined.
As a follow up for the first chapter, the second chapter, “Islamic Ethics and 
Genomics: Mapping the Collective Deliberations of Muslim Religious Schol-
ars and Biomedical Scientists”, analyzes how the mechanism of collective ij-
tihād was employed to address the Genome Question (GQ). In this chapter, 
Mohammed Ghaly presents a comprehensive overview of the key conferences 
and expert meetings which facilitated the interdisciplinary discussions among 
Muslim religious scholars and biomedical scientists, from the beginning of the 
1990s onwards. Ghaly identified two main approaches in these discussions, 
namely the “precaution-inclined approach” and the “embracement-inclined 
approach”. Within the precaution-inclined approach, genomics is perceived as 
something almost alien to the Islamic tradition and thus should be approached 
with great caution. For instance, the advocates of this approach argue that 
genomics-associated technologies are in principle forbidden unless proved 
otherwise, and that Muslims should rather wait for concrete research results 
before joining the genomic revolution. On the other hand, the advocates of 
the embracement-inclined approach contextualize genomics within the call 
of Islam to search for beneficial knowledge (ʿilm nāfiʿ), which God made ac-
cessible to all humans who work intensly. Within this approach, genomics is 
not only something permissible, but it is seen as a collective duty (farḍ kifāya), 
which means that Muslims are collectively required to engage in and contrib-
ute to. Recent developments in the Muslim world, especially in the Gulf region, 
showed that the second approach proved to be more appealing. However, the 
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advocates of both approaches agreed that Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ 
Sharʿiyya) should be developed in order to guide the research in the field of 
genomics and its resulting applications and technologies.
The final chapter in this part, “Transformation of the Concept of the Family 
in the Wake of Genomic Sequencing: An Islamic Perspective” by Ayman Sha-
bana, explores the details of some of the Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ 
Sharʿiyya) developed through the mechanism of the collective ijtihād. These 
deal with the family institution, which has a pivotal place in the ethical edifice 
of Islamic tradition. Within this edifice, each family has a certain ideal, with 
its own structure, characteristics and regulations governing the relationship 
among the members belonging to this institution. Genomics and associated 
technologies have not only challenged some aspects of this family ideal, but 
also created new possibilities for reshaping some constituents of this ideal. 
This chapter examines how the collective deliberations among religious schol-
ars and biomedical scientists addressed these challenges, in addition to the 
opinions of individual scholars, and whether the newly created possibilities 
should be seen as ethically defensible or objectionable options. These ques-
tions are addressed at the hand of three applied examples, namely premarital 
genetic testing, fetal sex selection and germline genetic modification.
Part 2: Genomics and Rethinking Human Nature
After setting the scene and examining the status quo of Islamic bioethical de-
liberations on genomics, the second part of this volume tries to impose new 
frontiers, explore new dimensions, and raise some of the deep questions which 
were not (fully) covered in the discussions facilitated by the mechanism of col-
lective ijtihād. The main thread which connects the three chapters included in 
this part is exploring how human nature can/should be comprehended, revis-
ited or even reshaped in the light of genomics and the new possibilities it has 
created. In the first chapter “Conceptualizing the Human Being: Insights from 
the Genethics Discourse and Implications for Islamic Bioethics”, Aasim Padela 
argues that formulating an ethical position towards complex issues in the field 
of genomics are usually premised on specific ontological perceptions about 
the nature of the human being, although these ontologies sometimes remain 
implicit and unspoken. Based on an extensive literature review, Padela holds 
that Western bioethical deliberations on issues related to genetics and genom-
ics are indicative of three main ontological perspectives, which perceive the 
human being as (a) a data store that houses information, (b) a reproductive 
organism, or (c) an evolving biological entity. Each of these ontological per-
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ceptions, Padela argues, impacts the ethical conclusions adopted by Western 
bioethicists. Padela’s proposal for improving the religious, and particularly Is-
lamic, bioethical discourse on genomics is not only to evaluate the techno-
logical applications by counting the strengths and weaknesses or the direct 
benefits and harms of each application but also by questioning and critically 
examining the underlying ontologies.
The second chapter, “Islamic Perspectives on the Genome and the Human 
Person: Why the Soul Matters” by Mehrunisha Suleman and Arzoo Ahmed, 
can be seen as a natural extension of the ontological discussions outlined by 
Padela, but with more focus on the Islamic tradition. The two authors start 
from the premise that the information unlocked by human genetics and ge-
nomics greatly influenced how we perceive our human nature. Against this 
backdrop, the chapter examines the relationship between the genome and the 
human person. A substantial part of the chapter is dedicated to studying the 
concept “soul/spirit (nafs/rūḥ)”, and associated terms. The authors surveyed 
the references to these terms in the Qurʾān and how they were analysed by 
Qurʾān exegetes, philosophers and theologians. The aim here is to explore how 
such narratives rooted in the Islamic tradition can provide novel perspectives 
to the understanding of the human person and the ethical considerations 
surrounding genomics. The chapter adopts an interdisciplinary approach by 
engaging insights from different disciplines within the Islamic tradition, espe-
cially Quranic exegesis, Islamic theology and philosophy. 
The last chapter in this part, “The Ethical limits of Genetic Intervention: Ge-
nethics in Philosophical and Fiqhi Discourses” by Mutaz al-Khatib, again pro-
vides an interdisciplinary investigation of how the new fields of genomics and 
genetics can influence our understanding of human nature and how far we 
can subject the human person to these cutting-edge technological interven-
tions. According to al-Khatib, the various ways through which people address 
such questions are usually determined by one’s stance towards other deeper 
questions, namely on how we understand the nature of genetic/genomic tech-
nologies (e.g. are they neutral and value-free, or do they imply certain value 
judgements, pre-assumptions and convictions?) and how we understand the 
nature of the human being, especially during the early pre-implantation stage 
and the following phases of embryonic development. Throughout the chapter, 
al-Khatib employs the analytical tools of Western philosophy and Islamic juris-
prudence (fiqh) to see how such questions are (to be) addressed and what kind 
of similarities and differences exist between these two disciplines.
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Part 3: Widening the Scope of Ethical Deliberations
The third part of this volume purposefully aims to enrich the abovementioned 
levels of interdisciplinarity of Islamic bioethical discourse by incorporating in-
sights from outside the Islamic tradition. In the first chapter, “In the Beginning 
Was the Genome: Genomics and the Bi-Textuality of Human Existence”, Hub 
Zwart continues investigating the possible impact of genomics on our under-
standing of human nature. In agreement with almost all authors who contrib-
uted to this volume, Zwart argues that focusing on specific applied issues like 
selective abortion, artificial reproduction and paternity testing does not do 
justice to the complexity of the religion-science relationship in the context of 
genomics. According to him, such an approach would typically present science 
as the progressive and liberating power and religion as the conservative and re-
strictive one. Instead of this reductionist approach, Zwart proposes perceiving 
human existence as the result of a reciprocal interaction between two types of 
texts, namely the text written in the language of molecular biology consisting 
of the alphabet of nucleotides, and the text recorded in the religious Scrip-
tures like the Bible and the Qurʾān. Within this proposed framing, Zwart devel-
ops what he calls an “occidental perspective” which builds upon the works of 
prominent philosophers like Hegel, Teilhard and Lacan. Through this perspec-
tive, he tries to revisit the relationship between science, represented here in 
genomics, and religion, particularly world religions like Islam and Christianity. 
Just to advance venues for possible cross-fertilization of insights, we refer 
to the fact that the very idea of having two interrelated texts is not alien to the 
Islamic tradition. The prominent Muslim religious scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 
1328) spoke about a similar idea when he divided God’s words into two types, 
namely “religious words (kalimāt dīniyya)” and “universal words (kalimāt 
kawniyya)”. The former is communicated through revealed Books like the Bible 
and the Qurʾān, while the latter is communicated through the universe (Ibn 
Taymiyya n.d., 5/8-17). The idea of Ibn Taymiyya received commentaries from 
contemporary religious scholars. One can see its clear impact on the contem-
porary school of “Islamization of Knowledge”, especially their ideas about the 
two readings (al-qirāʾtān); reading the written Book, i.e., the Quran, and read-
ing the observable book, namely the universe (Malkāwī 1981, 43-57). Thus, our 
aspirations are for this chapter to stimulate researchers in the field of Islamic 
Studies in approaching the Genome Question through this lens.
The second chapter, “Creation, Kinds and Destiny: A Christian View of Ge-
nome Editing” by Trevor Stammers, presents a perspective on the Genome 
Question rooted in the Christian tradition. The reader will notice a number of 
common themes and parallels between this chapter and the second chapter 
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in Part II, written by Mehrunisha Suleman and Arzoo Ahmed, although each 
chapter addresses the Genome Question through the lens of a different reli-
gious tradition. This became already clear during the seminar, where the three 
authors benefited from sharing thoughts and critical remarks in improving the 
earlier drafts of these two chapters. A great deal of this chapter is dedicated to 
explaining the accounts of creation and Fall and related concepts like imago 
dei (image of God), sicut deus (like God), embodiment, dominion and co-cre-
ation. Stammers is keen to expose the internal diversity within Christianity on 
explaining these accounts and concepts. He does so by granting space for dif-
ferent opinions expressed by authoritative voices in Christianity like Irenaeus 
(130-202 AD), Augustine of Hippo (AD 354-430), and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (d. 
1945). He also shows how this diversity continued when contemporary Chris-
tian ethicists, like John Wyatt and Ronald Cole-Turner, tried to interpret these 
accounts and concepts within the context of genomics-related technologies 
and genomic/genetic engineering. The author also touches upon the question 
whether genomics could problematize the distinction used to be made by ethi-
cists between therapy and enhancement. Finally, the idea of perceiving the ge-
nome as the secular alternative to the religious soul is critically examined from 
a Christian perspective, with a focus on the question of telos or end purpose, 
which makes the Christian vision sometimes quite different from the secular 
vision. 
The third item in this part is a review essay in which Ayman Shabana pres-
ents the book Living with the Genome: Ethical and Social Aspects of Human Ge-
netics, edited by Angus Clark and Flo Ticehurst. The material included in the 
reviewed volume is based on selections from a voluminous work, namely the 
five-volume and three-million word Encyclopedia of the Human Genome. The 
forty-two chapters included in this volume were meant to provide a collection 
of concise and accessibly written articles on the social and ethical aspects of 
human genetics and genomics. Although published in 2006, Shabana argues 
that the book provides a useful introduction to the range of ethical, legal and 
social implications of genetics and genomics, most of which remain relevant 
today. Thus, this is an ideal book to make specialists, and those interested, in 
Islamic Bioethics aware of the types of ethical questions and modes of rea-
soning which can be interpreted in international, mainly Western, ethical 
deliberations. Shabana gives a concise overview of the six main parts of the 
volume, namely the Human Genome Project; Genetic Disease; Disability, Ge-
netics and Eugenics; Genetics and Society; Genetic Explanations; and Repro-
duction, Cloning and the Future. In conjunction with presenting the key issues 
discussed in each part, Shabana also suggests how these issues are (to be) ap-
proached from an Islamic bioethical perspective. In addition to the agreements 
between what is presented in the reviewed volume and the parallel discussions 
in Islamic Bioethics, Shabana highlights issues which may create potential ten-
sion between the mainstream (Western) bioethical discourse and the Islamic 
tradition, e.g. the emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy in the former 
against more inclination towards communitarian ethics in the latter. 
Part 4: Contributions in Arabic
The material included in the fourth and last part of this volume was subsumed 
together purely for linguistic considerations. The three chapters which com-
pose this part are all written in Arabic. From the very beginning when the 
pre-publication seminar was still a vague idea, we were keen to have contri-
butions in both English and Arabic; that is the reason why the Call-For-Papers 
and the Background Paper of the seminar were published in both English and 
Arabic. In order to facilitate the communication among the participants in 
the seminar, all papers were translated into English or Arabic and there was 
a simultaneous translation throughout the three days of the seminar. In our 
view, having contributions from different languages is much more than just 
linguistic diversity. Bilingual authors are well acquainted that writing in a 
specific language predominantly determines the content as well, e.g. which 
sources should be consulted, what kind of questions should be prioritized to 
address the concerns of the targeted audience, how these questions should 
be approached, … etc. Consequently, we hope that the inclusion of this part 
will be of added value, especially for those who are curious about the Arabic 
writings on Islamic Bioethics.6 In order to make this material accessible to the 
readers who do not master the Arabic language, an English translation of the 
material included in this chapter will be available afterwards on the CILE web-
site (www.cilecenter.org). 
The first chapter, by Saadia Bendenia (Saʿdiyya Bin Dunyā), “Al-Jīnūm wa al-
ṭabīʿa al-bashariyya: Muqāraba taḥlīliyya fī ḍawʾ al-falsafa wa al-ʿilm al-tajrībī 
wa al-akhlāq al-Islāmiyya” (Genome and Human Nature: Analytical Approach 
in the Light of Philosophy, Experimental Sciences and Islamic Ethics) 
addresses the interplay of human nature and genome. The author starts her 
study by recognizing the complexity and elusiveness of the human nature and 
6 It is to be noted that abovementioned CILE seminar included more Arabic contributions 
than those included in this chapter. Some of these contributions will compose a thematic 
issue in the Arabic journal Tabayyun (https://tabayyun.dohainstitute.org), to be published in 
2019. 
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thus proposes an interdisciplinary approach to understand (certain aspects of) 
this nature. She emphasizes that the breathtaking advancements in fields like 
genetics and genomics, despite their significance, cannot alone explain what 
human nature is and that insights from other fields must be consulted. In this 
chapter, Bendenia tries to enrich her multidimensional analysis of the human 
nature through insights from different disciplines, including philosophy, 
biology (especially genetics and genomics) and Islamic ethics. Concerning 
philosophy, the chapter provides an extensive overview of perspectives, which 
spans many centuries of thinking about what the human nature exactly is. 
References are made to well-known philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Jürgen 
Habermas and others. As for the biological perspectives on human nature, 
Bendenia makes reference to influential names like Darwin, Gregor Mendel, 
Francis Crick, James Watson and also to the Human Genome Project. She 
explains how the big discoveries about the biological nature of humans led to 
the prominence of genetic determinism which was also countered by social 
determinism. Another consequence of these discoveries is that they opened 
up the possibility of understanding human nature as well as (re)shaping and 
modifying it. The last section of the chapter is dedicated to exploring human 
nature through the lens of Islamic ethics. According to Bendenia, human nature, 
from an Islamic ethical perspective, is a mixture of material (mādda) and soul 
(rūḥ) and that striking a good balance between the needs of these two aspects 
is the ideal way to remain healthy, in both the biological and moral sense. 
That is why the author believes that none of the two polarizing positions, viz. 
genetic determinism and social determinism, could capture the true character 
of human nature, which is actually a mix. The author interprets some Quranic 
verses, e.g. 25:54, in a way to support this idea. Using technologies like genomic 
editing in order to facilitate moral enhancement seems to be welcomed by the 
author because, she argues, it will generally improve human nature. Similarly, 
improving the material aspect of the human nature by making people taller or 
stronger does not seem to be problematic for the author. She bases herself on 
historical reports in the Qurʾān speaking about earlier generations of humans 
whose physical make-up was much stronger and bigger than ours. Thus, the 
author argues, the physical capacities that humans have now do not represent 
a fixed part of the human nature, but an evolving and improvable one. 
The second chapter, by Abbas Ameir (ʿAbbās Amīr), is entitled “Suʾāl al-jinūm 
bayna al-khilqa wa al-akhlāq: Muqāraba dilāliyya maʿrifiyya fī akhlāqiyyāt ʿilm 
al-jīnūm min manẓūr Islāmī” (The Genome Question between physical make-
up and ethics: A Semantic and Epistemological Approach to Genomic Ethics 
from an Islamic Perspective). The chapter investigates the links between par-
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allel concepts like genotype and phenotype, and between khilqa, an Arabic 
word which means physical make-up, and akhlāq or khuluq, which means eth-
ics or morality. The overall content of the chapter indicates that the author 
here touches upon the famous nature vs. nurture controversy. The main thesis 
of this chapter is that there is as a strong link between khilqa or one’s physical, 
including molecular, structure and one’s khuluq or ethics as the link between 
the genotype and phenotype. This means that any intervention in someone’s 
molecular structure, e.g. through genomic editing, can have an impact on one’s 
moral character. For Ameir, this does not necessarily mean that all types of 
genetic intervention are ethically objectionable, but that they should always 
be approached very cautiously. He distinguishes between a fixed part in our 
humanness that should never be touched, and a changeable part that can al-
ways be improved through human intervention. As an illustration, he refers to 
the freedom of human individuals to make choices about their own lives and 
the diversity of people’s identities in life as components of the fixed part that 
should not be touched by the genomic editing or similar technologies. As a 
specialist in Quranic Studies, the author elaborates on this thesis throughout 
the chapter by depending heavily on references from the foundational Islamic 
Scripture, viz. the Qurʾān. He uses various hermeneutical and exegetical tools 
in interpreting about fifteen Quranic verses to show their possible relevance to 
the abovementioned thesis and associated ideas. 
In the third chapter “Al-Jīnūm wa al-ḥayāh: Tamdīd al-ḥayāh wa atharuh 
al-akhlāqī ʿalā al-mujtamaʿāt al-Islāmiyya” (Genome and Life: Extending Lifes-
pan and its Moral Impact on Muslim Societies), Amara Naceur (ʿAmāra al-
Nāṣir) is somehow elaborating on the thesis outlined by Abbas Ameir in the 
previous chapter, but by focusing on one concrete example, namely modifying 
the genome for the sake of extending life and how far this would impact the 
world of ethics. According to the author, the attempts to postpone ageing and 
to have an extended life in principle do not go against human nature (fiṭra), 
as created by God. He makes use of prophetic traditions and references in the 
Qurʾān including historical reports about persons with extremely long lives, 
like Prophet Nūḥ (Noah), to argue that such attempts do not fall outside the 
borders of normalcy and natural course of life. On the other hand, the author 
argues that modifying one’s genome for the sake of extending his/her lifespan 
poses complex ethical and philosophical questions related to our longstand-
ing understanding of what “life” itself means. The social structure that people 
have in life, the author explains, and the associated values built throughout 
centuries are all linked to the average or “normal” lifespan that people used 
to live. Extending these “normal” lifespans will eventually mean that both the 
social structure of life and the associated values cannot continue without rad-
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ical changes. Nāṣir makes use of the works of Western authors, like Francis 
Fukuyama, to show some of the concrete problems that can be created by ex-
tending the lifespan through biotechnological means, like the one described 
below. 
The social structure of our current life largely depends on age-graded hi-
erarchies, which usually assume a pyramidal structure. Besides artificial con-
straints such as fixing a (mandatory) retirement age, death remains one of the 
main factors which recede old generations from the pool of competitors for the 
top ranks in society. By extending the current lifespan to the extent that peo-
ple will be expected to live and work until the age of 90 or even later, various 
generations will simultaneously exist and compete. Within this scenario, the 
elderly who are already at the top of the social hierarchies will not easily make 
space for the younger generations but will usually use their considerable influ-
ence to protect their positions, despite the likely declines in physical and pro-
fessional capabilities because of age-related complications. This means that 
generational succession, which is a major stimulant of progress and change, 
will possibly be hindered. Eventually, we will have to think of other possible 
social structures, together with their fitting moral values (Fukuyama 2002, 76-
79). Again, this shows that modifying the genome is not only a biological issue 
but a moral one as well. 
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Sharia Scholars and Modern Biomedical 
Advancements: What Role for Religious Ethics in 
the Genomic Era?
Mohammed Ghaly1
Historical Context of Medical and Biomedical Breakthroughs: 
What Role Would Religion Have?2
By the beginning of the twentieth century, it became clear that the ramifica-
tions of the breathtaking biomedical advancements and associated technolo-
gies will not remain within the confines of scientific and clinical practices. The 
complex questions and challenges raised by these advancements and tech-
nologies also necessitated profound ethical considerations. Various religions 
and philosophies addressed these questions and challenges as part of their 
historical role in responding to peoples’ concerns and curiosities, in addition 
to demonstrating that they still hold influential roles in the age of modernity, 
with all its new challenges. By the middle of the twentieth century, the role 
of religious thought in the field of biomedical ethics in Western scholarship, 
particularly in the United States and Western Europe, started to wane. Fur-
thermore, several scholars who specialized in religion and theology in their 
academic studies brushed aside religious discourse and instead, adopted a sec-
1 Professor of Islam and Biomedical Ethics, Research Center for Islamic Legislation & Eth-
ics (CILE), College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar, mghaly@
hbku.edu.qa 
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ed at the 6th Annual International Conference of Social and Human Sciences, organized 
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ular one when they embarked on the field of biomedical ethics. In his study on 
the history of the relationship between religion and bioethics, Albert Jonsen 
(Professor of the History of Medical Ethics at the University of Washington) 
drew a comparison between what the Italian missionary Matteo Ricci did in 
1582 when he crossed the Western borders traveling to the then “forbidden em-
pire”, viz. China, and what a large number of theologians did 400 years later 
when they decided to specialize in the field of bioethics, in the sense that they 
“doffed the intellectual garb of religious ethics and donned, if not the white 
coats of doctors, the distinctly secular mentality of modern medicine” (Jonsen 
2006, 23). 
In this regard, secular discourse does not necessarily clash with religion in 
its essence: although, it excludes any central role it may play in the common 
area of ethics by distinguishing between two types of morality. On the one 
hand, there is the “common morality”, which is universal in nature and ori-
entation and through which the public at large can be addressed. This type of 
morality is developed and communicated by a secular ethical discourse. On 
the other hand however, there is the “particular morality”, which addresses 
specific groups of people. The ethical discourse which is premised in religious 
beliefs and religiously-tented terminologies falls within the category of partic-
ular morality (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013, 2-6). It should be emphasized 
here that religious bioethical discourse did not completely disappear from the 
field of bioethics in Western scholarship. For instance, various contributions 
coming from the three monotheistic religions, viz. Judaism, Christianity and 
Islam, could always find their way to the public in addition to specialized jour-
nals like The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly. However, these contribu-
tions remained confined to the scope of ethics as practiced by certain groups 
of people, such as Muslims living as a religious minority in the West or the 
Christian Jehovah’s Witnesses. This situation continued to make the impact of 
such contributions marginal and narrow in comparison with those inspired by 
secular thought.
Islamic discourse, particularly the discipline of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 
was not detached from these historical developments. It is true that the ma-
jority of the achievements in the field of biomedical sciences occurred outside 
the Muslim-majority world and in a social, political and cultural environment 
not familiar to many contemporary Muslim jurists. However, these jurists, to-
gether with all those who believed that Islam is a religion which remains rele-
vant for our contemporary world and not just an ancient religious tradition3, 
3 It seems that the concern of proving the contemporaneity of Islam as a religious tradition 
was not exclusive to Sharia scholars. Some Muslim physicians also attempted to tackle these 
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felt the necessity of addressing the questions and challenges triggered by the 
modern biomedical advancements. Unsurprisingly, there is a link between 
this belief and the ongoing debates at that time about the validity of Islam 
and its religious ethical system (Sharia) in guiding various aspects of modern 
life. The position of Sharia scholars and like-minded thinkers at this time was 
couched in the famous phrase “Sharia is valid for all times and places.”4 Clearly, 
these scholars felt the risk of the marginalization of Sharia in the emerging 
field of biomedical sciences, seen as it is one of the marvelous achievements of 
modernity. Hence, addressing these modern questions and challenges, which 
subsequently came to be known as the field of “Islamic Bioethics” became an 
integral part of the quest to prove the contemporaneity of Islam and its possi-
ble active and impactful role in the age of modernity.
Accommodating Contemporary Challenges: The Evolving Role of 
Physicians
Some early signs of Sharia scholars’ concerns that some may believe that 
Sharia and modern biomedical sciences would conflict, were expressed in 
shaykh Rashīd Riḍā’s fatwa (d. 1935). The fatwa was issued in response to a 
question about the perspectives of early Muslim jurists regarding the possible 
maximum duration of pregnancy, as outlined in classical fiqh manuals, and 
their incompatibility with modern facts established by credible sciences such 
as medicine and anatomy. The Tunisian questioner raised the point made by 
“Frankish doctors (al-aṭibbāʾ al-ifrinj)” working in his country regarding the im-
possibility of the continuation of pregnancy for such long periods that could 
extend into years, as claimed by early jurists. The questioner added: “They 
excused the position of Muslim scholars in this regard [by assaying] that the 
science of medicine did not disclose its secrets in past times the way it does 
in our present time”. In his response to this question, Riḍā premised his thesis 
issues, as exemplified by the book written by the famous Egyptian physician ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 
Ismāʿīl. The first edition of this book appeared in 1939, followed by two editions in 1954 and 
1959. The book’s preface was written by the then Shaykh of al-Azhar Muḥammad Muṣṭafā 
al-Marāghī (d. 1945). See, Ismāʿīl (1959).
4 The objective here is not to provide a thorough investigation of the debates about this thesis 
and the (counter-) arguments of each party, but just to highlight the fact that there was re-
lationship between these debates on one hand and the supposed role of Sharia in the to-be-
born field of Islamic bioethics. For further information about the literature which addressed 
this topic in general, see for example, Ḥusayn (1999), Tirmanīnī (1977), Qaraḍāwī (1993), 
Ibrāhīm (2004), Zakariyyā (1986), Jābirī (1996), and ʿAshmāwī 2004.
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that the contentions of early jurists cannot be accepted at face value on the 
idea that adopting these classical opinions would entail dismissing what “has 
been established by physicians of our time, who hail from all kinds of religions 
and creed, despite their vast knowledge of medicine, anatomy and physiology, 
and their reliance on their research and trials on instruments, sensors, probes, 
and the X-rays which pierce through the skin and flesh, making the body trans-
parent and exposing its interior to the naked eye, in addition to basing their 
knowledge on experimentation and induction, and their collaborative work, 
despite living in different countries, thanks to the ease in postal and telegraph-
ic communication”. At the end of the fatwa, Riḍā argued that upholding such 
outdated contentions and neglecting the achievements of modern science 
could eventually result in a wide range of harms including, the attempts of 
non-Muslims to “defame and discredit our Sharia based on science and ex-
perimentation, not on prejudice and fanaticism, which would eventually pre-
clude them from converting to our religion and prevent revealing its truth to 
those who do not know the origin of these claims within our tradition. This 
also entails spreading doubt among many Muslims about the truthfulness of 
our Sharia and its divine nature. I mean by ‘many’ all those who are learning 
medicine and are aware of, and satisfied with, the opinions adopted by today’s 
physician and scientists about the duration of pregnancy despite knowing that 
these [opinions] are incompatible with what they think as the established Sha-
ria, attested by the Qurʾān and the Sunna” (Riḍā, 1910).
It seems that advocating a discourse which accommodates modern bio-
medical sciences and thus demonstrates the contemporaneity of Sharia and 
its relevance to the modern age was not exclusive to those who had a reformist 
agenda of the so-called reformists. In fact, the advocates of such a discourse 
comprised a wide range of scholars coming from different backgrounds in-
cluding those who had conservative inclinations. Just as an illustrative exam-
ple, we refer to the fatwa issued by the prominent Najdi scholar, Shaykh ʿAbd 
al-Raḥmān al-Saʿdī (d. 1955) on human organ transplant, which was seen by 
him as a groundbreaking medical intervention at this time: “Many questions 
are raised these days about what recently happened in modern medicine re-
garding the removal of part of a human body and transplanting it into another 
person who direly needs it”. After presenting the views of the proponents and 
opponents on the adoption of this modern technological advancement, al-
Saʿdī expressed his support for the position of the proponents. He concluded 
his fatwa by emphasizing the benefits that accrue to the Islamic religion as a 
result of adopting this position. In this regard he said that “It is also to be noted 
that people should know that Islam does not stand as a barrier against genuine 
and preponderant benefits (maṣāliḥ). On the contrary, it adjusts to the times 
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and conditions by keeping track of the comprehensive and partial benefits and 
interests. Atheists delude ignorant people that Islam cannot keep up with the 
modern developments, and this is a calumny on their part, for the Islamic re-
ligion is the quintessence of absolute good in its comprehensive and partial 
facets. It provides solutions for each and every problem, specific or general, 
and all other systems are inherently fallible”.5
However, it was not easy for Sharia scholars to deal with such modern ques-
tions, since providing answers concerning biomedical matters requires under-
standing the precise nature of these questions and the relevant subject matters 
or, using jurisprudential language, “the correct perception” (taṣawwur ṣaḥīḥ) 
of the issue at hand, which plays a pivotal role in the process of “verifying of 
the effective rationale” (taḥqīq al-manāṭ). In this context, we come across ear-
ly and important references to the significant role of physicians assisting reli-
gious scholars in developing the right perception of modern medical issues. 
Because of their educational background which almost exclusively consisted 
of religious and Sharia-related sciences, contemporary Muslim jurists could 
not have direct access to the right perception of these modern biomedical ad-
vancements. In the abovementioned fatwa of Rashīd Riḍā on the maximum 
possible duration of pregnancy, the questioner himself was aware of this com-
plexity. He realized that the question was two-fold where juristic and medical 
aspects intersect with one another. He hinted that the medical aspects would 
be undertaken by the physician Muḥammad Tawfīq Ṣidqī, a cherished friend 
of Riḍā and one of the contributors to al-Manār journal (Riḍā 1910, 900). Al-
though Riḍā did not reveal whether he actually consulted Ṣidqī while drafting 
the fatwa, the published text suggests that part of the information comes from 
a physician rather than a jurist. In this context, it is also worth mentioning 
the contacts between Shaykh Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (d. 1945), the former Shaykh 
of al-Azhar, and they physician ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ismāʿīl whom Muḥammad Farīd 
Wajdī described as “A notable authority in medicine in the Orient, and his 
position today in this honorable field resembles that of Ibn Sīnā and Abū 
Bakr al-Rāzī during the golden Arab age of science.” (Ismāʿīl 1952, 8). Shaykh 
al-Marāghī wrote a preface to Ismāʿīl’s book Al-Islām wa al-ṭibb al-ḥadīth (Is-
lam and modern medicine) (Ismāʿīl 1952, 5-7). The book originally appeared 
in the form of articles published in Al-Balāgh Newspaper and subsequently 
in Al-Azhar Journal (Ismāʿīl 1952, 9). Al-Saʿdī also referred to this issue in his 
5 Saʿdī (2011, 95-100). Also, in his book on human organ transplant, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī reported 
and endorsed the full text of the fatwa, hailing its author as a “prominent Saudi scholar from 
Najd who conforms to the Ḥanbali jurisprudential doctrine, but who enjoys broad horizons 
and an innovative propensity in his interpretations and fatwas.” See Qaraḍāwī (2010, 61-67).
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aforementioned fatwa by saying “All issues occurring at all times, whether their 
overall genus or identical cases took place before, should be conceptualized 
in the first place, and if their essence has become known, their characteristics 
have been diagnosed and one has fully conceptualized them, in their essence, 
their premises and results, they should then be applied to scriptural texts and 
their overall fundamentals.” Moreover, al-Saʿdī explained that experts in med-
icine have a major role to play in the conceptualization process or developing 
the right perception, “Whenever the highly skilled physicians unanimously 
agree that the organ donor will not be subjected to harm, and we realized the 
interest gained by others from this, [organ transplantation] becomes a genuine 
and pure benefit.” (Saʿdī 2011, 95-97).
Such examples show that preserving Sharia’s role in the modern age of bio-
medical breakthroughs would not have been possible, at least from the per-
spective of contemporary jurists, without resorting to physicians whose exper-
tise fall outside the scope of Sharia specialists. It was also clear that modern 
medicine, whose religious and ethical ramifications occupied the minds of 
Sharia scholars, was not different from the medicine that their predecessors 
dealt with. Though having Greek roots, pre-modern medicine gradually be-
came an integral part of the Arabic-Islamic civilization. Thus, this old medicine 
was not unfamiliar to early jurists, at least at the level of the Arabic language 
which was its lingua Franca. Modern medicine, however, comprises an integral 
part of the Western civilization, and its scientific and technical aspects cannot 
be grasped without studying the output of Western academies and institutions 
which do not use Arabic as a research language.
With time, the need to rely on physicians becoming more and more de-
manding, for various reasons. For instance, one can refer to the rapid and 
complex evolution of biomedical sciences and the rise of a large number of 
techniques, which posed new ethical dilemmas, such as organ transplanta-
tion, resuscitation, Assisted Reproductive Techniques (IVF), stem cell research, 
gene therapy, etcetera. As described by some contemporary Muslim religious 
scholars, these techniques used to be part of supernatural miracles in the past 
(Qaraḍāwī 1996, 104). On the other hand, the modern educational system frag-
mented these sciences into various disciplines,6 and created multiple special-
6 It seems that the complaint about the presence of a rupture between science and various 
specializations was not confined to Sharia scholars in the Muslim world only. This issue was 
addressed by a number of Western intellectuals, philosophers and also physicians, who talk-
ed about the need for the interconnectivity of sciences and humanities, or of the “two cul-
tures”, as named by the English writer C.P. Snow in his famous lecture delivered in 1955, see 
Ten Have 2012.
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izations and subdivisions within each discipline to the extent that it became 
impossible for contemporary Sharia scholars to keep track of them, not to 
mention to grasp their new techniques and subtleties. The inaccessibility to 
this type of information for Muslim religious scholars has to do, among other 
things, with the fact that relevant information is usually available in English 
only or in other languages that these scholars do not master.7 These develop-
ments necessitated further expansion of the role played by physicians in these 
bioethical discussions so that they can provide religious scholars with the right 
perception. The increasing need for a more intensive and systematic integra-
tion of the contributions made by physicians in the process of religio-ethical 
reasoning (ijtihād) eventually led to activation of the mechanism of collective 
ijtihād in the field of Islamic Bioethics by the beginning of the 1980s. Through 
this mechanism, the collaboration between Sharia scholars and biomedical 
scientists will reach new heights later.8
The mechanism of the collective ijtihād was institutionalized through the 
establishment of a number of religio-scientific institutions, three of which are 
to be singled out here because of their seminal contribution to the discourse 
7 Under the title “Conditions of ijtihād,” Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī cited the requirement of “knowl-
edge of people and life,” stating that it is a new condition which was not mentioned by schol-
ars of the Islamic science of fundamentals in the past. He added that this is not a prerequisite 
for attaining the rank of ijtihād, but it should enable ijtihād to be accurate and appropriate. 
Speaking of this requirement, he said that the mujtahid should acquire as much as possible 
scientific knowledge, such as biology, physics, chemistry, mathematics, and other similar 
subjects, because they constitute the cultural foundation necessary for every contemporary 
person. He also praised the experience of al-Azhar which had introduced “these sciences in 
the curriculum a long time ago” (Qaradawi 1996, 104). In reality, the introduction of these 
sciences in al-Azhar’s curricula did not bring about the required integration and intercon-
nectivity, for the student who enrolled in the Faculty of Sharia or in other legal specializa-
tions should have spent his secondary school education in the literary studies section, where 
the list of required subjects excludes almost any subject related to modern medical scienc-
es. Rather, these subjects are studied by those who join the Scientific Section so that at the 
university the student has the right to specialize in medicine, engineering or other modern 
sciences. This is what we experienced as students at al-Azhar, be it at school or university 
level, in the 1980s and 1990s, which is the period during which this book was written and 
published.
8 Islamic history has witnessed interactions between Islamic jurists, especially those who as-
sumed positions in the judiciary, and those who were known back then as “experts” in differ-
ent areas of knowledge, including medicine. However, these interactions were only confined 
to individual cases and matters that were dealt with on a case-by-case basis, and this coop-
eration and interaction were not institutionalized the way they are nowadays in a number of 
jurisprudential institutions and academies. (See Shaham 2010, and Wiryāshī 2016).
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on Islamic Bioethics. The Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (Al-Mu-
naẓẓama al-Islāmiyya li-al-ʿUlūm al-Ṭibbiyya), which was established in Ku-
wait in 1984, is one of the most prominent institutions in this regard whose 
activities are exclusive to addressing bioethical issues from an Islamic perspec-
tive. The IOMS collaborates with two other institutions, namely the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy (Al-Majmaʿ al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī), founded in 1977 and operating 
under the umbrella of the Muslim World League in Mecca, as well as the Jed-
dah-based International Islamic Fiqh Academy (Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī al-
Dawlī) founded in 1981 and operating under the umbrella of the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation.
The thesis that Islamic Sharia is compatible with and still relevant to con-
temporary life and is also valid for all times and places, as mentioned earlier, 
lies at the heart of the work of these institutions, especially when they tackle 
such emerging bioethical issues. Explicit reference to the question of Sharia 
has been made in some of the resolutions adopted by these institutions, in-
cluding the resolution of the IIFA adopted during its fifth session held in Ku-
wait on 10-15 December, 1988. The introductory text of the resolution entitled 
Taṭbīq aḥkām al-Sharīʿa (The Implementation of the Rulings of the Islamic 
Sharia) reads as following: “Bearing in mind that the International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy, which emerged from the good will of the Third Islamic Conference 
Summit held in Mecca, in order to seek Sharia-based solutions to the problems 
of the Muslim nation and the organization of the lives of Muslims in confor-
mity with the guidelines of the Islamic Sharia, as well as the removal of all 
obstacles to the application of God’s Sharia and the establishment of all the 
necessary means for its implementation” (IIFA 1988, 3471).
Despite the widespread use of the mechanism of collective ijtihād since the 
1980s and its output, which is generally characterized by good quality, individ-
ual ijtihād continued to play a role in addressing these issues. Furthermore, 
through the papers and studies presented to the conferences organized by 
these fiqh academies and institutions, individual ijtihād represented the foun-
dation of the positions adopted collectively by these institutions. Some con-
temporary jurists also disseminated the resolutions and recommendations of 
these academies by incorporating them into their own writings, which some-
times included studies presented within the framework of collective ijtihād 
(Quradāghī and Muḥammadī 2006). However, these collective resolutions and 
recommendations, in spite of their importance and earnestness, remain with-
in the non-binding jurisprudential opinions which do not qualify for consen-
sus (ijmāʿ) according to the majority of scholars, though they are less prone 
to error in comparison with individual ijtihād. Therefore, the area of ijtihād 
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remains open even after the issuance of such resolutions (Sharafī 2013)9. There 
are some instances of individual ijtihād submitted to these academies which 
despite not finding their way to the collective resolution, become disseminat-
ed in the form of individual opinions which may find acceptance in other con-
texts.
For example, the opinion of Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on human milk banks was 
not endorsed when it was debated during the second session of the Interna-
tional Islamic Fiqh Academy in 1985. However, Qaraḍāwī published his opin-
ion on this matter as part of the collection of his own fatwas, which was sub-
sequently adopted by the European Council for Fatwa and Research during its 
twelfth session held in 2004 (Ghaly 2012). Finally, there are also some cases of 
individual ijtihād which go contrary to the resolutions and recommendations 
adopted by the collective ijtihād institutions, and even call for the review of the 
latter. For instance, the Jordanian religious scholar, ʿAbd al-Nāṣir Abū al-Baṣal 
expressed his critical comments on the resolution of the International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy on cloning (Abū al-Baṣal 2004, 16).
The Role of Sharia in the Era of Genomics10
The early years of the twenty-first century witnessed the completion of the 
famous “Human Genome Project,” with the United States playing an avant-gar-
de role in it, along with several other countries. With the completion of this 
project, for the first time in history, the contemporary man has become able 
to identify himself almost entirely at the genetic level. Besides the physical 
structure of the human being, his organs and tissues (phenotype), human ge-
netic structure (genotype) has been identified, and the latter constitutes the 
basis for the physical structure and how it functions. The human body contains 
9  For information on some critical opinions about collective ijtihād and its contributors, 
see Raysūnī 2013, 64-72. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī spoke in an idealistic manner, when advo-
cating a refined collective ijtihad to be undertaken by an international Islamic scholarly 
academy with specific qualifications. He also stated that the agreement of this academy 
on a given issue which necessitates ijtihād represents “the consensus of the mujtahids of 
the era, claiming its own authority and becoming binding in fatwa and legislation.” It is 
clear, however, that al-Qaraḍāwī does not mean just any of the established Islamic acade-
mies. See Qaraḍāwī 1996, 184.
10  Some call it the “era of genomics” given that the study of genomes has become of interest 
to researchers in various scientific specializations, while others opt for the term “post-ge-
nomic era” as the decoding of the genome actually paved the way for current research in 
the field of medical and biomedical sciences.
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nearly thirty-seven trillion cells, inside each of which—excluding red blood 
cells—lies DNA in the form of tightly wrapped and packed threads. Hypothet-
ically, if the DNA threads were unwrapped and stretched out, they would span 
the return distance between the earth and the sun by nearly 200 times. The ge-
nome is the complete set of DNA, where DNA represents the main structure of 
the genome. Such a simplified image helps present the extent of the achieve-
ment of decoding the human genome, which is the sum-total of the genetic 
composition and includes about 30,000 genes. It is to be noted that mutations 
in one single gene may cause 4,000 diseases (Collins 2006, 1-2; DePamphilis 
and Bell 2011, 20; Lewis 2014, 1-12).
Since its inception in the last decade of the twentieth century, the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) has drawn significant global attention, which increased 
after the completion of the project and the publication of its findings in lead-
ing scientific journals. This event was compared to other major achievements 
in the history of science, such as the exploration of space and the discovery of 
nuclear fission. The HGP has equally led to major changes in the philosophy of 
modern medicine and its technical applications, some of which have already 
been used, while others are still expected. The human DNA structure has gen-
erated significant interest among biomedical scientists and physicians, and it 
now plays a pivotal role in various aspects of healthcare, such as in determin-
ing the appropriate diets and lifestyles for each individual, and the predictabil-
ity of potential diseases even in the absence of physical symptoms. Because ge-
netic composition varies from one individual to another, the tendency now is 
to embrace “personalized medicine” or “precision medicine,” which stipulates 
that the incidence of a particular disease does not necessarily require prescrib-
ing the same type and dose of medication for all patients. Instead, these should 
be determined on the basis of the genetic makeup of each person. In addition, 
the information inscribed in the genome reveals the biological kinship of the 
genome bearer and his distant ancestors, which could extend to hundreds of 
years, and the connection to his (future) progeny. Accordingly, we often hear 
the phrase “book of life” in reference to the huge amount of information inher-
ent in the human genome, which does not only relate to health and sickness, 
but also to human life in general (Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz 2000). 
Once again, the debate about the role of Sharia in dealing with these new 
scientific developments resurfaced. This time, however, the historical context 
of the twenty-first century differed from the one that prevailed in the debate 
about Sharia and modern medicine by the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. With the development of communication technologies, global distances 
shrunk, knowledge of scientific ventures, like the (HGP), became much more 
accessible, even in early stages. On the other hand, the mechanism of collec-
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tive ijtihād which brings together Muslim religious scholars and biomedical 
scientists became institutionalized by the beginning of the 1980s. The above-
mentioned difficulties created by the type of education received by contempo-
rary religious scholars, however, have not changed. There are even indications 
that these difficulties have been exacerbated, particularly with respect to the 
human genome. This is explicitly stated by Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bār, one of the 
physicians known for their regular participation in, and influential contribu-
tion to, the collective ijtihād discussions on bioethical issues. He explained 
these difficulties in his comments on the discussions that took place during 
the Symposium held by the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (IOMS) 
held in 1998, which will be outlined below.11 Thus, these developments in the 
genomic era have magnified the role of biomedical sciences and strengthened 
the need of religious scholars for biomedical scientists to explore and demon-
strate the role of Sharia in this new era.
In 1993, just a few years after the official declaration of the start of the Hu-
man Genome Project, discussions took off in the Muslim world. The Faculty 
of Science at the University of Qatar, in cooperation with the Islamic Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) and the World Islamic 
Call Society, organized a symposium under the title “Ethical Implications of 
Modern Researches in Genetics,” which brought together religious scholars 
and biomedical scientists. The symposium was held on February 13-15, 1993, 
and issued twelve recommendations, the fifth of which was on the Human Ge-
nome Project, describing it as “the largest scientific project in the history of hu-
manity.” (Īsiskū 1993, 360). These issues were also addressed by the conference 
on “Genetic Engineering between Shariah and Law”, convened by the Faculty 
of Sharia and Law at the United Arab Emirates University on May 5-7, 2002. 
The first session of the conference was devoted to the theme “Human Genome: 
Its Essence and Future.” The second edition was held on November 20-22, 2007 
and revolved around the Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya) for 
11  Al-Bār cites the book The Ethics of the Human Genome, in which the author Hānī Rizq re-
veals that he spent one hour explaining to jurists at this symposium the scientific aspects 
of the genome, but the jurists did not understand his jargon and asked for an interpre-
tation of what he said, “because we did not understand anything at all.” Al-Bār adds that 
although other specialists, including the late Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt and Al-Bār himself, tried to 
explain these scientific aspects more than once throughout the symposium, some of the 
participating jurists did not fully grasp them. (Tawṣiyyāt 1998, 1112). It is worth mentioning 
that the published proceedings of this symposium do not include Hānī Rizq’s paper, but 
he did present the papers written by Ṣāliḥ ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Karīm and Muḥammad al-Yashu-
wī, because neither author could attend the symposium. (al-ʿAwaḍī and al-Jundī 2000, 
5-10, 103, 107, 133).
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genomic research and genetic testing. Also, the Dubai-based Pan Arab Human 
Genetics Conference is periodically organized by the Center for Arab Genomic 
Studies. Moreover, in collaboration with other institutions based in Qatar, the 
Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) organized two activ-
ities, which focused on genomics and Islamic ethics. On October 2, 2014, a pub-
lic symposium entitled “Islamic Ethics in the Era of Genomics” was organized 
in collaboration with the Supreme Council of Health in Qatar. Furthermore, in 
its session held in 2015, the World Innovation Summit for Health collaborated 
with CILE to organize a symposium on “Healthcare and Ethics: Genomics”. A 
number of Sharia scholars and biomedical scientists from Qatar and abroad 
participated in these two symposia.12
As for the contributions of the abovementioned three key institutions, 
which adopted the mechanism of collective ijtihād in its institutional form, 
the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (IOMS) hosted a symposium 
on “Genetics, Genetic Engineering, Human Genome and Gene Therapy: An 
Islamic Perspective” on October 13-15, 1998 (ʿAwaḍī and Jundī 2000). The final 
recommendations of this symposium still represent an authoritative source 
for most of the subsequent debates between religious scholars and biomedical 
scientists. In its eleventh session held on November 14-19, 1998, the Interna-
tional Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) discussed the recommendations of this 
symposium, but the relevant resolution was deferred to a future session. The 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) also held its sixteenth session on January 5-10, 
2002, which debated several issues, including the potential areas for the use of 
genetic fingerprinting, and issued a number of resolutions. The seventh reso-
lution refers in passing to the human genome, emphasizing that it should not 
be commodified: “The human genome may not be sold to a race, to a people, 
or to an individual, for whatever purpose, and it may not be donated to any 
party, given the unethical consequences that result from these types of trans-
actions.” (IFA 2002, 360).13 Furthermore, the IOMS organized a symposium on 
February 6-9, 2006 entitled “Human Genetic and Reproductive Technologies: 
Comparing Religions and Secular Perspectives,” whose recommendations in-
cluded a section entitled “Declaration of Principles,” citing ad verbatim seg-
ments from the recommendations adopted during the IOMS symposium held 
12  In 2015, the Center was awarded a prestigious grant from the Qatar National Research 
Fund to undertake the scientific research project “Indigenizing Genomics in the Gulf Re-
gion (IGGR): The Missing Islamic Bioethical Discourse,” which was officially launched by 
the beginning of September 2016 and would run for a period of three years.
13  Proceedings of the Sixteenth Session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy in Makkah (Makkah: The 
Islamic Fiqh Academy/The Muslim World League, 2002), p. 360.
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in 1998. Apparently, the aim here was to garner support for those principles 
from religious and secular voices coming from outside the Islamic discourse. 
(al-ʿAwaḍī and al-Jundī 2008, 1173-1175). Several years later, during its twentieth 
session held on September 13-18, 2012, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(IIFA) discussed anew the recommendations of the IOMS symposium held in 
1998. Once again, the resolution was deferred to a future session, yet, the par-
ticipants recommended the organization of a specialized symposium to dis-
cuss these recommendations. This symposium was held in Jeddah on February 
23-25, 2013 and was jointly organized by the IIFA and IOMS. Finally, during 
its twenty-first session held on November 18-22, 2013, the IIFA approved the 
resolution of the IOMS recommendations, which had been made fifteen years 
before, with some modifications.14 The table below provides an outline of the 
most important symposia and conferences which adopted the mechanism of 
collective ijtihād to address the ethical issues related to genomics and associ-
ated technologies.
14  The resolution of the Academy’s is entitled “Resolution on Genetics, Genetic Engineering 
and the Human Genome” http://www.iifa-aifi.org/2416.html (Retrieved August 4, 2017).
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Chronology of Collective Ijtihād Debates on Genomics (1993-2015)
Symposium/Conference Venue Date Organizer
Ethical Implications of Modern 
Researches in Genetics
Doha, Qatar February 13-
15, 1993
The Islamic Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization/World 
Islamic Call Society/Faculty of Science, 
University of Qatar 
Genetics, Genetic Engineering, 
Human Genome and 




The Islamic Organization for Medical 
Sciences




The International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy




The Islamic Fiqh Academy
Genetic Engineering between 
Shariah and Law
Al Ain, United 
Arab Emirates
May 5-7, 2002 Faculty of Sharia and Law, United Arab 
Emirates University
Human Genetic and 
Reproductive Technologies: 
Comparing Religions and 
Secular Perspectives
Cairo, Egypt February 6-9, 
2006
The Islamic Organization for Medical 
Sciences
The Ethical Perspectives of 
Human Genetic Applications 





Center for Arab Genomic Studies
20th Session Oran, Algeria September 
13-18, 2012
The International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy
Genetics, Genetic Engineering 





The International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy/ The Islamic Organization for 
Medical Sciences




The International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy
Islamic Ethics in the Era of 
Genomics
Doha, Qatar October 2, 
2014
Research Center for Islamic Legislation 
and Ethics/ Supreme Council of 
Health, Qatar
Healthcare and Ethics: 
Genomics
Doha, Qatar February 17, 
2015
World Innovation Summit for Health/ 
Research Center for Islamic Legislation 
and Ethics
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It is worth noting here that approaching ethical issues from an Islamic per-
spective has not been limited to the institutionalized activities which adopted 
the mechanism of collective ijtihād. Some Muslim jurists have provided their 
own individual ijtihād, as reflected for instance in the writings of Nūr al-Dīn 
al-Khādimī, a Sharia scholar who participated in the collective ijtihād activities 
referred to previously, e.g. the conference organized by the Faculty of Sharia 
and Law in 2007 and the symposium organized by the Center for Arab Genom-
ic Studies in 2007, both held in the United Arab Emirates. Besides these par-
ticipations, in his capacity as a religious scholar, Al-Khādimī, published some 
works that convey his individual ijtihād (Khādimī 2003 and 2004). There is also 
the work of the late Muḥammad Raʾfat ʿUthmān (d. 2016), who participated 
in the conference organized by the Faculty of Sharia and Law in the UAE in 
2002. Additionally, several research studies which address some of the issues 
related to genomics and its applications have been published, even though, to 
my knowledge, their authors did not participate in the discussions of collective 
ijtihād referred to earlier. Such studies, however, remain limited in quantity 
(Kanʿān 2003; Idrīs 2003; Āl Shāfiʿ 2007; Yashū 2015-2016; ʿUbaydī 2017).
The Role of Sharia in the Genomic Era: Three Main Characteristics
In the perception of many Muslim religious scholars and biomedical scientists, 
the Human Genome Project represents an important historical landmark in 
the development of modern science. They argued that it has provided humans 
with an amazing power to know themselves, especially at the molecular level, 
in an unprecedentedly precise and profound way. It is also, to manage diseas-
es which used to be seen as incurable, and even to improve human physical 
and mental capacities. Considering the perception of religious scholars and 
biomedical scientists who participated in the deliberations on genomics and 
Islamic ethics, one can argue that the role of Sharia in the genomic era is char-
acterized by three main points:
The first point involves demonstrating the contemporaneity of Sharia. This 
issue remained a recurrent point in any discussion about the role of Sharia in 
the discussions on genomics. The old emphasis on the ability of Sharia to deal 
with emerging issues of any kind is repeated while stressing that genomic tech-
nologies make no exception in this regard. In line with the aforementioned 
statements of Rashīd Riḍā and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saʿdī, Ḥasan Yashū (College 
of Sharia and Islamic Studies at Qatar University) in the introduction to his 
research on genomics, sums up the mainstream position on genomics among 
contemporary Muslim jurists: “Since Sharia is characterized by its transcen-
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dental and everlasting nature, it has managed through its general texts, gov-
erning principles and consistent rules, as well as by enabling flexible ijtihād, to 
keep abreast of all the developments and to contribute profusely to the solu-
tion of various problems, especially those related to contemporary medicine” 
(Yashū 2015-2016, 18).
The second point which characterized the role of Sharia in the genomic era is 
the adoption of a position that goes beyond what Riḍā, al-Saʿdī and their col-
leagues in the twentieth century were trying to defend. Riḍā and his like-mind-
ed religious scholars were arguing that there is no contradiction between 
Sharia and modern science. However, the participants in the discussions of 
genomics and ethics, be it at the level of collective or individual ijtihād, were 
not just concerned about the (im)permissibility of conducting genomic re-
search, but mainly about how Muslims (should) contribute to this emerging 
field. For instance, the aforementioned symposium organized by the Faculty of 
Science at the University of Qatar stated “At a time when concerted efforts are 
being deployed by many countries to achieve the largest scientific project in 
the history of mankind, i.e. the comprehensive study of the complete genetic 
information of the entire human race and its genetic makeup known as the 
Human Genome Project, Muslims should not remain mere spectators who do 
not contribute to the study of the biological heritage of mankind and to the 
study of man’s future. Therefore, the participants at the meeting call upon the 
Islamic countries that are capable of providing strong financial support com-
mensurate with the magnitude of the project to share in this earnest human 
project so that we can benefit from its significant outcomes” (Īsiskū 1993, 360-
361). In later discussions, involvement in genomic research was seen as an act 
of collective duty (farḍ kifāya) as advocated in the final communiqué of the 
IOMS symposium held in 1998: “Given that genomic sequencing is the means 
to identify some genetic diseases or the susceptibility to them, it is therefore 
of added value to health studies and medical sciences in their endeavor to pre-
vent or cure diseases. This makes it fall within the category of collective duties 
in society.” (Awaḍī and Jundī 2000, 2, 1047-1048). The communiqué also invited 
the Islamic countries to embrace the field of genetic engineering by establish-
ing research centers in this area, whose raison d’être should be in conformity 
with Sharia. The same position was adopted again by the International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy in its session held in 2013, where Muslim countries were called 
to join the genomic revolution.15 This drive to encourage Muslim countries to 
participate in genomic research was perhaps among the factors that paved the 
15  See http://www.iifa-aifi.org/2416.html
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way for launching national genomic projects with huge financial allocations in 
a number of countries led by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The projects of these two 
countries were publicly announced by the end of 2013.16
The third point is the concern that genomic research and its associated 
technologies can result in devastating consequences especially if control is 
lost. Almost all religious scholars and biomedical scientists who contributed 
to the discussions on the interplay of genomics and Islamic ethics shared this 
concern, despite their differences on many other questions. They agreed that 
developing Shari-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya) is indispensable to 
make sure that genomic research and its applications will not end up deviating 
from the principles, ethics and provisions of Sharia. It is to be noted here that 
fear of ethical slippage in genomic research is not exclusive to Muslim jurists. 
This fear has to do with the enormous potential of genomics, which also raised 
concern among those in charge of the Human Genome Project (HGP) since 
its inception, starting from the renowned scientist and Nobel Prize laureate 
James Watson, who oversaw the management of the project in its early phases. 
Given these concerns, part of the budget of the HGP was allocated to the study 
of the ethical aspects of the project in the framework of the Ethical, Legal and 
Social Implications (ELSI) program. The ELSI program started concurrently 
with the scientific research in the project. This was contrary to the standard 
course of action in the field of biomedical ethics, where ethical issues are usu-
ally addressed after the scientific research has already taken great strides and 
the ethical dilemmas and challenges would emerge thereafter. In the case of 
genomics, however, it was clear from the onset that these dilemmas and chal-
lenges are inevitable (Green and Collins 2015). Strikingly enough, the word “re-
ligion” did not appear in this work and religious discourse was marginalized in 
the research output. In the program evaluation report, which assessed the first 
ten years of the ELSI work, this point was mentioned as part of the criticism 
directed to it (ELSI Research Planning and Evaluation Group 2000). This crit-
icism caused people responsible for ELSI to become increasingly aware of the 
need to consider ethics-based research studies from a religious perspective. 
This type of research, nevertheless, remained marginal in comparison with the 
literature which approaches the ethical issues from a secular perspective. Un-
doubtedly, the marginalized position of religious discourse in this program, 
16  For further elaboration on projects concerning genomic research in the Gulf region, espe-
cially in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, see the report published in the proceedings of the World 
Innovation Summit for Health (WISH) held in Doha on November 29-30, 2016. See also 
Ghaly et al. (2016), 7-15. 
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reflects the marginalized status of religious discourse in general in the field of 
biomedical ethics in the West, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. 
Against this background, it was natural for the participants in the ethical 
deliberations in the Muslim world to have concerns about the relationship be-
tween genomics and religion and to feel the need to emphasize that genomic 
research should be conducted in conformity with religious principles and par-
ticularly the provisions of Sharia. Signs of this apprehensive concern were re-
flected in the frequent and recurrent reference to Sharia in the communiqués 
and recommendations of the aforementioned symposia and conferences. Just 
as illustrative examples, few quotations are given below from the final commu-
niqué of the symposium organized by the IOMS in 1998 and the recommen-
dations of IIFA in 2013. These two documents represent the essence of what 
collective ijtihād produced about genomics:
But the findings of this research should not automatically move to the 
level of practical applications before they go through the filter of Sha-
ria-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya). Whatever proved to be com-
patible with Sharia should be approved, and whatever is incompatible 
should not be permitted
No research shall be undertaken or treatment or diagnosis carried out 
in connection with a person’s gene or genome unless a rigorous assess-
ment is undertaken beforehand to gauge the potential risks and benefits 
associated with these activities, ensuring in the process adherence to the 
provisions of Sharia
No research in the human genome or any of its applications, particularly 
in the fields of biology, genetics and medicine, should prevail over the 
provisions of Sharia
Islamic countries should engage in the world of genetic engineering by 
establishing the relevant research centers whose raison d’être should be 
in conformity with the Sharia17
The genome shall not be used in a harmful way or in any form which is 
contrary to Sharia
17  Abdul Rahman al-Awadhi and Ahmed Rajai al-Jundi (eds.), Genetics, Genetic Engineering, 
Human Genome and Genetic Therapy: An Islamic Perspective, Part II, pp. 1045-1052.
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Underscoring the Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ guidelines related 
to the human genome, as outlined in the recommendations of the sym-
posium on Genetics, Genetic Engineering, Human Genome and Gene 
Therapy: An Islamic Perspective, organized by the Islamic Organization 
for Medical Sciences in cooperation with the International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy in 1998
No clinical research (clinical trials) on the human genome or any of its 
applications shall be conducted, particularly in the areas of biology, ge-
netics and medicine, as long as it violates the provisions of Sharia or the 
human rights which is recognized by Islam (ʿAwaḍī and Jundī 2000, 2, 
1045-1052).
The aforementioned three points, especially the third one, represent seri-
ous challenges to demarcate a role for Sharia in the age of genomics, to both 
Muslim religious scholars and biomedical scientists. To the same extent that 
genomic techniques determine the priorities and aspirations of medical and 
biomedical sciences in the near future, the ethical issues resulting from these 
techniques will likewise determine the research agendas of biomedical ethics 
in general. The bulk of the ethical questions posed by modern techniques, such 
as Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ARTs), artificial insemination, and ge-
netic engineering, fall within the purview of the major questions raised by the 
field of genomics. Yet, the genomic context usually adds new dimensions and 
complexities to these questions. As far as the third point is concerned, a couple 
of studies tried to spell out the Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya) 
tailored for specific issues with relevance to genomics like medical treatment, 
DNA paternity, privacy and abortion (Kanʿān 2003; Khādimī 2004; Yashū 2015-
2016; ʿUbaydī 2017). These studies filled certain gaps because the abovemen-
tioned expressions regarding the necessity of taking Sharia provisions seri-
ously remain too general and in need of more detailed studies. This problem 
was highlighted by a number of Sharia scholars who argued that genomics is 
too complex to be governed by general and sweeping rules and standards. Al-
Khādimī’s statement below is an illustrative example:
The human genome is not just one thing so that it can be governed by 
these Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya) in a homogenous 
way. Rather, it is a renewed phenomenon with its own scientific identity, 
characteristics, uses, outcomes, overlaps and ramifications. It also moves 
from one stage to another, thus increasing in complexity, fragmentation, 
and is multifaceted. Additionally, it is a sensitive and thorny phenome-
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non as far as it relates to human dignity and sanctity, the edifice of ethics 
and values, as well as the security of peoples, countries and individuals. 
It is first and foremost premised on certain backgrounds and intersects 
with specific motivations and purposes, where not only the scientific and 
commercial aspects overlap. But, possibly also, the doctrinal, intellectual, 
political, cultural and religious aspects (Khādimī 2007).
In their bid to explore the role of Sharia in addressing the ethical issues raised 
by genomics, the published proceedings of the abovementioned conferences 
and symposia and the works written by individual religious scholars have al-
most exclusively focused on the discipline of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). The 
emphasis was on highlighting specific Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ 
Sharʿiyya) or juristic rulings (aḥkām fiqhiyya) which are supposed to govern 
specific genomics-related techniques and applications. These works depended 
heavily on the discipline of fiqh and employed the system of “five rulings” (al-
aḥkām al-khamsa)18 because like most pioneer studies, they were concerned 
with providing practical and direct answers for urgent questions. However, 
maintaining the role of Sharia amid the complex and multidimensional na-
ture of the ethical questions raised by the field of genomics requires a broader 
and more comprehensive ethical discourse than the widely used one today, 
which has almost exclusively been employing the tools of fiqh. Below, the final 
section of this chapter will review the strengths of the fiqh-centered bioethical 
discourse and how its weaknesses can be improved in the future.
Concluding and Critical Remarks
This chapter surveys the deliberations, which started as early as the beginning 
of the twentieth-century, regarding the role of Sharia in addressing the ethical 
issues raised by modern biomedical sciences, including genetics and genom-
ics. These deliberations, characterized by their almost exclusive dependence 
on the discipline of fiqh, have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
With respect to the strengths, the ijtihād practiced by individual Muslims 
religious scholars, and later collectively in collaboration with biomedical sci-
entists, in the area of biomedical ethics, significantly contributed to preserving 
a role for Sharia in this domain. This was different from the parallel develop-
ments in the Western bioethical discourse where the role of religion was in-
18  For more information about this system used for the categorization of human actions, see 
Ghaly 2016, 39-40. 
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creasingly marginalized. The most important writings and published works, 
in terms of quantity, quality,19 and impact in the public space20 in the Muslim 
world and for Muslims in general, are still based on Sharia as a source of refer-
ence. Also, contemporary Sharia scholars are still the most active contributors 
to these discussions within the Muslim world context. Their views and fatwas 
continue to be considered important references for many of the institutions 
operating in the field of healthcare in the Muslim world. The limited space 
here is not sufficient to provide all the instances which illustrate this aspect, 
but some illustrative examples can be mentioned. At the level of individual 
Muslims, the fatwas issued by some contemporary Sharia scholars testify to 
the existence of interaction between them and the general public, including 
medical doctors. For instance, ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Ṣiddīq al-Ghumārī (d. 1992), 
the Moroccan jurist and Ḥadīth scholar, responded to the questions raised by 
students in the Alexandria Faculty of Medicine. His answers were later pub-
lished more than once (Ibn al-Ṣiddīq n.d.; idem n.d.). Also, Shaykh Jād al-Ḥaqq 
ʿAlī Jād al-Ḥaqq (d. 1996), the former Shaykh of al-Azhar, answered a number 
of questions raised by female students in the Faculty of Medicine at al-Azhar 
University, along with some medical explanations prepared by some Faculty 
of Medicine professors (Jādd al-Ḥaqq 2005). Likewise, a number of fatwas on 
medical matters were issued by Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz (d. 1999) during 
his meetings with the staff at al-Nūr Hospital in Mecca (Ibn Bāz 1999). The 
final example here is Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī’s published fatwas, where a separate 
section was dedicated to bioethical issues in the second and third volumes 
(Qaraḍāwī 1994, vol. 2, 525-619; Qaraḍāwī 2003, vol. 3, 513-534). 
At the institutional level, various questions have been addressed to Sharia 
scholars by Ministries of Health and other governmental and non-governmen-
tal entities, some of which are from outside the Muslim world.21 In response 
19  The databases which catalogue research studies on biomedical ethics in the Muslim 
world are a witness to this fact. An example of these is the database “Islamic Medical and 
Scientific Ethics,” which is affiliated with one of the most important scientific research 
institutions in the field of biomedical ethics in the world, namely The Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics at Georgetown University.
20  This this applies to what happens within the Muslim world, such as the codification of 
laws that govern techniques like organ transplantation and the practices of in vitro fertil-
ization clinics. Additionally, this holds also true for the ongoing deliberations at interna-
tional forums, such as the United Nations where, for example, the fatwa issued by Aḥmad 
al-Ṭayyib, the mufti of Egypt at the time, was cited in the UN discussion on cloning. (Eich 
2006, 300-301, 305).
21  In a personal interview held in Europe several years ago, Aḥmad Rajāʾī al-Jundī (Assistant 
Secretary-General Assistant of the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences) told me 
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to these questions, Muslim religious scholars issued fatwas, some of which are 
now published and widely circulated. Just as examples, we refer to the fatwa 
of Shaykh Ḥasan Maʾmūn (d. 1973), in response to a question from the Egyp-
tian Al-Nūr and Amal Association, on the permissibility of donating the eye 
of a deceased person, and the fatwa of Shaykh Muḥammad Khāṭir (d. 2004), 
in response to a question from the Office of the Legal Advisor to the Egyp-
tian Minister of Health, on the use of skin from a deceased person to treat the 
burned skin of the living (al-Bār 1992, 327-331). The same Ministry sent anoth-
er question to the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ about the possibility of establishing a 
human milk bank (Jundī 1983, 458). Also, the set of fatwas issued by Shaykh 
al-Qaraḍāwī’s on organ transplantation were originally responses to a list of 
questions from the Organization of Islamic Medicine in South Africa and the 
Department of Islamic Medicine at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, 
which were compiled together and published by the Kuwait Transplant Soci-
ety (Qaraḍāwī 2010 and 1996). There are also two examples from the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, the first being the fatwa issued by the Saudi Council of Senior 
Religious Scholars (Hayʾat Kibār al-ʿUlamāʾ) in response to a question from the 
Head of the Pediatrics Department, Faculty of Medicine in Abha on the “pro-
cedures of cardiopulmonary resuscitation in some futile instances.” The text of 
this fatwa was published on the website of the General Presidency of Scholarly 
Research and Ifta (www.alifta.net). The second example is the fatwa issued by 
the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Issuing Fatwas (Al-Lajna 
al-Dāʾima li al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa al-Iftāʾ) in response to a question posed by 
the vice-chairman of the North West Armed Forces Hospital on the use of the 
defibrillator. The text of this fatwa was published on the abovementioned web-
site as well. The hospital drafted its policies in alignment with the purport of 
the fatwa.22 This fatwa also became well-known among researchers who wrote 
on this subject in journals published in English, referring to it as Fatwa No. 
12086 (Ayed and Rahmo 2014; Chamsi-Pasha and Albar 2017). Another relevant 
example comes from the United Arab Emirates, where a fatwa was issued in 
response to a question which had been occupying the minds of those working 
in the healthcare sector about the (in)compatibility of the “Good Samaritan” 
that the former US President Bill Clinton had sent a letter to the Organization asking for 
the opinion of Islam on the issue of cloning in the wake of the cloning of Dolly. He also 
informed me that he kept the original copy of Clinton’s letter at the Organization’s head-
quarters in Kuwait. There is also the fatwa issued by the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council 
in the United Kingdom in 1995 on organ donation, in response to a question addressed 
raised by the British Department of Health (Ghaly 2012a).
22  See http://afhsr.med.sa/cqi_web/docs/Standards/LD/Samples/40.09%20LD%20%20
DNRC.pdf (Retrieved August 15, 2017).
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principle with Islamic Sharia. This is about individuals who volunteer to save 
people whose lives are in danger but do not want to be held legally account-
able in case the rescue endeavor fails. The questioner also wondered whether 
differences in gender and religious affiliation would also matter in this case.23
The deliberations on genomics do not represent an exception to the above-
sketched landscape. The aforementioned symposium organized by the Fac-
ulty of Science at the University of Qatar in 1993 adopted a position which 
was also held later by many who participated in the individual and collective 
discussions on genomics. The advocates of this position strongly called upon 
Muslims to contribute to this emerging scientific field. This contribution was 
presented as a collective duty (farḍ kifāya), which is incumbent on Muslims 
in the present era. Undoubtedly, such a positive position should have had an 
impact on some Muslim countries which launched national genome projects, 
such as Qatar and its Qatar Genome Program (QGP) and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia which established its own Human Genome Project. Both projects were 
launched at the end of 2013. Qatar Biobank, which has been playing a key role 
in establishing and managing the QGP, paid attention from the beginning to 
the significance of addressing relevant ethical questions from the Sharia per-
spective. To do so, the Qatar Biobank convened an international symposium, 
which was attended by a number of Sharia scholars. In its pamphlet designed 
to familiarize the public with the activities of the biobank, a separate section 
was dedicated to the interplay of Sharia and the activities of the biobank. In 
this pamphlet, the biobank stressed its adherence to the “Islamic Code of Med-
ical Ethics,” also known as the “Kuwait Document,” which was originally issued 
by the World Organization for Islamic Medicine that later became known as 
the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (IOMS). In the same pamphlet, 
the Qatar Biobank spoke about collaboration with the Research Center for Is-
lamic Legislation and Ethics at Qatar Foundation (Qatar Biobank 2014, 12-13). 
Additionally, the biobank approached some professors in the College of Sharia 
and Islamic Studies at Qatar University to seek their opinion about the permis-
sibility of using blood, urine or saliva samples for scientific research purposes, 
also after the death of the sample donor.
The abovementioned examples demonstrate that the efforts of Muslim reli-
gious scholars, often in collaboration with biomedical scientists, could demon-
23  See https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/good-samaritan-principles-in-the-uae-le-
gal-liabilities-when-administering-f (Retrieved August 16, 2017). I would like to extend 
here my thanks to my colleague Jothi Ravindran (Legal Adviser to the Sidra Medical and 
Research Center in Qatar), who drew my attention to this fatwa when she herself was 
seeking a fatwa from Sharia scholars in Qatar on the same subject.
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strate the relevance of Sharia to the bioethical deliberations and the ability to 
provide answers for the questions raised by individuals and institutions. How-
ever, keeping Sharia at the heart of bioethical discourse in the era of genomics 
will face challenges ahead. Below, two main important points will be highlight-
ed to explore how certain weaknesses in the contemporary Islamic bioethical 
discourse can be improved. The first point is the need to revise the concept of 
Sharia itself and its scope. The second point concerns the pool of participants 
in the deliberations which theorize the presumed role of Sharia in the field of 
bioethics.
With respect to the challenge at the conceptual level, the term “Sharia” is one 
of the most frequently used words when discussing Islam, either negatively or 
positively, in the modern era. This holds especially true for fields like biomedi-
cal and financial ethics. Despite the frequent use of this term, rarely do we find 
researchers or scholars who discuss how the term Sharia should be defined or 
how its scope should be determined.24 However, examining available literature 
on biomedical ethics from an Islamic perspective, whether within the context 
of individual or collective ijtihād, shows that Sharia is almost exclusively seen 
through the lens of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). In other words, Sharia is per-
ceived as a set of practical provisions to be extracted directly from the Qurʾān 
and Sunna or premised on the works of previous jurists throughout the history 
of Islam. There is no question that the juristic dimension plays a pivotal role in 
delineating the role of Sharia and it should not be marginalized or dispensed 
with. However, many of the ethical issues which arise in the genomic era do 
not fall within the traditional scope of the discipline of fiqh. The question of 
the genome is much more profound and complex than being merely a matter 
of issuing partial ethical judgements about the use of a specific form of tech-
nology in a particular context. The results of genomic research and its current 
and future applications raise major questions about how to (re)consider some 
central concepts which shaped the Islamic ethical discourse throughout his-
tory. Such as, legal capacity (taklīf), human agency, acquisition of acts (kasb), 
determinism and free will in the light of what genomics revealed about the 
role of genes in determining some aspects of our structure, tendencies, and be-
24  Some of the important exceptions in this regard include the statement made by al-
Khādimī in one of his research studies about Sharia guidelines for genomic research. He 
said that the concept of al-Sharʿ al-Islāmī consists of two major parts: the first one mani-
fests itself in the religious Scriptures and their detailed evidences, while the second part 
consists of the general rules, overall objectives, and governing principles (Khādimī 2007, 
4-5). What al-Khādimā has explicitly said here indeed reflects the concept of Sharia as un-
derstood by other contemporary scholars who practice ijtihād in the field of biomedical 
ethics, though they might not have stated it so explicitly.
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havior, which eventually led to terms like “genetic determinism.” These issues, 
among several others, cannot be dealt with by looking at Sharia through the 
lens of fiqh alone. Integrating insights coming from disciplines like philosophy, 
theology, Sufism, Qurʾān exegesis, and Ḥadīth commentaries are indispensable 
to be certain that Sharia can still continue to guide the ethical discussions of 
the genomic era. Therefore, the ijtihād process exploring the role of Sharia in 
fields like genomics should involve specialists in these disciplines and not only 
those specialized in fiqh. This leads to the second challenge which concerns 
the identity of the participants in the process of this ijtihad.
Throughout Islamic history, jurists have been entrusted with the task of in-
terpreting the foundational texts of Islam (viz. Quran and Sunna) to extract 
practical rulings which guide the behavior of Muslims in various aspects of 
life including those related to states of health and sickness. This process was 
known as ijtihād, which literally means exerting one’s utmost effort. With time, 
ijtihād, in its technical sense, became the monopoly of those who excel in the 
discipline of fiqh. The prominent religious scholar Muḥammad al-Shawkānī 
(d. 1839), representing a mainstream position among Muslim jurists includ-
ing the contemporary ones, argued that even if ijtihād was undertaken by spe-
cialists in other disciplines like theology, its outcome will not be recognized 
(Shawkānī 1999, 2, 206; Qaraḍāwī 1996, 12-13). However, the ethical questions 
raised by modern biomedical sciences, as explained in this chapter, revealed 
the inability of Muslim jurists to exercise ijtihād by themselves. This is due to 
various reasons, especially the educational background of these jurists which 
usually focused on “religious” sciences and the Arabic language. This necessi-
tated their collaboration with biomedical scientists so they can have a proper 
understanding of the biomedical information related to the bioethical issues 
under discussion. The history of collective ijtihād in the field of bioethics, 
which spans about four decades, shows the involvement of biomedical scien-
tists in their capacity as equal “partners” in the process of ijtihād with jurists, 
simply as “informants” whose task is limited to explaining or simplifying spe-
cific biomedical information. This position was explicitly expressed by Shaykh 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz in his response to a question on whether patients can ac-
cept a fatwa given by a physician or if they should still consult a Sharia scholar. 
Ibn Bāz, said: “The patient should seek the scholars’ feedback about what phy-
sicians say regarding religious rulings, because physicians are knowledgeable 
about their own field, and religious scholarship has its own specialists… The 
physician’s duty is to ask but not to issue fatwas without proper knowledge, 
because he is not a Sharia scholar.” (Ibn Bāz 1999, 24-25). The same tendency is 
found in the practices of fiqh academies. In personal communication with the 
Saudi physician Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bār, he told me that the collective delibera-
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tions go as following: the physicians explain the scientific aspects to the jurists 
and together they discuss related issues. But the session dedicated to discuss-
ing and voting on the final recommendations and resolutions is attended only 
by the religious scholars. However, this is not a uniform practice for all insti-
tutions which employ the mechanism of collective ijtihād in the field of bio-
ethics. The Kuwait-based Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences (IOMS) 
broke away from this tradition by engaging biomedical scientists in all stages, 
including drafting and adopting the final recommendations. Some of the reli-
gious scholars who participated in the symposia organized by the IOMS made 
observations about this practice. The critique was directed to the physicians 
who cross over the borders of their specialization and argue about religious 
rulings that should otherwise be left to the jurists. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-ʿAmmārī, 
one of the jurists who participated in the 1983 symposium organized by the 
IOMS on the beginning and end of human life, said: “I call upon everyone to 
stick to their specialization. The physician must not deal with anything but 
with what he sees in front of him. Delving into the interpretation of Prophetic 
traditions and the discussions of the jurists should be deferred to the jurists 
and specialists.” The late ʿIṣām al-Shirbīnī (d. 2010), one of the participating 
physicians in this symposium, commented on al-ʿAmmārī’s position, explain-
ing how that the process of ijtihād should be a shared task between jurists and 
physicians, and that neither party can accomplish the task alone (Al-Madhkūr 
a.o. 1985, 221-264). Such disagreements among the participants in these collec-
tive deliberations encompass the difficulty of setting clear borders between 
the task of the physicians and that of religious scholars. As biomedical issues 
grow in complexity and ramifications, drawing a border between the task of 
explaining the scientific aspect of biomedical technologies, usually assigned 
to biomedical scientists, and addressing the ethical issues raised by these tech-
nologies, traditionally entrusted to religious scholars, is getting increasingly 
difficult, if not impossible in many cases. Against this background, the process 
of ijtihād in the age of genomics requires better management and coordina-
tion between the two groups. For the group of biomedical scientists, the dis-
cussions about genetics and genomics revealed that some jurists and biomed-
ical scientists began complaining that some of those who participated in the 
meetings organized by the fiqh academies are not coming from these scientific 
fields. They explain that the pool of participating biomedical scientists in the 
collective discussions hardly witnessed any modifications or updates since the 
1980s. However, fields like genetics and genomics are relatively new and many 
of these scientists did not study these specializations enough. The critics argue 
that most of them depend only on what they read in some discrete articles 
but with no concrete scientific contribution to genetics or genomics. The point 
these jurists want to make is that religious scholars who participate in the col-
lective ijtihād are usually required to produce original knowledge and not just 
transfer the opinions of early jurists. So, the critics argue that such requirement 
should also apply to the participating biomedical scientists if they want to act 
as partners in the process of ijtihād, i.e., they should also produce knowledge 
in fields like genetics and genomics and not just translate published material 
into Arabic because this would not qualify to the level of ijtihād, in its technical 
sense.
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chapter 2
Islamic Ethics and Genomics: Mapping the 
Collective Deliberations of Muslim Religious 
Scholars and Biomedical Scientists
Mohammed Ghaly1
When the Human Genome Project (HGP) took off in 1990, experts in the field 
were aware of the fact that this scientific megaproject would generate ethi-
cal questions and conundrums that should be taken seriously.2 So, an ethical 
arm for the HGP was established, namely the Ethical, Legal and Social Impli-
cations (ELSI) program. Five percent of the total HGP budget was dedicated 
to the ELSI program, making the project one of the largest-ever investments 
in bioethics research. Unlike most of the previous bioethics research, the ELSI 
program worked in conjunction with the scientific research activities. Rather 
than waiting for the results of the scientific research and their possible ethi-
cal implications, the HGP leadership decided to anticipate, identify, analyze 
and address the ethical concerns early on. The HGP example of conflating ge-
nomics with ethics concurrently became a to-be-followed model, sometimes 
with critical remarks, for subsequent genomics projects conducted elsewhere. 
Major research funding organizations, such as the Wellcome Trust and the 
UK Economic and Social Research Council, have also set a financial plan for 
research on genomics-related ethical issues (Rabinow and Bennett 2009, 106; 
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Jasanoff 2011, 7; Boddington 2012, 24-25; Kaye 2012, 673–674; Green et al 2015, 31; 
Morrison, Dickenson and Lee 2016, 1-6). 
Despite its considerable richness and potential usefulness for addressing 
many issues, the ELSI program and its resulting literature were less beneficial 
to the religious, not to mention particularly Islamic, perspectives. The govern-
ing moral landscape of the ELSI programs was dominantly, and sometimes 
even exclusively, secular in nature. The ELSI of the HGP and its subsequent 
versions in Western countries did not even include the word “religion” in the ti-
tle. This made the ELSI literature considerably poor when it comes to incorpo-
rating the perspective of religious ethics; a shortcoming that was highlighted 
by those who critically reviewed the ELSI work (ELSI Research Planning and 
Evaluation Group 2000, ii, iii, 3, 19, C2, C3). 
A    Genomics in the Age of Collective Reasoning (al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī)
Like the ELSI programs, the Islamic discussions on the ethical implications 
of the HGP and genomics in general were initiated before the completion of 
the scientific research. In fact, these discussions started even before the es-
tablishment of the national genome projects led by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, the ELSI literature was used in these discussions, especially by 
Muslim biomedical scientists3, as background information featuring the key 
ethical dilemmas and the main benefits and risks involved. However, unlike 
the ELSI work, Islamic ethical deliberations on genomics had their own dis-
tinct language, style, modes of reasoning and prioritization of the key ethi-
cal concerns, which are all steeped in the religious tradition of Islam and are 
couched under the key term of independent and critical reasoning (ijtihād).4 
The crux of ijtihād within the context of genomics is that Muslim religious 
scholars5 approach the foundational texts of Islam (viz. Quran and Sunna) and 
3 “Muslim biomedical scientists” and, less frequently, “physicians” are used as generic terms 
referring to the participants in the collective deliberations on bioethical issues, with back-
ground in biomedical sciences. 
4 See for instance the resolution adopted by the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), affiliated with 
the Muslim World League on ijtihād, issued in January 1985. The resolution stressed the ne-
cessity of practicing ijtihād, especially in its collective form, in order to address the modern 
complex issues from an Islamic perspective. See Baʿdānī 2016, 92-94. 
5 “Muslim religious scholars” and, less frequently, “jurists” are used in this chapter as gener-
ic terms comprising the broad spectrum of those with expertise in Islamic sciences. Some-
times, the term “jurists” is used to make reference to the experts in the discipline of Islamic 
jurisprudence in particular. Whenever the latter is the case, I indicate this clearly in the text. 
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their hermeneutics in order to show what these texts would imply with regards 
to such novel bioethical questions. As for genomics in particular, some Muslim 
religious scholars gave their own individual insights, through the mechanism 
of individual reasoning (al-ijtihād al-fardī). Nonetheless, the main and rigor-
ous discussions took the form of interdisciplinary discourse between Muslim 
religious scholars and biomedical scientists, through the mechanism of collec-
tive reasoning (al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī).
In its individual form, the whole process of ijtihād, starting from developing 
the right perception (taṣawwur ṣaḥīḥ) of the issue at hand, which was termed 
elsewhere the “informative” component, and ending by determining the right 
action to be taken, which was named elsewhere the “normative” component, 
is traditionally managed by an individual religious scholar, more particularly 
the jurist (al-faqīh) (Ghaly 2015, 287-288). Within this type of ijtihād, which 
has dominated throughout the history of the Islamic tradition, the jurist can, 
in principle consult with specialists in fields like medicine or engineering in 
order to improve the informative component of their ijtihād. However, the 
whole process remains individual in character in the sense that it is one jurist 
who is responsible for managing this process and, more importantly, seen as 
the individual issuer of the fatwa (muftī). On the other hand, the collective 
reasoning (al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī), as its very name suggests, is collaborative in 
nature and thus is not based on one single jurist but a group of individuals 
who collaboratively manage the whole process. This collaboration can take the 
form of consulting non-fiqh specialists, like physicians or scientists, in order 
to improve the abovementioned informative component or consulting other 
religious scholars to make sure that the normative component and the result-
ing fatwa are not flawed. Conventionally speaking, biomedical scientists would 
be responsible for developing the right perception (taṣawwur ṣaḥīḥ), or the 
informative element of the ijtihād process, by explaining, say, what genomics 
exactly is about to the religious scholars. On their turn, religious scholars will 
make use of this scientific explanation of genomics in order to construe the 
religious perspectives, or the normative element of the ijtihād process, in con-
formity with this right perception. However, we shall see below that the pro-
cess of al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī, especially as far as genomics is concerned, is highly 
dialectical and the arguments and counterarguments go frequently back and 
forth among these diverse groups of participants. For instance, we will see how 
biomedical scientists contribute to the discussions on the normative part of 
the ijtihād process.
Historically, al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī has its roots back in the early history of the 
Islamic tradition, where some would date it back to the lifetime of the Proph-
et of Islam and the subsequent period of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, but it 
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always remained less widespread than the individual ijtihād and was only spo-
radically practiced (Raysūnī 2010, 59-64). In the twentieth century, the need 
for reviving the mechanism of al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī in general, and particularly 
when it relates to novel issues, as it is the case in the field of biomedical ethics, 
was repetitively voiced by both religious scholars and biomedical scientists. 
Employing al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī, its advocates argued, was indispensable to 
properly address the complex ethical questions raised by astounding techno-
logical advancements, which transformed the nature of many aspects of peo-
ple’s lives. By the beginning of the 1980s, the mechanism of al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī 
started to take an institutionalized form. The Islamic Organization for Medical 
Sciences (IOMS), based in Kuwait, which was established in 1981 and assumed 
its current name in 1984, has been the most active and all their symposia ex-
clusively focused on bioethical issues. Shortly before getting its current name, 
particularly in 1983, the IOMS initiated the series of al-Islām wa al-mushkilāt 
al-ṭibbiyya al-muʿāṣira (Islam and Contemporary Medical Issues), which in-
corporated a long list of publications on various topics, including genomics. 
The IOMS coordinates with two other institutions whose interest in bioeth-
ics is rather occasional, as part of their broad interest in the role of Sharia in 
the modern world. One of these two institutions is the Islamic Fiqh Academy 
(IFA), established in 1977, which is affiliated with the Muslim World League 
and based in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. The other institution is the International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA), established in 1981, based in Jeddah, Saudi Ara-
bia, and affiliated with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Ghaly 2015, 
292-294). 
It is to be noted that the gravity shift to the collective ijtihād did not ter-
minate its individual form. The conclusions resulting from ijtihad, whether 
collective or individual, are not religiously binding and, in principle, they can 
be challenged by another collective ijtihād or even by individual scholars. In-
dividual ijtihād creates an opportunity for the religious scholar (mujtahid) to 
contemplate and reflect upon the issue at hand and the related textual refer-
ences and contextual aspects, making it more prone to error. Alternatively, col-
lective ijtihād is more restrictive because each participant in this process has 
to take into consideration the other participants’ thoughts; this makes it less 
susceptible that flawed conclusions are collectively adopted. In spite of this, 
collective ijtihād can only materialize and flourish when the participating indi-
viduals develop their own individual ijtihād and then constructively share the 
resulting conclusions with their peers. Therefore, these two forms of ijtihād are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive to each other (Raysūnī 2010, 59). This holds 
true for the case of genomics as well. Although collective ijtihād dominated the 
discussions, some Muslim religious scholars made their own individual contri-
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butions to this topic (e.g. Khādimī 2003, 7-48; Kanʿān 2003, 68-101; Idrīs 2003, 
22-25; Khādimī 2004, 59-76; ʿUthmān 2009; Ghaly 2016, 34). 
During the 1990s, the decade of the HGP, the mechanism of al-ijtihād al-
jamāʿī was already institutionalized more than a decade ago. Using this mech-
anism for addressing bioethical issues started to be the norm, and a certain 
legacy started to take form. Before its symposium was held in October 1998, 
which addressed the ethical issues of genomics, the abovementioned series 
“Islam and Contemporary Medical Issues” of the IOMS had already organized 
more than ten interdisciplinary symposia in which Muslim religious scholars 
and biomedical scientists collaboratively deliberated on a wide range of topics 
like abortion, beginning and end of human life, organ donation, AIDS, clon-
ing, …etc. This is also the case for the other two institutions, namely IFA and 
IIFA, where the mechanism of collective ijtihād was adopted to discuss many 
bioethical discussions, including assisted reproductive technologies, blood 
transfusion, human milk banks, organ transplantation, and sex reassignment 
surgery (Baʿdānī 2016, 199-210, 222, 223, 476-485, 491).
The almost two-decade experience of adopting the mechanism of collective 
ijtihād in the field of bioethics, with considerable success, made approaching 
genomics through this mechanism, an indisputable choice. Collective ijtihād 
was accepted as a recognized and credible mechanism for tackling modern 
bioethical questions, where they were seen as too complex to be addressed 
by those specialized in either religious sciences or biomedical sciences alone. 
If this is valid to issues like human milk banking and assisted reproductive 
technologies, then it applies in a much stronger sense to the case of genomics. 
This explains the frequency of collective discussions on genomics and Islamic 
ethics. Besides the aforementioned IOMS, IFA and IIFA, other institutions also 
used the mechanism of al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī to address the ethical aspects of ge-
nomics, as to be outlined below. 
Interdisciplinary Deliberations
To my knowledge, the seminar “Ethical Implications of Modern Researches 
in Genetics” (Al-Inʿikāsāt al-akhlāqiyya li al-abḥāth al-mutaqddima fī ʿilm al-
wirātha), organized by the Faculty of Science at the University of Qatar during 
the period 13-15 February 1993, was the first to examine the Human Genome 
Project and the prospective field of genomics from an Islamic ethical per-
spective. The proceedings of the seminar were published in both Arabic and 
English (ISESCO 1993; Īsiskū 1993).6 During the period 13-15 October 1998, the 
6 I hereby submit my due thanks to Dr. Khalid Al-Ali, the former director of the Foundation 
Program at Qatar University and Chairperson of the UNESCO World Commission on the Eth-
ics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST). He thankfully made me aware of this 
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IOMS organized the symposium “Genetics, Genetic Engineering, Human Ge-
nome and Gene Therapy: An Islamic Perspective” (Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa 
al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: Ruʾya Islāmiyya), hence-
forth the 1998 symposium. The proceedings of this symposium and its final 
recommendations remain the most influential document, and subsequent 
collective deliberations highly depend on them. In its eleventh session held 
during the period 14-19 November 1998, the IIFA discussed the recommenda-
tions of the 1998 symposium, but deferred the resolution to another future 
meeting because the participants felt the need for conducting further study 
and research. During the period 5-10 January 2002, the IFA held its sixteenth 
session, which discussed among other issues, the possible fields in which the 
DNA fingerprinting can be employed. The seventh resolution of this session 
made a cursory reference to the human genome, stressing that it cannot be 
dealt with as a commodity in whatever way. The Faculty of Sharia and Law at 
the United Arab Emirates University organized the conference “Genetic Engi-
neering between Sharia and Law” (Al-Handasa al-wirāthiyya bayna al-Sharīʿa 
wa al-qānūn) during the period 5-7 May 2002, whose proceedings were pub-
lished in four dense volumes (Kulliyyat 2002). During the period 6-9 February 
2006, the IOMS organized an international Seminar on “Human Genetic and 
Reproductive Technologies: Comparing Religious and Secular Perspectives”. 
The recommendations of this seminar included a section entitled “Declaration 
of Principles”, which paraphrased specific segments of the recommendations 
adopted during the 1998 symposium. The attempt here was seemingly to aug-
ment the support for these principles by engaging secular and religious voices 
from outside the Islamic tradition (Awadi and Gendy 2008, 1173-75). The second 
edition of the conference series, “Pan Arab Human Genetics”, organized by the 
Dubai-based Centre for Arab Genomic Studies (CAGS), included a Public Fo-
rum on “The Ethical Perspectives of Human Genetic Applications in the Arab 
World”, which was held on 20 November 2007. Besides the submitted papers, 
the forum issued the “Dubai Declaration”, adopting some standpoints related 
to genomics. A few years later, and during its twentieth session held during the 
period 13-18 September 2012, the IIFA rekindled the discussions on the recom-
mendations of the 1998 symposium, but, yet again, the resolution was deferred 
to a future meeting. During the period 23-25 February 2013, a specialized sem-
inar took place in Jeddah that was jointly organized by the IIFA and IOMS. 
After an extensive journey of almost 15 years, the recommendations of the 1998 
seminar and provided me with its publications. In the following sections, I will make use of 
the Arabic and English editions of this seminar depending on the original text of submitted 
articles. 
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symposium were endorsed, with few modifications and additional points, by 
the IIFA during its twenty-first session, held on 18-22 November 2013.7
In addition to hosting the conference held in 1993, Qatar also hosted some 
of the recent expert meetings during which both biomedical scientists and 
religious scholars deliberated on genomics. In collaboration with other Qa-
tar-based institutions, the Research Center for Islamic Legislation & Ethics 
(CILE) convened two activities. On 2 October 2014, a public seminar entitled 
“Islamic Ethics in the Era of Genomics” was organized in collaboration with 
the then Qatar Supreme Council of Health (SCH), now Ministry of Public 
Health. As part of its 2016 edition, the Doha-based World Innovative Summit 
for Health (WISH) collaborated with CILE in organizing a Research Forum on 
“Genomics in the Gulf Region and Islamic Ethics”, which focused on the ethi-
cal management of incidental findings. The study produced by this Research 
Forum was published in both Arabic and English (Ghaly 2016; Ghaly 2016a). 
Finally, CILE organized the international seminar “Islamic Ethics and the Ge-
nome Question” during the period 3-5 April 2017, the proceedings of which are 
published in this volume.
The analyses provided in this chapter are based on a careful review of the 
abovementioned deliberations, including some of the unpublished papers 
which were presented during these interdisciplinary meetings. However, the 
proceedings of the abovementioned 1998 symposium will serve as the main 
reference in this chapter. This choice has to do with the seminal role played by 
the proceedings of the seminar in the overall Islamic ethical discussions on ge-
nomics. References to other meetings and publications of individual scholars 
will be made whenever necessary to show certain similarities or differences 
between the individual and collective forms of ijtihād.
Explanatory Remarks
Before delving into the detailed analysis of the deliberations on genomics and 
Islamic ethics, three explanatory remarks are due in order to understand the 
analysis to follow: 
The first remark deals with the themes and issues discussed in the above-
mentioned meetings and conferences. The Human Genome Project (HGP) and 
the field of genomics in general occupied a central place in the discussions. 
However, almost all of these meetings also discussed many other issues, some 
of which are closely related to genomics, whereas others are of less relevance 
7 I hereby submit my due thanks to Dr. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bār who provided me with some of 
the papers presented to this session. It is to be noted that the proceedings of this session have 
not been published yet. 
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or may be completely unrelated. In the following section, I endeavored to keep 
the focus on the field of genomics and the HGP, but it was almost impossible to 
avoid references to issues related to other themes, especially genetics, genetic 
engineering, gene therapy and the like. Because of the nature of the discus-
sions during these meetings and conferences, it was sometimes impossible to 
make clear distinctions between the points and arguments related to genom-
ics and those related to genetic engineering, genetic counseling, etc. 
The second remark refers to the geographical scope of these deliberations. 
The abovementioned meetings and conferences were almost all transnational 
in character. In other words, an institution based in Qatar or Kuwait, for exam-
ple could host the event, but the pool of participants usually represented the 
diversity of the Muslim world in general, and also sometimes Muslims living 
as religious minorities worldwide. However, one notices that almost all events 
took place in the Gulf region, which witnessed the key genomics projects 
in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the countries that hosted many of these 
events, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, also established national genome 
projects, both in December 2013.8 This indicates that the conflation of genom-
ics and ethics, which we have seen in the HGP, continued in the initiatives 
taking place in the Muslim world.
The third remark relates to one of the typical difficulties of practicing ijtihād 
by religious scholars in the field of bioethics, namely the difficulty of grasping 
the technicalities of scientific information, especially in complex disciplines 
like genetics, genetic engineering and genomics. Among other reasons, Main-
stream Muslim religious scholars hardly have any background information 
about this type of knowledge or even access to relevant first-hand or primary 
sources (Ghaly 2015, 288-289). The deliberations on genetic engineering, ge-
nomics and the HGP demonstrated how difficult the interdisciplinary commu-
nication was between biomedical scientists and religious scholars. In the 1998 
symposium, the IOMS president, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-ʿAwaḍī, recognized that 
the participating religious scholars had difficulties understanding the lecture 
given by the Syrian biomedical scientist Hānī Rizq9 and asked that scientific 
information should be presented in a simpler and clearer way10 (Jundī 1998, 
8  For more information about genomics projects and initiatives in the Gulf region, see 
Ghaly 2016, 7-15.
9  After the symposium, Rizq wrote two key Arabic books that were meant to introduce sci-
entific information, especially in the field of genetics, to the general educated public. Two 
of his books, the latest of which was on human genome and ethics, (Rizq 2003; Rizq 2007) 
received awards from the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences (KFAS). 
10  The published proceedings of this symposium do not include a paper written by Dr. Rizq. 
However, Dr. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Bār, in his published paper in this symposium, spoke 
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195-196). After the first session of the symposium, the IOMS secretary general 
assistant, Aḥmad al-Jundī, mentioned that he had received many proposals 
suggesting that another biomedical scientist, namely Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt, should 
present his paper earlier than it was planned because of his ability to simplify 
scientific information. Eventually this happened to clearly save the situation 
and improve the level of communication with religious scholars (Jundī 1998, 
266). Ḥatḥūt himself recognized this problem and criticized the participating 
physicians for being sometimes inclined to “stretch their muscles” by present-
ing complex information inaccessible to the religious scholars. Conversely, 
Ḥatḥūt explained, physicians have to be aware that their exclusive mission 
is to communicate specialist information to the jurists. Whatever they do, 
which does not contribute to fulfilling this mission, is nothing but useless ef-
fort (Jundī 1998, 321). Ḥatḥūt’s presentation was well received and some jurists 
commended him for his ability to communicate complex information in an 
easy and accessible way (Jundī 1998, 297, 301, 302, 303). However, some reli-
gious scholars, like the Saudi Nāṣir al-Maymān and the Syrian Muḥammad 
Rawwās Qalʿajī, continued complaining about this problem and demanded 
that biomedical scientists should use an easier and more accessible language 
(Jundī 1998, 315, 353). During subsequent discussions within the International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA), al-Bār spoke about the same problem when he 
commented on what happened during the 1998 symposium. He said that after 
about a one-hour lecture given by Rizq, the participating jurists said, “Trans-
late to us what he said. We did not understand anything” (IIFA 1998, 11/1112).  
Additionally, both religious scholars and biomedical scientists objected the 
imprecise or vague character of some information presented by biomedical 
scientists. For instance, there were wide discrepancies in the papers submitted 
by the scientists about the number of genes in the human body, the accuracy 
of statistics mentioned by some papers, the right terminology to be used, the 
very definition of genetic engineering and whether cloning can be part of it, 
etc. (Jundī 1998, 299, 306, 308-310, 311, 317, 318-319, 684). This can be due to 
the fact that some of these scientists were not geneticists by specialization, 
about a certain paper that Dr. Rizq submitted to the symposium and that it included 
some inaccurate information (Bār 1998, 622). So, it is possible that al-ʿAwaḍī is referring 
here to a paper which did not find its way to publication, maybe because of its inacces-
sibility to the religious scholars or because of including mistaken information. However, 
Dr. Rizq presented two papers written by other scientists, respectively the Saudi Ṣāliḥ 
al-Kurayyim and the Moroccan Muḥammad al-Yashawī, because they were not available 
for presenting their papers on the first day of the seminar. So, it is possible that al-ʿAwaḍī 
here is referring to the presentation that Riqz gave on behalf of these two authors. It is to 
be noted that al-Yashawī could join the discussions later (Jundī 1998, 1012). 
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like the internist Muḥammad al-Bār, the gynecologist Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt and the 
pharmacist Aḥmad al-Jundī. Another possible reason for the confusion around 
specific scientific information can also be traced to the fact that most of the 
papers went back to the 1990s when the HGP was still in progress and many 
issues were unsettled among scientists worldwide. The papers written in the 
1990s, by both biomedical scientists and religious scholars, continued to be the 
main reference for all subsequent discussions with hardly any new updates 
that could have had tangible impact on the interdisciplinary discussions.11 A 
third possible reason is that some religious scholars were simply looking for 
the impossible, namely having clear-cut (qaṭʿī) information all the time. The 
very nature of an emerging and rapidly developing field like genomics makes 
it sometimes difficult to have stable and certain information which cannot 
be challenged by further research. One of the clear examples in this regard is 
calculating the exact number of genes in the human genome. This issue has 
always remained controversial, and one of the latest publications shows that 
scientists still cannot agree on how many genes are in the human genome and 
sometimes even on how to define a gene (Willyard 2018). 
Below, we will notice that this problem made some religious scholars feel 
that they missed the right perception (taṣawwur ṣaḥīḥ) of some issues related 
to genomics. Additionally, the absence of specific scientific information or the 
feeling that such information is not clear-cut or conclusive enough makes it 
difficult for the religious scholar to make a rigorous weighing between possible 
benefits (maṣāliḥ) and expected harms (mafāsid), or, in bioethical terms, the 
so-called benefit-risk assessment. In his comment on the draft of the final rec-
ommendations of the 1998 symposium, the UK-based physician ʿAbd al-Majīd 
Qaṭma said that the possible harms of a technology, like gene therapy cannot 
be known for sure, and this uncertainty will continue for a long time. That is 
why, he argued, it is better to wait until we are 100% sure (Jundī 1998, 1005). 
Another related problem was determining the person(s) who has/have the au-
thority to decide what is beneficial and what is harmful. The Syrian religious 
11  As an example, one can check one of the newest papers in this regard, namely the pa-
per of Aḥmad al-Jundī, which he presented during the eleventh session held by the IIFA 
in September 2012 and then again, but in a much more concise form, in the specialized 
seminar jointly organized by the IIFA and IOMS in February 2013 (Jundī 2013). Despite 
some updates included in the paper, we hardly see any influence resulting in modifying or 
updating the final recommendations adopted by the 1998 symposium. Strikingly enough, 
some of the ethical issues which emerged after the completion of the Human Genome 
Project and later dominated the ethical deliberations on genomics worldwide, like the 
management of incidental findings, hardly received any attention in the parallel Islamic 
bioethical discussions. See Ghaly 2016, 30. 
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scholar, Aḥmad al-Kurdī, argued that the referential authority in toto should be 
given to the academics and scholars, each in liaison with one’s specialization 
(Kurdī 1998, 241). On the other hand, the Tunisian religious scholar, Mukhtār 
al-Sallāmī, argued that such an opinion is factually isolating the jurists from 
the reasoning process. However, al-Sallāmī added, deliberations on these is-
sues should remain interdisciplinary by facilitating communication between 
specialists in human genome and genetic engineering on one hand and ju-
rists on the other hand. In his comment on al-Sallāmī’s critique, al-Kurdī said 
that this type of interaction between the two groups is actually what he meant 
(Jundī 1998, 249, 264). All the preceding difficulties did problematize the pro-
cess of ijtihād to the extent that some religious scholars became even reluctant 
to express an Islamic ethical position in general. 
B    Framing Genomics: Two Main Approaches
The participants in the abovementioned deliberations agreed that the world 
is currently witnessing one of its biggest scientific revolutions ever, especially 
in fields like genetics and genetic engineering. To them, the Human Genome 
Project (HGP) is at the very heart of this revolution. In the symposium held in 
Qatar in 1993, the Pakistani molecular biologist, Anwar Nasim, said that genetic 
engineering and its related disciplines are advancing at an unparalleled tempo, 
which was never seen throughout the history of biology. As for the HGP in par-
ticular, he said “the current effort to map and sequence the entire human ge-
nome is, without doubt, the most significant and ambitious undertaking of bi-
ological research in modem times” (Nasim 1993, 63, 70). In his opening speech 
of the 1998 symposium, the IOMS secretary general assistant, Aḥmad al-Jundī, 
said that what has been achieved during the last fifty years is equivalent to 
multiple folds of what humanity could achieve since the beginning of creation. 
He enumerated giant steps made by the relatively new field of genetics, which 
are increasingly narrowing the gap between imagination and reality.12 Similar 
statements were also expressed by Muḥammad al-Mursī Zahra (the then dean 
of the Faculty of Sharia at the United Arab Emirates University) in his intro-
12  Al-Jundī dedicated a number of pages to outline the key achievements made by genetics 
and genetic engineering. He gave examples like using electronic microscopes and com-
puters to fathom out the cell and unearth its secrets, producing human insulin (labora-
tory-grown synthetic insulin, which mimics insulin in humans) to replace the animal/
porcine insulin, trying to overcome the scarcity of human organs for transplantation by 
producing genetically-engineered porcine hearts so that they will not be rejected when 
transplanted in human bodies, and DNA fingerprinting (Jundī 1998a, 24-26). 
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duction to the voluminous publication on genetic engineering between Sha-
ria and law (Kulliyyat 2002, 5-6). Speaking about the Human Genome Project 
(HGP), al-Jundī said that this is the most serious issue in the field of genetic 
engineering. Despite possible risks related to autonomy and privacy that must 
be taken into consideration, al-Jundī argued that the potential of the HGP will 
go beyond mapping the genes and discovering mutations to eventually open 
the door for studying the reasons behind these mutations, and how to fix them 
through gene therapy (Jundī 1998a, 23-28). Recognizing the new scientific rev-
olution and the crucial role played by the HGP therein was a recurrent theme 
during the 1998 symposium and was repeatedly voiced by many others outside 
the symposium (ISESCO 1993, 263; Nasim 1993, 63, 70; Anees, 1993, 78; Ḥaffār 
1993, 123-137; Jundī 1998, 68, 70, 211, 274, 736, 797, 1024; Ḥatḥūt 1998, 274; May-
mān 1998, 797-798). Later on, we will notice that this agreed-upon fact among 
the participants would have an impact on framing genomics. It would lead to 
the expression of some theologically tinted explanations of how it was possi-
ble that scientific communities based in the West could achieve such a revo-
lution despite their carelessness and negligence of religious guidance and its 
associated values, whereas Muslim countries have hardly made any substantial 
contribution in this regard. 
Beyond this point of agreement, one can notice two different approaches 
towards genomics and related issues. Each approach is comprised of two main 
aspects; one is theological and theoretical in nature, while the other focuses on 
juristic and practical elements. In other words, each approach is premised on 
certain theological assumptions, which are further fleshed out and phrased in 
a juristic and a practical position towards the field of genomics, as epitomized 
by the Human Genome Project (HGP). Both religious scholars and biomedical 
scientists contributed to each approach. As explained in the first section of this 
chapter, the conventional boundaries between the tasks assigned to biomed-
ical scientists and those entrusted to religious scholars were blurred in these 
discussions. Below, we will see that the biomedical scientists did not restrict 
their contribution to providing scientific information only, i.e., the informative 
component of the ijtihād process. On various occasions, they additionally con-
tributed to the normative component by giving their insights on theological 
and juristic aspects of genomics. It is to be noted, however, that the contribu-
tion of the religious scholars to the informative component remained quite 
minimal. 
1    Precaution-Inclined Approach 
In a bid to explain the abovementioned point with regards to the scientific rev-
olution, its exclusive Western leadership and the absence of Muslim countries’ 
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contribution, this approach made use of a quasi-determinist, and typically 
Ashʿarī13, theological framing. This theological framing was mainly expound-
ed by the Kuwaiti religious scholar, ʿAjīl al-Nashmī, in his paper submitted to 
the abovementioned 1998 symposium. He started his paper with lamenting the 
deplorable state of scientific research in the Muslim world and expressing his 
frustration that today’s Muslims abandoned the leading role that their ances-
tors ever played in advancing sciences. Furthermore, al-Nashmī asked Mus-
lims to stick to the firm belief that all modern scientific advancements in cut-
ting-edge fields like genetic engineering, the HGP and gene therapy, could only 
materialize because this was God’s will. He explained that it was only God who 
provided these Western scientists with the necessary power and capabilities to 
accomplish these achievements, and had He willed otherwise, they would nev-
er have been able to achieve anything. However, the results of these scientific 
ventures belong to these scientists’ own acts for which they remain responsi-
ble, and God gave them the ability to do these acts by way of testing (ibtilāʾ) His 
creatures to see how they will behave (Nashmī 1998, 545-547). This is a typically 
Ashʿarī position which explains the seemingly problematic phenomena in life 
by trying to strike a balance between two points. On one hand, there is stress 
on God’s omnipotence and that nothing can take place in the universe against 
His will. On the other hand, there is recognition of a certain degree of individ-
uals’ freedom to act so that humans remain responsible for their acts by way of 
acquisition (kasb). Within such a position, there is little space left for detailed 
rational argumentations about the theodicy or the possible wisdom behind 
such problematic phenomena (Ghaly 2010, 24-26).
Against the background of this quasi-determinist theological framing, al-
Nashmī moved to the juristic practical aspects of this approach where he 
gives an overall preference for a casuistic approach. He argued that Muslims 
should deal with the applications of these cutting-edge scientific ventures and 
try to evaluate the benefits and harms of each application through of the lens 
of Sharia. This means that each application should have its separate religious 
ruling (ḥukm sharʿī). As for the Human Genome Project (HGP) in particular, 
al-Nashmī argued that it is in principle a noble project, or –again reflecting 
his inclination towards precaution– this is how it should be. Al-Nashmī held 
the notion that the overall juristic framework, which governs the HGP and its 
possible applications, is the framework of the five higher objectives of Sharia 
(maqāṣid al-Sharīʿā), namely safeguarding religion, one’s life, intellect, prog-
13  The analysis provided by al-Nashmī here is clearly inspired and influenced by the Ashʿarī 
theory of acquisition (kasb). For more information about this theory, see Abrahamov 
1989. 
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eny and property. According to al-Nashmī, the HGP relates more to the third 
objective, namely the preservation of progeny (nasl) whose integrity should 
always be safeguarded against any possible manipulation or misuse. If this is 
the case, al-Nashmī elaborated, then the default rule concerning the HGP and 
its applications should be that all related actions are in principle prohibited 
unless there are strong arguments to justify an exception to this default rule 
(Nashmī 1998, 548-550). 
Strikingly enough, the position premised on prohibition as the governing 
rule is not the mainstream position in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), where hu-
mans are generally permitted to make use of what God created unless there is a 
scriptural reference or compelling reason to move it from the realm of original 
permissibility (al-barāʾa al-aṣliyya) to prohibition. This mainstream position, 
supported by the majority of Muslim jurists, is based on Quranic verses like 
“He is the One Who created everything in the earth for you” (Q. 02:29) and 
“And He has subjected to you whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on 
the earth” (Q. 45:13). Jurists couched this position in the well-known legal max-
im, “permissibility is the original state of things (al-aṣl fī al-ashyāʾ al-ibāḥa)” 
(Wizārat 1983-2006, 1/130, 18/74-75, 103). What made a contemporary jurist like 
al-Nashmī transfer genomics from this mainstream original permissibility to 
the realm of original prohibition? Besides the technical juristic reason men-
tioned by al-Nashmī himself, viz. the relevance of genomics to the objective of 
safeguarding progeny which dictates more cautiousness, there are other possi-
ble reasons related to the scientific and socio-political context of the Muslim 
world in which the field of genomics was born.
Integral to this approach is the idea that Muslims should be aware of the 
possible religious perils of this scientific revolution, despite its possible bene-
ficial advancements in fields like genetics and genomics. In various places in 
al-Nashmī’s paper, one easily observes his deep distrust of the Western scien-
tific institutions, which dominate the field of genomics, when it comes to the 
commitment to religious values. Unsurprisingly, al-Nashmī explained, many of 
the results of modern scientific research are not in conformity with the Islamic 
Sharia because the leaders in these fields are not guided by religious values 
and are mainly motivated by material interest and personal desire (hawā). 
According to him, the absence of divine guidance, as communicated through 
revealed scriptures, will inevitably lead to misguidedness and deviation from 
the straight path. He added that this misguidedness got even normalized to 
the extent that many Muslims believe that this [absence of religious guidance 
in scientific research activities] is the norm to be followed (Nashmī 1998, 46). 
Similar concerns were shared by other participants like Aḥmad al-Jundī, the 
IOMS secretary general assistant and the late Egyptian physician and former 
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Minister of Health, Ibrāhīm Badrān (d. 2015) (Jundī 1998, 100, 102). In his open-
ing speech for the 1998 symposium, al-Jundī said that one should be alert that 
most of the scientific researchers have no religion to abide by except their own 
scientific imagination (Jundī 1998a, 29). Al-ʿAwaḍī, al-Jundī and the Mauritani-
an religious scholar, ʿAbd Allāh Bin Bayya, referred to the example of scientific 
research on nuclear energy, which eventually led to catastrophic repercussions 
by manufacturing the atomic bomb and using it twice. Bin Bayya expressed his 
fear that biology could move into the same direction that nuclear energy had 
walked through before, and thus may eventually lead to self-destruction of hu-
manity.14 In his paper submitted to the 1998 symposium, Aḥmad al-Jundī quot-
ed Oppenheimer (d. 1967), the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, to 
say, “Now and now only, science has fallen into sin” (al-ān wa al-ān faqaṭ waqaʿa 
al-ʿilm fī al-khaṭīʾa)15 (Jundī 1998, 30). In his paper submitted to the specialized 
seminar jointly organized by the IIFA and IOMS in 2013, al-Jundī suggested that 
a link between this notorious example and the Human Genome Project (HGP) 
is not too far-fetched. He recalled the history of the US Department of Energy, 
the main catalyst of the HGP, which goes back to the Manhattan Project and 
its role in developing the atomic bomb during World War II (Jundī 1998a, 30; 
Jundī 1998, 194, 197; Jundī 2013, 13). 
It seems that the perceived tension between current scientific research ac-
tivities and religious values also influenced some Muslim religious scholars 
while weighing possible harms against expected benefits in order to judge 
the Human Genome Project (HGP) and the field of genomics in general. Ben 
Bayya spoke about estimations stating that 30% of beneficial resources on 
earth was exhausted in the twentieth century (Jundī 1998, 197). As for the HGP 
in particular, al-Nashmī dedicated less than one page to outline its possible 
benefits, mainly preventing and treating genetic diseases (Nashmī 1998, 551-
14  The case of the nuclear bomb was, for these participants, the most glaring example to 
show how destructive scientific research can be. The Egyptian physician added other ex-
amples which show the severity of possible harms that can result from originally good 
scientific research and technologies. He referred to the advanced means of transportation 
that cause the death of 5 million people per year; the industrial revolution which left mil-
lions of qualified workers without jobs; and the laser that can be transformed into lethal 
weapons, making people blind before their death. See Jundī 1998, 101. 
15  Oppenheimer’s statement has to do with his experience after watching the first atom-
ic bomb test, called Trinity, and naturally with the later atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. It is to be noted that the original statement, “physicists have known sin”, is 
much more nuanced and cautiously formulated than what the Arabic translation given 
by al-Jundī suggests. According to some, this degree of ambiguity in the phrase was in-
tended by Oppenheimer himself, see (Thorpe 2006, 12, 190). 
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552). However, possible harms and corruptions of the HGP and gene thera-
py were discussed in about ten pages and divided into three distinct sections, 
namely technical, ethical and psychosocial harms. As for the technical harms, 
al-Nashmī spoke about the risk of cancer, or even death, for the individuals 
who undergo gene therapy. He also added that genetically modified animals 
might end up developing abnormal genes, which can put human life and the 
whole environment at risk. As for the psychosocial risks, al-Nashmī held that 
sequencing genome could lead to genetic discrimination with negative impact 
on one’s profession and family. For instance, when information about the se-
quenced genome reveals one’s susceptibility to serious diseases, he/she can 
be discriminated against by having difficulties to find a job or even a future 
marriage partner. Concerning the possible ethical harms, al-Nashmī said that 
subjecting body- and germ-cells to laboratory tests can, unnecessarily, under-
mine human dignity in many cases. Usually, the main aim in such cases is gain-
ing money and celebrity rather than conducting proper scientific research. 
What is even more concerning, al-Nashmī added, is the risk of compromising 
people’s privacy by exposing sensitive information included in their genomes 
to unauthorized agencies and institutions like insurance companies (Nashmī 
1998, 555-565). 
It is clear that a jurist like al-Nashmī feels that he is facing a quite suspicious 
technological advancement, whose possible harms outweigh its expected ben-
efits, while he himself has no power to control or guide its future course. In 
such a situation, it is not surprising to resort to the position that everything 
related to this new advancement is prohibited until it is proven otherwise. Ac-
cording to al-Nashmī, the only exception to be permitted in this regard is gene 
therapy at the level of body cells rather than germ cells. Al-Nashmī, in line 
with many other religious scholars, argued that gene therapy falls within the 
scope of medical treatment (tadāwī), whose benefits of treating diseases are 
to be recognized from an Islamic perspective. Additionally, within the system 
of maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa, gene therapy is more relevant to the objective of pro-
tecting one’s life (ḥifẓ al-nafs) that generally entails permissiveness rather than 
safeguarding progeny (ḥifẓ al-nasl), which usually dictates more cautiousness 
(Nashmī 1998, 552-554). 
Finally, as part of their inclination to cautiousness, the contributors to this 
approach were reluctant about whether Muslim countries should play a role 
in this phase of the ongoing scientific revolution or abstain from contributing. 
Al-Nashmī explicitly stated that Muslims are helpless in this regard. Accord-
ing to him, scientific research will move forward today or tomorrow, and the 
stakeholders of this research will completely disregard Muslims who will only 
have to deal with the new reality imposed upon them. He added that Muslims’ 
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voices are discounted in this regard, and poor Muslim countries are some-
times even misused as field experiments. Without regaining the scientific and 
civilizational leadership, al-Nashmī argued, both Muslim jurists and political 
leaders in Muslim countries will not be in a position to do anything except 
preparing themselves for the worst possible scenarios by drafting protective re-
ligious rulings and ethical safeguards (Nashmī 1998, 545-548, 560). Al-Nashmī’s 
concerns about the missing role of Muslim countries in this regard were com-
monly shared by others like Ḥamdī al-Sayyid, the then head of the Egyptian 
Medical Syndicate and the Egyptian physician Ibrāhīm Badrān (Jundī 1998, 
191, 201). Some of the participants took this position a step further and asked 
for extreme cautiousness. The Egyptian religious scholar, Muḥammad Raʾfat 
ʿUthmān, argued that experiments in the field of genetic engineering seemed 
too risky and unsafe. Therefore, moratorium would be a good option. Accord-
ing to him, Muslim scientists would better refrain from participating in this 
field and let scientists in the West continue the work they started until it be-
comes certain that the final products are free from ethical concerns and phys-
ical harms (Jundī 1998, 247).16 Besides postponing the scientific activity, some 
religious scholars, like Bin Bayya, also asked for parallel cautiousness when it 
comes to developing an Islamic ethical position. This certainly relates to the 
third remark, explained in the first section of this chapter, which elaborated 
the difficulties of the religious scholars to grasp the scientific technicalities of 
fields like genetics and genetic engineering. Bin Bayya said that religious schol-
ars are required to issue a fatwa in which the scholar is supposed to deduce 
what God wants people to do. Bearing in mind this very nature of the fatwa, 
religious scholars are in need of certainty (yaqīn) or preponderant probability 
(ẓann ghālib), about available scientific information before stating anything. 
That is why it will be too early to issue a general fatwa about these advance-
ments in the light of the current state of uncertainty about specific informa-
tion (Jundī 1998, 256-257). On the other hand, the UK-based physician, ʿAbd 
al-Majīd Qaṭma17, argued that Muslim jurists are not yet ready to give fatwas 
on these complex issues because they are still not sufficiently aware of the rel-
evant scientific discussions and conferences taking place in the UK and Eu-
16  It seems that the further discussions during the 1998 symposium made ʿUthmān change 
his mind later and express opinions which are closer to the second approach, outlined 
below. We see this change clearly in his post-symposium published book on genome 
(ʿUthmān 2009). More details about this change in position will be mentioned below. In 
any case, this is one of the examples which show how collective reasoning and interdisci-
plinary deliberations (al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī) can influence the individual form of ijtihād. 
17  His family name was sometimes written as “Qaṭāyā”, but it seems to be just typo (Jundī 
1998, 837). 
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rope. As for long-term solutions, Qaṭma proposed that Muslim religious schol-
ars would study medicine, as do some lawyers and physicians in the UK who 
combine between studying medicine and law (Jundī 1998, 839). The Kuwaiti 
religious scholar, ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh, found that the proposed 
cautiousness of the jurists when they deal with a brand-new issue, such as ge-
netic engineering, is in line with the ideal practice of early religious scholars. 
The process can be time consuming, sometimes lasting a year, e.g. by studying 
and verifying the economic reality, including visiting the actual markets to see 
how people conclude transactions on the ground, before giving their religious 
advice (fatwa). That is why, ʿAbd Allāh suggested, it might be better if today’s 
jurists would first visit the laboratories and observe in reality what happens 
there, so that their fatwas would be as precise as possible (Jundī 1998, 259-260). 
2    Embracement-Inclined Approach
Contrary to the precaution-inclined approach, this approach responds to the 
success of the scientific revolution led by Western institutions and the failure 
of Muslim countries in this regard by giving a different theological framing. 
The main focus of this theological framing is God’s justice and wisdom rather 
than His omnipotence. It is also more open to rational argumentation about 
the theodicy where human agency occupies a central place. In certain ele-
ments, this approach seemed to bear the spirit of Muʿtazilī theology (Ghaly 
2010, 26-29). 
One of the main advocates of this approach who contributed to its theo-
logical framing was the late Egyptian US-based physician, Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt (d. 
2009), a prominent and influential figure in al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī deliberations 
on bioethical issues. In his paper submitted to the 1998 symposium18, the first 
subtitle reads “paradox”. In this section, Ḥatḥūt spoke about God’s wisdom 
that dictated that humans are uniquely gifted with intellect; their main tool 
to acquire knowledge. Throughout history, Ḥatḥūt explained, humans could 
employ their intellectual capacities to read the universe and unearth its var-
ious secrets, one after the other, to the extent that they could achieve break-
throughs and revolutions. However, some people lagged behind in this human 
search for, and march to, knowledge because they did not use their intellect as 
they should have. If they continue to do so, Ḥatḥūt added, their deserved fate 
will be marginalization and exploitation through the other advanced nations 
(Ḥatḥūt 1998, 274). The following section of Ḥatḥūt’s paper was entitled “Man 
Explores Man (Taʿarruf al-insān ʿalā al-insān)”, where he introduced the HGP 
18  Selected parts of this paper was published later in an interview form in 2003, see Amīn 
2003. 
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as one of the key stations in man’s long journey to know oneself. This journey, 
Ḥatḥūt explained, started with very basic knowledge about man’s external ap-
pearance and physical makeup as male or female. As time went by, this knowl-
edge continued to improve and assume complex forms where credit goes to 
sciences like comparative anatomy, studies exploring the genetic structure of 
the nucleuses of the cells in human bodies, and later the DNA discovery in 1953 
by the two Noble laureates, James Watson and Francis Crick. Ḥatḥūt argued 
that the HGP is reading and exploring the human being at the molecular lev-
el. Besides their benefit for improving self-knowledge or enhancing the “know 
thyself” value, Ḥatḥūt explained that genomics and the HGP also contribute 
to having a better knowledge of life and the universe in general. According to 
him, the four nucleotides found in DNA, namely Adenine, Thymine, Cytosine 
and Guanine known with the abbreviation ATCG, are the four letters that com-
pose the language of life (lughat al-ḥayāh). Here, He continued, that the ATCG 
plays the same role that dots and dashes do in the telegraph and the figures 
one and zero do in the computer world (Ḥatḥūt 1998, 275-277).  
During the further discussions among the biomedical scientists and reli-
gious scholars, Ḥatḥūt elaborated on this point by quoting the Quranic verse 
“Say, ‘Travel throughout the earth and see how He has originated the creation’. 
Then God will bring the next life into being. Surely, God has power over ev-
erything” (Q. 29:20). Ḥatḥūt commented by saying that this is a Quranic com-
mand, which applies to the question of genome, genetic engineering and the 
like (Jundī 1998, 320-321). More Quranic verses in the same spirit were added by 
the Syrian religious scholar, ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghudda, in his paper presented 
to the same symposium, including “And in your own selves; do you then not 
behold?” (Q. 51:21) and “Our Lord is He Who gave to each thing its due shape 
and nature, then guided it aright” (Q. 20:50)19. Such scriptural references, Abū 
Ghudda stated, mean that the whole creation, including the universe and man 
therein, is governed by consistent and coherent laws (sunan) that can be dis-
covered by human intellect (Abū Ghudda 1998, 573). Against this theological 
background, the results of the scientific revolution are compatible with God’s 
justice and wisdom in the sense that those who used what God gifted them 
with, viz. human intellect, and worked relentlessly (Western countries) ended 
up harvesting good results, while those who fell short of the ideal behaviour 
in this regard (Muslim countries) lagged behind. Consequently, the existing 
19  An extensive list of the Quranic verses, which outline the relationship between man and 
the universe and urge man to look into the wonders of this universe and discover its se-
crets, was given by the Moroccan religious scholar, Muḥammad al-Rūkī, and the Syrian 
Aḥmad al-Kurdī. See Rūkī 1998, 218-219; Kurdī 1998, 233-236.
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gap in scientific research between the West and the Muslim world is presented 
through the lens of human agency not in a deterministic framework where the 
focus is on accepting the status quo as part of God’s will. 
As we shall see below, this different theological framing will result in dif-
ferent juristic practical perspectives on various issues. It is true that religious 
scholars and biomedical scientists, who contributed to this approach, accept-
ed certain points advocated by the precaution-inclined approach like the over-
all preference to a casuistic or case-by-case approach where each application 
of these cutting-edge technologies is evaluated on the basis of its overall ben-
efits and harms through of the lens of Sharia. Within the paradigm of the five 
higher objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa), they also agreed that these 
technologies are more relevant to the objective of safeguarding progeny (nasl) 
and, to a certain extent, also to protecting one’s life (nafs), especially when it 
has to do with therapeutic applications like gene therapy (Abū Ghudda 1998, 
577, 579). Beyond this, the contributors to the two approaches expressed differ-
ent viewpoints on many issues, as outlined below.
As for the overall governing rule, which applies to the Human Genome Proj-
ect (HGP) and generally to fields like genetics and genetic engineering, the 
contributors to this approach opted for the “original permissibility” (al-barāʾa 
al-aṣliyya). The Moroccan religious scholar, Muḥammad al-Rūkī, extensively 
spoke about this rule and its application to genetic engineering in plants, ani-
mals and also in humans but with a higher degree of cautiousness (Rūkī 1998, 
216-225). Abū Ghudda argued that this position, especially when it comes to 
the HGP, should not be a disputable issue (Abū Ghudda 1998, 578). Abū Ghud-
da defended the relevance of the position of “original permissibility” to these 
new technologies by referring to the so-called principle of “scripturally unat-
tested or unregulated benefit” (al-maṣlaḥa al-mursala) which has its roots in 
the Islamic legal theory.20 Abū Ghudda recalled this principle to argue that un-
precedented situations, like the issues relating to genetics and the HGP, which 
entail recognized benefits but are not declared permissible or otherwise by a 
direct scriptural evidence, should be judged as permissible. According to him, 
the principle of al-maṣlaḥa al-mursala is crucial evidence recognized by Sha-
ria (dalīl Sharʿī) when one addresses novel issues (mustajaddāt) (Abū Ghudda 
1998, 577). 
As for the risk-benefit assessment or weighing expected benefits versus pos-
sible harms, the mode of reasoning and the resulting conclusions were both 
different from the precaution-inclined approach. Reference was made to a 
point that early Muslim religious scholars reiterated, namely the very nature 
20  For more information about this principle, see Hallaq 1997, 112-113; Opwis 2010, 165-173.
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of this life hardly allows for the existence of things that are purely and exclu-
sively beneficial (maṣlaḥa maḥḍa). The normal course of this life is that ev-
erything has two inseparable sides, one beneficial, the other harmful. What 
people should usually do is to weigh between these two sides and see which 
side is stronger than the other.21 As for the Human Genome Project (HGP) and 
technologies related to fields like genetics and genetic engineering, Abū Ghud-
da stressed the strength of the expected benefits within the scale of Sharia. 
According to him, such benefits are not luxuries but would rather fall within 
the highest degree of benefits, namely the necessities (al-ḍarūriyyāt). Instead, 
he recognized that possible harms should be taken seriously because they can 
eventually disturb one of the higher objectives of Sharia, namely safeguarding 
progeny (Abū Ghudda 1998, 577-579). Some religious scholars who participated 
in these discussions, like the Syrian Muḥammad Rawwās Qalʿajī, clearly stated 
that the argumentation of Abū Ghudda proved to be more convincing than 
that of al-Nashmī. The Syrian religious scholar, Aḥmad al-Ḥājjī al-Kurdī, added 
that al-Nashmī was quite uncharitable when he spoke of the possible harms of 
the HGP, many of which are not necessarily inevitable (Jundī 1998, 601-603). 
On the other hand, Abū Ghudda explained that such harms can be controlled, 
regulated or at least minimized through the mechanism of Sharia-based deter-
minants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya) so that one can make sure that the harms will not 
eventually override the benefits (Abū Ghudda 1998, 577-579). As the interdisci-
plinary deliberations during the 1998 symposium proceeded, the Egyptian re-
ligious scholar, Muḥammad Raʾfat ʿUthmān, despite his conservative opinions 
expressed by the beginning of the seminar, was convinced that the benefits of 
the HGP strongly override the possible harms. He tentatively expressed this 
opinion during the seminar (Jundī 1998, 300-301, 834) but his outspoken opin-
ion was expressed in his book on the genome and DNA, which was published 
in 2009. For instance, the view that the Human Genome Project (HGP) can 
eventually lead to genetic discrimination that, for him, is nothing but unjusti-
fied fear (ʿUthmān 2009, 79-80). On his turn, the Saudi gynecologist, ʿ Abd Allāh 
Bāsalāma, made use of the very theological framing presented by al-Nashmī 
to dispel such fears (Jundī 1998, 254-255). As long as one believes that nothing 
happens in this universe without God’s will, Bāsalāma argued, one should not 
worry about the fate of humans or even their possible ruin. At the end, humans 
are God’s creatures and He is the One who can protect them. It is God who, one 
21  In order to give credibility for this premise and its rootedness in the Islamic tradition, 
Abū Ghudda quoted the prominent religious scholar, al-ʿIzz Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 1263), 
who wrote one of the most authoritative and influential works related to the concept of 
maṣlaḥa. See Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām 1991. 
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day, can burn the factories, stop the flow of knowledge and put the whole life 
to an end (Jundī 1998, 254-255). 
The contributors to the embracement-inclined approach shared the con-
cerns raised by their peers in the precaution-inclined approach about the 
possible risks or harms that can result from the separation between scientif-
ic research conducted by Western institutions and the religious values (Abū 
Ghudda 1998, 577). As the deliberations of the 1998 symposium advanced, 
however, some of the participants insisted that Western institutions are still 
committed to strict standards and regulations despite the absence of outspo-
ken commitment to certain religious values. ʿ Abd al-Majīd Qaṭma, who already 
contributed to the first approach, conceded that the situation in countries like 
the United Kingdom might be much better than that in the Muslim world, 
thanks to thousands of civil society associations active in raising public aware-
ness (Jundī 1998, 838-839). In his paper submitted to the specialized seminar 
jointly organized by the IIFA and IOMS in 2013, Aḥmad al-Jundī gave a some-
how different picture about the relationship between genomics and religion in 
the Western context. He addressed the case of Francis Collins, the director of 
the HGP, who was said to be an atheist but then turned to be a believer in God 
because of his research in this field. After two years of contemplation, al-Jundī 
added, Collins eventually couched his journey of searching for the truth by 
saying “I found God in the human genome” (Jundī 2013, 24). Al-Jundī’s account 
of Collins’s combination of scientific excellence and belief in God missed a 
few but important nuances. The overall idea that Collins is a prominent scien-
tist and also a committed believer in God is already attested by his own book, 
The Language of God, published in 2006. However, the book shows that Collins 
was already a committed believer before leading the HGP, as he spoke about 
spending a long afternoon praying in a little chapel, seeking guidance from 
God whether he should accept the offer of being the HGP director (Collins 
2006, 119). Thus, Collins’ religious commitment did not arise because of his 
involvement in the field of genomics in particular, although it is clear that his 
unique experience with the HGP had a positive impact on his belief in God. 
Although it is an individual case, such an account of a scientist of the caliber 
of Collins shows that the situation in the West is not as gloomy as al-Nashmī 
and his likeminded peers may think and that scientists with commitment to 
religious values can still play leading roles in a scientific mega-venture like the 
HGP. However, one should not overstate the impact of this supposed science 
and faith harmony on the bioethical reasoning even for Collins himself. His 
aforementioned book was appended with a section on “The Moral Practice of 
Science and Medicine: Bioethics”. Collins argued that religious values could 
play a role, although limited, in the current bioethical deliberations despite 
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possible objections from professional bioethicists (Collins 2006, 235-270). But 
“I hesitate, however, to advocate very strongly for faith-based bioethics”, Col-
lins concluded (Collins 2006, 217). 
The above-sketched theological framing, the way the contributors to this 
approach viewed the risk-benefit assessment and the other related juristic and 
practical aspects, all paved the way to reach the following positive conclusion; 
Muslims’ contribution to fields like genetics, genetic engineering, gene therapy 
and the like is not only permissible, but is a collective duty (farḍ kifāya). Various 
arguments were advanced to support this conclusion. Contributing to these 
sciences and related technologies was seen as a positive response to the call of 
Islam to search for knowledge; whatever knowledge as long as it is beneficial 
for mankind. Throughout the history of Islamic civilization, Muslims provided 
significant contributions to science and it is now the turn of today’s Muslims to 
do the same through these emerging fields (Zuḥaylī 1998, 776; Kurdī 1998, 240; 
Khādimī 2004, 61). Furthermore, the applications of these emerging fields are 
meant to help humans improve their health through preventive or therapeutic 
techniques, and all of these fall within the scope of medical treatment (tadāwī), 
whose knowledge is also a collective duty from an Islamic perspective (Zuḥaylī 
1998, 777). The third key argument dealt with socio-political dimensions. As 
explained above, the contributors to Islamic bioethical discourse on genomics 
agreed that this field makes part of an impressive scientific revolution whose 
resulting technologies will determine the future, and even the fate, of countries 
worldwide (Jundī 1998, 13, 71, 251; Ḥatḥūt 1998, 274; Nashmī 1998, 545). The Tu-
nisian religious scholar, Nūr al-Dīn al-Khādimī, spoke about an ongoing civili-
zational race towards achieving scientific supremacy. Currently, he explained, 
modern scientific discoveries are under global non-Islamic, sometimes even 
inhumane, hegemony, which monopolizes the resulting technologies and of-
ten deprives Muslim countries from having access to these technologies and 
their benefits. This context of civilizational competition, al-Khādimī argued, 
dictates that the whole umma (Muslim nation) is under collective obligation 
(farḍ kifāya) to participate in promising fields like genetics and genomics. Po-
litical leaders and scientists, who have the ability to participate in exploring 
the genome, are even under individual obligation (farḍ ʿayn) to do so (Khādimī 
2004, 63; Khādimī 2007). In this vein, the idea of calling for a moratorium on 
scientific research in the Muslim world related to promising fields like genetics 
and genomics was vehemently opposed and seen as considerably harmful for 
the future of Muslim countries (Jundī 1998, 248, 251, 255, 258,). 
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C    Further Developments
The two main approaches examined in this chapter, with the associated ar-
guments and counter-arguments and internal agreements and disagreements, 
both contributed to shaping the Islamic discourse on the Human Genome 
Project (HGP) and genomics in general, in addition to guiding subsequent on-
the-ground developments in some Muslim countries.
As far as the overall framing of the HGP and genomics is concerned, the 
embracement-inclined approach proved to be more appealing and convinc-
ing than the precaution-inclined approach. This is clearly reflected in the final 
recommendations adopted by the conferences and expert meetings outlined 
in the first section of this chapter. In its Final Report and Recommendations, 
the 1993 seminar organized by the Faculty of Science at the University of Qa-
tar spoke highly of the HGP and considered it “the most ambitious scientific 
project in the history of mankind”, stressing that “Muslims should not be idle 
by-standers in this endeavor but should contribute their share to the study of 
the human biological heritage and to the study of man’s future”. Consequently, 
it called upon rich Islamic countries “to generously fund this research, at a level 
corresponding to the importance and size of the task, so that Muslims may 
be present in one of humanity’s most delicate enterprises and so that we may 
benefit from its far-reaching results” (ISESCO 1993, 263; Īsiskū 1993, 360-361). 
The same tone is reiterated in the final recommendations adopted by the 1998 
symposium that was organized by the IOMS. The recommendations made no 
mention of the quasi-determinist theological framing introduced by the pre-
caution-inclined approach, but adopted the other theological framing pro-
posed by the embracement-inclined approach. The HGP was framed as part of 
man’s quest to know oneself and to explore the laws governing God’s creation 
as implied in Quranic verses, such as: “We will show them Our signs in the uni-
verse and within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth” 
(Q. 14:53). At the practical juristic level, the position of the embracement-in-
clined approach was also adopted in these recommendations. The HGP was in-
troduced as an added value to the health and medical sciences in their mission 
to prevent and treat diseases. Thus, the recommendations concluded, reading 
the human genome falls within the scope of collective duties in society (Jundī 
1998, 1048). The same recommendations also included a call for Muslim coun-
tries to join the field of genetic engineering by establishing research centers 
whose activities should be in compliance with the Islamic Sharia (Jundī 1998, 
1047).22 By the end of the conference organized by the Dubai-based Centre for 
22  The exact points outlined in these recommendations were quoted verbatim in the recom-
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Arab Genomic Studies (CAGS) in 2007, the participants issued the so-called 
Dubai Declaration (Bayān Dubayy). The way the declaration was formulated 
shows that participating in the field of genomics was no longer a question 
anymore but a taken-for-granted fact, “Since the Arab World is capable of par-
ticipating in genome research, there is an urgent need for the formation of 
national committees where the mission is to define an ethics code for scientific 
research in each of the Arab countries and, subsequently, to coordinate be-
tween them and committees in other States”. So, the question to be addressed 
here is no longer whether these countries should contribute to genomics or 
not, but rather how their contribution should be regulated from an Islamic 
ethical and legal perspective (http://www.cags.org.ae/e0dubaideclaration.
pdf).
The subsequent on-the-ground developments in scientific research, at least 
in the countries that hosted some of the collective deliberations outlined in 
this chapter, also proved that the embracement-inclined approach had the 
upper hand. In December 2013, Qatar and Saudi Arabia declared launching 
their large-scale national human genome projects, each with a huge budget 
and strong political support at the governmental level.23 Available literature 
indicates that Islamic ethical deliberations, including those examined in this 
chapter, helped these projects and the associated biobanks in developing their 
guidelines. This has to do with the fact that “Islam is the dominant religion in 
these countries, and it affects people’s behavior and influences their positions” 
(Ghiath et al 2015, 53). As for the Saudi Biobank, the two researchers, Ghiath 
Alahmad and Kris Dierickx, stated that it was “designed in a manner to respect 
not only international guidelines and Saudi law but also Islamic values, as out-
lined by the Saudi Biobank governance document” (Alahmad and Dierickx 
2014, 682). The Qatar Biobank does not differ much from the Saudi biobank 
in this regard. In 2014, the biobank released a booklet entitled A Healthier Fu-
ture Starts with You, which addressed questions related to the relation between 
scientific biomedical research and Islamic values. The booklet also indicated 
that the Qatar Biobank is keen to make all its current and future activities 
compliant with Islam, in collaboration with the Research Center for Islamic 
Legislation & Ethics (CILE) (Qatar Biobank 2014, 12-13). The last conference 
of the Qatar Genome Program on “Ethics, Regulations, and Best Practices in 
Genomic Medicine”, held on 29-30 April 2018, was jointly organized with CILE, 
mendations adopted by the participants in the twenty-first session of the IIFA, which was 
held in November 2013 (http://www.iifa-aifi.org/2416.html).
23  For an overview of these two projects and parallel developments in other countries, see 
Ghaly 2016, 7-19. 
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which supervised two distinct sessions of the conference dedicated to discuss-
ing relevant ethical issues from an Islamic perspective.24 The influence of the 
precaution-inclined approach was most visible in highlighting the urgency of 
possible risks and harms associated with conducting research within fields like 
genetics and genomics. The final recommendations adopted by the 1998 sym-
posium and their updated version in 2013 adopted by the IIFA, like many other 
documents, strongly reflected the fears that this type of biomedical research 
can violate some Islamic values. The recommendations were included in a rela-
tively short text of about 1230 words. In such a concise text, about ten times the 
reference was made to the necessity of making sure that all research activities 
are in compliance with the Islamic Sharia and its core values. In support of this 
argument, we quote phrases like “No research, therapy or diagnosis related to 
someone’s gene or genome can be undertaken unless a rigorous assessment is 
conducted beforehand in order to measure the potential risks and benefits as-
sociated with these activities, in compliance with the provisions of Sharia” and 
“It is not permissible to use the genome in a harmful way or in any way that vi-
olates the Islamic Sharia” (Jundī 1998, 1046; http://www.iifa-aifi.org/2416.html). 
Despite such frequent references to the significance of abiding by the so-called 
Sharia-based determinants (ḍawābiṭ Sharʿiyya), unfortunately the final recom-
mendations were usually ambiguous about what exactly these determinants 
are. However, individual scholars who contributed to these Islamic bioethical 
deliberations have been trying to clarify some of these ḍawābiṭ on specific top-
ics like gene therapy, genetic testing, genetic counseling, DNA fingerprinting or 
profiling and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Jundī 1998, 6-10). 
Concluding Remarks
In the bestseller The Language of God, the acclaimed scientist and director of 
the Human Genome Project, Francis Collins, held that ethical dilemmas asso-
ciated with advances in genomics and related fields should not be left to the 
scientists alone to speculate. Although they have a critical role to play in the 
deliberations on such dilemmas, scientists’ perspectives should be espoused 
with a wide variety of other perspectives at the table (Collins 2006, 270-271). 
24  To attract high-quality research, CILE published a call-for-papers in both English and Ar-
abic (https://www.cilecenter.org/en/news/call-for-papers-policies-regulations-and-bio-
ethics-of-genomic-research/ ) and a Background Paper was drafted in order to stream-
line the discussions in the conference (https://www.cilecenter.org/en/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/Background-Paper-QGP-CILE-Conference-April-2018.pdf). 
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The review of the discussions on genomics and Islamic ethics presented in 
this chapter illustrates that this was the case when the ethical aspects of the 
Human Genome Project (HGP) and genomics were discussed in the Muslim 
world. Scientists collaborated with Muslim religious scholars through a certain 
mechanism of collective and interdisciplinary reasoning rooted in the Islamic 
tradition, known as al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī. 
By addressing the ethical questions of genomics and related fields through 
the mechanism of al-ijtihād al-jamāʿī, both biomedical scientists and religious 
scholars could achieve together what each group could not have done alone. 
Within this interdisciplinary setting, Muslim religious scholars could develop 
a kind of scientific literacy about genomics and gain scientific information 
that they otherwise would not have access to. However, these interdisciplin-
ary discussions were not without difficulties. Scientific information provided 
by biomedical scientists was not always clear enough or delivering the level 
of certainty that Muslim religious scholars were seeking. What must be done 
with such incomplete or indecisive information, especially when a rigorous 
benefit-risk assessment should be performed on cutting-edge technologies 
like those in the field of genetics and genomics? Where are the borderlines 
that should distinguish between the role to be played by the biomedical scien-
tists and the one assigned to religious scholars? Whose opinion should weigh 
heavier when the two groups disagree with each other? These were some of 
the controversial questions that the contributors to these interdisciplinary de-
liberations had to grapple with. This chapter reviewed the various ways used 
by these participants to address such questions and highlighted the key agree-
ments and disagreements. This study has also shown that the Islamic ethical 
deliberations had their own concerns, which we do not see, or at least do not 
occupy a central position, in parallel discussions in the West, e.g. the perceived 
separation between scientific research on one hand and religious guidance 
and associated values on the other. This made some religious scholars quite 
suspicious about the intentions, aims and long-term plans of scientific insti-
tutions based in the West and concurrently almost obsessed with the fear that 
the same separation can occur to scientific institutions (to be) based in the 
Muslim world. This point raises questions about the hypothetical universali-
ty of secular ethics and the conviction that non-religious ethics can speak for 
everybody, hence making it an integral part of the so-called public morality. 
These discussions showed that putting religious values aside when discussing 
the (un)ethical character of scientific research can be quite problematic for 
certain groups of people.
As for the overall position towards the Human Genome Project (HGP) and 
the field of genomics in general, the chapter analysed two main approaches. 
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The precaution-inclined approach is leaned towards taking the “safe side” 
option by requesting to wait and taking time before rushing into joining the 
on-going scientific research ventures related to emerging fields like genetics 
and genomics. To be on the safe side, overall preference is given to consider-
ing all related activities as prohibited until this is proven otherwise. The em-
bracement-inclined approach is more pre-emptive in nature, where the key 
governing idea is that Muslims should not remain idle anymore, and immedi-
ate pro-active steps must be taken to ensure that Muslim countries will make 
significant contributions to the on-going scientific revolution in these fields. A 
great deal of the chapter is dedicated to the detailed arguments and counter-
arguments of each approach. The study argues that the embracement-inclined 
approach proved to be more influential, both at the theoretical level of the eth-
ical discourse and at the practical level of actual genomics initiatives, which 
took place in some Muslim countries.
Despite the various breakthroughs achieved by the interdisciplinary discus-
sions reviewed in this chapter, these discussions have shown that there are 
serious challenges ahead. Generally speaking, there is a serious problem of 
pursuing the recent scientific updates in a rapidly growing field like genom-
ics. The material presented in the conferences and expert meetings held in 
the 1990s remained to be the only reference in all-subsequent discussions with 
hardly any significant updates, even after the completion of the HGP. With re-
gard to the informative component of these discussions, which is usually as-
signed to the biomedical scientists, it is clear that more specialists in genetics 
and genomics should be involved. One would also add that papers submitted 
to these meetings and conferences should be solicited from geneticists with a 
good publication record in the field, not just those who can read works pub-
lished by others and then translate them into Arabic. Additionally, the overall 
scientific literacy of religious scholars should improve, and they should not 
remain exclusively dependent on the papers submitted to each conference. 
As for the normative component which is generally entrusted to the religious 
scholars, much more rigorous tools should be developed to manage the bene-
fit-risk assessment, even if no conclusive information is not available yet. The 
discussions reviewed in this chapter, and also elsewhere (Ghaly 2012, 190-191), 
demonstrate that religious scholars usually expect biomedical scientists to 
only come up with information that has been verified and consequently get 
recognized as certain and conclusive, otherwise this will not be part of prop-
er science. This perception of science can be quite problematic, especially in 
fields like genomics and genetics. I would suggest addressing this problem by 
improving the literacy of religious scholars in philosophy of science in general 
and philosophy of medicine in particular. When it comes to clinical research, 
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clinical medicine and therapeutic interventions in particular, philosophers of 
medicine indicate that uncertainty is unavoidable, with just a few exceptions 
like vaccination and antibiotics. The same holds true for preventive medicine 
where uncertainty proliferates and thus claims of certainty are often baseless. 
Bearing this mind, decisions and judgements in clinical medicine are usually 
based on plausibility more than on certainty. William Osler, the renowned Ca-
nadian physician known as the “Father of Modern Medicine”, recognized this 
fact when he called medicine the art of probability and the science of uncer-
tainty (Thompson and Upshur 2018, 3, 77, 122, 127, 138, 141, 144). 
As for the contributors to these interdisciplinary discussions, only two 
groups still dominate the discussions, namely biomedical scientists and re-
ligious scholars. However, the complexity of the ethical dilemmas raised by 
fields like genomics and genetic engineering necessitate having various groups 
with much more diversified backgrounds. The group of religious scholars usu-
ally consists, dominantly or exclusively, of specialists in Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh); the so-called jurists (fuqahāʾ). However, the vast Islamic tradition can-
not be reduced to the discipline of fiqh, despite its recognized significance in 
the Islamic bioethical discourse. The absence of specialists in Islamic theology 
and philosophy in the discussions reviewed in this chapter was reflected in 
the somehow poor and superficial discourse on the intersection between ge-
nomics and Islamic theology and philosophy. Serious ethical dilemmas with 
crucial theological and philosophical underpinnings were completely missing, 
including the very concept of soul and its possible relation with the genome.25 
Surely, these interdisciplinary discussions would be much more enriched once 
the pool of participants get progressively diversified by adding specialists in 
other related fields depending on the topics to be addressed, e.g. social sci-
ences, medical anthropology, secular bioethics, Jewish and Christian bioethics, 
medical law, etc. We hope that the material included in this volume will set the 
suitable base for filling some of the abovementioned gaps. 
25  The background paper of the CILE seminar, organized on 3-5 April 2017, whose proceed-
ings are published in this volume, outlined some of these issues and questions like: what 
makes us distinctively human? How to determine the boundaries between what is nor-
mal/natural and abnormal/unnatural? How should the controversy on determinism and 
free will be revisited in the age of genomics? (https://www.cilecenter.org/en/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/Genomics-Background-Paper-English.pdf). 
References 
Abrahamov, Binyamin. 1989. “A Re-Examination of al-Ashʿarī’s Theory of Kasb Accord-
ing to Kitāb al-Lumaʿ”. The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and 
Ireland 2: 210-221.
Abū Ghudda, ʿAbd al-Sattār. 1998. “Al-Muwākaba al-Sharʿiyya li muʿṭayāt al-handasa 
al-wirāthiyya”. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī wa 
al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: Ruʾya Islāmiya, edited by Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī, 573-594. Kuwait: Islamic 
Organization for Medical Sciences. 
Alahmad, Ghiath and Kris Dierickx. 2014. “Confidentiality, Informed Consent and Chil-
dren’s Participation in the Saudi Biobank Governance: A Comparative Study”. East-
ern Mediterranean Health Journal 20 (11): 681-689. 
Alahmad, Ghiath, Mohammed Al Jumah and Kris Dierickx. 2015. Confidentiality, In-
formed Consent, and Children’s Participation in Research Involving Stored Tissue 
Samples: Interviews with Medical Professionals from the Middle East”. Narrative 
Inquiry in Bioethics 5(1): 53-66. 
Al-Munaẓẓama al-Islāmiyya li al-Tarbya wa al-ʿUlūm wa al-Thaqāfa (Īsiskū). 1993. Al-In-
ʿikāsāt al-akhlāqiyya li al-abḥāth al-mutaqddima fī ʿilm al-wirātha. Rabat, Morocco: 
Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization & Tripoli, Libya: World 
Islamic Call Society.
Amīn, Ṭāhā. 2003. “Qirāʾa īmāniyya li al-jīnūm al-Basharī”. Al-Waʿy al-Islāmī 39 (447): 
37-41.
Anees, Munawar. 1993. “Biological Sciences: Moral Mediators in the Making? In Islamic 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO)”. Ethical Implications of 
Modern Researches in Genetics, 77-88. Rabat, Morocco: Islamic Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization & Tripoli, Libya: World Islamic Call Society. 
Baʿdānī, Muḥammad Nuʿmān al-. 2016. Tabwīb qarārāt majmaʿayy al-fiqh (al-dawlī wa 
al-rābiṭa) ilā al-dawra al-thānya wa al-ʿishrīn. Available at http://www.saaid.net/
book/open.php?cat=4&book=11261 retrieved on 26 May 2018.
Bār, Muḥammad ʿAlī al-. 1998. “Naẓra fāḥiṣa lī al-fuḥūṣāṭ al-ṭibbiya al-jīniyya (al-faḥṣ 
qabl al-zawāj wa al-istishāra al-wirāthiyya)”. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthi-
yya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya., edited by Jundī, Aḥmad 
Rajāʾī, 621-662. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences.
Boddington, Paula. 2012. Ethical Challenges in Genomics Research: A Guide to Under-
standing Ethics in Context. New York: Springer.
Collins, Francis. 2006. The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. New 
York: Free Press. 
ELSI Research Planning and Evaluation Group. 2000. A Review and Analysis of the Eth-
ical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) Research Programs at the National Insti-
tutes of Health and the Department of Energy. Available at http://www.genome.gov/
Ghaly76
Pages/Research/DER/ELSI/erpeg_report.pdf (retrieved on 25 May 2018)
Ghaly, Mohammed. 2010. Islam and Disability: Perspectives in Theology and Jurispru-
dence. London: Routledge. 
Ghaly, Mohammed. 2012. “The Beginning of Human Life: Islamic Bioethical Perspec-
tives”. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 47 (1): 175-213.
Ghaly, Mohammed. 2015. “Biomedical Scientists as Co-Muftis: Their Contribution to 
Contemporary Islamic Bioethics”. Die Welt des Islams 55: 286-311. 
Ghaly, Mohammed. 2016. Genomics in the Gulf Region and Islamic Ethics: The Eth-
ical Management of Incidental Findings. Doha, Qatar. based World Innovative 
Summit for Health (WISH). Available at http://www.wish.org.qa/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/01/Islamic-Ethics-Report-EnglishFINAL.pdf, retrieved 28 May 2018. 
Ghaly, Mohammed. 2016a. ʿIlm al-jīnūm fī minṭaqat al-Khalīj: idārat al-natāʾij al-ʿaraḍi-
yya min manẓūr Islāmī. Doha, Qatar: World Innovative Summit for Health (WISH). 
Available at http://www.wish.org.qa/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Islamic-Eth-
ics-Report-Arabic.pdf, retrieved 28 May 2018.
Green, Eric, James Watson and Francis Collins. 2015. “Twenty-Five Years of Big Biology”. 
Nature 526: 29-31.
Ḥaffār, Saʿīd al-. 1993. “Al-Inʿikāsāt al-qiyamiyya wa al-khlāqiyya wa al-qānūniyya wa 
al-insāniyya li abraz munjazāt al-thawra al-iḥyāʾiyya”. In Al-Munaẓẓama al-Islāmi-
yya li al-Tarbya wa al-ʿUlūm wa al-Thaqāfa (Īsiskū) (1993). Al-Inʿikāsāt al-akhlāqiyya 
li al-abḥāth al-mutaqddima fī ʿilm al-wirātha, 123-139. Rabat, Morocco: Islamic Edu-
cational, Scientific and Cultural Organization & Tripoli, Libya: World Islamic Call 
Society.
Hallaq, Wael. 1997. A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Uṣūl 
Al-Fiqh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ḥatḥūt, Ḥassān. 1998. “Qirāʾat al-jīnūm al-basharī”. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa 
al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya., edited by 
Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī 273-286. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences. 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, al-ʿIzz. 1991. Qawāʿid al-aḥkām fī maṣāliḥ al-anām. Edited by Ṭāhā 
ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Saʿd. Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyya.
Idrīs, ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ. 2003. “Al-Amn al-maṭlūb li al-kharīṭa al-jīniyya”. Majallat al-Waʿy 
al-Islāmī 40 (450): 22-25.
International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA). 1998. Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 
(11). Jeddah: International Islamic Fiqh Academy. 
Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO). 1993. Ethical Im-
plications of Modern Researches in Genetics. Rabat, Morocco: Islamic Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization & Tripoli, Libya: World Islamic Call Society. 
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2011. Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic Age. Cam-
bridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Jundī, Aḥmad al-.1998a. “Lamḥa ḥawla al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī 
77Islamic Ethics and Genomics
78 Ghaly
wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: Ruʾya Islāmiyya”. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-
jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: Ruʾya Islāmiya, edited by Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī, 23-
30. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences.
Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī. 1998. Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-
basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical 
Sciences. 
Jundī, Aḥmad. 2013. “Al-Jīnūm al-Basharī min al-naẓariyya ilā al-taṭbīq”. In Buḥūth wa 
tawṣiyyāt al-nadwa al-ʿilmiyya ḥawla al-wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-
jīnūm al-basharī min manẓūr Islāmī, edited by Abū ʿAlyū, 14- 24. Jeddah: Interna-
tional Islamic Fiqh Academy. An online version can be accessed via https://www.
imamu.edu.sa/elibrary/Documents/Genetic_Engineering.pdf (retrieved 21 June 
2018)
Kanʿān, Aḥmad Muḥammad. 2003. “Al-Jīnūm al-basharī wa taqniyyāt al-handasa 
al-wirāthiyya: muqārabāt fiqhiyya”. Majallat al-Buḥūth al-fiqhiyya al-Muʿāṣira 15 
(60): 68-101.
Kaye, Jane et al. 2012. “ELSI 2.0 for Genomics and Society”. Science 336: 673–674. 
Khādimī, Nūr al-Dīn al-. 2003. “Al-Jīnūm al-basharī”. Majallat al-Buḥūth al-fiqhiyya 
al-Muʿāṣira 15 (58): 7-48.
Khādimī, Nūr al-Dīn al-. 2004. “Al-Kharīṭa al-jīniyya al-bashariyya (al-jīnūm al-basharī): 
al-aḥkām al-Sharʿiyya wa al-ḍawābiṭ al-akhlāqiyya”. Majallat al-Mishkāh 2: 59-76.
Khādimī, Nūr al-Dīn al-. 2007. “Al-Ḍawābiṭ al-Sharʿiyya li buḥūth al-jīnūm al-basharī”. 
A paper presented to the second conference on “Pan Arab Human Genetics” held 
in November 2007, available at http://www.cags.org.ae/e1khadami.pdf (Retrieved 
20 June 2018). 
Kulliyyat al-Sharīʿa wa al-Qānūn. 2002. Al-Handasa al-wirāthiyya bayna al-Sharīʿa wa 
al-qānūn. Al-Ain, UAE: United Arab Emirates University. 
Kurdī, Aḥmad al-Ḥājjī al-. 1998. “Al-Handasa al-wirāthiyya fī al-nabāt wa al-ḥayawān 
wa ḥukm al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya fīhā”. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa 
al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya., edited by Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī, 
229-242. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences.
Maymān, Nāṣir al-. 1998. “Al-Irshād al-jīnī: ahammiyyatuh – āthāruh -maḥādhīruh”. 
In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: 
Ruʾya Islāmiya, edited by Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī, 797-824. Kuwait: Islamic Organiza-
tion for Medical Sciences.
Morrison, Michael, Donna Dickenson and Sandra Soo-Jin Lee. 2016. Introduction to 
The Article Collection “Translation in Healthcare: Ethical, Legal, and Social Impli-
cations”. BMC Medical Ethics 17 (74): 1-6.
Nashmī, ʿAjīl al-. 1998. Al-Waṣf al-Sharʿī li al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī. In Jundī, 
Aḥmad Rajāʾī (ed.) Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī 
wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya, 545-570. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical 
Sciences.
Nasim, Anwar. 1993. “Genetic Manipulations and Ethical Issues: Challenges for the 
Muslim World. In Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISES-
CO)” Ethical Implications of Modern Researches in Genetics, 59-74. Rabat, Morocco: 
Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization & Tripoli, Libya: World 
Islamic Call Society.
Opwis, Felicitas. 2010. Maṣlaḥa and the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal 
Change from the 4th/10th to 8th/14th Century. Leiden: Brill.
Qatar Biobank. 2014. A Healthier Future Starts with You. Doha: Qatar Biobank. 
Rabinow, Paul, and Gaymon Bennett. 2009. “Synthetic Biology: Ethical Ramifications 
2009”. Systems and Synthetic Biology 3 (1-4): 99-108.
Raysūnī, Aḥmad al-. 2010. Abḥāth fī al-maydān. Cairo: Dār al-Kalima li al-Nashr wa 
al-Tawzīʿ. 
Rizq, Hānī. 2003. Mūjaz tārīkh al-kawn: min al-infijār al-ʿaẓīm ilā al-istinsākh al-basharī. 
Damascus: Dār al-Fikr.
Rizq, Hānī. 2007. Al-Jīnūm al-basharī wa akhlāqiyyātuh. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr.
Rūkī, Muḥammad al-. 1998. “Al-Istifāda min al-handasa al-wirāthiyya fī al-ḥayawān wa 
al-nabāt wa ḍawābiṭuhā al-Sharʿiyya”. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa 
al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya, edited by Jundī, Aḥmad Rajāʾī, 
211-225. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences.
Thompson, R. Paul and Ross E. Upshur. 2018. Philosophy of Medicine: An Introduction. 
New York: Routledge.
Thorpe, Charles. 2006. Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
ʿUthmān, Muḥammad Raʾfat. 2009. Al-Mādda al-wirāthiyya: al-jīnūm. Cairo: Maktabat 
Wahba.
Willyard, Cassandra. 2018. Expanded Human Gene Tally Reignites Debate. Nature vol. 
558: 354-355.
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya bi al-Kuwayt. 1983-2006. Al-Mawsūʿa 
al-fiqhiyya. Kuwait: Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs.
Zuḥaylī, Muḥammad al-. 1998. Al-Irshād al-jīnī. In Al-Wirātha wa al-handasa al-wirāthi-
yya wa al-jīnūm al-basharī wa al-ʿilāj al-jīnī: ruʾya Islāmiya, edited by Jundī, Aḥmad 
Rajāʾī, 773-793. Kuwait: Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences.
Islamic Ethics and Genomics 79
chapter 3
Transformation of the Concept of the Family in 
the Wake of Genomic Sequencing: An Islamic 
Perspective
Ayman Shabana1
The twentieth century witnessed many life-changing scientific and techno-
logical achievements that touch almost all aspects of human life both at the 
individual and collective levels.2 One of the most fascinating and impactful 
discoveries has been the identification of the human genetic structure in the 
form of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Subsequent efforts aimed to decipher 
the entire human genetic makeup, which was successfully achieved with the 
completion of the Human Genome Project. The human DNA has become the 
main marker of personal identity, if not even destiny, with its ability to reveal 
important information about one’s current as well as future health conditions. 
Consequently, it has opened up a new chapter in the history of medicine with 
the introduction of personalized medicine, which aims to evaluate individuals’ 
healthcare needs on the basis of their genetic structures. It has also acquired a 
metaphysical status with its comparison with the soul and its identification as 
the locus of human personhood, although unlike a soul it has a physical exis-
tence (Chadwick 2006, 256). 
On the other hand, the availability of this genetic information has raised 
serious ethical, legal and social questions that concern not only the individuals 
whose DNA is being examined but also their families. Increasingly physicians 
and life scientists are trying to come to terms with the fact that having a ge-
netic condition (disease or mutation) is a family experience, rather than an 
individual one. To what extent then does this new medical and scientific state 
1 Associate Research Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar 
(SFS-Q), as2432@georgetown.edu 
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of affairs change/challenge our perception of family relationships and the very 
concept of the family itself? What does it mean to be related to someone? Does 
this rest solely on biological or genetic factors? And finally, to what extent does 
this biological revolution impact relationship with future family members? 
Modern genomic technology has inspired many technical applications that 
have forced reconsideration of many aspects of the family. The most striking 
feature of these applications is not only their ability to impact existing family 
relationships but also, more poignantly, to influence important traits and char-
acteristics in prospective offspring. This chapter aims to highlight some of the 
numerous vexing questions that these applications raise for both existing as 
well as prospective family relationships and to explore the range of Islamic re-
sponses to these questions. More particularly, it discusses the extent to which 
these technologies challenge an ideal Islamic model of the family as well as 
the distinctive characteristics of such a model. At the core of these discussions 
lies a central question on the permissibility/desirability of utilizing these new 
technologies. In other words, should they be celebrated as a gift of the God-giv-
en human intellect or avoided due to their involvement of uncalculated risks 
that threaten to disrupt the original order of divine creation? The chapter 
examines the extent to which various applications of genetic technology are 
transforming some of the most important aspects governing the structure of 
the family in terms of its formation through marriage and also individuals’ 
ability to control the reproductive process by influencing basic genetic charac-
teristics of their prospective children. In exploring Islamic discourses on these 
issues, particular focus is placed on the normative pronouncements as well 
as related discussions of several transnational institutions such as the Islam-
ic Organization for Medical Sciences, the Islamic Fiqh Council of the Muslim 
World League, and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organiza-
tion of Islamic Cooperation. Several recent studies aimed to provide Islamic 
perspectives and guidelines on cutting edge genetic and genomic research but 
they have not paid close attention to this normative body of literature that 
was generated by these institutions (Al Aqeel 2007; El Shanti et al 2015). This 
chapter, therefore, aims to contribute to existing scholarship by highlighting 
the potential role that this literature can play in this regard.
Genetic Revolution and Genetic Testing 
The history of modern genetic testing goes back to 1953, when Francis Crick 
and James Watson identified the basic genetic structure (the deoxyribonucle-
ic acid or DNA) in the form of a double helix, which comprises the chemical 
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compounds responsible for the production and maintenance of all living or-
ganisms. This major scientific discovery was the prelude to the successful com-
pletion of the Human Genome Project in 2003. This major scientific achieve-
ment is said to have ushered a transition from an industrial age to a biotech 
age (Rifkin 2006, 46). Enthusiastic depictions characterize the human genome 
as the book of life, the code of codes, or the human blueprint (Rose 2006, 
252). The entire human genetic repository (genome) consists of 20.000-25.000 
genes, which exist in the form of extended segments (of varying length) on the 
base pairs that make up the spiral staircase or double helix. A human genome 
consists of a total of 3 billion base pairs within the nucleus of each cell, which 
are bundled into 46 chromosomes. They are arranged into 23 pairs, out of 
which 22 are the same for both males and females and only one (the sex chro-
mosome) varying between a male and a female. Sequencing of the entire hu-
man genome has inspired scientists to develop various types of tests to screen 
genetic disorders and devise means to fix them or preempt their occurrence. 
Genetic disorders occur as a result of mutations or alteration in one’s genetic 
structure, which can then be passed down to subsequent generations. Genetic 
alterations are responsible for as many as 4000 hereditary diseases and genetic 
tests are now available for over 1000 diseases, which are expected to increase 
in the future (Vaughn 2010, 460-1). Some of the most common types of genetic 
tests include: newborn screening for detection and early treatment of certain 
diseases; carrier testing to determine whether a person is a carrier of a partic-
ular disease; predictive testing, especially in case of family history; diagnostic 
testing for confirmation purposes; prenatal testing to screen fetuses for certain 
disorders such as the Down Syndrome; and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) to screen IVF embryos prior to implantation into the mother’s uterus 
(Vaughn 2010, 462). Despite their immense potentials, these tests are quite 
complex to the extent that some researchers question their utility. Part of this 
complexity is due to the nature of their results, which are usually probabilistic 
rather than conclusive.3 Moreover, tests can hardly confirm whether a partic-
ular genetic disorder is linked to a single gene mutation, multiple mutations, 
or yet as a combination of gene mutations and other environmental factors. 
Scientists cannot identify all possible mutations responsible for a particular 
disease (apart from available tests) or even potential mutations that may occur 
in the future. Also, severity of symptoms may vary from one case to anoth-
er depending on interaction with other factors. Finally, the most challenging 
aspect about genetic testing is availability of effective treatment. Testing can 
3 On the probability rather than certainty of genetic test results, see Emslie and Hunt 2006, 
104.
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only confirm a particular diagnosis but this does not mean that there is a cure 
for every (known) disorder.4 
Impact of Genetic Technology on Existing and Prospective Family 
Relationships
Many researchers note that genomic technology is changing medicine in 
significant ways. For the purpose of this chapter, one remarkable feature of 
these genomics-driven changes is the growing realization of one’s biological 
ties and connections with family members. With reference to the different 
types of genetic testing mentioned above, it is often noted that revelation of 
test results is not always a blessing because the process usually comes with a 
psychological toll regardless of the outcome of the testing process. Most im-
portantly, these results often do not pertain to the individual being tested but 
they may be relevant to family members as well, thereby raising the question 
whether it would be necessary to share this information with related family 
members who are likely to be affected. For individual patients, the situation 
may vary depending on availability of a cure. In other words, one’s decision to 
share testing results with family members who are expected to develop simi-
lar symptoms may depend on whether a medical treatment already exists or 
not. Some may find that revelation of distressing information in the form of 
susceptibility to develop an untreatable condition such as Alzheimer’s disease 
would be of little use if not outright harmful. On the other hand, treating phy-
sicians may find themselves torn between a patient’s right to autonomy (in 
case they do not wish to reveal test results to family members who are likely 
to be affected) and the duty to prevent harm to others (by sharing such infor-
mation) (Vaughn 2010, 464-5). While some may argue that the revelation of 
testing results should be the norm, others argue that revelation of test results 
is not always useful especially when susceptibility to genetic disorder may lead 
to genetic discrimination in the form of bias by an employer or an insurance 
company.5 From another perspective incidental or inadvertent findings during 
the testing process could have serious social implications as is the case with 
4 For example a 2002 study showed that 81 percent of respondents wanted to undertake genet-
ic testing when a cure is available. See Vaughn 2010, 463.
5 In the United States, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (2008) prohibits dis-
crimination by an employer or an insurance agency on the basis of genetic information. Un-
documented cases of discrimination, however, are difficult to account for. See Vaughn 2010, 
466
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misattributed paternity (Reilly 2006, 67). The use of genetic testing for pater-
nity verification is particularly interesting in light of the fact that it has been 
adopted in many jurisdictions as the main method for the legal ascertainment 
of paternity. Within the Muslim context it has stirred heated debates due to 
significant ramifications on Islamic family regulations.
Modern advances in genetic technology have not only impacted existing 
family relationships but they have also allowed the possibility of predetermin-
ing the nature and shape of these relationships. For example, recent genomic 
advances have given rise to a wide array of procedures that aim at screening 
and even manipulating human genetic structure for therapeutic or non-ther-
apeutic enhancement purposes through various types of genetic testing and 
genetic engineering. The outcome of these procedures could have lasting 
consequences for prospective family members. Some of the most important 
examples include carrier or predictive genetic testing, which can be undertak-
en to ensure proper matching for marital purposes. Prospective couples may 
undergo these tests to circumvent certain genetic disorders in future offspring, 
especially in societies where consanguineous marriages are common. In these 
cases, testing aims to screen couples to determine whether one or both indi-
viduals are carriers of a genetic disorder.6 Carriers possess one copy of a gene 
mutation and this does not mean that they do or will have the disease but 
when two carriers get married their children will inherit two copies of the mu-
tated gene responsible for a particular disease (e.g. cystic fibrosis or Tay-Sachs), 
which will significantly increase their chance of having the disease. Apart from 
legal enforceability of these tests, which would depend on particular jurisdic-
tions, these tests pose a series of moral concerns for these prospective couples 
and also for their families such as necessity to submit to these tests, sharing 
test results, possibility of concluding marriage despite positive test results, and 
finally impact on and responsibility towards future offspring (Vaughn 2010, 
462).
Another example of tests that affect prospective family members is prenatal 
testing, which is undertaken during pregnancy to screen fetuses for particular 
diseases such as the Down Syndrome, which is found to be common when 
pregnancy occurs after the age of 35. While these tests can be useful in assuring 
parents about the health status of a fetus they raise the problem of moral de-
6 Premarital genetic screening has been used in places like Cyprus, where Thalassemia is a 
major public health issue, to reduce birth rate of affected babies. Some studies show that a 
large percentage of prospective couples who learn that they are both carriers before marriage 
continue with marriage. The majority of those couples use prenatal diagnosis in every preg-
nancy and resort to abortion when fetuses are affected. See Modell 2006, 119. 
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cision-making in case an abnormality is detected, for which the main solution 
is often abortion. Legality of abortion would depend on several factors such as 
the age of the fetus, the moral-religious perspective, and also the legal juris-
diction in question. This particular case of selective abortion, however, raises 
several additional ethical questions pertaining to perception of and attitude 
towards disability and disabled persons. Another problem has to do with the 
certainty of diagnosis or even percentage of accuracy. Ultimately this testing 
raises a question about the extent to which it can be used to screen for common 
disorders that can be treated with drugs? (Vaughn 2010, 466-7) Similarly, pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) shares a great deal with prenatal testing 
because it also aims to screen embryos or pre-embryos for genetic disorders 
prior to implantation into the uterus. While this type of testing also highlights 
the two issues of sanctity of human life and moral status of embryos, it also 
poses a set of additional moral concerns associated with the nature and objec-
tive of this testing. Equally problematic is preimplantation genetic screening 
(PGS), when it is undertaken for fetal sex selection to ensure pregnancy with 
a fetus of a desired sex, as it raises questions of gender discrimination and 
natural gender balance. 
In the same vein, different applications of genetic engineering raise similar 
questions pertaining to prospective offspring. Ability to decipher human genes 
and identify their functions inspired efforts to repair mutated or faulty genes 
through gene therapy or genetic engineering. This could take the form of re-
placing, fixing, or activating particular genes. Gene therapy may target regular 
body (somatic) cells or germline (ovum or sperm) cells. While somatic gene 
therapy aims to fix a disorder within a person’s body, germline gene therapy 
impacts one’s offspring. Although this latter type of gene therapy is not yet 
available, it raises the question of manipulating the genetic structure of pro-
spective children, which is sometimes referred to as “designer babies.” While 
somatic gene therapy undertaken for therapeutic purposes is usually praised 
as a commendable undertaking, germline gene therapy, similar to PGD and 
PGS, raises a question about the merit of enhancement as well as the boundar-
ies of legitimate and illegitimate intervention. Most importantly, it also raises 
a question about making important and lasting decisions on behalf of future 
generations and whether this is warranted or even desirable (Vaughn 2010, 
468; Barry 2012, 254). Finally, stem cell research also raises questions about en-
hancement and boundaries of proper and improper use of stem cells. Stem 
cells are particularly important due to their high therapeutic potential and also 
their ability to develop into any type of body cells. The main ethical problem 
associated with stem cell research has been the need to destroy embryos in the 
process of extracting them. Although this problem has been resolved after the 
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development of a technique to reprogram adult cells to function as embryonic 
stem cells, some argue that it is premature to judge the extent to which this 
technique can actually match or replace the need for embryonic stem cells. 
Prior to the emergence of this technique in 2007, the two main sources to ex-
tract stem cells were IVF surplus embryos and embryos specifically created for 
research. Two main methods are used for the creation of embryos for research: 
parthenogenesis (stimulation of unfertilized eggs from which stem cells can 
be extracted); and somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT), which is also known 
as cloning. The latter process involves the extraction of the nucleus of an egg 
and replacing it with the nucleus of a regular somatic cell (Barry 2012, 266). 
Therapeutic cloning involves the creation of embryos just for the purpose of 
research. On the other hand, reproductive cloning involves implantation of 
the created embryo in the uterus, consequently resulting in a copy of the nu-
cleus donor. The birth of Dolly the sheep in 1997 marked the success of the 
procedure in animals, although to date the procedure has not been tried in 
humans. This scientific feat, however, stirred reverberating waves of anxiety 
worldwide, which inspired global consensus on the prevention of human re-
productive cloning and the need to develop appropriate research guidelines 
on these procedures. Nonetheless, the scientific possibility of developing hu-
man clones raises important questions not only about human exceptionalism 
but also about the integration of such clones within families and the social 
order in general (Barry 2012, 282-5).
Islamic Family Regulations and Genomic Technology
Since the emergence of the various applications of modern genetic technolo-
gy, ethicists worldwide, both religious and secular, have been grappling with 
the moral quandaries that they have engendered. Within the Muslim context, 
responses have come mainly from Muslim jurists, which reflects the continu-
ing influence of Sharia law for the definition of Islamic normativity. The Is-
lamic legal corpus includes detailed regulations on various aspect of family 
affairs, which continue to inform related legislation in most Muslim majority 
countries. In light of the remarkable diversity and plurality within the Islamic 
legal tradition, these juristic regulations were often debated and even contest-
ed among jurists of the various legal schools. With the development of bio-
medical technology, however, Muslim jurists have been forced to revisit certain 
legal opinions and doctrines that were based mainly on pre-modern medical 
knowledge and experience. One of the earliest examples is the ruling pertain-
ing to the maximum duration of a viable pregnancy. In the modern period it 
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has been fixed to one single year instead of the extended periods that classical 
jurists accommodated in order to preserve, to the extent possible, the sanctity 
of marriage and reputation of married women. It is important to keep in mind 
that legal integration of technical applications or revision of legal opinions 
and doctrines in light of advances in scientific knowledge remains subject to a 
process of negotiation that often requires extensive deliberation and scrutiny 
by both legal and scientific experts within a particular social and cultural con-
text. Each of the above-mentioned procedures is already being subjected to 
this process of deliberation and scrutiny. Below I explore Islamic discourses on 
three main issues: premarital genetic testing, fetal sex selection, and germline 
genetic modification.
Islamic Law and Medical Suitability for Marriage
Contemporary juristic deliberations on premarital genetic testing are often 
placed within the context of classical juristic discussions on health-related 
concerns and their role in either facilitating the conclusion of marriage or 
warranting its termination.7 This includes different rules, principles, and gen-
eral injunctions that aim to prevent diseases or to encourage their treatment. 
For example, this would cover criteria for the choice of marital partners; pro-
nouncements on guarding against diseases in general and avoiding their caus-
es; and health-related defects sanctioning dissolution of marriage.8 
Islamic injunctions pertaining to marriage often emphasize the choice of 
marital partners on the basis of their moral character. Several pronounce-
ments also address physical suitability for marriage. In this context explicit 
warning against consanguineous marriage is meant to avoid any negative im-
pact on the health of future children, which has been confirmed by modern ge-
netic research. The Islamic tradition includes several references discouraging 
this practice on the basis of the observation that consanguineous marriages 
often result in weaker offspring. The most important reference is attributed 
to the second Caliph ʿUmar who advised the clan of al-Sāʾib to marry outside 
close family circles (Abū Ghuddah 2000, 1:585; Mahrān 2002, 226-7). Several 
7 Both this section on premarital genetic testing and the following one on fetal sex selection 
draw heavily on an earlier publication, see Shabana 2017, 201-213.
8 Researchers often distinguish between general premarital medical testing, which screens 
for particular viral or contagious diseases and premarital genetic testing, which screens for 
genetic conditions that are likely to affect prospective children. While the first type is not 
contested due to its immediate benefits for the couples themselves, the second is debated 
due to its hypothetical or inconclusive nature. See ʿAbd Allāh 2007, 9-13; ʿIbādah 2010, 17. 
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Prophetic narratives are also reported but their authenticity have been ques-
tioned. The ban on marriage with the prohibited degrees mentioned in the 
Qurʾān (4:23) supports this attitude favoring strangers as marital partners over 
close family members, which is said to be rooted in both physical and psycho-
logical considerations (al-Muḥammadī 2005, 321-3).
Apart from these general injunctions on the selection of the marital part-
ner, the Islamic normative tradition includes numerous references emphasiz-
ing the importance of taking preventive measures to avoid diseases either by 
contagion or any other means. The issue of contagion has been particularly 
problematic due to several competing references that seem to give different 
connotations on the exact relationship between contagion and actual occur-
rence of particular diseases. This causal connection between contagion and ill-
ness has often triggered larger theological questions pertaining to the efficacy 
of independent causes and the extent to which a belief in such efficacy would 
conflict with God’s omnipotence.9 
With few exceptions, contemporary jurists often do not oppose premarital 
genetic testing but they disagree, however, on the extent to which it can be 
enforced.10 In general scholars can be divided into two main groups: those who 
argue for the enforcement of premarital genetic testing and those who argue 
that it should remain optional. Jurists who argue for enforceability emphasize 
physical fitness as an important condition for the achievement of the ideal ob-
jectives of marriage, which include sexual gratification and emotional fulfill-
ment. They also emphasize the right of progeny to a healthy life, which involves 
protecting them against harmful or dysfunctional genes (al-Muḥammadī 2005, 
321; al-Zuhaylī 2000; Shabīhunā 2000). Jurists who argue for optionality, on the 
other hand, link their attitude to the question of medical treatment in gener-
al which, according to this line of reasoning, is considered permissible rather 
than obligatory (ʿUthmān 2000).
Supporters of the enforcement of premarital testing point out the impor-
tance of exercising discretion when it comes to the choice (takhayyur) of the 
marital partner as indicated in several Prophetic reports. These injunctions 
on the proper selection of marriage partners can lend support to premarital 
genetic testing, which would equip prospective couples with valuable infor-
mation regarding their own health as well as the health of their children (Abū 
9 For a discussion on the question of contagion in the Islamic tradition, see Stearns 2011. 
10 Some scholars, such as the late Saudī jurist ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz bin Bāz, argued against premar-
ital genetic testing on the grounds that results can be inaccurate. It is also argued that in 
principle couples are presumed to be free from genetic diseases, which obviates the need 
for genetic testing. See al-Shuwayrakh 2007, 128-9.
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Ghuddah 2000, 1:583).11 In this regard statements against consanguineous 
marriages are read in light of modern biomedical findings linking consanguin-
eous marriage with increased likelihood for genetic disorders in the second 
generation. For example, the Syrian jurist Muḥammad al-Zuḥaylī argues that 
if tests show more than 50% chance of serious genetic disorders, legal action 
can be taken to prevent marriage in this case (al-Zuḥaylī 2000, 2:784; Abū 
Ghuddah 2000, 1:584; ʿAbd Allāh 2000, 2:740-1).12 With regard to the issue of 
physical health, supporters of this attitude highlight the importance of guard-
ing against all types of diseases, whether by contagion or any other means.13 
On the issue of contagion, they rarely question its influence and they large-
ly do not think that such influence would imply contradiction with religious 
faith. In this regard textual references supporting the influence of contagion 
are emphasized and other competing references are interpreted. For example, 
the text of the famous Prophetic ḥadīth negating the influence of contagion is 
said to mean either no contagion can be effective without God’s permission or 
no one should cause contagion to befall others. In this context genetic testing 
is seen as an important preventive measure to avoid contagion by protecting 
offspring against potential genetic disorders (Abū Ghuddah 2000, 1:582). With 
regard to the legal status of medical treatment, although it is recognized that 
the general ruling is permissibility, this ruling may change to recommendation 
and even obligation if it affects others as is the case with communicable or 
genetic diseases (al-Zuḥaylī 2000, 2:779-80). 
One of the important contexts within which premarital genetic testing is 
often placed is the premodern discussions on health defects that justify an-
nulment of marriage (Abū Ghuddah 2000, 1:582-4; Shabīhunā 2000, 2:944).14 
These discussions address the reproductive function of marriage but they 
also address other aspects such as mental capacity as well as medical condi-
tions affecting one’s ability to interact normally with others.15 Supporters of 
11 For an overview of this issue in Arabic culture and literature, see Van Gelder 2005.
12 Supporters of enforcing premarital testing argue that it is permissible for the governing 
authority to enforce these tests in order to protect progeny, which is one of the main ob-
jectives of sharīʿah, see also Buḥālah 2010, 301-2. 
13 For example, according to the Syrian jurist ʿ Abd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah, premarital genet-
ic testing can be subsumed under a general principle that can be referred to as guarding 
against all types of diseases. See Abū Ghuddah 2000, 1:582. 
14 Subsequent studies often adopt this approach as well. See, for example, Shubayr 2001.
15 This list includes conditions that are common for men and women such as madness 
(junūn) and different types of skin diseases such as leprosy (baraṣ and judhām ); two con-
ditions specific for men, which are castration (jabb) and impotence (ʿunnah); and three 
conditions specific for women, which are fatq, qaran, and ʿafal. Some jurists note that 
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the enforcement of genetic testing do not see the list of defects that pre-mod-
ern jurists discuss as exhaustive, which means that any other condition that 
jeopardizes the continuity of marriage can be added as well (Shabīhunā 2000, 
2:952-3).16 In general, while the discussion on the possibility of enforcing pre-
marital testing presumes that such enforcement is to be done by the govern-
ment, some also indicate that prospective couples may stipulate such testing 
if they wish.17
While supporters of the enforceability of premarital genetic testing empha-
size the reproductive function of marriage, supporters of optionality of genetic 
testing insist that procreation is not the sole objective of marriage. They also 
discuss other objectives such as lawful fulfilment of the sexual desire as well 
as establishment of loving and merciful cohabitation (Mahrān 2002, 227). 
Similarly, while they do not question the considerable advantages of genetic 
testing, they also emphasize its limitations. After all, genetic testing does not 
these three terms refer to a blockage in the female genital part that obstructs normal sex-
ual relationship. Other jurists make further distinctions between them. See Ibn Qudāmah 
1997, 10: 57. Some jurists expand the list to include up to 18 conditions while others argue 
that any defect that would defeat the original purposes of marriage could be included, see 
Ibn al-Qayyim, 1998, 5: 166; al-Qaradāghī and al-Muḥammadī 2008, 276-8. 
16 By way of analogy to the health conditions that pre-modern jurists list as sanctioning the 
dissolution of marriage, several jurists argue that a genetic disease can serve as a valid 
reason for the annulment of marriage provided that such a disease was not known or 
confirmed before the conclusion of the marital contract, see al-Shuwayrakh 2007, 202-4. 
Some researchers, therefore, suggest premarital genetic testing as a precautionary pre-
ventive measure that should be undertaken by prospective couples. For example, Shu-
bayr notes that undertaking premarital testing does not conflict with sharīʿa or with the 
objectives of marriage because marriage of healthy couples is likely to last more than that 
of ill couples. He argues that such tests should be facilitated and administered by the gov-
ernment without charge. He also suggests that such tests should be a standard procedure 
for all individuals once they reach 15 years of age. This medical statement should then be 
submitted at the time of concluding the marriage contract, see Shubayr 2001, 336. Some 
researchers suggest that AIDS can be one of the diseases that may warrant annulment of 
marriage, see al-Qaradāghī and al-Muḥammadī 2008, 279. 
17 The European Council for Fatwa and Research supports this opinion, see al-Qaradāghī 
and al-Muḥammadī 2008, 297; Mahrān 2002, 212. Classical jurists discuss the possibility of 
adding an additional stipulation (sharṭ zāʾid), which is neither prohibited nor permitted 
under the rubric of al-sharṭ al-jaʿlī. The majority of jurists admit such stipulations as long 
as they accord with the intent of the contract in question. The Ḥanbalis in particular are 
known for their acceptance of this type of stipulations as long as they do not violate the 
intent of the contract. Including premarital genetic testing as a precondition for the mar-
ital contract would then depend on whether it is deemed in support of the overall intent 
of the marital contract, see al-Ludaʿmī 2011, 262-3; Buḥālah 2010, 230-5.
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by itself involve any therapeutic value and all it does is reveal existing, latent, 
or potential risks. Some actually question its utility in case of incurable con-
ditions. They note that negative results in genetic testing do not necessarily 
mean that the tested individuals are free from genetic diseases in general, but 
only from the particular genetic diseases for which they are tested. In light 
of the increasing number of genetic disorders, it is almost impossible to find 
out one’s status regarding all possible genetic diseases. But, apart from these 
immediate and direct disadvantages that genetic testing may involve, it can 
also result in several adverse moral, legal, and also economic consequence that 
may affect not only the person being tested but also other members of the 
family (al-Bārr 2000, 2:630-1).18 For example, they argue that enforcing genetic 
testing would open the door for corruption in case someone wants to obtain 
a certificate without being tested. Moreover, they denounce general condem-
nation of consanguineous marriage as the percentage of genetic disorders that 
can be linked directly and exclusively to this type of marriage can hardly be 
determined beyond any doubt. Even in the case of genetic disorders, the role 
of the environment as well as other causal factors cannot be excluded (al-Bārr 
2000, 644-9).19 After all, the Qurʾān includes references to marriage with first 
cousins (33:50).
Apart from the two main attitudes mentioned above (supporters of enforce-
ability and optionality), some scholars argue that in principle premarital ge-
netic testing should not be made compulsory unless there is a dire necessity 
for it, in which case the government should take appropriate action (al-Qa-
radāghī and al-Muḥammadī 2008, 285-8; al-Maymān 2000, 2:821; al-Madḥajī 
2011, 2:935). Otherwise, it should be left to individual discretion and more ef-
forts should be made to raise public awareness about its importance.20 On the 
18 See also al-Shuwayrakh 2007, 92-5 (speaking about the false impression that genetic test-
ing may give and also possible adverse consequences). These considerations prompted 
some religious scholars to question the benefit of genetic testing and argue against it. 
19 Moreover, supporters of this attitudes argue that ascertainment of the medical condition 
of a prospective spouse is not one of the conditions of a valid marriage. They also note 
that marriage is not necessarily meant for reproduction. See Buḥālah 2010, 308. 
20 Islamic organizations and juristic councils issued different statements on this topic. For 
example, the Kuwait-based Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences supported the at-
titude to keep premarital genetic testing optional. This is included in the statement that 
was issued at the conclusion of its seminar on this and related issues in 1998. With regard 
to genetic testing and counseling, the statement called for: raising public awareness about 
the importance of genetic counseling, especially for prospective couples; preserving the 
privacy of individuals and confidentiality of their test results; ensuring that the process 
remains optional; and raising awareness about genetic risks associated with consanguin-
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other hand, non-genetic regular medical tests can be enforced under certain 
conditions. First, tests should aim to screen for a particular list of dangerous or 
contagious diseases. Second, failure to submit to testing should not affect the 
validity of the marital contract. This condition is meant to avoid the possibility 
of changing the stipulated Sharia-based conditions for the validity of a marital 
contract either by addition or deletion. Alternatively, non-compliance can be 
penalized by the payment of a fee or any other similar means but it should not 
affect the validity of the marital contract (al-Qaradāghī and al-Muḥammadī 
2008, 285-8; ʿAbd Allāh 2007, 95, 125). In light of the increasing significance of 
premarital testing in general and genetic testing in particular they have often 
been incorporated within family law legislation throughout Muslim-majority 
countries. However, while some countries make them compulsory, others keep 
them only optional. 21
eous marriage, see Ruʾyah Islāmiyyah, 2:1050-2. The topic was also addressed by both the 
Islamic Fiqh Council, IFC (affiliated with the Muslim World League in Mecca) and the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy, IIFA (affiliated with the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation in Jeddah). The IFC decision, which was issued in its 17th session (held in 
Mecca in 2003), focused on the possibility of stipulating premarital medical testing as 
a precondition for the conclusion or authentication of the marital contract. It declared 
that this would be impermissible (al-ilzām bi al-fuḥūṣ al-ṭibbiyyah wa rabṭ tawthīq al-ʿaqd 
bihā amr ghayr jāʾiz). It still called for raising public awareness about premarital tests; 
encouraging them; and facilitating them for those who wish to undertake them. Finally, 
it also noted that test results should remain confidential. See Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-Fiqhī 
al-Islāmī 15: 17(2004), 305. On the other hand, the IIFA decision, which was issued in its 
21st session (held in Riyadh in November 2013), emphasized the permissibility of premar-
ital genetic testing and also included a statement giving authorities the power to enforce 
it if this is deemed of a considerable pubic interest (maṣlaḥah muʿtabarah ʿāmmah), see 
http://www.iifa-aifi.org/2416.html (accessed March 2017). A similar indication was also 
included in IIFA’s decision with regard to the rights of the disabled in its 22nd session that 
was held in Kuwait in March 2015. This decision emphasized the importance of methods 
that can remove causes of disability such as premarital medical testing and vaccination 
against polio, see http://www.iifa-aifi.org/3998.html (accessed March 2017). 
21 Some Muslim-majority countries already require premarital medical testing but these 
tests are generally perceived as routine and ineffective. See, for example, Abū Ghuddah 
2000, 1:584 (noting that these tests often do not include genetic testing); al-Bārr 2000, 
2:631 (noting that in most cases formal medical statement certifying physical fitness for 
marriage can be obtained easily without actual testing); Mahrān 2002, 213 (noting that 
in Egypt marriage registrars are required to obtain a written statement from the couples 
indicating that they do not suffer from concealed diseases, amrāḍ sirriyyah. This state-
ment, however, does not have any legal impact and its absence does not have any effect); 
ʿIbādah 2010, 46 (referring to an Egyptian law that was issued in 2008 requiring premarital 
medical and genetic tests for the registration of marriage. Many observers, however, com-
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Genetic testing is often discussed in relationship to the larger process of ge-
netic counseling, which aims to provide detailed information about the tests 
being undertaken as well as advice on possible options in light of test results 
according to best practices. In the Muslim context this also includes elucidat-
ing possible implications and consequences of medical decisions in light of 
Islamic norms and regulations (al-Ḥāzimī 2000, 682). In case of positive re-
sults genetic counseling can provide possible options depending on the exact 
circumstances of the couple and whether both of them carry the same copies 
of mutated genes. These options range from cautioning them against marriage 
in severe circumstances to detailed advice on further steps if they choose to 
proceed with marriage indicating recommended procedures after marriage, 
whether before pregnancy, during pregnancy, or after birth (al-Ḥāzimī 2000, 
680-1). In these cases they would be in a better position when it comes to an-
ticipation of potential disorders as well as necessary arrangements to address 
them.
Possible options for couples whose offspring are at great risk for genetic dis-
orders prior to pregnancy include preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). 
This is one of the techniques that assisted reproductive technologies have 
made possible and by means of which IVF embryos can be tested for potential 
genetic disorders prior to implantation in the mother’s womb. Apart from the 
high cost of the procedure as well as the limited success rate, the technique 
raises other ethical questions regarding the moral status of the embryo as well 
as proper disposal of surplus embryos (al-Bārr 2000, 2:634-5). A range of other 
options can also be explored during the process of genetic counseling along 
with related moral as well as religious evaluation of these options (e.g. tempo-
plain that it is usually implemented in a formalistic and routine manner. Several media 
reports indicate that a statement can be issued easily without undergoing any type of 
testing, see for example http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/42427 (accessed 
April 2017). Some countries made pre-martial genetic testing compulsory such as Jordan 
(2004), Algeria (2005), Qatar (2006), and Kuwait (2008), see Buḥālah 2010, 53, 313-32; 
al-Qaradāghī and al-Muḥammadī 2008, 269. It is also worth mentioning that legislations 
that make premarital testing mandatory emphasize the confidentiality of the testing re-
sults and also freedom of prospective couples to conclude their marriage regardless of 
the testing results. For example the Algerian law indicates that the certificate issued to 
the prospective couples only indicates that the prospective couple completed the testing 
(without including the testing results), see Buḥālah 2010, 75. In Saudi Arabia a ministerial 
decree was issued in 2004 to enforce premarital testing however, without any limitation 
on the freedom of prospective couples to conclude the marital contract regardless of the 
testing results, see al-Madḥajī 2011, 2:936; al-Yābis 2012, 1:220. 
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rary or permanent prevention of pregnancy or aborting deformed or defective 
fetuses).
Islamic Reproductive Ethics and Boundaries of Genetic 
Intervention: Case of Fetal Sex Selection
One of the options that a couple may explore after PGS is fetal sex selection, 
particularly when a genetic disorder is associated with one sex more than the 
other. In this case this technique is proposed as a therapeutic procedure rather 
than an exercise of preference for a particular sex over the other. Apart from 
the technical possibility of the procedure, fetal sex selection often raises two 
main theological questions: potential conflict with God’s will; and potential 
risk of unsettling original balance of male and female distribution. The first 
question emanates from several scriptural sources indicating that knowledge 
of embryonic life belongs solely to God.22 These scriptural references imply 
that this divine knowledge controls one’s sex during the early stages of embry-
onic life. 
Juristic discussions on the possibility of fetal sex selection can be traced 
back to a seminar that the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences orga-
nized under the general theme of “reproduction in light of Islam” held on May 
24, 1983 (al-Jindī 1983). Within this seminar the discussion centered around a 
brief paper that the late Egyptian physician Ḥassān Ḥatḥūt presented in order 
to explain the medical and scientific nature of the procedure and how it can 
be implemented. According to Ḥatḥūt, two methods could be used. The first 
involves extracting a sample of the amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus and 
analyzing it in order to find out its sex. A decision then can be made either to 
retain the embryo or to get rid of it depending on the desired sex, which would 
raise the question of (im)permissibility of abortion as well. The second meth-
od, which at the time was undertaken only in animal breeding, depends on 
sperm sorting by subjecting extracted semen to a technical process by means 
of which Y-chromosome (male) and X-chromosome (female) are separated 
and then later injected in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining an em-
bryo with the desired sex (Ḥatḥūt 1983, 37-8). 
22 For example, see “God knows what each female carries (whether male or female) and 
what the wombs decrease or increase (of the pregnancy term) and everything with him is 
according to a (precise) measure.” [Q 13:8] and “with God is knowledge of the Hour (Day 
of Judgment), He causes rain to descend, He knows what is in the wombs, no single soul 
knows what it will acquire the following day or where it will perish ” [31:34]
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In general the opinions expressed during the seminar were indicative of 
three main orientations, which could be termed as liberal, restrictive, and in-
termediary. The liberal orientation emphasized the religious merit of discov-
ering the secrets of the universe, which is the explicit goal of science. Ulti-
mately this search for the hidden secrets of the universe cannot escape divine 
knowledge and this remains a matter of theological belief. For example, in his 
commentary, the Egyptian jurist Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī questioned the possibility 
that such a procedure would place limitation on God’s comprehensive knowl-
edge, which includes every aspect of one’s life. He argued that whatever man 
knows (e.g. in the case of fetal sex determination) is facilitated in the first place 
by God’s knowledge, not despite it. Moreover, human ability to control fetal 
sex is no different because this also cannot escape God’s will or command. As 
much as human knowledge is facilitated by divine knowledge, so also is human 
will, which is facilitated by the divine will.23 As far as the question whether hu-
mans should interfere, al-Qaraḍāwī argued that they should not unless in cases 
of necessity, which should be treated on an individual rather than collective 
basis. According to this argument, humans are better off maintaining natural 
gender distribution, which has always been established from the beginning of 
human existence in the universe (al-Jindī 1983, 94-5). 24 Scientists will continue 
to explore all types of natural phenomena and Muslims should participate in 
this effort and explain the boundaries of the permissible and impermissible. In 
this example, one of the main restrictions would be total ban on the mixing of 
the gametes of unmarried couples. 
Several normative precedents are used to bolster this argument such as the 
example of Prophet Zakariyya (Zechariah) and his appeal to God to bless him 
with a baby boy. Another precedent believed to be supportive of this attitude is 
the Prophet’s remark concerning coitus interruptus (al-ʿazl). While the Proph-
23 Similarly, the Syrian scholar ʿAbd al-Sattār Abū Ghuddah refers to a distinction that the 
famous theologian and jurist Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) made between two types of di-
vine will: cosmic and legislative. The former governs what happens in the universe in-
dependently of human will or action while the latter leaves room for human voluntary 
action. Regardless of what man chooses, divine cosmic will ultimately reflects and mani-
fests what God wants. See Abū Ghuddah 1983, 162.
24 This is with reference to this Qurʾānic verse “and you can only will what God has willed” 
Q 76:30 and 81:29. In support of this argument some participants also elaborated on the 
notion of ultimate supremacy of the divine will by pointing out the role of the original 
God-given condition into which man is created (fiṭrah). Part of this original condition is 
individual inclination towards a particular sex, which differs from one person to another 
and which, even in case of human intervention, would eventually maintain even distribu-
tion of the sexes, see Ibid, 96. 
96 Shabana
et did not forbid his companions, he noted that if a pregnancy is decreed it 
would occur regardless whether coitus interruptus is practiced or not (al-Jindī 
1983, 97). Some reports also urge prospective couples to keep in mind future 
offspring while choosing marital partners (takhayyarū li nuṭafikum) (al-Jindī 
1983, 112). One of the main religious concerns that fetal sex selection raises is 
that it may involve changing the original form of God’s creation (taghyīr khalq 
Allah). Proponents of this attitude, however, retort by noting that this process 
does not entail changing the original nature of either the sperm or the ovum. 
All what it does is to facilitate the merger of certain gametes, not refashioning 
them in order to modify their basic characteristics. As long as Sharia rules are 
observed (e.g. preservation of the marital framework), the process should be 
subject to ijtihad (al-Jindī 1983, 103). Moreover, in certain individual circum-
stances the procedure could be quite helpful in satisfying the need for a baby 
of a particular gender. Such would be the case, for example, of spouses who 
have four or five girls and they want to have a baby boy. This need should not 
be dismissed as trivial or insignificant (al-Jindī 1983, 104).
On the other hand, a more restrictive orientation was expressed, mainly by 
some of the participating physicians in light of practical experience with the 
early phases of the fetal sex detection technology. They noted that this technol-
ogy was used almost always to facilitate aborting female fetuses (even in the 
West), which demonstrates a global trend of anti-female bias.25 This technolo-
gy, therefore, raises the risk of facilitating modern forms of female infanticide 
(mawʾūdah), in comparison to the pre-Islamic Arabian practice. Accordingly, 
Islam’s attitude on this issue, should be total rejection of technical interven-
tion in fetal sex selection. Any form of explicit or implicit bias against women 
would conflict with the original spirit of Islamic legislation and should there-
fore be condemned, whether before or after birth. Some proponents of tech-
nical intervention argue that it could assist in the process of readjusting the 
balance of gender distribution in certain circumstances such as post-war situa-
tions, during which the male-female ratio is usually disturbed in favor of the fe-
male side due to the fact that more men are killed during wartime. Opponents, 
however, refer to some demographic studies indicating that in these circum-
stances gender balance is usually readjusted through natural means, obviat-
ing, therefore, the need for human or technical intervention (al-Jindī 1983, 101). 
While the proponents of the liberal attitude deemphasized the theological im-
plications of fetal sex selection, proponents of the restrictive attitude insisted 
that this issue has clear theological implications on the grounds that scriptural 
25 For a discussion on how the technology is used to reinforce anti-female attitudes in India, 
see also Davis 2006, 291-5.
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references relegate choice of the gender of babies exclusively to God (e.g. Q 42: 
49-50). Moreover, fetal sex selection involves changing God’s creation, which 
covers any type of intervention in the natural process (al-Jindī 1983, 109-11). In 
particular, this procedure opens the door for more questionable procedures, 
especially those involving messing with human sperm.
This exchange of views shows that one of the main grounds for disagree-
ment between proponents of the restrictive and liberal orientations is whether 
fetal sex selection is fundamentally a theological or merely a legal/jurispruden-
tial question. While the former emphasized the theological implications of the 
issue, the latter insisted that this should be pursued as a regular legal/jurispru-
dential question. Between these two main orientations, a third attitude also 
emerged, which urged caution and advised against rushing into premature 
conclusions. Proponents of this attitude noted that more time was needed in 
order to be able to judge on the basis of actual results in the real world, in light 
of the fact that up until then technical means for sex selection had not yet 
been implemented in human reproduction (al-Jindī 1983, 102). The recommen-
dations issued at the conclusion of the seminar included a statement on the 
question of fetal sex selection indicating its impermissibility at the collective 
level. On the other hand while some participants argued for permissibility at 
the individual level to satisfy the need for gender balancing, others argued for 
impermissibility lest this should lead to unsettling natural gender balance (al-
Jindī 1983, 349). 
Following this collective discussion on the issue during the IOMS seminar, 
normative Islamic discussions usually distinguish two main methods for sex 
selection: natural and technical.26 The natural methods include a range of pro-
cedures that are meant to increase the likelihood of pregnancy with a fetus of 
the desired gender such as: timing of the intimate relationship relative to the 
ovulation process; following a specific diet; or use of special types of herbal 
or chemical solutions.27 While these natural methods are generally considered 
26 This distinction can be traced back to the initial discussions during the seminar that the 
IOMS organized in 1983, see al-Jindī 1983, 114. See also al-Rashīdī 2011, 567-624; al-Qa-
radāghī and al-Muḥammadī 2008, 556-62.
27 For example, some studies indicate that sexual intercourse during the early phase of ovu-
lation increases the chance of obtaining a male fetus in comparison to later phases, which 
increase the possibility of obtaining a female fetus. Similarly some studies point out the 
connection between certain types of food and pregnancy with a fetus of a particular gen-
der. Accordingly, a diet rich in potassium and sodium increases the chance of obtaining a 
male fetus while a diet rich in magnesium and calcium increases the chance of obtaining 
a female fetus. The sex of a fetus may also depend on the acidic or alkaline environment 
within the uterus. While an acidic environment is said to be more likely for obtaining a 
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permissible, some scholars include certain stipulations for their permissibil-
ity such as: pursuing such methods should not conflict with belief in divine 
omnipotence, they should not result in greater harm either for the man or the 
woman; and they should not involve uncovering of the private parts of the 
body. The technical methods also include several procedures that are meant 
to achieve pregnancy with a fetus of the desired gender, which require artifi-
cial insemination either internally through direct injection of properly sort-
ed sperm or externally through in vitro fertilization (al-Rashīdī 2011, 590).28 In 
general, juristic opinions on the use of technical means to achieve fetal sex 
selection can be divided into three main attitudes: permissibility as long as 
there is a justified psychological, social, or medical need; total prohibition; and 
restricted permissibility in cases of necessity for therapeutic purposes only. 
The third attitude, representing the majoritarian view, captures the view of the 
Islamic Fiqh Council of the Muslim World League. Its resolution on this issue 
during its 19th session, held in Mecca in November 2007, indicates that natural 
methods for sex assignment are permissible as long as they do not include any 
questionable procedure from the Sharia perspective. Technical methods, on 
the other hand, could be used only for medical necessity as is the case with ge-
netic diseases affecting a particular gender. Cases of medical necessity should 
be evaluated individually on the basis of a consensus evaluation of a special-
ized committee consisting of a minimum of three physicians.29 
Fetal sex selection is just one example that illustrates the extent to which 
the interaction between assisted reproduction and genetic technologies may 
pose considerable challenges to the traditional structure of the nuclear family. 
Other examples include use of DNA fingerprinting for paternity verification 
and also use of gamete donation as well as surrogate motherhood to overcome 
infertility problems. While DNA paternity testing questions the utility and con-
tinuity of the marital presumption, gamete donation and surrogacy arrange-
ments question the traditional definitions of both paternity and maternity. 
male fetus, and alkaline environment is more likely for obtaining a female fetus. See al-
Rashīdī 2011, 583-6.
28 Some researchers refer to another technical procedure involving genetic intervention to 
change the sex of the fetus during pregnancy, which has been experimented on animals. 
In light of the various complications that such a procedure results in, it is deemed imper-
missible, see Mahrān 2002, 374.
29 See Majallat al-Majmaʿ al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī 20:23 (2008): 359–360. 
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Between Genetic Intervention and Genetic Enhancement: Case of 
Germline Modification
The unlimited capabilities of the genetic revolution has inspired scientific ef-
forts not only to treat complex and untreatable conditions but also to modify 
human genetic structure to influence the outcome of the reproductive process. 
With the development of synthetic biology and its goal to modify and engineer 
living organisms, scientists are not only trying to understand or explain these 
living organisms but also to shape them (Lustig 2013, 15). From a religious per-
spective this explains why genetic manipulation raises the question of “playing 
God,” which has been one of the most commonly used metaphors in bioeth-
ical literature with regard to issues ranging from reproductive technologies, 
genetics, and end of life issues. Within this context, it is used to signify sev-
eral connotations but at the most basic level it stands for the notion that cer-
tain boundaries should not be crossed because they are believed to belong to 
God’s domain (Lustig 2013, 24). From the perspective of Islamic foundational 
sources, creation is one of the divine acts, which is also captured in the divine 
names and attributes, one of which is the creator (al-khāliq). Islamic scriptural 
sources often place creation within a restrictive list of actions such as provi-
sion (rizq), death (mawt), and resurrection (baʿth) that are usually attributed to 
God. (e.g. 30:39; 45:26). This exclusive ascription of the act of creation to God 
within the Islamic moral universe explains the theological as well as ethical-le-
gal problems associated with the notion of changing God’s creation. In part, 
changing God’s creation implies a challenge to divine will. Also, the Qurʾān 
draws a connection between efforts aiming at changing God’s creation and the 
evil plots of the devil (4:119), which is also reinforced in several Prophetic re-
ports characterizing such efforts as deserving divine curse. 
In light of its impact on the constitution of future offspring, germline genet-
ic modification often invokes religious reservations associated with the notion 
of changing God’s creation. Moreover, similar to procedures such as reproduc-
tive cloning, germline genetic modification raises serious concerns about po-
tential impact on the structure of the family as well as larger social order in the 
future. Although these procedures have not yet been tested in humans, many 
researchers argue that it may only be a matter of time. 
Muslim discussions on these questions often address potential scenarios, 
associated ethical-legal implications, and also guidelines that should govern 
research in this area. Germline genetic modification was already highlighted 
in some of the collective discussions mentioned above, especially within the 
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various IOMS meetings since the 1980s.30 In 2006 IOMS convened an inter-
national seminar to address the ethical implications of modern genetic and 
reproductive technologies from an Islamic but also secular as well as interre-
ligious perspectives. The seminar touched on several applications of genetic 
and reproductive technologies with a particular focus on the family and so-
cial institutions.31 Germline genetic modification was one of the issues that 
the seminar identified and it featured in different papers as well as group dis-
cussions following the main panels. This collective and interdisciplinary dis-
cussion revealed the range of theological, legal, or larger social questions that 
genetic modification raises. 
From a theological perspective, germline genetic modification inspires re-
flections on the concept of creation (khalq) and whether such genetic inter-
vention can challenge the exclusive attribution of this act to God. In general, 
contributions by Muslim scholars during the seminar emphasized the Islamic 
conception of creation as a divine act. They also emphasized the special place 
that man occupies within the divinely created universe in his capacity as a 
vicegerent of the creator, entrusted with the responsibility to develop it follow-
ing divine instructions and guidelines. Man is created in the best shape and is 
also endowed with honor and dignity. Other creatures are made subservient 
to man, who is instructed to interact with them in a careful and conscientious 
manner. On the basis of this theological background, human scientific efforts 
should not aim to change this original order of divine creation (al-Saḥmarānī 
2008, 1:245-57). Consequently, one of the important guidelines that sever-
al participants emphasized with regard to genetic research is the distinction 
between preventive and therapeutic intervention on the one hand and pure-
ly enhancing intervention on the other. Genetic research involving humans 
should concentrate on preventive and therapeutic purposes only. As far as 
enhancement efforts are concerned, another distinction is made between 
enhancement in agricultural and animal research and enhancement involv-
ing humans. The first type is considered acceptable in light of its anticipated 
benefit in improving the quantity and quality of food products. Such research, 
however, has to comply with standard regulations and research ethics con-
cerning proper treatment of animals and environmental balance. In the case 
of humans, genetic intervention to manipulate specific characteristics such as 
30 See, for example, Sharaf al-Dīn 1983, 136-147; Abū Ghuddah 1983, 148-163 (published also 
in Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, 8:3 (1994), 165-178).
31 The seminar had four main themes: humanity and creation; genes, reproductive technol-
ogies and the family; social implications of genetic and reproductive technologies; and 
where boundaries should be drawn. See the summary report in al-Jindī 2008, 115-75. 
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sex type or skin color would not be acceptable (al-Saḥmarānī 2008, 1:266; Wāṣil 
2008, 1:337-55; al-Salāmī 2008, 1:509-30; al-ʿAwaḍī 2008, 605). 
Another relevant theological concept that the issue of genetic modification 
raises is human nature and its uniqueness. Genetic modification raises import-
ant questions on possible impact on the original God-created human nature 
and on the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable enhancement. For ex-
ample, the Sudanese scholar Jaʿfar Shaykh Idrīs argues that human nature, as 
created by God, is both distinct and unmalleable. Genetic modification, if it 
is implemented in humans for non-therapeutic purposes, would not tamper 
with this God-created human nature but would end up developing different 
types of beings (kāʾināt jadīdah) (Idrīs 2008, 2:472).32 The question that he asks 
is whether it would be of the best interest of humans to allow this to happen. 
He answers in the negative by exploring all the distinctive features of human 
nature, which, similar to other creatures in the universe, instinctively recog-
nizes its creator through devotional submission and glorification. Most impor-
tantly, the distinctive human nature is marked by its combined (material-spir-
itual) composition of a body and a spirit, which defines the beginning and end 
of human life both in this world and the next. This metaphysical dimension 
of human nature is coded in the inborn disposition (fitrah) with which all hu-
mans are created and which in essence is inclined towards what is good. In 
other words, this inborn disposition is not created as neutral but its initial pos-
itive inclination is either reinforced or altered through social factors and influ-
ences. Although the human body shares many features of the animal nature, it 
remains also distinct due to its endowment by God with dignity and sanctity, 
which should be protected and preserved against all types of manipulation. 
With regard to genetic engineering, a fundamental difference, therefore, should 
be emphasized between possible therapeutic efforts and non-therapeutic en-
hancement efforts. While the former should be encouraged, similar to regular 
medical treatment, the latter, similar to all types of unnecessary tampering 
with nature, should be banned. Not only these enhancement efforts signify 
unjustified affront against God but experience shows that such efforts tend to 
cause more harm than good (Idrīs 2008, 2:479).33 In addition to common defi-
32 On the other hand the Algerian scholar ʿAmmār al-Ṭālibī argues that genetic enhance-
ment could be accommodated as long as it does not result in distorting God’s creation. 
For example, enhancement that aims to improve stamina or immunity should be cele-
brated, see al-Ṭalibī 2008, 1:423.
33 Some scholars had issues with the notion of challenging divine will and whether man is 
actually capable of that. For example, the former Muftī of Tunisia Muḥammad Mukhtār 
al-Salāmī denies this possibility and cites the statement of the second Caliph ʿ Umar when 
he was accused of fleeing from God’s decree after his refusal to enter the city afflicted by 
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nition of fiṭrah as a set of inborn characteristics, the Moroccan thinker Ṭāha 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān argues that the term can also signify values (qiyam) in light 
of his interpretation of the Qurʾānic verse indicating the original ability that 
God endowed Adam with (to know all the names, 2:31). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān notes 
that the etymological root of the term name and its meaning in Arabic could 
refer not only to the ability to distinguish (tumayyiz) things but also to evaluate 
(tuqayyim) them. In other words, this original knowledge includes the moral 
values that are incorporated within the inborn state in which man is created 
(al-Ṭālibī 2008, 1:423). 
From a legal perspective, Muslim scholars often place questions pertaining 
to reproductive issues within the context of the ultimate objectives of Sharia. 
Preservation and protection of progeny is considered one of the five essential 
values that Sharia aims to protect and preserve, along with religion, life, intel-
lect and property (al-Bārr 2008, 1:653-4; Abū Ghuddah 2008, 1:687). On the oth-
er hand, with the availability of the various applications of genetic technology, 
jurists point out a distinction between two types of a Sharia-based ruling (al-
ḥukm al-sharʿī): al-ḥukm al-taklīfī and al-ḥukm al-waḍʿī (Abū Ghuddah 2008, 
1:688; Abū Ghuddah 1983, 162). While the former delineates assessment of a 
particular issue along the continuum of the five main categories: obligation, 
recommendation, neutrality, reprehensibility, and prohibition, the latter spec-
ifies relevant causes, conditions, or stipulations. In particular, jurists point out 
the importance of the second type of rulings regardless of its status on the con-
tinuum of the five main categories, which is usually the case with procedures 
that are deemed prohibited or even reprehensible. They argue that in case a 
prohibited act is undertaken, this type of ruling will still regulate the implica-
tions and consequences of the prohibited act in order to preserve the rights of 
all parties concerned. This becomes clear in juristic discussions on issues such 
as reproductive cloning and surrogacy. From an ethical-legal perspective, ge-
netic modification raises the question of guardianship and the boundaries of 
prospective parents’ authority over their prospective children. In other words, 
would parental guardianship in this case include the ability of parents to ma-
nipulate the genetic structure of future children? Would such authority ulti-
mately have implications on the identity of these children and their character? 
And, to what extent would it change the perception of prospective children as 
unique and idiosyncratic individuals rather than being another type of con-
sumer goods? In light of these questions, jurists also emphasize the distinction 
between a preventive or therapeutic intervention, which is seen as warranted 
and permitted and a non-therapeutic intervention, which is seen as unwar-
the plague “we flee from God’s decree to God’s decree.” See al-Jindī 2008, 2:496.
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ranted and unpermitted (Abū Ghuddah 2008, 1:698-703).34 One important 
point that scholars use to judge the propriety or morality of a particular proce-
dure is the intended objective that it aims to achieve. This criterion is used to 
distinguish therapeutic or corrective efforts from other non-therapeutic ones. 
Morality of an objective is also extended to the means through which it will be 
achieved (Abū Ghuddah 1983, 153). In other words, a moral objective has to be 
pursued only through moral means. A clear example would be an objective to 
overcome infertility through artificial insemination. This objective, however, 
cannot be achieved through a religiously questionable procedure such as gam-
ete donation due to its conflict with the sanctity of the marital relationship. 
From a social perspective, genetic modification raises several issues per-
taining to social justice and accessibility. If such an option becomes avail-
able, critics argue, it would widen the gap between those who can afford it 
and those who cannot. Moreover, on the long run, enhancement, or at least 
certain types of it, may even become a standard procedure for the economi-
cally privileged, which would further put poorer segments of the society at a 
disadvantage (Athar 2008, 2:280). The most concrete social implication that 
many participants raise is the risk of rejuvenating eugenic tendencies and the 
impact this may have on the definition of what is normal or average, let alone 
perception of disability and the disabled persons (Badrān and Shāhīn 2008, 
2:459; Ebrahim 2008, 2:689). With this new version of eugenics, however, the 
aspiration to order or design one’s babies would not be a far-fetched imagina-
tion (Fataḥ Allāh 2008, 2:719). Ultimately, enhancement procedures, similar to 
other procedures such as reproductive cloning, would seriously impact con-
ventional understanding of family ties and wider social relationships (Ḥatḥūt 
2008, 1:198).35 At the conclusion of the seminar a declaration of principles was 
issued, which included several points with regard to genetic modification. 
First, it emphasized the distinction between preventive and therapeutic appli-
cations and enhancement applications. Second, another distinction is empha-
sized between non-human applications and others involving humans. Third, 
it proscribed any effort aiming at manipulating the human genetic structure, 
which would adversely affect human personality or distinctive characteristics.36 
34 Abū Ghuddah uses the term istibdāl (replacement) to refer to genetic modification that 
aims to change basic human qualities or characteristics. See Abū Ghuddah 1983, 154.
35 From another perspective genetic modification also raises all types of speculations about 
transhumanism and hybrid combinations, see Moazzam 2008, 2:389-408. 
36 al-Jindī 2008, 2:747-9. Over the past few decades a number of similar resolutions and 
statements were also issued to clarify Muslim perspectives on genetic research and 
various applications of genetic technology. Important examples include the following: 
recommendations of the 21st IOMS seminar, which was held in 1998 on the theme of ge-
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Concluding Remarks: Structure of the Family between Genetic 
Determinism and Genetic Manipulation
The above analysis shows the power of the genetic technology and its various 
applications in influencing both existing and prospective family relationships. 
Such power is expected to only increase in the future, thereby necessitating 
careful moral evaluation of these various applications. Within the Muslim 
context, the process of moral assessment is highly dependent on the Islamic 
normative framework, which is often dominated by the juristic discourses. The 
examples explored in this chapter, however, reveal the theological vision un-
derlying these juristic discourses. Any systematic effort to provide answers to 
the questions that the various applications of genetic technology raise would, 
therefore, need to address the theological assumptions associated with issues 
such as divine creation, human nature, original disposition, and also scope 
of human freedom. Moral assessment of the various genetic applications in-
volves meticulous balancing of their anticipated benefits against their poten-
tial harms. At this stage of scientific research, genetic testing offers remarkable 
diagnostic advantages with only limited therapeutic options. The unprece-
dented diagnostic power of genetic testing is sometimes invoked to support 
arguments promoting genetic essentialism, determinism, or reductionism, 
which often ignore environmental as well as other types of factors. On the oth-
er hand, genetic applications can enable greater levels of intervention and ma-
nipulation of living organisms, as the above discussions concerning impact on 
prospective family members clearly illustrate. As much as the genetic technol-
ogy is constantly evolving, resulting in ever increasing number of applications 
and capabilities, Muslim discourses seek to keep up with these developments 
by offering at least tentative assessments, most notably as a result of collec-
tive deliberations within transnational institutions such as the ones covered 
in this chapter. Judging from the sizeable volume of publications citing these 
deliberations (mostly in Arabic), this cumulative body of moral insights would 
netic engineering and genetic therapy form the Islamic perspective (published in 2000); 
a decision by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation, Jeddah) on cloning in its 10th session in 1997, see Majallat Majmaʿ al-Fiqh 
al-Islāmī 10:3 (1997), 417-32; a decision by the Islamic Fiqh Council (of the Muslim World 
League, Mecca) on genetic engineering in its 15th session in 1998, see Qarārāt al-Majmaʿ 
al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī, 313-5; a decision by the Islamic Fiqh Council on genetic fingerprinting 
in its 16th session in 2002, see Qarārāt al-Majmaʿ al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī, 345-8; a decision by 
the Islamic Fiqh Council on genetic blood diseases in its 17th session in 2003, see Qarārāt 
al-Majmaʿ al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī, 345-6; a decision by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy 
on genetics, genetic engineering and human genome in its 21st session in 2013. 
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be indispensable for exploring Islamic perspectives on these new questions. 
Already some broad lines can be identified in light of this literature. For exam-
ple, on the issue of premarital genetic testing, Muslim scholars are unanimous 
on the importance of educating the public and raising awareness about this 
procedure, especially in places where consanguineous marriage is a common 
practice. Jurists, however, are divided on whether it should be enforced but 
even those who argue for its enforceability insist that this should not impact 
prospective couples’ decision to proceed with marriage even in case of positive 
results. With regard to fetal sex selection, most jurists approve it for medical 
purposes. They disagree, however, when the procedure is undertaken for fam-
ily balancing. Finally, with regard to germline genetic modification, another 
distinction is made between preventive and therapeutic intervention on the 
one hand and non-therapeutic enhancement on the other. A near consensus 
exists on the permissibility of the former case only.
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Bioethics is a complicated field of inquiry. For one, its subject matter is vast as 
the “bio-” in bioethics pertains to a broad range of human activities involving 
the biomedical sciences such as clinical care, research, and policy-making. At 
the same time, the “-ethics” part of the term brings in multiplicity as it draws in 
many different moral theories and reasoning modalities utilized by experts to 
assess the morality of practices and policies relevant to biomedicine. In addi-
tion, bioethics as a field of study breeds further variety as it engages multi- and 
inter-disciplinary perspectives on any particular issue. Consequently, reflect-
ing a field that sits at the interface of many different areas of knowledge, and a 
discipline that has ambiguous boundaries, bioethics discourse is complex and 
multi-faceted.
Although there are a great number of issues discussed in the bioethics lit-
erature and a great number of disciplinary experts offer perspectives on these 
issues, contemporary bioethics discourse fundamentally deals with the ethical 
(and legal) issues that arise from the interaction of the biomedical sciences 
with society. Thus bioethicists, in their normative mode, make claims about to 
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how we ought to behave and structure society. Yet in as much as bioethicists 
(and bioethics discourse in general) speak to the ethico-legal, they also com-
ment, directly or indirectly, on the ontological. Arguably, the identification of a 
bioethical problem, the framing of the dimensions of that problem, the ethical 
concepts deployed to work through the problem, and even the interpretation 
of the biomedical science or technology that is at the center of the problem 
are connected to understandings of what sorts of things human beings are. In 
other words, ontological claims about the nature of things can be carried with 
bioethical arguments. 
By way of example consider the moral assessment of a physician intention-
ally acting against a patient’s informed and voluntary decisions about health-
care. One may formulate ethical problem(s) in many different ways, and use 
various philosophical concepts to solve the problem. For some the dominant 
issue is the harm to a patient inflicted by an undesired therapy (a patient fo-
cus), others may consider the core issue to be the lack of respect accorded to 
a patient’s choice (a focus on the relationship between patients and doctors), 
and still others may consider the physician’s paternalism to be morally objec-
tionable (a focus on the physician). Clearly all of these different vantage points 
are related. Yet, the starting point for analyses and the accompanying ethical 
concepts invoked can belie an ontological claim about the nature of patients. 
Illustratively, a version of that claim could proceeds as follows: Patients are 
persons, and persons are members of the human species. Humans, in turn, are 
living organisms with a certain set of distinguishing capacities (or essential 
features) that include the potential for ratiocination and will making. These 
capacities are realized when making healthcare decisions. Physicians likewise 
are humans and equivalent to patients in essence. Therefore, all else equal, 
acting against a patient’s will is wrong because it disrespects the essence of 
the patient. Another formulation might invoke the notion of humans being 
endowed with dignity, and that having dignity differentiates things that cannot 
be instrumentalized from things that can be. Consequently, should a physician 
intentionally act against a patient’s informed and voluntary decision they are, 
in effect, instrumentalizing the patient in the pursuit of an interest that the 
patient has rejected. Consequently, the patient’s dignity has been assaulted. 
The point here is not the logic of these claims, rather it is to highlight that 
ontologies of the human can undergird bioethical views. Within the discourse 
these ontologies might be implicit or unspoken but can be nonetheless funda-
mental. 
As a result, religious scholars engaging with the contemporary (and large-
ly secular) bioethics discourse need to not only understand the biomedical 
science and technology involved with the moral issue at hand and the socie-
115Conceptualizing the Human Being
tal and legal implications of that science and/or technology, but also need to 
evaluate whether particular ontologies are impressing upon ethical arguments 
presented in the discourse. If a “secular” ontology prefigures ethical debates, 
scholars of religion may need to address that ontology alongside the ethics 
of the matter because religious ontologies can shape distinctive moral world-
views. 
With this thesis as an introduction, this paper presents several ontologies of 
the human that inhabit the “genethics” literature.3 These ontologies were iden-
tified through qualitative content analyses of a systematic literature review 
of the bioethics literature. Prior to discussing these methods and our findings 
(the ontologies), a few provisos are in order. First there is considerable debate 
as to whether ontology precedes ethical deliberation, or whether ethical no-
tions are contained within social structures that define relationships between 
beings. In other words do (and must) we know what and whom we are before 
defining ethical obligations related to other entities, or do ethical obligations 
define us even before we recognize who and what we are. This debate is found 
within the medical ethics literature where some bioethicists ground theories 
of medical ethics within ontologies of the living body (Pellegrino and Thom-
asma 1981), and others hold that a moral philosophy for medicine starts with a 
“living heteronomy (that) constitutes the basis of patient-physician relation...” 
(Tiemersma 1987, 133). This paper operates out of the view that ontology and 
ethics are related, and that for religious traditions (particularly Islam) this 
linkage is important and fundamental. However the paper does not assert that 
ethics and ontology must always be related, or that all of the contemporary 
bioethics literature proceeds from ontological claims. Thus those seeking to 
find the bioethical literature replete with discussions on ontology will be dis-
appointed, as will those seeking to find this paper to offer plentiful snippets of 
text demarcating how ontology informs the ethical in genethics debates. Rath-
er this paper presents conceptualizations of the human being that emerged 
during our examination (details below) of the bioethics literature; that can be 
theorized up from the bioethical deliberation contained therein. Our study 
further proposes that connections between ontology and ethical concepts can 
3 Genethics initially referred to “the study of the ethical issues that arise out of the science of 
genetics and the uses of genetic technologies” but presently also encompasses ethical issues 
relating to genomics. See BM Knoppers. From medical ethics to genethics. Lancet 2000:356, T 
Lewens. What is genethics? J Med Ethics 2004(30): 326-328, D Heyd. Genethics: Moral Issues 
in the Creation of People, University of California Press 1992. J Burley and J Harris (eds). A 
Companion to Genethics. Blackwell Publishing 2004. 
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reasonably be inferred, even if these links are subliminal to the authors of spe-
cific articles. We will demonstrate these particulars below. 
Another important point is that the paper asserts that the Islamic tradition 
has distinctive ways of explaining reality, describing relationships between hu-
man beings and other entities, and of moral reasoning. To be sure there is no 
singular Islam; Islamic theological doctrines and ethico-legal schools are many 
and a pluralistic orthopraxy constitutes the intellectual tradition. Yet as a tra-
dition that is distinguished from other systems of thought and practice by its 
scripture and authority structures, one can make claims about there being “Is-
lamic” theological, ethical, and ontological frameworks. While the hallmarks 
of an “Islamic” system can be debated, and a multiplicity of “Islamics” may be 
advanced, the paper contends there to exists Islamic worldviews arising out of 
its scriptural texts. This claim bears underscoring because this paper discusses 
ontologies of the human and one might argue that the reality of the human 
being is singular and shared by religious adherents and secularists alike. Our 
point is not to suggest that there are different types of humans inhabiting the 
earth some Islamic and some not, rather that the Islamic tradition might offer 
descriptions of human nature and its essence that are in some way distinctive 
and different, and that these differences are morally significant for genethics 
discourses. 
Bearing these qualifications in mind, the paper proceeds as follows. The 
next section details the sources of study and methods by which these ontolo-
gies were identified. The subsequent section discusses how the ethical terms 
and concepts contained within articles match up with a particular ontological 
stance about the human being. The final section of the paper outlines how 
these ontologies implicate Islamic theology and ethics, and outlines critical 
questions Islamic bioethicists must address as they provide Islamic perspec-
tives on genetic and genomic interventions.
Sources and Methods 
Several standard social scientific methods common to health research, each 
with their particular research aim, were utilized in this study. First, a systemat-
ic literature review was conducted to identify the major themes and topics of 
the genethics discourse. Once the ethics topics and concepts were thematical-
ly grouped, qualitative content analytic methods were used to identify poten-
tial ontologies that could provide explanatory links between ethics concepts 
and discussion themes (Miles and Huberman 1994, Crabtree and Miller 1999, 
Corbin, Strauss, and Strauss 2008). Greater details are provided below.
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Literature Search Strategy
The genethics discourse is vast, contains multiple different sources for study, 
and a variety of research approaches can be taken to canvass the discourse. 
Our primary goal was to identify the major topics of discussion (domains) 
within the genethics literature, and to catalog the ethical concepts deployed 
in these debates. Accordingly a systematic literature review was undertaken as 
a method to capture scholarly discussions among bioethicists. We decided to 
focus upon journal articles because these are often more timely and contain 
more concise arguments than books, and are more scholarly than public piec-
es. Furthermore the MEDLINE database was purposively selected because it 
contains the greatest number of peer-reviewed journal articles on the life sci-
ences, is globally accessible, and is the primary literature source for clinicians, 
biomedical researchers, and bioethicists (Falagas et al. 2008) 
The OVID interface was used to carry out a systematic literature review of 
MEDLINE on December 19th 2016. A conjunction of two search terms was used 
to retrieve pertinent articles, the first term representing genomics/genetics, 
and the second term restricting articles to those contained within leading bio-
ethics journals. These terms were combined using the Boolean operator “and.” 
Specifically “genomics” as the first term was exploded using MESH headings, 
keywords, and subheadings to include the following terms “genomics”, “genetic 
therapy”, “genetics”, “human genome project”, “gene therapy” and” genetic re-
search.” All of these terms were entered into the search string using the Bool-
ean operator “or”. Also using the Boolean operator “or” the second search term 
limited the literature retrieval to articles contained within the top ten bioeth-
ics journals according to the h5-index score. These journals were the Journal 
of Medical Ethics, the American Journal of Bioethics, Journal of Bioethics, the 
Hastings Center Report, BMC Medical Ethics, the Journal of Clinical Ethics, Cam-
bridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 
the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, and Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. We 
restricted the search to these leading bioethics journals in order to capture 
an “in-group” conversation among bioethicists, although we acknowledge that 
journals focused on the science and practice of genomics and genetics likely 
contain ethical debates as well. Finally, for reasons of practicality the search 
was also restricted to articles published in the past 5 years and in the English 
language. 
Literature Review
After completing the MEDLINE search, two researchers independently re-
viewed manuscript titles and abstracts for relevance- the primary focus of the 
paper had to be on ethical issues related to genetics and genomics. Accord-
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ingly, book reviews, editorial introductions to special volumes, animal stud-
ies, and historical articles were removed from the database, as were duplicate 
titles. Articles without abstracts were automatically placed into database for 
full-text review. With this final list of articles for full-text review, the two re-
searchers jointly developed a standard abstraction instrument that classified 
articles by type (empirical study, case report, bioethical analysis, literature re-
view, commentary, and other). 
Moving from conventional systematic literature review methods to a more 
qualitative grounded-theory based content analysis approach, data abstrac-
tion also involved “open coding.” (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The two research-
ers independently described several paper characteristics through open cod-
ing including the principal ethical question or topic(s) addressed by the paper 
and the ethical concepts deployed within the arguments. Each of these labels 
applied by the researchers functioned as qualitative “codes” for subsequent 
qualitative analysis.
In order to assure consistency of data abstraction a set of ten abstracts and 
articles was independently reviewed and “double coded” by the researchers. 
Discrepancies in data abstraction were resolved by consensus. Subsequently, 
each researcher independently reviewed approximately half of the remaining 
abstracts and articles. Combining the two researcher’s databases created a fi-
nal database containing the bibliographic and abstraction data.
Development of Findings
While standard qualitative analysis techniques were used to develop our find-
ings (described below), our approach was also inspired by a critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) theory. While there are many different ways in which CDA is 
applied in research and many different techniques, at the core of strategies is 
an acknowledgement of discourse being both socially constructed and social-
ly conditioned. CDA seeks to make “visible the interconnectedness of things” 
in order to open up understandings of how social practices inform dominant 
forms of language use and marginalize others, and emphasizes multidisci-
plinary approaches (Wodack and Meyer 2009, Fairclough 2009).
Although we do not perform the sorts of in-depth textual and semiotic anal-
yses often used by those employing CDA (we used qualitative analyses meth-
ods instead) our project applies a CDA lens to unpacking the often-implicit 
conceptualizations of the human that undergird the genethics literature. To 
be sure, we view contemporary bioethics discourse as social constructed and 
conditioned for it advances ethical pluralism and operates under secular con-
ventions that privilege philosophy over theology, and reason-based arguments 
over scriptural-based hermeneutics. Our qualitative content analyses sought 
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to make visible the connections between ethical concepts and genethics-re-
lated domains of study and fundamental ontologies regarding the human. Fi-
nally, we bring multidisciplinary approach to our development of findings for 
both researchers are situated in multiple bioethics-related practices. Both are 
practicing clinicians, bioethics researchers, participate in ethics committees, 
and both have deep religious commitments (MKA is Catholic Christian, and 
AIP Sunni Muslim).
As noted above the data abstraction instrument allowed the researchers to 
apply codes representing the principal ethical questions of and ethical con-
cepts mentioned within the papers. For example one article might be entered 
in the database as focused on analyzing whether parents have a duty to select 
the best genetic traits for their children (principal question), and used the con-
cepts of beneficence and Parfit’s grounds for complaint principle to offer its 
argument (ethical concepts). Based on these codes the researchers sought to 
develop higher-order themes to classify the articles by topic of study. Based on 
consensus the bioethical topics discussed by the papers were grouped into six 
higher-order domains of study [plus an other category as detailed below], and 
each article was subsumed under one of these domains via researcher consen-
sus. Once these domains were identified, the next task was to assess relation-
ships between the open-coded ethical concepts, the principal questions of the 
article, and the domain. In conventional qualitative methods terminology, we 
were using a grounded theory approach to develop an overall conceptual link 
between all of the codes within a particular domain. We hypothesized that 
this link, if present, would represent a specific ontology of the human. In other 
words, the analyses sought to identify how all of the ethical concepts and ques-
tions contained within the articles within that particular domain conveyed a 
distinctive conceptualization of the human being. 
Results 
Descriptive Results of the Systematic Literature Review
277 articles were retrieved from MEDLINE, and after discarding duplicates, 
book reviews, editorial introductions to special volumes, animal studies, his-
torical articles and articles not relevant to genethics, 203 unique articles un-
derwent data abstraction [See Figure 1]. These articles could be grouped into 
six domains of ethical study: (1) Information Disclosure & Data-Ownership, (2) 
Human Enhancement & Modification, (3) Ethical Structures & Moral Respon-
sibility in Genomics Research, (4) Human Reproduction Related-Ethics, (5) 
Special Considerations for Research in Vulnerable Communities and Popula-
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tions, (6) Environment & Epigenetics. Articles not fitting within these domains 
were marked as “other.”
Most articles (n=108) related to Information Disclosure and Data-Owner-
ship and covered bioethical issues such as the ethics of conveying incidental 
findings, and notions of ownership of data in bio banking. The next most rep-
resented category was Human Reproduction Related Ethics (n=16) in which 
articles discussed moral issues related to reproductive cloning, gender and 
trait-selection in the to-be-born, and other bioethical issues related to pre-im-
plantation genetic diagnoses. Human Enhancement & Modification and Spe-
cial Considerations for Research in Vulnerable Communities & Populations 
comprised of a nearly equal number of articles (10 and 11 respectively), and 
these domains covered articles discussing issues such as the genetic enhance-
ment and the cultural significance of genetic data in minority communities. 
Eight articles were placed into category 3 and pertained to ethical structures 
such as informed consent, while 5 articles detailed bioethical issues related to 
epigenetics and the environment. 
As the ethical concepts discussed by, and principal questions of, the articles 
were linked to specific domains, three ontologies of the human were found to 
underlie three domains. These ontologies can subsume all of the ethical con-
cepts and questions contained within a particular domain. The articles within 
the Information Disclosure and Data-Ownership appear to conceptualize the 
human being as a source of information about the past, present, and future 
and the ethical arguments and questions pertain to this ontology. The discus-
sions contained within the domain of Human Reproduction-Related Ethics re-
volve around the ontology of a human as a being whose essence is defined by 
the capacity to reproduce. Undergirding the ethical concerns contained within 
the articles about Human Enhancement and Modification was the vision of a 
human being as an ever-evolving entity. 
In what follows we will describe these ontologies with reference to the eth-
ical concepts and questions dealt with by individual articles (in qualitative 
methods terms we will describe the codes and links). Our intention, however, 
is not to describe all of the articles along with all of the associated ethical con-
cepts and questions, rather it is to describe the ontologies in sufficient enough 
terms so as to evidence the validity of our findings. 
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The Human Being as a Source of Information about the Past, Present, 
and Future
Genes are segments of DNA within chromosomes, which assist in the produc-
tion of proteins that are critical to the physiological functioning of an organ-
ism. In a sense, genes are the instruction manuals by which organisms develop, 
grow, maintain themselves, and reproduce because they contain the blueprint 
for all proteins needed by a cell. These proteins then play a role in all functions 
of the body. Genes are also integral to human heredity as they are passed down 
from parents to children in chromosomes contained within male and female 
gametes (sex cells). In this way parents and children bear resemblance to one 
another physically and psychologically, and rare disorders can afflict members 
of a family because of their similar genetic composition. Given the critical role 
genes play in the existence, maintenance, and propagation of human life the 
popular notion that genes make us who we are is understandable.
Given the important role genes play in generating the human being, and 
their importance in passing on information from one generation to the next, 
the ontology of a human being as a data store that houses information about 
the past, present and future is implicit in the genethics literature. This con-
ceptualization prefigures bioethical questions and concepts related to genetic 
and genomic technologies. The genetic code contained within human cells 
provides information about the past in that it reveals ancestral linkages, e.g. 
paternity. It contains data about the present because it reveals data about a 
person’s present physiological and psychological state and disorders that may 
be present. Genetic data also reveals dispositions and likelihoods related to 
future disease. In a sense then, genes contain essential knowledge about hu-
mans, individually and collectively, relevant to the past, present and future. 
When the human being is seen as a repository of such information, it follows 
that ethical concerns revolve around the moral duties related to protecting, 
and regulating, the use of these data. To begin with bioethicists debate own-
ership because the information gleaned from genes is relevant not only to the 
individual it was procured from, but also to other individuals such as relatives 
and children because of the shared genetic composition. Such debates were 
found in many different articles (Dheensa, Fenwick, and Lucassen 2016, Roth-
stein 2013, Milner, Liu, and Garrison 2013). For example, in their interviews of 
patients, Dheensa and colleagues found that participants perceived “genetic 
information as essentially familial;” in the words of one participant shared 
“this isn’t my information, I don’t own the gene.” (Dheensa, Fenwick, and Lu-
cassen 2016, 2). This view was based on the idea that relatives “have a right to 
know about their potential risks” for disease, and that patients and clinicians 
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have a moral duty to disclose pertinent information provided sufficient po-
tential for significant harms exist. (Dheensa, Fenwick, and Lucassen) Notably, 
participants introduced some ambiguity by viewing genetic information relat-
ed to one’s own day-to-day health to be personal and not communal (Dheensa, 
Fenwick, and Lucassen 2016). 
While Dheensa’s paper presents qualitative data pertaining to the moral du-
ties of disclosure, other articles present direct normative arguments. The stan-
dard view regarding genetic data is that they “belong” to the individual that 
supplied the physical material from which they were gleaned. The ownership 
relationship coheres with the ontology of a human as a data-store where genes 
are its inner core. Accordingly, usage of the data requires authorization from 
the individual. Bioethicists assessed whether forgoing individual consent in 
order to disclose genetic information to the other individuals is legitimate. For 
example the reflection of a moral “duty to warn” relatives that have a genetic 
marker for disease into legal structures was analyzed by Weaver (2016). She 
asserts that physicians’ “ethic of care” can help inform professional standards 
and reconcile legal statues so that a particular patient’s consent might not 
be necessary for disclosing risks of disease to that patient’s relatives (Weaver 
2016). Similarly a series of articles discussed the ethics of re-contacting the 
family members of a deceased research participant in order to convey genet-
ically determined risks for disease (Milner, Liu, and Garrison 2013, Rothstein 
2013, Shah et al. 2013, Taylor and Wilfond 2013). The case study analyzed was 
complicated by the fact that the research study consent forms inadequately 
covered such scenarios.
Moral duties and obligations related to genetic data and issues of ownership 
are “collectivized” in the context of genomic data and biobanking. For example, 
in the research arena, genetic/genomic data may disclose information about 
an individual’s genetic composition that is unrelated to the particular focus of 
the research study. The ethics of these “incidental” findings is hotly debated 
(Viberg et al. 2016, Hofmann 2016, Costain and Bassett 2013, Kleiderman et al. 
2014, Gliwa and Berkman 2013, Garrett 2013, Borgelt, Anderson, and Illes 2013, 
Price 2013, Anastasova et al. 2013, Ross and Reiff 2013, Parens, Appelbaum, and 
Chung 2013, Greenbaum 2014, Appelbaum et al. 2014). The relevance and lim-
itations of the concepts of “duty to rescue” and “right not to know” to inciden-
tal findings is also canvassed by many articles (Berkman, Hull, and Biesecker 
2015, Zuradzki 2015, Fenwick et al. 2015, Wachbroit 2015, Meagher 2015, Jecker 
2015, Garrett 2015, Parsi 2015, Ulrich 2013). Illustratively, Garrett argues that a 
rescue paradigm grounded in beneficence insufficiently relates to genomics re-
search because the traditional rescue paradigm was developed for short-term 
situations where risks were unpredictable and unanticipated. Genomics data 
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have a much longer horizon and allow for the calculation of statistical proba-
bilities for disease-related harms and thus a duty to rescue paradigm does not 
apply (Garrett 2015, Ulrich 2013). With respect the notion of “right not to know” 
Hofman investigated the many arguments for, and against, the right of individ-
uals to remain ignorant of data gleaned from their own genome (2016). These 
arguments include ones that differentiate types of knowledge, ones that ana-
lyze the question in terms of ownership of data, and others that focus on the 
consequences of disclosure. Hofman holds that individuals “should be able to 
stay ignorant of incidental findings of uncertain significance” if they so choose 
(Hofmann 2016, 1).
If data about risks to relatives and progeny speak to the conceptualization 
of a human as containing data about the future, the incidental findings that 
Hofman discusses speak to both the individual’s present and her future. An 
interesting case discussing the right not to know and one’s present stage was 
covered by Wiesemann (2011). She uses the case of Caster Semenya, a world-
class runner who was forced to submit to sex verification via genetic testing in 
order to compete as a female in competitive sports, to argue that individuals 
have a right to not know their genetically determined biological sex.
The genome contained within humans also stores information about the 
past. A particularly intriguing piece information that can be uncovered by ge-
nomics is paternity. The bioethical debate here hinges on the merits of truth 
telling in the context of clinical work balanced against duties of non-malfea-
sance and the respect for individual autonomy. In their article, Adlan and ten 
Have analyzed the relevance of these concepts in the context of the Islamic 
faith and Saudi culture where paternity is part biological and part socially-con-
structed (Adlan and ten Have 2012). At least one commentator felt that disclo-
sure of biological non-paternity in a Muslim context carries the risk of signifi-
cant harm to the child and mother, thus he advocates for nondisclosure based 
a duty not to harm (Zabidi-Hussin 2012). Other bioethicists also reflect upon 
notions of autonomy, data ownership and the regulation of knowledge in the 
context of direct-to-consumer genetic testing (Bunnik 2015, Hoffman 2016). 
In summary a significant proportion of the genethics literature focuses on 
the regulation of genomic/genetic data. These data are seen as containing in-
ner knowledge about the human being, and are relevant to the individual’s rel-
atives and progeny. Underlying the debates about data ownership and protec-
tion, the right to know or not know such data, and the moral duties researchers 
have to patients, research participants, and the wider society is a conceptual-
ization of the human as a source of information about the past, present, and 
future. 
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The Human Being as a Reproductive Organism
One of the characteristics that distinguish living organisms from non-living 
matter is their capacity to reproduce. There are two forms of reproduction: 
asexual and sexual, where sexual reproduction requires bringing together two 
living organisms. Conventional human reproduction is of the sexual type, and 
allows for the propagation of genes (and the traits mediated through genes) 
from parents to their children. Genetic and genomic technologies provide 
humankind with greater knowledge about, and ability to intervene upon, re-
production. Consequently, these newfound capacities generate bioethical de-
bates about whether we ought to manufacture, and otherwise intervene upon, 
human reproduction events. Obviously, the genethics literature addressing 
human reproduction operates out of an ontological view of the human as a 
reproductive organism. The striking feature of the discourse, however, is that it 
pushes the conventional limits of human reproduction to debate the facilita-
tion of asexual, and artificial sexual, reproduction. 
This literature thus views reproduction not as one of the many essential 
features of the human being, but rather as a defining characteristic that bio-
medicine might be morally obligated to service. Furthermore, since success-
ful reproduction among the human species generates biological ties between 
offspring and progenitors, this subgenre also contends with a host of thorny 
issues about what constitutes, and what moral duties emerge from, the so-
cial construct that lies at the intersection of reproduction and genetic resem-
blance: parenthood. 
Stemming from the idea that members of the human species might have 
a right to reproduce, Fries comments on a request made by a patient’s family 
to harvest oocytes from their brain-dead family member. Such harvest was, at 
least in part, argued for on the basis of allowing for the individual’s genome to 
be passed on to others post-death (Fries 2016). Several articles also argue over 
the moral significance and social ramifications of using genetic technology to 
assist homosexual couples reproduce. For example, Pennings discusses wheth-
er ova donation from one partner to another (ROPA) in lesbian couples is anal-
ogous to embryo donation, egg donation or gestational surrogacy (2016). He 
finds each analogy to be imperfect and argues that “ROPA can be seen not only 
symbolically but physically creating an equal contribution [to parentage]: one 
partner becomes the birth mother, and the other the genetic mother.” (Pen-
nings 2016, 255).
Scientists also have the ability to create synthetic gametes (ova and sperm) 
from either component. This technology is particularly useful for gay and les-
bian couples as it facilitates the creation of a zygote that contains genes from 
each of the two partners. As genetic material from the sperm can be used to 
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create a synthetic ovum for gay couples and vice versa for lesbian couples, a 
quasi-natural form of biological reproduction becomes possible. Murphy de-
bunks arguments against synthetic gamete creation for same-sex couples in 
order to suggest that homosexual individuals have a right to reproduce, and 
that clinicians are morally bound to assist such reproductive efforts (2014b). 
The human right to reproduction, notions of parenthood, and their associa-
tion with genetic resemblance of parent to child is also a central feature in 
articles discussing the ethics of reproductive cloning and mitochondrial re-
placement therapies (MRTs) (Harris 2014, Wrigley, Wilkinson, and Appleby 
2015, Harris 2015). Reproductive cloning, an asexual form of reproduction not 
natural to the human species, may be considered to be a useful reproductive 
technology enabling individuals to reproduce without the need for a partner 
(genetic or otherwise). On the other hand, MRT is a technique that produces a 
child with three “parents” since genetic material carried within the mitochon-
dria of a donor ova also becomes part of the zygote. Thus the genetic material 
in the zygote now comes from the procreative couple as well as the egg donor. 
As noted above, the idea that parenthood is ascribed solely on genetics is de-
batable. Furthermore, and with respect to MRT, some bioethicists argue that 
since the mitochondrial DNA comprises of less than 5% of the total DNA in the 
zygote, and because the genes contained therein do not contribute to physical 
resemblance, a parent relationship among the egg donor and the future child 
does not issue forth.
Moving from the gamete stage to the zygote and embryo stages, many ar-
ticles discussed the merits, risks, and morality of pre-implantation and/or 
pre-natal genetic diagnosis and intervention. A central bioethical question re-
lated to the use of these technologies was do aspiring parents have the moral 
responsibility to produce the “best” children? This concept of procreative or 
reproductive beneficence was featured in multiple papers. Harris’s aforemen-
tioned paper on reproductive cloning argues that cloning preserves the human 
genome more so than any other reproductive method, and should be consid-
ered in-line with reproductive beneficence since the ensuing clone would have 
a “tried and tested” genome (Harris 2014, 58). Other bioethicists carry forth the 
procreative beneficence argument to IVF and debate whether potential par-
ents who use IVF to reproduce, or who discover abnormalities in their embryo 
based on prenatal genetic tests, have a moral obligation to insure that their 
future progeny are free of disability and/or to not select IVF-created embryos 
that carry disability-like traits (Soniewicka 2015, Weinberger and Greenbaum 
2015). In the context of using genetic/genomic technologies to alter the genetic 
makeup of the to-be-born, Delaney argues that genetic engineering might be 
morally objectionable (2011). On the basis of Parfit’s origin view and a grounds 
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for complaint principle, he asserts that genetic engineering modifies a being 
that has already been “created” from a particular ova and sperm (Delaney 2011). 
Consequently that being has grounds to complain that they might have been 
better off in the pre-engineered state. 
These ethical concepts were extended to the ethical implications of ger-
mline manipulation enabled by CRISPR-Cas 9 technology and MRTs (Harris 
2015, Evitt, Mascharak, and Altman 2015). Such technologies change the DNA 
makeup of all future progeny of the fetus created using them. Accordingly, the 
genetic pool available to future generations is restricted, as some genes are not 
allowed to be passed onto future generation. The morality of thus constrain-
ing the reproductive “rights” of future generations remains a hot topic of de-
bate. Moving from the clinic to the “free-market,” Gynell and Douglas argued 
that the state has ethical grounds for regulating the use of genetic technolo-
gy-based selection of traits on the basis of collective action problems that may 
ensue should the free-market be allowed to operate unrestricted (2015).
The bulk of the discussion about the ethical dimensions of genetic tech-
nologies that enable the creation of synthetic gametes and clones, introduce 
the possibility of different types of genetic linkages between donors of gam-
etes and the embryo produced from such biological material, and allow for 
the selection of the genetic composition of progeny operates out of the view 
that members of the human species, in general, are entitled to reproduce. The 
implicit ontology of the human being, therefore, is one where the human is, 
in essence, a reproductive living organism. That is not to say that the entire 
bioethical discussion is focused on the moral duties that emerge from such 
reproductive rights, or that the assertion of such rights in universally accepted, 
rather the point here is that the undergirding ontology is one that needs to be 
unpacked and attended to in order to present a comprehensive moral vision 
for the use of such technologies. 
The Human as a Biologically Evolving Entity
A third ontology that can help to explain the ethical concepts and questions 
embedded within the genethics literature is the human as an evolving biologic 
entity. Evolution, particularly in religious circles, is a particularly controversial 
topic. Much of the religious debate revolves around speciation, the formation 
of a new species from prior ones, over the course of time. This idea is not the 
focus of genethics literature, rather the evolutionary notion here is that the 
genetic composition of humankind is not static; it is dynamic. As noted above, 
sexual human reproduction involves the admixing of genetic material from 
both parents within the nucleus of the zygote. There are many different com-
binations that can occur and these combinations of parental DNA allow for 
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novel genes to be present in the child that are not in the progenitors. More-
over, errors in DNA replication routinely introduce random changes in the 
cell’s DNA, and environmental exposures can also alter one’s DNA. Therefore 
the human genome is not a static entity but is always changing. As new genes 
can emerge within the human genome, human traits and features may also 
change. The questions at core of this set of articles revolve around the morality 
of deliberately changing the genetic profile of adults. If the human gene pool 
is always changing then using biomedicine to positively influence that change 
may be morally valid.
Illustratively, Glick discusses the morality of genetic enhancement from a 
Jewish perspective (2011). He notes that “man is commanded to be co-creator 
with his Creator in many areas of endeavor” and that Rabbinic authorities 
state that after the creation of humankind “there remained additional power 
to create anew, just like people create new animal species through inter-spe-
cies breeding.” (Glick 2011, 417). On the basis of scriptural texts and Rabbinic 
commentaries, he suggests that there is no “inherent banning of the use of 
[genetic] techniques for [human] enhancement” in the Jewish tradition (Glick 
2011). Some bioethicists find genetic enhancement to be immoral and invoke 
the concept of human dignity to suggest that humans are part of a natural 
kind that demands non-interference (and optionally link this concept to a the-
istic worldview) (Greenbaum 2013, Chan 2015). Other bioethicists push back 
against such arguments. Chan argues that an Aristotlean view of humanity and 
ethics supports the usage of genetic technology to enhance human flourish-
ing. He notes that Aristotle held that “a human being reaches its full potential 
through a combination of nature and nurture” and that “the development of 
human excellences [is] the goal of human existence.”(Chan 2015, 280). One 
could extend this argument by saying that since the human project involves 
moral enhancement, therefore using genetic technology for moral enhance-
ment should not be categorically prohibited. Indeed the debate around mor-
al enhancement underlies Murphy’s paper on biomoral modification. In it he 
outlines Persson and Savulescu’s views on the moral obligation towards mor-
al enhancement and how differences between individual and societal goals 
for human enhancement impact the moral assessment of such technologies 
(Murphy 2015). In another paper Murphy builds out an argument for genetic 
enhancement by noting that such modification can amplify choices, enrich 
lives, and consolidate identities (Murphy 2014a).The blurring of the morally 
important distinction between therapy and enhancement by genetic technol-
ogies is also discussed by several articles (Chan 2015, Holtug 2011).
Debates around the ethics of genetic enhancement of the individual or 
progeny (discussions of genetic intervention on progeny were outlined in the 
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previous section) are based on the conceptualization of a human being under-
going constant change in his or her genetic composition. This biological fact 
is used by proponents of advancement to displace notions of humanity as a 
static creation, perfect in its nature, and thereby inviolable. Rather they view 
human nature as a project in development and that there are moral obliga-
tions to assist such that the development provided it accords with individual 
and societal conceptions of the good. An ontological perspective of the human 
being as an evolving entity informs the subsequent ethical argument for genet-
ic enhancement. Other voices in the literature argue against enhancement but 
do not squarely challenge this ontological perspective.
Human Ontologies and Their Implications for Islamic Bioethical 
Perspectives on Genomic and Genetic Technologies
Our analysis of the genethics literature revealed at least three ontological per-
spectives on the human that are at the heart of the bioethical discussions- the 
human being (i) as a source of information about the past, present, and future, 
(ii) as a reproductive organism, and (iii) as an evolving entity. We hold that 
Islamic scholars wading into the bioethical debates over genetics and genom-
ics must first assess how these ontologies compare with Islamic theological 
perspectives on the human being, and subsequently use the instruments of Is-
lamic ethico-legal tradition to craft responses. Below we outline several issues 
relevant to the reception of these ontologies in the Islamic tradition.
The first ontology sees the human being as a repository of knowledge. Thus 
we must ask what is the relationship between knowledge and the human being 
in Islam? A Qur’anic worldview holds that God is the source of all knowledge 
and that He instructs humankind. Illustratively, the opening story of the Qur’an 
relates to teacher-learner relationship as God instructs the first human, Adam, 
about the “names of all things” and is instructed to obey God’s commandments 
(Ali 1999 Verse 2:31). Thus while humans may hold onto knowledge, ultimately 
it is deemed to originate from God. If information contained in the genome 
originates from God’s knowledge then how do we understand possession and 
ownership? For example, one might assert that the genomic/genetic data 
belongs to the individual it was derived from. Alternatively, Islamic scholars 
might contend that a stewardship responsibility emerges from the idea that 
humans are but custodians of God’s knowledge encoded in the genome. Dif-
ferent legal analyses might therefore proceed from an ownership relationship 
when compared to a stewardship one. If a particular human “owned” that data 
then permission and consent might be required prior to any disclosure, howev-
er if the relation was of stewardship then God’ rights (ḥaqq Allah) over the data 
can be asserted if the data are of public benefit (maṣlaḥah) (Emon 2006). A re-
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lated question is whether genomic/genetic data is categorically beneficial. The 
Prophet Muhammad is recorded to have supplicated for beneficial knowledge 
and protection from knowledge of no benefit (Ibn Mājah Book 34: Hadith 17). 
How are these categories to be applied to probabilistic data from the genome 
about the past, present and future? As noted above, bioethicists debate the bal-
ancing of a biomedical scientist’s responsibility and duty to warn people about 
disease risks with the individual’s right not to know incidental findings. The 
ways in which the Islamic bioethicists classify genetic/genomic data in terms 
of its ownership and benefit will surely inform their view on the moral duties 
related to disclosing and protection these data.
Another related question is whether genetic and genomic data to be treated 
as certain knowledge in Islam? Science suggests that the genome conveys data 
about an individual’s origin, helps to explain their present state, and forecast 
probabilities about their future. Islamic logicians define knowledge (al-ʿilm) to 
be propositional in nature, and consider knowledge to reflect the correspon-
dence between one’s understanding of, and true, reality. Accordingly certainty 
about correspondence between a particular truth claim and reality exists along 
a spectrum from absolute conviction, yaqīn, through predominant certainty 
(>50%), al-ẓann al-rājiḥ and equivocal certainty (50%), al-shakk, to an improb-
able conviction, al-ẓann al-marjūḥ (Qureshi and Padela 2016). The claims of 
genetic science regarding the past, present and future would need to be placed 
into this spectrum prior to making moral assessments. For example how does 
an Islamic perspective assess DNA evidence? One well-researched example of 
where genetic claims uneasily fit into Islamic law pertains to claims of pater-
nity. As Shabana and others note even though genetic evidence might reach 
near certainty it does not negate traditional religious conventions that allow a 
father to claim paternity (Adlan and ten Have 2012, Shabana 2012, 2013).
In related fashion how do Islamic theologians contend with genetic deter-
minism? And how does genetic knowledge matchup with Islamic theological 
views about fate, will, destiny and moral responsibility? For example, if the 
knowledge contained in one’s genes reflects God’s omniscience one could sug-
gest that it is the “language of God” and contains knowledge about one’s fate 
(Collins 2006). Indeed in our focus group interviews with diverse groups of 
Muslims, the idea that the genetic code reflects God’s destined plan for a per-
son with respect to disease was a dominant theme (Padela 2011). These public 
understandings merit recognition by scholars providing an Islamic moral vi-
sion for genetic and genomic technologies for they reflect the mindset of the 
technology’s end-user. 
An ontological perspective of the human as a reproductive organism by na-
ture also bears upon Islamic bioethical positions of genomic and genetic tech-
131Conceptualizing the Human Being
nologies. As noted above, genetic technologies have a wide variety of uses in 
human reproduction. They can help in manufacturing offspring for those who 
cannot “naturally” reproduce, and can aid in diagnosing and repairing genetic 
diseases at the prenatal stage. As referenced above, some argue that members 
of the human species have the right to reproduce and thus the usage of tech-
nology to aid reproduction is inherently good. Would an Islamic worldview 
also contend that having offspring is part of what makes a human, human? 
A Qur’anic verse seems to suggest that one’s biological capacity, as well as the 
eventual destiny to have children, is part of God’s decree. The relevant verse 
reads “Or He bestows both males and females, and He leaves barren whom He 
will.”(Ali 1999 Verse 42:50). On this basis might Islamic theologians interpret 
infertility among the human population as normative and thus not requiring 
genetic technologies to “fix”? While much of the Islamic bioethics literature 
is supportive of using IVF and similar methods to facilitate reproduction in 
the confines of marriage, do these judgements of permissibility also apply to 
manufacturing synthetic gametes, manipulating donor ova to accept DNA 
from other humans, and using reproductive cloning technologies? On one 
hand, Islamic legists deem having children to be a critically important human 
interest that Islamic law must protect. So much so that one of the overarching 
essential higher objectives of Islamic law, maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, is the preserva-
tion of lineage (Raysūni ̄and International Institute of Islamic Thought. 2005, 
Shāṭibi ̄et al. 2011). Indeed the permissibility of using IVF and other biomedical 
technologies for procreative assistance is often grounded in this objective. As 
the same time, it is beyond dispute that traditional views on lineage would 
need to be reimagined to cover the scenarios outlined above. For example, is 
the moral duty to preserve lineage a relevant construct through which to con-
sider the morality of reproductive cloning? Does mitochondrial DNA create 
lineal relations according to Islam? Such questions can be better addressed 
once Islamic theologians reflect on whether reproduction is essential to the 
human being. If reproduction is deemed essential then perhaps reconceptu-
alization of traditional constructs about lineage in light of new technologies, 
and the fashioning of detailed ethico-legal views on how to preserve lineage 
in the present genetic and genomic age is necessary. While Islamic jurists have 
prohibited gestational surrogacy due to concerns over disturbing traditional 
notions of lineage, would the ova donor whose cellular material is used in MRT 
have a claim to parenthood of the future embryo? 
In a similar way, genetic and genomic technologies are reconfiguring views 
on what is means to be a parent, and the attendant moral obligations to the 
to-be-born. Does procreative beneficence cohere with an Islamic moral vision? 
While Islamic scriptural sources are replete with references to parents being 
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responsible for the moral formation of children, do such responsibilities ex-
tend to using genetic selection and/or enhancement technologies on embryos 
pre- and post-implantation? As some have argued the selection of embryos 
to implant involves not only choosing who is born but also who is not. How 
would Islamic theology analyze the role of the human vis-à-vis God in select-
ing the to-be-born, and how is that reflected into Islamic ethics and law? Ideas 
such as accepting God’s will and dominion versus competing with God’s role in 
creation are often invoked by Islamic scholars discussing biomedical technolo-
gies, working out how these concepts relate to human reproduction in the con-
text of genetic and genomic technologies that allow for the selection of traits 
in one’s progeny and even in the future generation of progeny is much needed.
As our ability to modify the genetic composition of individuals and to make 
germline modifications improves, one wonders if whether we should? This 
ethical question moves the discussion to the realm of genetic enhancement 
and brings the notion of a human being as an evolving entity to the fore. Does 
Islam see the gradual process of human creation as having reached its end, and 
that the present human being is fully developed biologically? The Qur’an notes 
that the human is molded by God in the best of forms and Islamic theologians 
consider humankind to be at the pinnacle of God’s creation (Ali 1999 Verse 
40:64). Biomedical science and genetic technologies, however, give rise to the 
ability to modify genotype and the resulting phenotype of individuals and 
their progeny. Is this modification akin to altering God’s creation? With the 
distinction between therapy and enhancement having been blurred by new-
found capacities to intervene upon the human genome, can Islamic theology 
furnish a clear “red-line” for clinical practice based on this conventional frame-
work? Arguably, an applied ethics must be rooted in theological conceptions 
of what the human being represents, and in judgements about what aspects 
of the human being’s composition fall under God’s sole purview. For example, 
Islamic legists offer that the Qur’anic prohibition of suicide, in part, stems from 
a moral condemnation of interfering with God’s role as the originator and ter-
minator of life (Yacoub 2001, Sachedina 2004). How are these views about God 
reconciled in an age when humans can select which embryos to gestate (and 
which ones not to) and can effect genetic modifications that allow for humani-
ty to gain new, or improve upon existing, moral, physical and other capacities? 
Glick (2011) finds that Jewish scriptural sources do not categorically prohibit 
human enhancement, would a reading of the Islamic scriptures offer the same 
perspective? Moosa’s exposition of the varied ways in which scholars have in-
terpreted scriptural texts that appear to warn against the “changing of God’s 
creation” but permit for the cross-pollination of date-palms to determine the 
illicitness of genetically modified foods, speaks to the need for context- depen-
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dent exegesis in order to delineate moral duties related genetic enhancements 
(Moosa, 2009).
Final Remarks
Bioethics sits at the intersection of many fields of knowledge, and has porous 
disciplinary boundaries. It certainly pertains to the biological sciences as eth-
ical issues pertaining to living organisms are subsumed under the “bio” in the 
neologism; however conservation of the environment is viewed as part of bio-
ethics as well. The “ethics” portion of the word is also expansive in that encom-
passes not only the traditional ethical disciplines of philosophy and law (and 
arguably theology) but politics and sociology as well. Accordingly, the field is 
marked with multidisciplinary, and a multitude of perspectives are offered on 
any given moral question. 
This variety makes the bioethics discourse a complex one to navigate. For 
researchers an accurate description of the genre requires recognizing the par-
ticular disciplinary vantage points and ethical reasoning modes used by com-
mentators to delineate and analyze the moral dimensions of a problem. For 
religious scholars seeking to provide moral guidance on a particular bioethical 
issue, their challenge is compounded by the fact that they need to not only un-
derstand the pertinent concepts and relevant ethical perspectives in the field, 
but also need to deconstruct those concepts and arguments in light of their 
own tradition prior to lending a religiously informed perspective. 
By means of a systematic literature review and qualitative analytic meth-
ods this paper aims to help the deconstructive exercise by identifying several 
ontologies of the human that are implicit to the genethics discourse. We have 
demonstrated how the relevant bioethical questions as well as the bioethical 
concepts used to address those questions arise from such conceptualizations 
of the human being. While our literature search was not exhaustive, and our 
analytic methods introduce limits on the comprehensiveness with which we 
can detail specific ontologies, we hold that the developing field of Islamic bio-
ethics must address the ontological claims of biomedicine in addition to the 
ethical and legal dimensions of the biomedical sciences and practices. Indeed 
it may be that Islamic theological perspectives on human ontology can supply 
visions for human flourishing that generate fresh, nuanced, and relevant Is-
lamic bioethical guidance for the present era. 
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chapter 5
Islamic Perspectives on the Genome and the 
Human Person: Why the Soul Matters
Arzoo Ahmed1 and Mehrunisha Suleman2 
Introduction 
A preoccupation with knowledge of the self and nature can be traced through-
out human history. From writings of the Ancients to modern scientific inqui-
ries, we find a collocation of ideas that range from the macrocosmic nature of 
the universe to microcosmic subcellular structures. Recent genomic advances, 
however, have not only added to a key facet of mankind’s raison d’etre—seek-
ing the truth about oneself and the world—it also offers a window into the 
repercussions of and consequences for manipulating matter on the nature of 
man, a nature that has hitherto been thought of as being immutable (Savules-
cu, ter Meulen, and Kahane 2011, XV). The myriad possibilities of genetically 
manipulating matter for human ends, raises critical questions about such en-
deavors and how they may influence our understanding of the human per-
son (Savulescu, Ter Meulen, and Kahane 2011, XV). Central to the advances of 
mankind’s ability to understand and manipulate matter is the unlocking of the 
cellular nucleus and the discovery of DNA with the identification of genes that 
code for particular phenotypes. This initial discovery has been rapidly applied 
to subsequent technological breakthroughs in genetic intervention. The latter 
offers mediation at the sub-cellular level and has the potential to alter the ge-
netic constitution of individuals thereby offering them personalized therapies 
and unprecedented enhancement. The genetics revolution is thus profound-
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ly influencing our understanding of the human person, inheritance, genetic 
and species relatedness and distinctiveness. Concurrently, such advances have 
raised urgent moral questions about our ability to alter and influence the ge-
netic makeup of individuals, and the potential adverse ethical impact these 
may have on future generations.
Recent genetic innovations have been studied through the prism of variegat-
ed fields including philosophy, theology and ethics. But very few studies have 
focused on the Islamic tradition’s perspectives on the human genome and the 
human person. A constellation of Islamic philosophical, theological and spir-
itual narratives have contributed to the definitions for and understanding of 
the human person. Central to such accounts is the nature and role of the soul 
in defining and determining the human person. Yet very few scholarly contri-
butions consider the relationship between the human genome, its association 
with the human person, and how these relate to Islamic considerations of the 
soul. The aim of this paper is to redress this imbalance. 
This study seeks to extend the list of textual sources that contribute to eth-
ical considerations of the genome question. We will show that these issues 
must, of necessity, include discussions of the human person and interrogate 
the interplay between them. Based on this hypothesis, this work will argue that, 
within the Islamic tradition, deliberations on the genome question should take 
into account knowledge of the soul and the body, since these are also believed 
to be constituents of the human person. Observations on these two primary 
determinants of the human person will be proffered from the fields of Qurʾānic 
exegesis, theology, and philosophy. The modus operandi of this investigation 
will be the exploration of key terms, how they relate to the approaches of dif-
ferent fields, and how they are conducive to offering a deeper understanding of 
the human person. The study will initially propound the relationship between 
the genome and the human person and how perspectives on the human ge-
nome are informing ideas about the human person and how such positions are 
stimulating ethical deliberations around speciesism, genetic determinism, en-
hancement, capacities, will and responsibility. This will be followed by an ex-
plication of the soul from within the Islamic tradition and how narratives from 
within this tradition provide novel perspectives to our understandings of the 
human person and the ethical considerations surrounding genomics. Finally, 
we will delineate areas for future engagement that this study has disinterred.
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On the Relationship between the Genome and the Human Person: 
Definitions, Perspectives and Challenges 
Genetic advancement, through the elucidation of the structure of DNA (Wat-
son and Crick 1953) and the subsequent sequencing of the Human Genome,, 
has propelled us to a higher plateau of understanding our basic functions and 
the nature of human life (IHGSC 2004; Lander et al. 2001). Such developments 
are changing, not only what we can do, but also how we think and understand 
ourselves (Annas 1997, 157). George Annas explores how the mapping of the 
human genome has been a powerful “thought transformer” (Annas 1997, 157) 
similar to that of the astronomical mapping by Copernicus and the global 
mapping by Columbus. He argues that “maps model reality to help us under-
stand it” (Annas 1997, 157). This proposition requires careful consideration vis-
à-vis the mapping of the human genome in deriving understandings of the 
human person. The conceptualization of the human person from scientific, 
philosophical, ethical and legal perspectives, often refer to a composite – a 
person with distinct yet interacting parts (Taylor 1985). These fields oblige us 
to re-evaluate our understanding of the human person in light of genomics. 
This section will briefly explore perspectives on the human genome that are 
informing ideas about the human person and how such positions are stimu-
lating ethical deliberations around speciesism, genetic determinism, enhance-
ment, capacities, will and responsibility. 
The Role of Genes in Determining Our Species Identity: Who Are 
We?
“Who are we? The question must be answered by each generation,” suggests 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu reflecting on our need to reconcile recent scientific 
advancements with long held beliefs (Tutu 2015, ix). The discovery that our 
genes may define us as a species, Homo sapiens, brings into focus how pivotal 
scientific discoveries often involve “narcissistic offences” (Zwart 2009). Hub 
Zwart explains, for example, that scientific developments realized through 
Copernican heliocentrism demonstrate that earth and man do not occupy a 
central position in the organization of the universe; rather, we are deemed to 
be equals amongst other bodies in space (Zwart 2009). He adds that Darwin’s 
seminal work on evolution elucidated how little we differ from other species 
(Zwart 2009), and that these estimations have been proven through compara-
tive genomics, which reveal that humans may share up to 99.4% of their DNA 
with chimpanzees (Wildman et al. 2003). 
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Ethical considerations resulting from such findings are being realized 
through recent deliberations about and investigations into the moral status 
of Homo sapiens. Those who define being human along genetic lines argue 
that our species distinction confers certain privileges. This speciesism involves 
claims that humans should be able to manipulate other species for their own 
ends, such as killing them for food or using them for research (Steinbock 1978). 
The argument for employing the concept of a “genetic humanity” (Warren 
2013, 308) as a way of defining human beings, is advocated by those who argue 
against abortion suggesting that it is wrong, not simply because fetuses are 
alive, but because they are human. However, this definition would require fur-
ther evaluation when attempting to tackle questions around the best interests 
of the mother and fetus. If both are equal, since both are human, that is, each 
carries the human genome, then life-saving prioritization decisions cannot be 
made between mother and fetus on this basis.
Others, however, emphasize that comparative genomics, rather than con-
ferring upon humans a genetic distinctiveness, demonstrate that, as a species, 
we are merely one entity on the species spectrum (Zwart 2009). How then do 
we relate to one another and comprehend, not only our identity as human be-
ings, but also our identity as distinct persons? Peter Singer, who advocates for 
animal liberation, does, nevertheless, concede that human animals are distinct 
from non-human animals (Singer 1975; Steinbock 1978). If our genetic code 
alone does not confer such distinctness, then what accounts for it? And how 
can we understand intra-species differences, such as that of a mother and her 
fetus? Genomics may offer avenues for answering these questions, not through 
the Human Genome’s application as a species map, but through it’s conferring 
of individual phenotypic traits and therefore physical realities and capacities. 
The Role of Genes in Determining Our Individual Identity: Who 
Am I?
James Watson, who co-discovered DNA with Francis Crick, famously claimed, 
“We used to think our fate was in our stars. Now we know, in large measure, our 
fate is in our genes” (Watson 1989). Richard Dawkins, in his pioneering work 
on evolution posits: “They (genes) are in you and in me; they created us, body 
and mind; and their preservation is the ultimate rationale for our existence. 
They have come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the name of 
genes, and we are their survival machines” (Dawkins 2016). Such claims rely on 
reductionist models of the human person, which suggest a linear causal link 
between genes, the proteins for which they code, the subsequent cellular pro-
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cesses they initiate, their amalgamation at the level of individual tissues and 
organs and, finally, organ systems that are eventually realized as an entire hu-
man organism (Noble 2008). These models of biological systems find support 
in examples of so-called “genetic determinism” (Peters 2014) where genes de-
termine phenotypic outcomes, illustrated by conditions such as Huntingdon’s 
disease (HD) and cystic fibrosis (CF). 
CF is a genetic disorder characterized by an autosomal recessive pattern of 
inheritance (Rommens et al. 1989). The disease is caused when an individual 
inherits mutations in both copies of the gene that code for the cystic fibrosis 
transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) protein. The condition affects 
multi-organ systems including the respiratory tract, reducing lung capacity, 
and impairing digestion resulting from suboptimal functioning of the pan-
creas; inheritance of the recessive alleles predict the presence of disease at 
birth. Currently, no treatment exists for CF and management comprises symp-
tomatic relief for individual organ systems. It is a life-limiting disease (Tobias, 
Connor and Ferguson-Smith 2011) wherein the identification of the CF gene 
(Rommens et al. 1989) has raised the possibility of genetic intervention. Gene 
therapy targeting the faulty CFTR gene in individuals who carry the muta-
tion has been hailed as a potential biomedical magic bullet for suffers of CF 
(Colledge and Evans 1995). 
The identification of genes and their resulting phenotype, as well as the 
concurrent development of techniques to modify these genes hold great di-
agnostic and therapeutic potential. Nor are their uses limited to single gene 
disorders such as CF. Genetically predisposing factors such as the presence 
of BRCA1 and 2 in breast and ovarian cancer present subcellular level targets 
that may alter or ameliorate the risk of disease. The ability to alter our genetic 
makeup and in turn reduce risk of disease holds immense potential benefit. 
These advances and their proposed potential have also been welcomed as ev-
idence for theories of genetic determinism. It also leads to claims that such 
genetic intervention ought to be pivotal in shifting our understanding of the 
fate of humans. For individuals carrying the genes that code for a potentially 
debilitating condition, like CF, gene therapy would undoubtedly have a tre-
mendous impact on their sense of self and quality of life. It would thus support 
the notion that genetic intervention through gene therapy plays a critical role 
for genes in determining the human person by offering an unprecedented abil-
ity to alter the fate of humans at the level of the germ line.
Such genetic interventions also raise ethical concerns, however, around the 
human person in terms of health, illness and quality of life. Few would argue 
that to intervene at the genetic level to prevent or treat a debilitating condi-
tion, like CF is ethical. But what can be said of gene therapy induced cosmetic 
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changes or the potential to extend life through telomere repair? How do we 
distinguish between therapeutic benefit and enhancement when both aim to 
improve quality of life? A genotypic emphasis for understanding normal traits 
(Buchanan et al. 2001) and the human person raise questions, not only about 
our existing attributes, but also about our aspirational endeavours. Who do 
we want to become? Some authors argue that it is not only desirable but also 
a moral obligation to enhance ourselves (Savulescu, ter Meulen, and Kahane 
2011). If such enhancement enables people to lead better lives, the argument 
goes, then we have a responsibility to promote such an endeavor. Human en-
gineering or “transhumanism” raises hopes in many spheres about how the 
human species can be advanced in fields of physical and intellectual endeavor. 
Nevertheless, such views raise critical questions about what it means to lead 
a good life or better life. These discussions highlight the need for societies to 
gain a deeper understand of the meaning of health, disease and wellbeing in 
the wake of genetic intervention and enhancement. Modern eugenics or selec-
tive breeding to “optimize” the population gene pool is commonly practiced, 
with genetic testing and subsequent selection against disorders such as Down’s 
syndrome. This practice is considered acceptable as it is predicated on paren-
tal consent and has the overall objective of producing a child with the best 
opportunities for a good life (Savulescu 2009). However, are people the best 
guardians of their own interests and capable of making appropriate choices, 
not just for themselves, but also for their offspring and future generations? The 
potential uses of genetic technologies have revolutionized our understanding 
of biomedical therapeutics and enhancement. However, such innovations 
have raised not only bioethical questions about personal capabilities, but also 
potential diachronic implications for future generations.
When biomedical interventions seek to be both lifesaving and life enhanc-
ing, how do we decide the boundary between enhancement and therapy? 
Consideration of genetics alone does not enable us to answer such questions. 
Instead, they require a deeper evaluation of how we individually, and collec-
tively, understand concepts such as quality of life and suffering, and alleviation 
thereof. It is also important to consider that few diseases confer such a strong 
causal link, such as is seen in CF, between genotype and phenotype. The hu-
man phenotype comprises, not just physical characteristics such as eye color 
or a faulty protein, it also constitutes features such as behavior and general dis-
position. How far do genes account for these other aspects of our phenotype? 
Studies of twins reveal that they can share identical genotypes, yet display dis-
tinct phenotypes. Individual genotypic definitions of the human person are 
therefore limited and require us to consider broader phenotypic models that 
incorporate features such as our behavior and general disposition.
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The Role of Genes in Determining Human Psychology: Am I My 
Thoughts and Actions? 
Crick believes the role of genes determine thoughts and actions. He remarks, 
“You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your 
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior 
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (Crick 1994, 3). 
Other scientists, on the other hand, caution against such genetic determinism 
by emphasizing that “stretches of DNA that we now call genes do nothing on 
their own. They are simply databases used by the organism as a whole” (Noble 
2008, 18). Denis Noble goes on to argue that genes are “captured entities, no 
longer having a life of their own, independent of the organism” (Noble 2008, 
18). Dawkins also recently clarified that in his thesis, “The Selfish Gene,” the 
“anthropomorphic personification” (Dawkins 2016, xi) of DNA that was initial-
ly employed ought to be clarified. He explains that “no sane person thinks DNA 
molecules have conscious personalities” (Dawkins 2016, xii) and that the per-
sonification of molecular structures simply offers scientists a “didactic device” 
(Dawkins 2016, xii). The disambiguation of Dawkins notwithstanding, there 
have been increasing misconceptions about the role of genes in determining 
behaviors and psychologies. Studies show growing cognitive biases in terms of 
genetic essentialism where people consider that their lives, thoughts and be-
haviors are an inevitable reflection of their genotype (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 
2011).
The discussion hitherto has been on the role of genes in determining the hu-
man person with regards to our species identity as Homo sapiens, and to their 
lesser role in determining our individual biological composition through phys-
ical phenotypic determination. As persons, however, our identity goes beyond 
belonging to a species and having a physical or bodily identity. Some authors 
have suggested that “persons are separate entities to human beings” (Savulescu 
2009, 220). Charles Taylor, in his ground-breaking account of “Human Agency 
and Language,” elucidates the concept of a person. He writes:
Where it is more than simply a synonym for ‘human being,’ ‘person’ fig-
ures primarily in moral and legal discourse. A person is a being with a 
certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral status, 
as its condition, are certain capacities. A person is a being who has a sense 
of self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make 
choices; in short, can adopt life-plans. At least, a person must be the kind 
of being who is in principle capable of all this, however damaged these 
capacities may be in practice. (Taylor 1985, 97) 
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Moral philosophers, such as Singer, argue that what characterizes us as persons 
and confers upon us certain moral implications, is not membership within the 
species: Homo Sapien, but rather, the particular properties of rationality and 
self-consciousness (Singer 2011, 83-87). Both of these accounts indicate that a 
person is someone who is able to retain a sense of self over time and hold val-
ues and preferences into the future. Additionally, Julian Savulescu comments 
that a necessary, but not sufficient, component of persons is their “capacity to 
act from normative reasons, including moral reasons” (Savulescu 2009, 243). 
He also explains that “animals have desires and wants about what to do. Hu-
mans alone have beliefs about what they should do” and that they “sometimes 
act on the basis of these” (Savulescu 2009, 244).
Such philosophical narratives imply a complex interplay between genetic 
predispositions, rationality and how we relate to our past and future selves. Yet 
there are also claims that particular genetic traits predispose to certain actions 
that challenge notions of individual reasoning and will, and subsequent no-
tions of responsibility. For instance, the XYY or super-male karyotype, which 
has been linked with criminal behavior (Farrell 1969), has been employed as 
a legal defense. Individuals arrested for a crime who were found to have this 
genetic makeup argued that, due to a genetic predisposition, they could not 
be held responsible and should thus not be considered criminally accountable 
for their actions. This so-called “XYY defence” has broadly been rejected and, 
in cases where it was accepted, it was on the grounds of diminished mental ca-
pacity, where the defendant was confined to a mental institution (Annas 1997, 
158). Be that as it may, the “XYY defence,” and genetic myths (Fox 1971) implying 
genes are the “metaphorical locus of our fate” (Wolpe 1997), bespeak not only 
a nascent understanding of how and if genes impact our ability to reason and 
act, they exhibit our willingness to believe that such faculties are beyond our 
conscious control (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011). Sigmund Freud, for example, 
famously posited that we are not rationally driven beings and are entirely sub-
ject to our subconscious (Zwart 2009). Freud’s psychoanalysis thesis forces a 
further reconfiguration of our understanding of the human person and the 
role of the human genome in the latter’s determination. Current and future 
developments within science, psychology, philosophy and ethics will continue 
to inform such discussions.
It is important to reflect here that recent research has also elucidated the 
role of genes in determining non-physical characteristics. Studies have illus-
trated the genetic heritability of a range of cognitive abilities, including intel-
ligence (Plomin and Spinath 2004). However, these links are posited currently 
as possibilities and not accurate predictions. Such advances also raise ethical 
concerns about future possibilities of artificially selecting for such genes. The 
147Islamic Perspectives on the Genome and the Human Person
ethical implications of “designer descendants” are vast; including how such 
interventions may alter our capacity for moral reasoning. If these designer de-
scendants are genetically selected and programmed to be morally infallible, 
then are such entities still considered persons? Such interventions would have 
an unprecedented bearing on our understandings of free will, consciousness, 
determinism, responsibility and our aspirations for and obligations towards 
future generations of “persons.”
The foregoing displays how genetic advancements, which have offered new 
perspectives on our understanding of the human person, have also stimulated 
novel ethical deliberations. Accounts presented above indicate that there are 
many gaps in our construction of the human person when relying solely on 
the genome. Ethical deliberations around speciesism, genetic determinism, 
enhancement, capacities, will and responsibility that are stimulated by the 
human genome also require broader examination through additional sourc-
es of knowledge. The scientific, ethical, philosophical and legal accounts of 
the human person presented above suggest that more work needs to be done 
to characterize the human person, in terms of personal and collective traits, 
before the associated ethical considerations can be fully addressed and scruti-
nized. Now we offer perspectives from the Islamic tradition and, in particular, 
accounts on the human soul, which offer novel perspectives on aspects of the 
human person, and the associated ethical considerations surrounding the ge-
nome question.
On the Relationship between the Soul and the Human Person 
within the Islamic Tradition: Definitions, Perspectives and 
Implications for the Genome Question 
Knowledge about the concept of the human person is informed, not only 
through biological and scientific advances as they relate to the genome, and 
other fields of inquiry mentioned earlier, but also through religious and spiri-
tual traditions which offer specific insights into the non-physical dimensions 
of the human person. 
The concept of the human person within the Islamic tradition commonly 
features in bioethical discussions concerning abortion and the specific events 
marking the beginning and end of life (Brockopp 2008; Ghaly 2012; Shaw 2014). 
In these contexts, the human person is defined in accordance with the status 
conferred upon it by the movement of the soul as it enters or leaves the human 
body. A broader consideration of what constitutes the human person, and the 
nature of the soul, according to the Islamic tradition, is not only helpful, but 
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also necessary before assessing the impact and implications for the genomics 
project.
Key Qurʾānic terms that relate to the physical and spiritual aspects of the 
human person are identified and explored within various disciplines of Islamic 
thought. Here we will present a narrative on the human person that combines 
beliefs about the body, soul and spirit - their origins, existence, fate, and pur-
pose of creation. The primary focus is on highlighting the complexity that the 
existence of a soul adds to a conceptualisation of the human person. Where 
possible, the implications for the genomics project are touched upon, insofar 
as they may impact the soul’s propensity for reflecting on and returning to its 
pure and natural (fiṭrah) primordial state, as originated by God.
Defining Key Terms Related to the Human Person: Qurʾānic, 
Theological and Philosophical Perspectives 
This section surveys Qurʾānic terms related to the human person, which are 
further elaborated in exegetical, theological and philosophical sources. Table 
1 displays these terms, their associated translations and their frequency of oc-
currence in the Qurʾān. 
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of term in 
Qurʾān






71* (2:60) (4:28) (7:82) (10:12) 
(11:9) (12:5) (14:34) (15:26) 
(16:4) (19:67) (21:37) (22:66) 




18 (6:112) (6:128) (6:130) (7:38) 
(7:179) (17:88) (27:17) (41:25) 
(41:29) (46:18) (51:56) (55:33) 






37* (3:47) (3:79) (5:18) (6:91) 
(11:27) (12:31) (14:10) (14:11) 
(15:28) (15:33) (16:103) 
(17:93)
Arḍ Earth 2 Arḍ occurs 461 times, but 
only on two occasions does it 
refer to the human being as 
produced from earth (arḍ)**
(11:61) (53:32)
Ṭin̄ Clay 8 Material out of which the 
human being was fashioned
(6:2) (7:12) (17:61) (23:12) 
(32:7) (37:11) (38:71) (38:76)
Turāb Dust 14 Half of the verses refer to the 
human being’s creation from 
dust, other half refer to the 
human being’s return to dust
(3:59) (13:5) (18:37) (22:5) 
(30:20) (35:11) (40:67) (23:35) 
(23:82) (27:67) (37:16) (37:53) 
(50:3) (56:47)
ṣalṣāl Clay 4 Three of the references 
describe the clay as being from 
an altered black mud
(15:26) (15:28) (15:33) (55:14)
Jasad Body 1 Refers to the prophets’ forms (21:8)
Badan Body 1 A purely physical bodily form 
after the spirit has departed
(10:92)




of term in 
Qurʾān
Note References of Qurʾānic verses 
mentioning term
Qalb Heart 132* (2:7) (2:10) (2:74) (2:88) (2:93) 
(2:204) (2:283) (3:7) (3:126) 
(3:156) (4:155) (5:41) (6:25) 
(7:100) (7:179)(9:93) (9:127) 
(10:88) (26:89) (33:26) (41:5) 
(49:7) (50:33) (57:16) (61:5) 
(66:4) (74:31) 
Fuʾād Heart 16 (6:110) (6:113) (11:120) 
(14:37) (14:43) (16:78) (17:36) 
(23:78) (25:32) (28:10) (32:9) 
(46:26) (53:11) (67:23) (104:7)
ṣūra Form 3 The perfected form of human 
beings
(40:64)(64:3) (82:8)
Taqwim̄ Mould 1 The stature or mould of human 
beings
(95:4)
Nafs Soul 290 In an additional 5 verses, God 
refers to ‘Himself ’ using the 
same root word nafs. Occurs 
as a noun denoting ‘soul,’ ‘self,’ 
‘person,’ ‘mind,’ dependent 
upon context
(2:9) (2:44) (2:48) (2:54) (2:72) 
(2:123) (2:155) (3:93) (5:32) 
(5:70) (5:80) (5:116) (6:152) 
(7:42) (7:189) (9:81) (9:118) 
(11:21) (12:53) (13:42) (17:15) 
(21:35) (39:6) (41:31) (50:21) 
(82:19) (91:7) 
Rūḥ Spirit 21 References the spirit of God, 
the Holy spirit, the spirit in 
human beings, inspiration, as 
well as the angel Gabriel
(2:87) (2:253) (4:171) (5:110) 
(15:29) (16:2) (16:10) (17:85) 
(19:17) (21:91) (26:193) (32:9) 
(38:72) (40:15) (42:52) (58:22) 
(66:12) (70:4) (78:38) (97:4) 
ʿAql Intellect, 
reason
49* Not mentioned as a noun. 
Occurs as form I verb ʿaqalu 
meaning to understand, 
reason, intellect
(2:44) (2:73) (2:76) (2:164) 
(3:65) (3:118) (5:58) (5:103) 
(10:16) (12:2) (29:43) (30:24) 
(36:68) 
Fiṭrah Nature 1 Original, natural state upon 
which God created human 
beings
(30:30)
Table 1 Key terms from the qurʾān relating to the human person (cont.)
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* Terms with a large frequency where only select references are mentioned. 
** Nine Qurʾānic verses mention God making humans ‘vicegerents’ (khalif̄ah) on earth (arḍ) . 
Four of those mentions (Q. 2:30; 6:165; 27:62; 35:39) refer to vicegerents on earth in the general 
sense. It appears that being a vicegerent on earth is a property of humans that is intrinsically 
tied to their physical existence on earth. Humans, produced from earth, sent through the Fall 
to be vicegerents on earth, must inevitably return to earth through death, and be resurrected 
again from earth, before continuing their journey to the hereafter.
The term nās (translated as people, or mankind) occurs 241 times as a noun in 
its plural form. This has been omitted from the table because it is employed as 
a general address to humans, which is extraneous to the specific physical and 
spiritual constitution of the human person that this paper addresses.
In the Qurʾānic narrative, man (insān/bashar) was created from clay (ṭin̄/
ṣalṣāl) and dust (turāb) (Q. 32:7; 15:28; 35:11), and fashioned (ṣawwara) into the 
best of forms (ṣuwar) (Q. 64:3), before God blew into him, of His spirit (rūḥ) (Q. 
38:72). Elsewhere in the Qurʾān, God states that “He created you from a single 
soul (nafs)” (Q. 4:1). Man is thus constituted of three key elements: the form 
(encompassing the body), the soul, and the spirit, and has been endowed with 
a physical and spiritual existence, both of which are central to a conception of 
the human person.
Yet, as Table 1. clearly demonstrates, these terms are not equally significant 
in the Qurʾānic narrative. Of all the terms outlined, one stands out as being 
the most important: nafs. This term features in the Qur’an more than fourteen 
times its potential synonym, rūḥ. It is used more than twice as many times as 
its nearest related term (qalb, 132), and it is cited with a significantly higher 
frequency as compared to all the other terms under consideration combined 
(290: 379). There can be little doubt, then, as to its centrality from a Qurʾānic 
perspective. Any study that makes bold to address the notion of the human 
person in the Islamic tradition, therefore, must place nafs at the centre of that 
endeavour. This is the reason nafs shall assume pride of place in this paper, 
with all other terms being examined as they are connected to or affiliated with 
it. 
Nafs and rūḥ: Distinct Entities or Synonyms? 
A person’s metaphysical and spiritual existence is predicated on, and deter-
mined by, the existence of nafs (soul, self) and rūḥ (spirit). From Table 1, it can 
be seen that the Qurʾān mentions nafs far more frequently than rūḥ (290:21, 
respectively). The vast array of verses that mention nafs provide copious in-
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formation about its nature, its different levels and functions, and how it some-
times inclines towards good and, at other times, away from it. On the other 
hand, the Qurʾān is far less expansive in its elucidation of rūḥ: “They question 
you about the Spirit (rūḥ). Say: the Spirit is from the command of my Lord. And 
you have not been given knowledge about it, save a little.” This verse bespeaks 
an essential numinosity, which is why many scholars chose not to elaborate on 
matters pertaining to the spirit.
The renowned exegete, Abū ‘Abd Allah al-Qurṭubi ̄ (d. 671/1273), writes “it 
[the rūḥ] is a great matter and a significant affair from the matters of God that 
He has obscured for us and not explained, so that man realizes his apodictic 
incapacity to know the reality of his self, whilst knowing that [his reality] ex-
ists. And if man is so incapable of knowing his own reality, then he is, a fortiori, 
incapable of knowing the reality of God” (Qurṭubi ̄2004, 10: 210). 
Some scholars hold that nafs and rūḥ are one and the same, thus the terms 
for each can be used interchangeably to indicate the masculine and feminine 
forms of the soul. Others, like Saʿid̄ Ḥawwa, distinguish superficially between 
the two entities, and posit that rūḥ is the form of the spirit’s independent ex-
istence prior to being affiliated with a body, and that rūḥ resides as nafs after 
it is “clothed in the body” (Saʿid̄ Ḥawwa 1995). Thus, nafs is a term for the body 
being fertilized with the spirit.
Not all orthodox scholars accepted the synonymy of nafs and rūḥ; the Sufi 
exegete, ʿAbd al-Karim̄ al-Qushayri ̄(d. 465/1072), for instance, comments that, 
“rūḥ is the locus of subtle states (aḥwāl laṭif̄ah) and praiseworthy actions, just 
as sight is the locus of visions… the rūḥ is [thus] the locus of all praiseworthy 
attributes, just as nafs is the locus of all blameworthy ones” (Qushayri,̄ 4: 304). 
The Qurʾān assigns three states to nafs: the satisfied soul (nafs al-muṭma-in-
nah) (Q. 89:27); the self-accusing soul (nafs al-lawwāmah) (Q. 75:2); and the 
soul inclined to evil (nafs al-ammārah bi’l-sūʾ) (Q. 12:53) . That nafs is associated 
with states inclined towards actions, both good and bad, means that it offers a 
tangible link between the physical and metaphysical dimensions of a person.
Others were more succinct, and offered a deeper distinction between nafs 
and rūḥ, stating that “the latter is that whereby is life; and the former, that 
whereby is intellect (ʿaql), or reason; so that when one sleeps, God takes away 
the nafs, but not the rūḥ, which is not taken save at death” (Lane, Arabic Lexi-
con, 1111). Opinions of scholars citing a significant difference between nafs and 
rūḥ present a perspective that is more coherent with the Qurʾānic characteri-
zation of both aspects of the human person. In the Qurʾān, God attributes rūḥ 
to Himself, as part of His command, whereas nafs is more directly associated 
with humans. Were nafs and rūḥ similar in their origin, existence and func-
tion, the Qurʾān would not have distinguished between the two so clearly, by 
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specifying that rūḥ is from the matter of God, of which we know little, whilst 
offering far greater insight into nafs.
A consideration of nafs, therefore, is more conducive to constructing a 
framework connecting the physical and metaphysical aspects of the human 
person, particularly through the lens of human action. That there is an inti-
mate connection between the body (jasad, jism, badan) and the nafs, it is im-
possible to deny. But how are they connected, and how, and to what extent, do 
actions of the body influence the soul?
Nafs and Body
The body and soul are intimately connected. The mystic Muhammad b. al-Ḥu-
sayn al-Sulami ̄(d. 412/1021), writes that ‘the soul is a band of rays of the Reality 
whose traces differ in bodies’ (al-Sulami ̄2001, 1:395). The soul is the receptor 
of the Divine ray, whose output is through the body. The soul thus percolates 
through the actions of the body, and so, would it be too outlandish to assert 
that the actions of the body, in mutualistic fashion, affect the soul? Before we 
consider this specific conundrum, we must look at the general relationship 
between the body and the soul, and whether the human person is the body 
alone, or the body—soul amalgam.    
The Qurʾān asserts that ‘every soul (nafs) shall taste death’ (Q. 3:185). The 
term employed in this verse, nafs, is significant because there is unified opin-
ion that the soul (nafs) does not die. It is the body that dies, its death marked 
by the departure of the soul. Thus, in this verse, the term nafs more literally 
represents the body or person, who experiences death. It is indeed the case 
that the Qurʾānic usage of the term nafs oscillates between ‘soul’ and ‘self ’ 
and the ‘human person’ emphasizing the inextricable association of the body 
and soul. The Qurʾān’s deliberate application of the term nafs to indicate both 
physical and metaphysical realities supports the body-soul amalgam of the hu-
man person, addressing what is visible: the body, and that which isn’t visible: 
the soul.  
The nature of the interaction between the body and the soul was of central 
concern to Muslim philosophers and theologians. Their debates about the na-
ture of the human person took place within wider discussions about human 
agency and theories of action, as they sought to understand nature, their role 
as humans, and the role of God (Wolfson 1976; Calverley and Pollock 2002). 
Their discussions and the questions they raised resonate within our current 
scientific milieu, as we tread the boundaries of what is natural and question 
again what it means to be a human person.
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Many opinions circulated among theologians, as al-Ashʿari ̄(d. 324/935) in his 
doxographical work, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyin̄, catalogues. The discussions ranged 
from whether the body alone could define man, that is, “the individual that you 
see,” or whether accidents (aʿrāḍ), too, formed part of the body. A group opined 
that the body itself is man and its accidents are not part of it. It was also debat-
ed whether the soul was regarded as a separate substance (jawhar) to man, in 
addition to the body. Ḍirār b. ʿAmr (d. 200/815?), rejecting the idea of a spirit or 
an immaterial soul, remarked “man is made up of many things, namely: colour, 
taste, smell, the ability to touch and so forth. They constitute man whenever 
they are combined and there is no separate substance other than these.” Oth-
ers, like the dualist Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825), disagreed, “man is body 
and spirit, and these two together constitute man” (Ritter 1929, 329). Writing 
a couple of centuries later, Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahāni ̄ (d. 502/1108) conveyed his 
understanding of the role of the body and soul, respectively: “man (insān) is 
composed of a body (jism) with the faculty of sight (baṣar), and a soul (nafs) 
with the faculty of insight (baṣir̄a)’... the soul is the locus of spiritual accidents, 
and the body the locus of bodily accidents” (Mohamed 2006, 456). 
In his capacity as a celebrated physician, Avicenna (d. 429/1037) wrote 
about the human body, most notably in his Canon of Medicine, whilst as a 
distinguished philosopher, he wrote on the human soul, and how intellectual 
perfection allows the soul to attain ultimate happiness. Avicenna, adopting the 
Aristotelian concept of the soul, defines it in his magnum opus, al-Najāt as “the 
first entelechy (perfection) of a natural body possessing organs that potential-
ly has life” (Rahman 1952, 25). The soul, therefore, is the defining feature that 
perfects a body to make it part of a species and distinct from other species. 
Avicenna’s conception of soul as “entelechy is wider than that of form” because 
forms necessarily subsist in matter, whereas entelechy allows the soul to be 
associated with the body without exclusively being a form inherent in the body 
(Rahman 1952, 9).
Avicenna postulates a tripartite division of the souls (vegetative, animal, 
and human). These are bifurcated into the physical (vegetative and animal) 
and spiritual (human) souls, with the former “passing away upon the death of 
the body” and the latter (human, spiritual) being classified as an “independent 
and immaterial substance” (Rahman 1952). 
Although the foundations of an immaterial soul were laid by the Ancient 
Greeks, with Plotinus asserting that the ‘soul is not in the body as in space, it 
is not related to the body as form to matter, as a whole to a part or a part to a 
whole,’ it was Avicenna, who, through his unique thought experiment of ‘the 
flying man,’ helped explain the immaterial nature of the soul as a form of con-
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sciousness and self-awareness. He thus opined that the soul, by its very nature, 
has self-knowledge (Reisman 2004).
The immortality of the soul is another unique aspect of Avicenna’s defini-
tion of the soul. In chapter 13 of his Najāt, the philosopher writes, “we say that 
the soul does not die with the death of the body and is absolutely incorrupt-
ible. As for the former proposition, this is because everything, which is corrupt-
ed of something else, is in some way attached to it. And anything, which is in 
some way attached to something else, is either coexistent with it or posterior 
to it in existence or prior to it, this priority being essential and not temporal 
(Rahman 1952, 58). 
Avicenna’s theory of the substantiality of the soul and the assertion of the 
separability of the human rational soul from the body grants the soul an inde-
pendence from the body. Goodman comments on the idea that the soul does 
not exist in the body as mere form in a substrate. He states that “human actions 
are not to be conceived solely in terms of the behavior of the body, and are 
not reducible to physical terms or explicable wholly and solely by reference to 
mechanical events… souls can affect bodies; it is not always a case of bodies af-
fecting souls… this thesis is crucial to our ability to maintain or restore the idea 
that a person is an agent, that human thought, action and experience are not 
adequately described or explained in mechanistic terms” (Goodman 1992, 161).
The soul’s experience of life on earth is intrinsically tied to the body. al-Attas 
writes that “the human body and the world of sense and sensible experiences 
provide the soul with a school for its training to know God” (al-Attas 1995, 175). 
Further questions can also be posed about whether the body and soul are inde-
pendent in the spiritual sense, since physical actions have been shown in the 
Qurʾān and other writings, to have an effect on the human person’s spiritual 
existence, and eternal fate. To disinter the full complexity of this relationship, 
we must first look at the point when the body and soul became united. 
How Old is the Association between the Body and the Soul?  
The First Covenant 
The story of creation, which details different stages and events in the origin of 
the human person and its purpose for creation, is useful in providing further 
insights into the nature of the soul and how it relates to physical, psychological 
and spiritual aspects of the human person, in the space-time realm which pre-
cedes that of the human being’s earthly existence. In its primordial existence, 
as described in the Qurʾān, the human being took his first covenant: “And (re-
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member) when your Lord brought forth from the Children of Ādam, from their 
loins, their seed, and made them testify about themselves, (saying): Am I not 
your Lord? They said: Yes, verily. We testify” (Q. 7:172).
Scholars, who have commented on this first covenant and the nature of 
the extraction of human beings from the loins of Ādam, differ concerning the 
form of human existence during the event. Some assert that the covenant was 
taken in a corporeal form, whereas others hold that it was just the souls that 
were gathered for this moment and testified. Ibn Jarir̄ al-Tabari ̄ (d. 310/923) 
cites ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbbās (d. 74/687), the exegete par excellence, as having 
said, ‘When God created Ādam, He extracted his progeny from his back [and 
they were] like atoms (dharr).’ Al-Tabari ̄is more categorical as to the constitu-
tion of Ādam’s progeny, when he states that upon extraction from Ādam, his 
progeny was ‘in the form (hayʾa) of atoms (dharr)’ (al-Tabari ̄2005, 6:111). The 
lesser-known exegete, Abū Isḥāq al-Thaʿālibi ̄(d. 427/1035), avers that the souls 
were either like atoms (dharr) or mustard seeds (khardal). He then quotes Mu-
hammad ibn Kaʿb (d. 108-120/726-738?) who remarks, “they were souls (arwāḥ) 
to whom a task was given’ (al-Thaʿālibi ̄ 1996, 1:586). Al-Qurṭubi ̄ also records 
the viewpoint that the covenant was taken pre-phenomenally. He writes, “God 
extracted the souls (arwāh) [from Ādam] before their bodies (ajsām). He also 
mentions, a somewhat cryptic notion that “He, be He exalted, extracted simu-
lacra (ashbāh) [of bodies] in which were souls from the back of Ādam, … and 
God made them cognisant (ʿuqūl)….’ (Al-Qurṭubi ̄2004, 7:200). Precisely what 
state the pre-existent souls or bodies existed in, and their respective modes of 
testifying are unclear. Furthermore, it is not known whether it was a testimony 
through speech, or through their very being before God. However, it is clear 
that created beings possessed a knowledge of God and themselves, in the ear-
liest moments of the creation story.
The timing of the first covenant is also disputed, with opinions existing on 
both sides claiming that the covenant took place either before, or after, earthly 
existence. Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suddi ̄(d. 127/745?) believes that it oc-
curred on the lowest heaven (al-samāʾ al-dunyā), which would indicate it was 
before earthly existence, but, significantly, still after the fall. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri ̄
(d. 110/728) believes that after the progeny of Ādam was extracted from his back 
and the covenant was taken, it was returned to him (Al-Qurṭubi ̄2004, 7:201). 
Accounting for the different opinions, a potential sequence of events could 
then be: the creation of Ādam and Ḥawāʾ; the fall of man to the lowest heaven; 
the progeny extracted from Ādam’s back; covenant taken; progeny returned 
to Ādam’s back; Ādam lowered to earth. When addressing a conception of the 
human person, it may be helpful to consider the implications of a pre-earthly 
existence, and give further thought as to how aspects of the unity and unique-
ness of creation contribute to an understanding of the human person.
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Notwithstanding the differences of opinion vis-à-vis when the body and 
soul came to be united, it is clear that the association of the body and soul, at 
least in the opinion of many scholars, predates our corporeal existence in the 
world. We have not yet considered the specific implications of actions on the 
soul. For this, we must look at the first act of human transgression, and wheth-
er it had an effect on the soul. 
Fall to Earth: a Case Study of the Interaction between the Body and 
nafs 
One of the most significant events in the creation story is the Fall of Ādam 
and Ḥawāʾ from heaven to earth, after they consumed fruit from the forbidden 
tree. The most detailed account of this oft-mentioned narrative in the Qurʾān 
is found in The Heights (al-Aʿrāf):
“O Ādam, dwell, you and your wife, in Paradise and eat from wherever 
you will but do not approach this tree, lest you be among the wrongdo-
ers.” But Satan whispered to them to make apparent to them that which 
was concealed from them of their private parts. He said, “Your Lord did 
not forbid you this tree except that you become angels or become of the 
immortal.” And he swore [by God] to them, “Indeed, I am to you from 
among the sincere advisors.”
So, he made them fall, through deception. And when they tasted of the 
tree, their private parts became apparent to them, and they began to fas-
ten together over themselves from the leaves of Paradise. And their Lord 
called to them, “Did I not forbid you from that tree and tell you that Satan 
is to you a clear enemy?”
They said, “Our Lord, we have wronged ourselves, and if You do not for-
give us and have mercy upon us, we will surely be among the losers.” God 
said, “Descend, being to one another enemies. And for you on the earth is 
a place of settlement and enjoyment for a time. Therein you will live, and 
therein you will die, and from it you will be brought forth” (Q. 7:19-25).
In this account, it is unclear precisely what form characterized the existence 
of Ādam and Ḥawāʾ in paradise: was it as corporeal or incorporeal beings? Or 
perhaps it was an existence in between or neither. Further, what role did the 
form, whether it existed corporeally or ethereally, play in the decision to con-
sume the fruit and what effects manifested in their form as a ramification of 
that act? Finally, what is one to infer from the notion that their private parts 
were exposed? Though there is a farrago of opinions on each of these issues, 
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what can be concluded is that their physical act had both physical and spir-
itual consequences for their existence, which caused them to repent and be 
descended to the earth. 
Al-Ṭabari,̄ in his exegesis, mentions that there was “a light over their private 
parts” that dissipated when they ate the forbidden fruit (Al-Ṭabari ̄2005, 5:449). 
Al-Thaʿālibi ̄comments that a number of exegetes view the manifestation of 
Ādam and Ḥawāʾs private parts (sawʾa) as denoting folly; thus ingestion of the 
forbidden effected an alteration in their consciousness and awareness of self. 
He writes, ‘this phrase means only that there are imperfections (maʿāʾib) and 
what diminished their state was exposed to them, it does not denote “private 
parts”’ (Al-Thaʿālibi,̄1996, 1:534). Al-Rāzi ̄is even more explicit that the manifes-
tation of sawʾa could connote deterioration in their spiritual state. He writes, 
‘the manifestation of their sawʾa is a metonym (kināya) for their loss of sanctity 
(ḥurma) and dissipation of dignity (jāh)’ (Al-Rāzi ̄2004, 14:39). 
Al-Qurṭubi ̄declares that there was an actual alteration, though not in the 
physical constitution of Ādam and Ḥawāʾ, but in the light surrounding their 
private parts, which still reflected a visible change in them. He writes, “their 
private parts only became manifest unto both of them, not to anyone besides 
them, as there was [theretofore] a light (nūr) over them, such that their private 
parts could not be seen, so the light disappeared [when they ate the forbidden 
fruit]” (Al-Qurṭubi ̄2004, 7:115). 
It is evident from this, and other accounts, that the physical act chosen by 
Ādam and Ḥawāʾ, effected a change to their consciousness and psyche, and 
contributed to how they perceived themselves and their bodies. This creates 
a psychological and physical link between the body and nafs, and raises the 
question of how physical acts may impact our psychological and physical 
states, as well as the physical environment around us. The actions of Ādam and 
Ḥawāʾ with their physical, psychological and spiritual consequences, demon-
strate that inasmuch as human beings act and produce actions, they and their 
physical and spiritual fate are also impacted by their actions. In the context 
of the Islamic tradition, one could go further; in questioning what effect this 
early event in creation may have had on the collective psyche of humans, and 
whether this could affect individual notions pertaining to conceptions of the 
human person. The human genome project which opens up the potential for 
new knowledge and actions, should consider how it is that this knowledge and 
subsequent actions could indeed shape what it means to be a human person 
in its multifaceted dimensions.
Returning to the Fall, whether or not there was a physical change in Ādam 
and Ḥawāʾ following their act of transgression, most scholars agree that there 
was a metamorphosis in perception and cognizance. This would suggest an 
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intimate relationship between nafs and the intellect (ʿaql). Indeed, Ibn Sin̄ā 
believes the two to be so inextricably intertwined that he predicates happiness 
of the nafs upon achieving intellectual perfection. It thus behooves us to inves-
tigate this link further. 
Nafs and ʿaql 
The ability to reason and engage in rational thought is common to several 
conceptions of the human person. In the Islamic tradition, the intellect (ʿaql), 
and the act of reasoning, located in the soul, is a central step in the journey of 
human beings fulfilling their purpose for creation. The capacity to reason is 
called upon in order to establish and strengthen faith (im̄ān), and for the per-
formance of virtuous actions. Linguistically, “ʿaql, is derived from the expres-
sion for the strapping of a camel in order to prevent it from running away…the 
intellect is thus imagined as a cause for man being restrained from practicing 
that which is not ethically beautiful”3 (ʿAjamī 1985).
The Qur’an repeatedly calls humans to think, reflect and reason, using the 
root word ʿa-q-l. Not restricting itself to this term alone, it also employs a num-
ber of other terms, such as fahm (understanding) (Q. 21:79), nuhā (intelligence) 
(Q. 20:54), ḥijr (intelligence) (Q. 89:5), ʿilm (knowledge), tafakkur (reflection) 
(Q. 13:3), tadabbur (contemplation) (Q. 38:29), lubb (inner heart) (Q. 3:190) and 
ḥikma (wisdom) (Q. 2:269). The strenuous emphasis on reason in the Qur’an 
may have inspired the preoccupation of Muslim scholars and philosophers to 
speculate about the intellect, as evidenced by their numerous epistles4 on its 
definitions, loci, nature and functions, as well as ontologically placing the in-
tellect within their respective cosmic schemes of the universe (Davidson 1992). 
Islamic philosophers assiduously studied the Greek tradition wherein one 
of the most widely discussed topics was the development of the theoretical 
intellect (nous) in man, as elaborated by Aristotle and his commentators. This 
resulted in a more prominent focus on knowledge of the soul (as a synonym of 
the intellect), such as we find in Aristotle’s De Anima. Some philosophers dis-
tinguished between the intellect and the soul, with the former being envisaged 
3 Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) cites Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādi ̄(d. 560/1164?) in his book al-muʿ-
tabar fi’l-ḥikmah who mentions: “In Arabic, ‘aql means the thing which controls man’s whims 
and desires... This thinking element which controls whims is called ‘aql because it prevents 
man from carrying out his intentions in the same way that the rope called ʿuqāl binds the 
camel, preventing it from moving to any place it wants.’ (Salim 1979)
4 Examples of such works include Abu Nasr Fārābi’̄s (d. 339/950), Risālat fi ̄̓ l-ʿaql and 
Miskawayh’s (d. 421/1030) Min kitāb al-ʿaql wa al-Maʿqūl.
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as a spiritual and incorporeal substance, while the latter being conceived of as 
something linked to the body as a potential intellect.
For Avicenna, the rational soul has two components, namely, a practical in-
tellect and a theoretical intellect. The practical intellect is the lower, downward 
facing, active component of the soul that is responsible for movement, controls 
bodily appetites and governs all other faculties of the body. Through the act of 
deliberation, and the help of the theoretical intellect, it forms the ordinary and 
commonly accepted opinions, concerning actions and other premises. Good 
ethical behavior is a result of a successfully functioning practical intellect.
The theoretical intellect, on the other hand, is on a higher plane, and this 
is the soul’s upward facing component, it is passive and receives information, 
through contemplation from the celestial intelligences. This is the faculty re-
sponsible for the pure cognition of truth, receiving and acquiring intelligibles, 
and impressions (imprinted on the mind) of universal forms (ideas) abstracted 
from matter, through a connection with the Active Intellect (ʿaql faʿʿāl).
The Active Intellect is an intelligence that is always in actuality; it bestows 
intelligible forms on the potential intellect. In Avicenna’s cosmological model, 
the Active Intellect arises from the emanation scheme, in a top-down hierar-
chical structure for the flow of existence and thought in the universe, starting 
with God. Avicenna includes three stages of potentiality before the intellect 
becomes an actual intellect. “The first is the material intellect (ʿaql hayulāni)̄ 
which is a potentiality for thinking, the second which is possible potentiality 
(ʿaql bi’l malaka), and possesses principles of knowledge; while the third is the 
perfection of this potentiality, the actual intellect (ʿaql bi’l-fiʿl)’ (Rahman 1952, 
89).
Thus, despite the crucial role of the body, human intellection is not purely 
a bodily function, nor is it entirely individual. Islamic schemes of intelligence 
rely on the soul, and a cosmic intelligence, “which broadcasts an undifferen-
tiated range of forms,” in the wider cosmological schemes of the universe. Is-
lamic conceptions of the human person may be enriched by accounting for the 
individual’s ability, in accordance with its soul-body amalgam, of being able 
to reason and acquire knowledge. This knowledge, in the Islamic tradition, 
includes knowledge of the self and God, for “He who knows himself, knows 
God.” 
The acquisition of knowledge, nevertheless, is not the only conduit to 
knowing oneself and one’s Lord. Indeed, inspired by the Qurʾān, Abū Hāmid 
al-Ghazāli ̄(d. 505/1111) clearly advocates a path to God through repristination 
of the heart, and the soul. In so doing, he forges a connection between the two 
most significant terms, from a Qurʾānic perspective, that are here considered: 
nafs and qalb. Tying the diverse threads of intellect, nafs, and heart (qalb) to-
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gether, and considering these in light of the human genome project - which 
has the capacity to affect and influence some, if not all, of these loci of intel-
lection - remains a challenge that has to date, not only not been met, but also 
has not been considered. 
Nafs and qalb 
The Qurʾān predicates the human being’s successful return to God upon a 
sound heart (qalb salim̄) (Q. 26:89; 37:84) and a purified soul (nafs zakiyyah) (Q. 
91:7-9). As the human person is described in physical and metaphysical terms, 
so do Qurʾānic references of the heart that similarly signify both physical and 
spiritual dimensions. Although Qurʾānic descriptions of the heart include 
words loaded with physical connotations such as diseased (Q. 2:10), sealed 
(Q. 2:7), and hardened (Q. 5:13), the overriding emphasis remains very much 
on the non-physical heart. Nafs and qalb share traits that are described in the 
Qurʾān in similar ways: both have the capacity to “earn” deeds (‘nafsin mā ka-
sabat’ (Q. 2:281) and ‘kasabat qulūbukum’ (Q. 2:225)) and as a consequence (of 
earning good ones) have the potential to reach a state that is mutmaʾin (‘an-
nafs al-muṭma-innah’ (Q. 89:27) and ‘taṭma-inn al-qulūb’ (Q. 13.28)). It can thus, 
be supposed that nafs and qalb each contribute significantly to the physically 
manifest metaphysical conceptualization of the human person. 
Contrary to Islamic philosophical schema wherein intellect is localized in 
the nafs, the Qurʾānic paradigm designates the heart as the locus of reflection 
(yatadabbaru) (Q. 47:24), reasoning (yaʿqilūna) (Q. 22:46), and understanding 
(yafqahūna) (Q. 7:179). The heart deliberates, makes judgements, and becomes 
resolute on decisions for which it will be held to account, and in cases deemed 
sinful (Q. 2:225; 2:283). On several occasions the Qurʾān makes mention of qalb 
alongside hearing (samʿ) and sight (baṣar) (Q. 2:7; 6:46; 22:46), thus connecting 
the heart directly with sensory input. It calls human beings to use their hearts 
to reflect upon information garnered by their senses to arrive at faith. Thus, the 
heart is made the seat of faith (fi qulūbihim al-im̄ān) (Q. 58:22). This interaction 
of the heart with sensory input offers another consideration for the human 
genome project, where it ought to take into account the potential impact of 
the physical on other dimensions of the human person’s existence and expe-
rience. In the Islamic narrative, the actions of a person influence the level of 
faith (im̄ān) in the heart, which can increase or decrease. Given that the heart 
is the locus of faith, the body therefore has the capacity to affect the state of 
the heart. Qalb, as a nexus between the sensory and spiritual worlds, may thus 
be the connective tissue that links the body—in its outward facing, physical 
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role-- with the nafs—in its inward facing, spiritual one— thereby forging a 
body-qalb-nafs composite.
In his chef d’oeuvre, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-din̄, under the chapter of “ʿajāʾib al-qalb”, 
al-Ghazāli ̄deals with the terms qalb, nafs and rūh, with the focus being on the 
heart, the actions it inspires and the knowledge to which it may be privy. Purity 
of the heart, attained through acts of worship and remembrance of God, is a 
prerequisite for authentic knowledge of God, says the theologian. He draws a 
connection between the physical heart and the spiritual realms, between the 
limbs and the heart, and how the heart is influenced by the actions of the limbs 
(al-Ghazāli ̄2007, 1:858-86).
The foregoing views of theologians, philosophers and exegetes on the na-
ture of the human person demonstrate that a range of positions was held re-
garding the physical and metaphysical dimensions that constitute the human 
person. These include the soul, the spirit, body, intellect, and heart, and their 
respective functions in human person’s journey. Notwithstanding differences 
in the nature, method and comprehensiveness of these opinions, the essence 
is that an understanding of the human person cannot be limited to the phys-
ical, and that the spiritual and metaphysical dimensions must also be consid-
ered. This necessitates that an ethical evaluation of the human genome project 
should examine how it facilitates or hampers the journey of the human person 
towards God.
On the Interrelationship of the Soul, Genome and Human Person: a 
Primer for Future Research 
The above discussions elucidate the inextricable connection of the soul to the 
human person, and how conceptions of the latter are being further informed 
by recent developments in genomics. Earlier sections of this paper presented 
the complex interplay between genes and the human psyche and how genes 
may confer aspects of our mental capacities. One mechanism of genetic traits 
determining cognitive states is through the phenotypic determination of our 
sensory receptors and neural circuitry. Recent neuropsychological studies have 
investigated the role that external stimuli play on emotions and the subcon-
scious (Winkielman and Berridge 2011). As we rely on our sensory receptors to 
first collate information from external stimuli and our cortical and subcortical 
structures to process this data through internal modification, the embryonic 
formation and subsequent development of these devices all rely on precise 
genetic coding and programming. Yet, we cannot precisely determine how far 
this internal modification is carried out through our hard-wired neural circuit-
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ry. Despite this, we may reasonably assert that sensory input, at least to some 
degree, affects the intellect (‘aql) in ways which we are neither aware, nor have 
taken cognizance of. Since the metaphysical relationship between the ‘aql and 
nafs and qalb has already been established, we can speculate a link between 
genes, their role in sensory reception and the subsequent influence on the soul. 
The soul plays an integral role in the performance of actions, and reciprocally, 
the actions of a person impact the soul. These attributes of the soul intercon-
nect and overlap with the aforementioned descriptions of genetic traits and 
their probable correlation with physical attributes that confer the ability to 
perform actions. In the context of a discussion relating to faith, this relation-
ship allows us to tentatively consider how it is that a potential alteration of 
the human genome may impact the soul - not in its constitution, but in its 
propensity for particular types of actions. Given that the actions of a person 
are considered to have an impact on the soul (nafs) and heart (qalb), we may 
cautiously posit that genomic alterations of the body, which can impact a per-
son’s actions, could in turn have metaphysical and spiritual consequences, by 
impacting the non-physical dimensions of a human person.
This paradigm can be further elaborated in terms of health, illness and 
suffering. Illness and disease in Islam are suffering incurred by believers that 
may act as a means of spiritual cleansing where religious transgressions are 
manifest as ailments, or as a means of elevating the devotee (Al-Shahri 2005, 
432-6). Patiently endured, such suffering is considered a means of expiation of 
sins and thus a vehicle for increasing one’s level of faith. Although the Islamic 
tradition urges the prevention of disease and the seeking of cures, if genetic al-
teration leads to a sterile or disease-free human genome then the question can 
be raised of how such advancements would impact existing understandings of 
suffering, spiritual cleansing and subsequent faith. Despite such possibilities, 
the role and interaction of genes with the environment in determining suffer-
ing remain. It may be argued that although genes can undergo “disease-free” 
modification, there are myriad environmental risks that leave man’s fate prone 
to disease. 
Furthermore, could a change in the capacity of persons, conferred through 
genomic alteration of organs and limbs, influence their accountability? Given 
that “God does not charge a soul except [with that within] its capacity” (Q. 
2:286) how would manifestations of these altered capacities impact the soul? 
Additional to disease and therapy, how would concerns related to enhance-
ment map onto Islamic understandings of human capacity and accountabil-
ity? Elaboration of such questions, through future research, may further elu-
cidate the interrelatedness of the genome, soul and human person that this 
paper seeks to initiate.
Conclusion 
This paper explores the connection between the physical and non-physical 
dimensions of the human person to broaden the scope of ethical discussions 
concerning the human genome project. A multifaceted conception of the hu-
man person in the Islamic tradition is informed by differing beliefs about the 
body, soul and spirit - their origin and existence, nature of interaction, and 
purpose for creation. Through surveying key terms, and subsequent theories 
on the nature and interaction of the non-physical aspects of a human person 
with the body, the centrality of the soul for a person’s experience and existence 
is established. The non-physical dimension of a human person, identified here 
as nafs, influences the body, and the body, as the physical dimension of a hu-
man person influences the nafs. A more detailed exploration is required to de-
termine the extent to which the body influences the non-physical dimension 
of human existence, and the role of nafs in inclining towards or away from 
good actions. Yet, this narrative opens up a pathway to question the metaphys-
ical repercussions of physical changes in the body through the human genome 
project, which may facilitate the perpetuation of good or bad deeds.
In the Islamic narrative, the purpose of human existence is associated with 
a higher spiritual journey and a return to fiṭrah; thus any project impacting this 
existence ought to consider the nature and extent to which the soul’s propensi-
ty for returning to its primordial state of purity and obedience may be affected. 
The human person’s striving in this life to reenact the first covenant—the mo-
ment at which the realization of faith was at its greatest—is a physical endeav-
or with spiritual manifestations. This striving is undertaken by the human per-
son through actions carried out by the body, which have a purifying potential 
and the possibility of increasing a person’s faith. Given that the locus of faith 
is the soul, the body is therefore capable of influencing, through its actions, 
the state of the soul. It can be reasonably questioned what impact the human 
genome project could have on a person’s ability to recollect the first moment 
of witnessing and being before God.
Although this paper is constructed on the views of Islamic scholars who 
inherited the bifurcation of body and spirit from the Hellenistic tradition, the 
Qurʾānic conception and categorization of man does not gainsay the possibil-
ity, even probability, of spirituality being resident in, and an intrinsic property 
of the human body. This sacralised conception of the body demands closer 
scrutiny through the lens of the Qurʾānic discourse, and may have ethical im-
plications for genomics.
This is a preliminary survey, engaging two fields that have hitherto been 
presumed to be disparate, if not entirely antipodal. It has forged an interstice 
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between them and carved a landscape wherein they cohabit. This paper lays 
the groundwork for subsequent analyses that can take up the multitudinous 
strands of relations delineated, and interactions defined here, to arrive at a 
higher plateau of knowledge about the spiritual dimension of human exis-
tence, and our understandings of the human person.
References
al-Ashʿari,̄ Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli ̄ ibn Ismāʿil̄. 1963. Maqālāt al-Islāmiȳin̄ wa ikhtilāf al-
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chapter 6
The Ethical Limits of Genetic Intervention: 
Genethics in Philosophical and Fiqhi Discourses
Mutaz al-Khatib1
The world has witnessed three important transformations. The first is the Dar-
winian theory of evolution, which subverted the perception of the human an-
thropological configuration and its origin.2 It was through this image that man 
occupied an exceptional position among the species and acquired his superi-
ority and sacredness. The second transformation is the discovery of the move-
ment of the earth whereby Copernicus destroyed the perception of geograph-
ical centrality or the way the geography of our world was known at that time. 
The third transformation lies in sophisticated biotechnology, which could be 
representative of the third decentering of our worldview3. Subjugation of our 
body and our life to biotechnology results in philosophical, ethical and reli-
gious issues related to human life and reflective of a specific vision of man and 
his nature, as well as the limits of dealing with, or disposing of, his body. These 
problematic issues include questions like: when does life begin? What criteria 
should be used to support the belief that the human being is human? Who 
should require ethical rights? Why do we consider life sacred? What effect does 
this have on the way we deal with the human being at various life stages?
Historically, the abovementioned questions have been linked to the specific 
issue of abortion, although biotechnological developments have broadened 
the familiar potential of work to include reproduction and procreation. These 
1 Assistant professor of Methodologies and history of Islamic Ethics at the Research Center for 
Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE), College of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa Univer-
sity in Qatar, malkhatib@hbku.edu.qa 
2 This research was made possible by the NPRP grant “Indigenizing Genomics in the Gulf 
Region (IGGR): The Missing Islamic Bioethical Discourse”, no. NPRP8-1620-6-057 from the 
Qatar National Research Fund (a member of The Qatar Foundation). The statements made 
herein are solely the responsibility of the author. This chapter is based on an earlier Arabic 
version. 
3 Habermas 2003, 54.
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technical developments open the door to vast possibilities, allowing for new 
patterns of reproductive and procreative interventions whose consequences 
are difficult to predict, while they were purely human acts or practices in the 
past. This has led to numerous debates and raised problematic issues at the re-
ligious, legal, political, philosophical, ethical and social levels. As well as, issues 
with regards to emergence of the term “liberal eugenics.”4
In view of the previous questions and the many possibilities provided by the 
technical revolution, the subject of “genetic engineering” is dealt with in trans-
disciplinary studies and consequently, specialists in philosophy, ethics, medi-
cal ethics, biology and the sociology of medicine all engaged in it. Moreover, in 
the field of medical ethics, biotechnology has provoked a serious debate about 
the use of prenatal genetic engineering and other modern genetic techniques. 
There is also the question of whether we have to impose ethical constraints on 
this field to limit its possibilities and to keep the technology under human con-
trol and not the other way around. In philosophy, the applications of genetic 
engineering raise several problematic issues that pertain to the field of applied 
ethics and thus preoccupy philosophers.
Despite all these ramifications, the central question posed by genetic engi-
neering is: what should a human being do to avoid compromising his life? Or 
what should man do in the course of the life he is destined to live? In other 
words, what is an exemplary life worthy of following, which is also reflective 
of the perception of Jürgen Habermas in the context of his treatment of hu-
man nature, which itself is threatened by genetic intervention?5 If we use the 
religious formula, however, the question will be about the good deed and the 
good life that relate to the mission incumbent on the human beings on earth 
as “khulafāʾ fī al-arḍ” (Allah’s vicegerents), which includes concepts of worship 
and the promotion of growth and prosperity on earth. This implies that we are 
faced with a philosophical and religious question simultaneously, a question 
that deals with the “binding force” relating to the personal and communal life, 
as well as the “doctrine of life” and the way it should be lived. This fundamental 
question relates to ethics and meta-ethics, and the relationship between mo-
rality at its ethical level of universalistic deontology and ethics at the level of 
critical self-clarification of values concerning societies and individuals.
The central question is a metaphysical one, while the prevailing trend in 
philosophy and ethics is secular and liberal, thus posing new challenges that 
4 In the German version of his book, The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen Habermas uses the 
subtitle: “auf dem weg zu einer liberalen eugenik” (“Towards liberal eugenics”). However, this 
subtitle does not figure in the English version.
5 See Habermas 2003, 2.
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add to the preceding challenge. In dealing with this question, there are two 
main directions: the first is the post-metaphysical trend, which is espoused 
by Jürgen Habermas who argues that liberal societies must seek metaphysical 
answers to the metaphysical questions about existence, its aim and end. The 
second trend is the metaphysical one and is represented by the Christian and 
Islamic theological visions, which engages in the study of the issue of genetic 
engineering and its effects, passing judgments according to perceptions em-
anating from jurisprudence, kalām (Islamic scholastic theology), and ethics.
Since biomedical technology raises all these questions, debates, and stimu-
lates this influence we should address it by first examining the position of this 
technique itself and understanding each party’s perceptions of the possibili-
ties it offers, as well as by understanding how it operates and considering its 
implications. This is because any debate or position will be the result of two 
stands: the first deals with the form and extent of awareness of this technol-
ogy and its possibilities. The second is concerned with the philosophical and 
religious perceptions of man and his existence. The third lies in identifying the 
problematic issues raised by this technology, which are the corollary of the two 
preceding issues. This deductive and sequential method informs this study.
1   Genetic Engineering and the Limits of Awareness
Generally, thinking about technology as such is always problematic in itself, 
and one’s attitude towards it depends on how one defines it. In trying to answer 
the question “what is technology?” We face two answers. The first sees technol-
ogy as a means to achieve some objectives, while the second sees technology 
as an ability which is specific to human beings. The two answers are mutual-
ly supportive. The pursuit of goals and the utilization of means is a human 
act. In addition, the manufacturing of tools and machines is part of the nature 
of the technique, and the perception that makes of it both a means and an 
ability characterizing human beings is an “instrumental and anthropological” 
conception. It is a vision that directs every effort to put man in an appropriate 
relationship with technology, thus enabling man to control and guide it for 
the sake of spiritual purposes (i.e., bringing technology under human control). 
Thus, the discussion revolves around the means that are being used and the 
ends that are being researched.
Martin Heidegger, on the other hand, argues that “when we consider tech-
nology neutral we surrender to it in the worst form, because this perception 
makes us lose sight of what technology is,” which refers, according to him, 
to a pattern of exposure to any form of truth. Technology reveals that which 
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does not self-create (i.e. outside the causal relationship), which is not yet in 
existence but which can take different forms. Technology is production, in the 
sense of disclosure and not manufacture. Disclosure then takes the form of 
provocation and incitement of natural energies and of reality as a supply that 
is ready for use.6
With regard to biotechnology, in particular, we can distinguish between two 
views: first, a simple or instrumental view that deals with the question of means 
and ends, which is the jurisprudential view that determines its positions and 
judgments based on this perspective. The second is a complex philosophical 
view that explores the scope of this technique and its effects on human kind 
and its ethical dimensions.
1.1   The Philosophical Analysis 
Aristotle’s philosophy offers the possibility of distinguishing between three 
positions: the theoretical position that observes nature in a non-advantageous 
way, the technical position that works with the aim of producing, thus inter-
vening in nature, through the development of means and the use of tools, and 
the practical position which works according to the rules of upholding cus-
toms. Habermas adds the assertive position which works through a communi-
cative manner that requires communication with someone else on something 
(Habermas 2003, 45-46). Experimental sciences, however, have combined the 
theoretical position of the “neutral observer” and the technical position of the 
“intervening observer” who seeks the experimental effects. Thus, the revolu-
tion in the technical practice of genetics has developed from the simple to 
the complex level. It has taken the human being from the expansion of the 
possibilities of familiar actions to the creation of a new limitless type of inter-
vention. In other words, by eluding to Habermas’s arguments,7 on the principle 
that development is comprehensive and can unfold into considerable features.
The first feature reveals that in adapting to the human “special nature dy-
namics,” the biological technique has transcended the limits of “therapy” to 
the search for what is “precautionary,” which is excluded or avoided. Therefore, 
this led to the gradual dissolution of the boundaries separating “justified inter-
vention” (negative) from “unjustified intervention” (positive), which was pre-
viously transparent, especially with the emergence of “liberal eugenics.” The 
latter does not recognize the boundaries between therapeutic interventions 
and those which aim at development and are subject to market dynamics.
6 See Heidegger 1995, 44.
7 See Habermas 2003, 16-74, and for a critical view see Christiansen 2009, 147-156. 
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The second feature is that the biological technique constructs man as a 
body, and here there is a difference, according to Helmut Plessner, between be-
ing a body and having a body (Plessner 1969, 9-10). Hence, turning man into a 
body eliminates the boundary between nature (us) and the bodily organ where 
the self resides. Thus, the technique creates a new relationship with the self 
which is immersed in the depths of the organic carrier. Consequently, influ-
encing how the self understands itself and how the self is used in the new real-
ity, independently or arbitrarily, according to self-choices through the market. 
In other words, technical progress affects our understanding of ourselves as 
having responsibility over our actions (the normative understanding of self). 
The third feature is that the new possibilities offered by the biological tech-
niques are an expansion of freedom, thus posing new challenges to the modern 
understanding of freedom. Given the impact of this freedom on the future of 
the human species, in its search for “limits” to be imposed on procreation (the 
improvement of progeny) so as to prevent serious deformities. Meanwhile, 
these possibilities can help us acquire a new understanding of ethical free-
dom—that is the freedom of each person to possess the management and be 
responsible for his own “conduct,” and the right for each newborn to a genetic 
formation which is unhindered by any deliberate programming or manipula-
tion. As an adult, he will be able to submit his own personal history to critical 
judgment and revision, as Kierkegaard argues in the context of the individual’s 
possession of his own life history or the ethical self-understanding.8
The fourth feature demonstrates that the development of biological tech-
niques is a dynamic that threatens to compromise the normative clarification 
process, which will affect our self-understanding as beings of a qualitative es-
sence. 
The fifth feature shows how interventions in genetics can turn into a hege-
monic act that affects the self and causes present-day people to exert domina-
tion over future generations by turning them into subjects, to the extent that 
the other side of today’s authority will be reflected in the subsequent subjuga-
tion of the living by the dead.
The sixth feature shows that biological genetic research is embodied in 
what increases the investor’s profit and the pressures of national governments 
whose success depends on these developments and achievements.
All these considerations lead to a complex vision of the technique and its ef-
fects, thus considering genetic intervention an infringement upon the physical 
foundations of the spontaneous relationship with the self and on the ethical 
freedom of another person. This intervention raises problematic issues of an 
8 For further details, see Stack 1973, 108-125; Holmer 1953, 157-170. 
174  al-Khatib
ethical nature, on the one hand, and other types of problematic issues, on the 
other hand. Some aspects of these controversies will be tackled below.
1.2   The Contemporary Jurisprudential Analysis 
Technology has imposed important challenges on contemporary jurists in 
many respects, both in terms of the changes and the possibilities it creates, 
which will contribute to the resolution of some serious differences of opinion 
that exist in the jurisprudential tradition (menstruation, moonsighting, preg-
nancy, proof of parentage, etc.). Yet, the understanding of the dimensions of 
the techniques has been confined within the limits of the simple and intui-
tive view. Besides, some attempts to study the “impact of modern technology” 
have failed to formulate a systematic and mature attitude and have, thus, been 
characterized by superficiality and hesitancy in using technology in many in-
stances, which is the result of an ambiguous vision and a weak method.9 The 
result is an acceptance of some of its impacts due to “necessity,” despite the 
homogeneous acknowledgment among jurists that changes in jurisprudential 
traditions may occur with the advancement of the technical means.
In terms of genetic technology, the jurisprudential consideration is con-
stantly governed by practical attitudes. The jurist’s view is focused on the ex-
amination of the means used, the discussion of the goals and the differentia-
tion between them based on a latent conception of technology and its limits, 
on the one hand, and on a specific representation of the meaning as intended 
by the lawgiver, in whole or in part, on the other hand.
The issue of “genetic intervention” encompasses all the applications affect-
ing human genes: genetic testing, genetic engineering, diagnosis, treatment, 
cloning and research. These can generally be classified into three types: di-
agnosis, treatment, improvement or enhancement. While the intervention is 
apparent in the treatment and improvement cases, much of the examination 
or diagnosis is usually but a precursor to most types of interventions. For in-
stance, the intervention aimed at diagnosing existing or anticipated genetic 
diseases, the detection of anticipated genetic traits in both the sex cells or the 
fetus for the genetic improvement of the offspring, knowledge of the struc-
ture of the genetic fingerprint as evidence for the detection of crime and the 
establishment of lineage, and genetic testing for the purpose of executing var-
ious types of civil contracts (marriage, insurance, employment, etc.)10. In other 
words, genetic technology refers to a network of possibilities interrelated to 
changes and effects, sometimes making it difficult to differentiate amongst 
them or bring parts of them under control without the reciprocal interacting 
9  For example: Al-Sheikh 2010.
10  See al-Lūdaʿmī 2006, 141; al-Lūdaʿmī 2011, 55-67.
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effects. Thus, the distance between the means and the results may become nar-
row, complicated, and overlap as a result of the intervention of several parties, 
and the gene’s owner would be merely one of the parties. Therefore, I argue 
that the neutral observer merges with the intervening observer.
The instrumental consideration provided in the legal decree issued by Dār 
al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyyah,11 focuses on the great therapeutic potential offered by ge-
netic technology and that “a large part of it is in the interest of the human 
being and serves to preserve his health,” arguing that reservations are due to 
the possibility of some rare harm. This, however, does not explain the concept 
of “harm” and its dimensions. It neither defines the concept of “interest” or its 
dimensions, especially when it seems that the Mufti’s view does not exceed the 
duality of body and disease. 
It is true that the International Islamic Fiqh Academy provides a more com-
prehensive and detailed perception, since it has brought together jurists and 
experts in this regard,12 but it does not transcend the simple consideration of 
genetic technology. The decision revolves around two things: defining the con-
cept of genetic technology and its uses. Learning about the human genome “is 
part of man’s discovery of himself and of God’s ways in His creation and, as 
a means to identify some genetic diseases and the possibility of infection, it 
has become an added value to health and medical sciences in their pursuit to 
cure diseases, thus being considered part of the collective obligations (furūḍ 
al-kifāya).” (International Islamic Fiqh Academy 2013). In other words, it is a 
neutral technical view and the relevant judgment is geared to how the tech-
nique is used, including genetic therapy and genetic engineering. Therefore, 
words such as “use” and “procedure” are repeated to express this practical tech-
nical view. 
The discourse here addresses the field of practice (the physician-practi-
tioner and the subject-person), which is restricted to the scope of “beneficial 
areas” and that there should be no “harmful use of the genome.” What is meant 
by “useful” here is the “treatment and prevention” purpose. It is then clear that 
the positive perception has prevailed in the decision of the International Is-
lamic Fiqh Academy by determining the genome’s technique and dimensions. 
Yet, it seems that the International Islamic Fiqh Academy is still held captive 
by the experts’ technical medical outlook which favors technology as a means 
of knowledge over the treatment and control it offers, without considering the 
11 See the legal decree “Al-handasa al-wirāthiyya wa-istikhdāmuhā fī majāl al-ʿilāj” on Dār 
al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya (website 09-09-2014).
12 It is based on a previous symposium organized in Jeddah in cooperation with the Islamic 
Organization for Medical Sciences under the title “Genetics, Genetic Engineering and the 
Human Genome,” February 2013.
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overall philosophical perception that governs this development and the pos-
sibilities it promises. The concern was focused on the technique’s uses only as 
a commodity. Hence, one of the recommendations following the decision was 
to appeal to Islamic countries “to adopt genetic engineering in all its legitimate 
fields and applications” and “enact laws and regulations necessary to protect 
the citizens from being used for experimental purposes,” calling upon states “to 
provide these services to their citizens who require them.” The Makkah Coun-
cil, on the other hand, recommends at the end of its resolution that “doctors 
and laboratories fear God who is watching them and stay away from actions 
that harm the individual, society, and the environment” (Islamic Fiqh Council 
1998). 
The jurisprudential view herein is dominated by instrumental consider-
ations, and therefore it focuses on the restriction and control of the practices 
of technology. Consequently, it is directed at individuals and doctors. Since 
the International Islamic Fiqh Academy is an affiliate of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference, it appeals to states, while the Makkah-based Council 
addresses only the individual conscience.
Some theologians became aware that “technology is power and power is 
never neutral.”13 Habermas talks about the investor’s profits and the pressure of 
governments to implement technology. If we consider the fact that the Islamic 
world is a mere consumer to such techniques, we will discover that jurispru-
dential decisions respond to this particular case without thinking about what 
lies outside its boundaries and questioning the development and its dimen-
sions. This could also be attributed to the function of the jurist himself who 
is not preoccupied with the totality of the developments in the field and the 
principle of possibilities, but he is concerned with practical positions vis-à-vis 
specific issues. He may not be able to achieve these without the use of means 
and objectives in the light of a principled and legislative vision, be it a text, a 
general, or an all-inclusive rule. Generally, genetic technology and biological 
developments may impose the transition from jurisprudence to kalām theol-
ogy, linking the practical to the ontological so as to avoid the consideration of 
the practical or the partial in isolation from the overall perceptions.
2  Genetic Interventions as an Ethical Dilemma
We have already pointed out that genetic technology raises problematic issues 
of a multidimensional nature, but, we want to focus here on the ethical and 
jurisprudential dimensions. Ethical problems belong to the fields of philoso-
13 See Simmons 1983, 211.
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phy and Islamic jurisprudence, and issues related to reproduction are at the 
heart of religion which considers the safeguarding of lineage as one of its ma-
jor objectives, and this is linked to the pattern of human life which has preoc-
cupied philosophers and religious scholars alike.
2.1   The Philosophical Debate
A genetic test is allowed at the pre-transplant phase for the benefit of the pa-
tient’s family members, for the sake of having an estimated examination, over-
coming organ deficiency or, for intervention to repair the genome. Although 
this intervention offers positive and therapeutic possibilities, it is not limited 
to that. Therefore, the philosophical discussion initiated by Jürgen Habermas 
revolves around global technical development, a matter which raises three 
main problematic issues. The first one is that it undermines the concept of au-
tonomy, which in turn threatens human morality, because all human actions 
are linked to the human being as an ethical creature. If his autonomy is un-
dermined, then his effectiveness is undermined as well. Second, it affects the 
ability to understand the self/identity, and self-understanding is a sine qua non 
for engagement in liberal democratic culture and in secular ethics. The third 
problematic issue is the attitude towards pre-personal life and human dignity.
2.1.a Genetic Interventions and the Concept of Autonomy
The decision to intervene in the formulation of another person’s identity 
imperils the Kantian concept of autonomy which is based on freedom and 
equality for all persons as a birthright. It also compromises the ethics of a 
person who is responsible for his actions under his own free-will and to act 
without influence. This cannot happen in genetically programmed humans 
whose genes have been manipulated by virtue of another’s will. Genetic in-
tervention threatens Habermas’ communicative action theory which seeks to 
understand human existence through the assumption that human beings rec-
ognize themselves in terms of Kantian individuals, who possess freedom and 
reason. Genetic intervention is, accordingly, achieved by controlling the ethics 
of personal relationships and the ethical orientation of people as human be-
ings who should be able to determine—without interference—who they are 
and what they want to be, without one acting on their behalf. Intervention in 
the natural formation of another person is a non-reciprocal predilection, and 
a relationship with an unknown personality evolves out of it. This represents 
a strange form in the mutual recognition of relationships at the judicial and 
institutional levels in modern societies. Such an intervention necessarily curbs 
equality, that is, the parallel responsibility initially held among free and equal 
people. In normal situations, one can establish a rational relationship as per 
his formational process, carving his own self-understanding through revision 
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and possessing a self-critical stand on his own maturation. None of this will be 
possible in the case of genetic intervention.
Elizabeth Fenton14 raised the issue that Habermas exaggerated his concern 
with the idea that genetic modification would distort human relations, espe-
cially between the begetter and the begotten, because this kind of relationship 
is already lacking in equality, and the parents have the authority to exert con-
trol over their children during their growth and development. It is, therefore, 
a relationship which disrupts Habermas’s presumptive thesis that “all people 
receive the same normative status, and that it is part of their duty to mutually 
and simultaneously recognize each other, based on the principle of exchange 
in human relations.” Habermas, however, argues that there is a difference be-
tween social dependency and liberal eugenics. He states that “the irreversible 
decision of a person to regulate someone else’s genome, according to his wish-
es, will generate a new pattern of relationships between these two individuals,” 
which undermines the ethical understanding of the self that acts and emits 
judgments in an independent manner without the existence of a primary ob-
stacle that conflicts with the system of equal relations between people. Ge-
netic programming generates a non-paralleled relationship, which is “a spe-
cial kind of parental,” because the child’s dependency on parents, although 
non-reversible, dissolves when children reach adulthood without affecting the 
children’s existence or any specific determinants of their future lives. As for 
genetic dependency, it is focused on a single act attributed to the program-
mer and it eliminates the “normal exchange between equals by birth.” The pro-
grammed person can explain the parental intention of the programmer but 
he cannot modify it , prevent it from happening, or reverse its occurrence. In 
other words, this genetic parenting intention takes in this case an in-kind form 
through a genetic program that creates an effect without any social practice or 
social exchange based on communication.
2.1.b Genetic Interventions and the Ethical Understanding of Self/
Species
Genealogy relates to the central discussion about the concept of “human na-
ture” and the effects that genetic technology can have in this case. The ethical 
question “what should I do?” is linked to the other fundamental question “what 
can I do?” Both questions lead to self-knowledge, which is the foundation on 
which ethical theories have been based since Socrates, who said: “Know your-
self.” Kierkegaard believes that knowing one’s self is an important requirement 
14 See Prusak and Malmqvist 2007, 4-6.
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for man to become an ethical being.15 He and Kant attached importance to 
the inner voice as a reliable source of information and guide in the control of 
one’s actions. The ethical understanding of human kind is based on the under-
standing of one’s self in the same way one writes alone his own autobiography. 
This ethical understanding also recognizes the self as an individual working 
independently. Genetic technology, however, undermines confidence in this 
inner voice, which becomes the product of genetic modification that parents 
can choose a month before their child’s birth. Genetic interventions challenge 
the ethical field that Kant established, the idea of  objective morality. However, 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century, this has shifted toward self-eth-
ics, so much so that it became difficult to sustain Kierkegaard’s relativist vision. 
Kierkegaard argues that even though we do not share the same values with 
our neighbors, at least we can all be honest with ourselves (being ourselves), 
because of the control of individualism over the field of ethics.16
Habermas calls “moral” such “issues as deal with the just way of living to-
gether. Actors who may come into conflict with one another address these is-
sues when they are confronted with social interactions in need of normative 
regulation” (Habermas 2003, 38). What the codification of human nature does 
is a different understanding of ourselves to the extent that we no longer un-
derstand ourselves as human beings who are able to act freely, ethically equal, 
and guided by norms and proofs. The manipulation of the genome, with the 
aim of decoding it and changing it, destabilizes the stark differences that exist 
between the “grown” and the “made”, the subjective and the objective; whereas 
the body is the medium in which the person’s existence is embodied. Thus, we 
can distinguish between the actor and the acted upon, between creation and 
process, between the mind and revelation, between acts  that are attributed 
to the self and those attributable to others. Any change in this respect would 
imply transformation of our understanding of ourselves, affect the moral con-
science and alter the conditions of natural growth that are necessary for our 
understanding of our ourselves as the creators of our own personal lives and 
as equal members with respect to the communal ethical rights. Thus, this kind 
of change threatens the freedom and the constant equality of all people with 
regards to rights granted to people at birth, and is equally a form of domination 
over the ethics of personal relationships and the ethical orientation of human 
beings as species who know themselves and what they want to be, i.e., it ob-
fuscates our perception of who we are as created beings with a body. This can 
result in a new pattern of unequal relationships.
15 See Stack 1973, 108-125.
16 See Guilfoyle 2004, 483.
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Genetic intervention leads to “fetal reification” and impacts the ethical un-
derstanding acquired by humanity as a whole. The ethics of one’s will is going 
to become but one among other possibilities, and this will affect the philo-
sophical question about life as it should be lived. Since, it will disclose a gen-
eral debate about the understanding we may have on the cultural forms of life 
as such, and thus normativity will be lost. Also, the expansion of reproductive 
techniques and its transformation into something “natural” will contribute to 
a change in the intellectual outlook of human life, and the elimination of our 
moral sensitivity to the deference of “cost and profit” calculations. “The eu-
genic practice may cause damage to the status of the potential human, as a 
member of a universal group composed of ethical creatures.” The debate about 
the commodification of fetuses for research purposes or about the conditional 
creation of embryos is “a violation of the boundaries of the species that we 
consider firm and it is the beginning of the uncertainty associated with the 
identity of the human race,” on the one hand, and it is the context in which our 
legal and ethical representations are organized, on the other hand (Karmein 
2012, 106-107).
Elizabeth Fenton has argued in this context against the belief that there is a 
decisive boundary between the natural and the artificial, and therefore in her 
view there are no criteria to follow in this differentiation. Habermas, however, 
asked serious critical questions about the seriousness of the absence of these 
limits, because this undermines the required ethical clarity. If we consider the 
totality of this trundling evolution, we will end up “commodifying” the human 
being and turning him into a device. Hence, we must talk about the right to ge-
netic inheritance that is free of manipulation so as to prevent any interference 
or control of our physical existence.
The philosophical debate here is based on the concept of man and human 
nature. The German and European debate focuses on a normative concept 
of man which is centered on principles, it adopts a metaphysical perception 
of human nature and seeks to bring the future developments of the genetic 
technique under control. The American debate, however, seeks to find an ap-
propriate way to accept the technological developments. In other words, it is 
based on the unshakeable confidence in science and technological develop-
ment and relies on the liberal legacy—from John Locke onwards. It is mainly 
concerned with the protection of the freedom of choice enjoyed by a “person” 
according to the law. This approach to new challenges focuses on the vertical 
dimension of the relations established by the social partner with the social 
force surrounding him; consequently, the decisions here are left for the par-
ents’ own estimations. The technical possibilities, however, are no more than 
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an extension of the freedom of reproduction and the rights of the parents (ba-
sic individual rights).17
2.1.c Genetic Interventions and the Pre-Personal Nature 
The third problematic issue is based on the following central question: is the 
act of intervention (creation with reservation) compatible with human digni-
ty? Do we have the right to expose human life to selection and alteration? This 
view concerns two stages: The pre-embryonic stage and the embryonic stage. 
In either case, we are talking about the pre-personal life and the debate around 
its nature, either as a described or determined nature, and whether it acquires 
the status of a being with moral rights or not.
The ethical status of the fetus, or the fertilized egg, is determined through 
a central concept of human sacredness based on the common characteristics 
that give it value. Defining the concept of human sacredness is the key to all 
issues relating to medicine and biology. Since the ancient times, the religious 
concept has given man a unique position because he is God-made, this sta-
tus has been shaken with the development of science which has deprived him 
of his unique position. Kant, who established his understanding of man on a 
purely rational basis away from methods of faith, considered man a purpose in 
himself, and developed principles that would analyze man’s ethical behavior 
as it should be. Thus, Kant restored man’s natural position as no longer mere-
ly a means to achieve others’ purposes. Hegel as well explored this path by 
arguing that the absolute right lies in the principle: “be a person and respect 
others as persons.” Hegel derived all the political rights of man (ownership, 
acquisition, contracting, …etc.) from this Kantian premise (Hegel 2007, 14-16; 
146). Given that all of this relates to personal life, the problem here is in regard 
to the nature of pre-personal life.
Several definitions were offered to define the meaning of the sacredness of 
human life, including “appreciation of life,” in the sense that whenever there 
is life, intervention to terminate it is contrary to its sacredness; the “quality of 
life,” which means that life deserves to be lived. But, determining it remains 
ambiguous, since based on this, one can argue that in order to preserve the 
quality of life, other lives can be sacrificed in the process and experiments can 
also be carried out on embryos if the aim is to preserve the general public life. 
Other ideas concerning the sacredness of life include the characteristic of the 
“distinctness of life” in the sense that life itself is a characteristic related to man 
and his existence, and it is immutable before the acquisition of any experi-
ence. The problem, however, is that this sacredness does not tell us what to do 
17 See Habermas 2003, 77; J. Karnein 2012, 93-116.
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about procreation and morphogenesis. This also includes the perception of life 
in the sense that the sacredness here is internal and that our feelings towards 
life are imbued with sanctification and respect. Another relevant idea is that 
the sacredness of life reflects the general direction of life by being a compre-
hensive view that affects our attitudes towards it both in terms of its normative 
and applied aspects. A human being has the right to live (life), and life should 
not be wasted without a justifiable reason, which makes of it an ethical law 
that allows for exception, according to logical justification. Life includes a clear 
and accurate judgment that depends on care for one’s self and for others, and 
concern for exceptions as well as for the original principle.18
The main issue, however, remains the definition of the concept of “sancti-
fied life.” Does it begin after a certain stage of fertilization, or does it do so in 
line with the Aristotelian view that “the human being becomes human during 
his first movements in the mother’s womb and when the mother starts feeling 
this movement”? Does it start from the moment of the fusion of the sperm 
with the egg, as biologists believe? The ethical debates focus on identifying 
a constant criterion through which the human being can be evaluated; these 
debates propose a number of possibilities, such as self-awareness that dis-
tinguishes the human being from other beings and enables him to exercise 
his independence and communicate with others; the ability to evaluate life 
as an internal perception; responsibility over one’s actions and behaviors and 
the ability to account for this.19 Yet, these criteria do not help us evaluate the 
pre-personal life stage; they do not even include the fetus, while other criteria 
do not include the child after birth.
This issue seems to have prompted Teresa Iglesias, a Roman Catholic phi-
losopher, to defend the idea that the human being is a person throughout the 
stages of his growth, and that what makes us people as such is the kind of be-
ings we are, as well as the nature we possess; all phases in our existence carry 
this identity. That is, the concept of a person cannot be determined by a partic-
ular phase or be restricted to it. Accordingly, the respect due to the fetus should 
be the same as the one due to the person without any distinction. Therefore, 
it should not be killed or subjected to other uses or means of exploitation (Ig-
lesias 1984, 32-37).
Although personal nature is only proven in the case of the born neonate, 
Anja J. Karnein argues that our ethical obligations vis-à-vis the “person” means 
towards the developing fetus that is going to take the shape of a fully devel-
oped human being, i.e. the respect shown for the fetus should be accredited 
18 See al-Baqṣamī 1993, 111-120.
19 See al-Baqṣamī 1993, 121-137.
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to what it will subsequently be. True, it will be difficult to distinguish between 
what will develop and become a full-fledged person and what will not, but the 
assumption is based on the principle of precaution, which requires us to treat 
all embryos as potential people. Once the living organism becomes a person, 
it means that the stages it went through before should be taken into consid-
eration. Another reason to show respect to embryos comes from the difficul-
ty of establishing hierarchical levels during the course of human life; that is, 
embryos must be protected from harm, and harm is anything that is liable to 
cause any change in the unique characteristics that embryos bear in an abso-
lute sense (hold in trust) (J. Karnein 2012, 26-34).
Habermas acknowledges that, given the multifarious views, it is difficult to 
give the embryo—from inception— “complete protection” in life since this is 
attributed to those who enjoy basic rights. Yet, Habermas believes that human 
dignity dictates that life be preserved at the pre-personality stage and not be 
subjected to speculation or entreaty. Hence, the difference between the de-
bate on genetic intervention and that on abortion can be summarized in terms 
of the “commodified” research on embryos and the pre-transplant diagnosis. 
Monitoring the intended or desirable nature turns human life into a “mechan-
ical one” created in certain conditions in accordance with third-party prefer-
ences. It is true that the diagnosis can warn against the likelihood of abortion, 
but it leads to the conflict between the protection of the child’s right to life and 
the right of parents who put him through the research testing as though he 
were property. This conflict, however, occurs when allowing the fetus to under-
go genetic testing, thus showing that the parents have been part of this contra-
diction from the beginning. Nonetheless, the debate on unintended pregnancy 
concerns the woman’s right to determine abortion and the need to protect the 
fetus, meaning that the life decision to terminate the pregnancy has nothing 
to do with this readiness for a consumer type use. There is also a difference 
between abortion and pre-personal life. The discussion on abortion is a dis-
cussion on embryonic life, and there are two different views on this matter. 
The first describes human life in neutral terms (free from a prior judgments), 
such as describing the fetus as a “clump of cells,” unlike the “neonate” which 
represents the first stage in which the person is described as having acquired 
human dignity. The second view describes the fertilization of cells as the ac-
tual start of a sophisticated process which enjoys uniqueness and organizes 
as well as regulates itself, and this can be biologically described as perforce a 
human prototype and, therefore, this prototype should be entitled to funda-
mental rights.
Habermas endeavored to find the criterion that would allow pre-personal 
life to be worthy of protection by arguing that the world of ethical rights and 
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duties lies in determining the “basis of ethics” provided by the group of eth-
ical beings who decide their own laws. This group is concerned with all the 
relations that require organization in accordance to given criteria. It imposes 
ethical obligations on itself, and the members expect each other to behave in 
conformity with the criteria. Even animals can benefit from the ethical duties 
of our relationships, including all creatures who are sensitive to feeling pain. 
Human dignity, therefore, is one that is equal to this parallel in relations and 
resides in the concept of “inalienability” which is meaningless unless it is con-
ducted within relations among persons who mutually recognize each other 
within the framework of parallel and equal exchanges (Habermas 2003, 33).
2.2  The Jurisprudential Debate
Contemporary jurisprudence debates have shifted from genetic technology to-
wards research on its “uses” and identifying the legitimate vs. illegitimate uses. 
Some researchers have limited the framework of discussion to three areas: 
medication and therapy in respect to the principle of inviolability of body and 
soul; the legitimate concept of mating and procreation in order to preserve off-
spring and lineage; and control as well as follow-ups of these techniques.20 The 
uses of genetic technology, however, relate to several central concepts, such 
as the beginning of life, the sacredness of the body, the system of rights; the 
rights of God and the rights of people, and the preservation of self and lineage. 
These concepts intersect with the abovementioned philosophical problematic 
issues, because they constitute the issues of “justified intervention” (negative), 
“unjustified intervention” (positive), and the “boundaries” to be imposed on 
“eugenics” (the improvement of lineage) with the intent of preventing serious 
malformations. Other intersections are reflected in the distinction between 
what is “clinical/therapeutic” and what is “precautionary.” As will be explained 
below, these concepts are concerned with other dimensions, including the hu-
man body and the limits of intervention in the human body, whether carried 
out by the person himself or by his custodian, in order to avoid “domination 
over self.”
2.2.a The Beginning of Human Life
Determining the beginning of human life remains a controversial matter 
among jurists. The old jurisprudential discussions revolved around the fetus 
in its three phases: sperm drop, the clinging substance, and then the embryo, 
followed by breathing of the soul. The duration of each stage is forty days. The 
debate about the fertilized sperm outside the uterus (before implantation) was 
20 See ʿAbd al-Raḥīm 2002.
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not part of the debates or even imagined before the emergence of modern 
technology. In other words, the debate is about two issues: the nature of the 
fertilized egg and the fetus, especially in its early stages.
Disagreement regarding the fertilized egg is but an extension of the dis-
agreement about its nature: is it considered a fetus so that it can be judged 
accordingly? Most of the participants in the symposium held by the Islam-
ic Organization for Medical Sciences21 held the viewpoint that the fertilized 
egg has no legitimate sacredness of any kind, nor consideration for before it 
is implanted in the uterine wall, for it is not yet called an embryo. In Arabic, 
the word embryo is derived from “ijtinān” which means “concealing”, which is 
“the name for the baby as long as it is in the womb” (al-Qalyūbī 1998, 4:160). In 
surveying jurisprudence and its different domains, we find that Ḥanbalī schol-
ars, among others, base a number of rulings on the embryo as it is implanted 
in the uterus, which means that the estimation of the age of the embryo be-
gins on the day the sperm drop sticks to the uterus.22 Therefore, the majority 
of jurists do not ascribe sacredness to that which lies outside the womb. If life 
deserving of respect begins in the uterus, according to the recommendations 
of the abovementioned symposium, this means that testing on un-implanted 
ova is permissible. But under two restrictions: that the nature of God’s creation 
should not be altered and that the exploitation of science for evil and corrupt 
practices should not be pursued.
There is a second view which argues that the location is not a criterion in 
establishing the ruling.23 This meaning can be elicited from the words of Imam 
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, who considered that existence is founded on levels, the 
first of which is “that the sperm drop falls into the uterus and mixes with the 
woman’s liquid to become prepared to accept life.” Al-Ghazālī says: “I argue 
that human life starts when semen drops inside the uterus, not in terms of its 
exit from the female urethra, and given that the sperm in the vertebrate does 
not create the baby, the same applies to the sperm’s exit from the female ure-
thra, unless it mixes with the woman’s liquid and blood, because this should 
be a tangible criterion” (n.d. 2:51). Accordingly, the semen drop, when mixed 
21 See the third symposium of the Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences in Kuwait 1987; 
al-Ashqar 2001, 305-310.
22 A reference was found later in some of the fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Schol-
arly Research and Iftāʾ in Saudi Arabia. See al-Buhūtī 1993,1:646; 2:619; Wizārat al-Awqāf 
(n.d.), 30:295; and fatwas of the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Iftāʾ 
(No. 17576) see Āl al-Shaykh and Bin Bāz 2004.
23 This view is expressed by Sheikh Muḥammed al-Mukhtār al-Sallāmī in the discussions 
that took place during the symposium held by the Islamic Organization for Medical Sci-
ences. See: (http://islamset.net/arabic/aioms/). See also: Abā al-Khayl (n.d.), 28-29.
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with the woman’s liquid, regardless of the site of this mixture, is affected by 
the development of technical means and capabilities. This is consistent with 
medical knowledge which has concluded that life begins at conception in a 
gradual manner and that the characteristics of the human being are complet-
ed in the fertilized embryo, and the subsequent stages are those of growth and 
development.
Holders of the first opinion consider only the concept of the “fetus” and 
neglect the other provisions relating to this fertilized egg, such as the rights of 
either or both parents once they initiate the fertilizing process but then one 
of them retracts from the completion of the conception process. This applies 
to the disagreement regarding the ruling on coitus interruptus, for those who 
forbid this process confer on the sperm some sort of “respect,” as the principle 
should be its dissemination on the part of the man inside the woman’s uterus 
and not waste it. From this perspective, and in view of the confirmation of 
the child’s lineage, Shāfiʿī jurists stipulate that the sperm be “respected,” from 
the moment it is exuded from the male body to the moment it is injected into 
the female body. This can only take place during sexual intercourse between 
a legally married couple24. Therefore, one cannot say that the fertilized egg is 
wasted and not respected at all!
As for the issue of the fetus, there are divergent and elaborate views on it. In 
the context of this chapter, the dispute between the jurists revolves around the 
process of determining the occurrence of the inception and the stages of life. 
All jurists agree on the prohibition of abortion once the soul has been breathed 
into the fetus. This act of breathing of the soul only occurs four months after 
the inception, but the jurists differ on the ruling concerning abortion in the 
three stages preceding this one. Mālikī jurists argue for total prohibition even 
at the semen-drop stage. The Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, on the other hand, argue for 
the permissibility of abortion before the absolute breathing of the soul into the 
fetus, while the Ḥanbalīs have adopted an intermediate position between pro-
hibition and permissibility, advocating permissibility at the semen-drop stage 
and prohibition at the stages of the clinging substance and the embryo. There 
are also overlapping views across the doctrines, but in the present study I have 
only focused on the statements adopted in each doctrine.25
The legitimate life agreed upon begins with breathing of the soul. The soul 
is what makes the living being a human being. Therefore, jurists have agreed 
that it is forbidden to abort the fetus at this stage and have issued a number 
of rulings, both worldly and holy, such as the performance of Janāzah prayer 
24 See al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī 1994, 6: 516.
25 See the different views on abortion in Wizārat al-Awqāf (n.d.), 2: 57-59; Yāsīn 2008.
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on it, wrapping it in a shroud and burying it, arguing for its resurrection on 
the Day of Judgment, etc. This, however, does not imply that the fetus’s life 
should be tampered with before the soul is breathed into it, for there is a “legal 
life” involved here. Even though the embryo, before the soul is breathed into it, 
is like an inanimate thing,26 many jurists have forbidden its abortion because 
they see in it a legal life though they differ on the timing of its inception. Does 
it start with the “clinging substance” and the settlement of the semen drop 
in the womb or from “clotting” and the beginning of its transformation into 
pregnancy in the formation of the clinging substance stage? Those who argue 
that it starts with the “settlement” forbid abortion altogether, and those who 
see that it starts at the clotting stage conclude that the sperm drop does not 
require consideration or concern and it may be wasted, because it has not yet 
with certitude turned into life.
The question of legal existence (al-ḥayāt al-iʿtibāriyya) is based on the prin-
ciple of precaution in religion (al-iḥtiyāṭ fī-l-dīn), whether in terms of the rul-
ings of pregnancy or respect for the life of the fetus. Aspects of precaution 
that determine the rulings show that Ḥanbalī jurists have not issued rulings for 
the clinging substance the way they have for pregnancy (such as the postpar-
tum period, the prescribed legal period, etc.), because they do not consider the 
clinging substance to represent a real state of pregnancy even if the life of the 
embryo is considered to be a legal one. Part of the precautions for the life of 
the fetus itself is what some Shāfiʿī jurists refer to as the “sanctuary of the soul,” 
(ḥarīm al-rūḥ) i.e. the period preceding the breathing of the soul,27 in order to 
take precautions concerning the actual life agreed upon, ensuring no injustice 
is inflicted upon it. Some jurists have issued rulings concerning the embryo, for 
they see it as the locus of the formation of the lump of flesh. Others, however, 
have exercised reservation concerning the time span of the sperm. Hence, Ibn 
al-Jawzī, of the Ḥanbalī school, prohibits abortion starting from the stage of 
the semen drop, because “the pregnancy is in the process of development and 
leading towards completion and perfection. Therefore, abortion is a violation 
of the divine will” (1981, 374). Ibn ʿĀbidīn, of the Ḥanafī school, reports that 
some fellow Ḥanafī jurists abhor this practice because “after the sperm falls 
26 The Ḥanbalīs differentiate between the soul and life and argue that they do not correlate. 
Before the soul is breathed into it, the embryo experiences movement, growth and nour-
ishment just like plants, but with no sensation or will. When the soul is breathed into it, 
then sensation and will join the process of growth and nourishment. The movement of 
the fetus is of two types: a volitional self-movement that is made possible thanks to the 
soul, and a casual movement caused by membranes and moisture. See: Ibn Qayyim Ibn 
al-Qayyim (2008), 509.
27 See al-Ramlī 1984, 8: 442.
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into the womb, it is destined to live; therefore, it falls under the ruling applica-
ble to life” (1992, 3:176). This view is the most recognized in the Shāfiʿī doctrine, 
because “the sperm drop, after becoming settled, is destined for formation and 
prepared for the breathing of the soul” (al-Shabrāmallisī 1984, 6: 182; al-Shar-
wānī 1983, 7:186).
However, this precaution does not eliminate the difference between the 
ethical legal aspect and the aspect of rights, although a number of provisions 
have been established to protect the fetus, they do not confer the aspect of 
“personality” (shakhṣiyya) upon it until it is born. This means that its existence 
in any form is only recognized when it leaves the uterus and as far as it bears 
characteristics of a human being. Hence, the rulings have been based on birth 
and the perception of a human being, even if this humanness itself is con-
cealed.
2.2.b The Attribute of Humanness (al-ʾādamiyya) and the Sacredness of 
the Body
The ruling principle in this matter is that souls and bodies have sanctity (ḥur-
ma) (al-Bukhārī 1997, 3: 147), and pregnancy is considered as part of the moth-
er’s body since the embryo relies on it.28 It is also related to the fact that human-
ness is defined in terms of a number of concepts observed by jurists, who have 
placed obligational provisions, such as the concept of “clotting,” (al-inʿiqād) 
which is the principle of turning the semen into a clinging substance. The lat-
ter, then, is the semen turned into a congealed blood clot. Ḥanbalī texts and 
rulings consider the clinging substance as the first indication that the preg-
nancy is a conceived baby; therefore, they use the principle of sacredness to 
forbid the abortion of the clinging substance because it is a “solidified embryo” 
(Ibn Mufliḥ 1997, 7:74; Ibn Rajab 2004, 1:161; Al-Buhūtī (1993), 3:193; Al-Ruḥay-
bānī 1994, 1:267&5:561). Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn forbids the abortion of the clinging 
substance on the principle that it is “blood, and blood is the substance of life” 
(2007, 13:342). This is also true of the concept of “formation” (al-takhalluq) or 
“the principle of human creation” (i.e. its beginning), and “the hidden image of 
humanity,” among other expressions.
Humanness (al-ʾādamiyya), or the principle of its formation, requires respect 
as it is developing to completion to become a full-fledged body that is ready to 
receive the soul. On this basis, one should distinguish between “humanness” 
(al-ʾādamiyya) and “human life (al-ḥayāt al-ʾādamiyya).” Human life is estab-
lished by virtue of breathing of the soul, which is commonly agreed upon, but 
humanness is inherent to the creation of man before and after breathing of 
28 See al-Kāsānī 1986, 4:94.
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the soul and is recurrent in the debate on abortion of the early fetus. There are 
special obligational provisions not to compromise humanness, denigrate it, or 
destroy it in discretionary punishment (projected penalties include imprison-
ment, etc.). Corpses should not be subjected to torture or denigration. These 
provisions also exist in dealing with slavery, as in ancient times, whereby the 
jurists decided that the “characteristics of humanness in a slave are not com-
promised as a result his status as a slave” despite him not being free, and that 
“humanness in a slave is more elevated than money.”29
These concepts and considerations refer to the relationship between body 
and self, discussed previously under the philosophical debate, especially that 
the human body is valued from the beginning of its formation: the clotting 
and the perception, and even after the departure of the soul. In a Prophetic 
tradition, it is stated, “when the soul of a believer goes out (of his body) it will 
be received by two angels who will take it to the sky,” and it will be told: “let the 
blessings of Allah be upon the body in which you used to reside.”30
Genetic intervention in the body’s cells is considered an intervention in an 
actually existing person whose own characteristics have been identified and 
established; that is, the intervention takes place in the components of the hu-
man body itself. Therefore, the intervention must abide by the considerations 
of its nature, motive and implications, in case harm is expected to result from 
this. This situation may, therefore, be subject to case-by-case considerations.
2.2.c The System of Rights 
Islamic law identifies three types of rights, those owed to God, to people, and 
to both.31 The fetus, on the other hand, is endowed with several rights accord-
ing to different considerations that govern the issuance of the ruling in this 
matter. These are: God’s right, the fetus’s right and the parents’ right. These 
aspects constitute the basis of the following discussion.
The embryo is primordially a divine creation, and this is a religious issue 
that distinguishes between parents as the means of procreation and God as the 
owner and creator of the fetus. The formation and development of the embryo 
is part of the system of creation, from the beginning to the end. Thus, all kinds 
of abortion are acts of transgression against God’s design and creation. There 
are some Ḥadīths that refer to the existence of an angel in charge of the semen; 
yet, some jurists disagree on the timing of the angel’s pledge to take charge of 
it depending on different Ḥadīths. However, some of these jurists conclude 
29 See Wizārat al-Awqāf (n.d.), 23:13&73. 
30 Muslim 1998, No. 2872. 
31 See Mutaz al-Khatib 2013, 27. 
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that “the angels are committed to and caring for the condition of the semen 
at its different periods” (Al-ʿAynī 2001, 3:435). Some late Ḥanbalīs argue that 
the angel designated for the affairs of the fetus starts recording its destiny in 
its first forty seconds (Ibn al-Qayyim 1988, 173; Ibn Rajab 2004, 1:173). In view of 
this religious explanation, there is a distinction between the sin of committing 
abortion and the determination of the obligatory expiation and “blood mon-
ey” related to the destruction of the fetus. The religious sin is established as a 
crime against the clinging substance and the unformed lump of flesh, though 
the jurists do not require that the offender pay blood money or perform acts 
of expiation in this situation. The required expiation in case of a crime against 
the fetus who bears human traits is a punishment imposed in the name of 
Almighty God’s right. In this case, the punishment carries the meaning of de-
terrence as well as worship, because it is carried out through the act of fasting. 
This punishment is proof that the sinful act represents a transgression against 
the Creator’s wisdom and design, hence the imposition of expiation as an ob-
ligation towards Almighty God. Genetic interventions can be included in this 
rubric, and the permission of the legislator is necessary in this regard, because 
it represents an act of disposition that concerns God’s Kingdom and system of 
creation.
In respect to the fetus and its entitlement to rights, the jurisprudential view 
examines and determines the nature of the fetus: is it an independent being? If 
it is looked at as being part of the mother and is nourished by her nourishment, 
the ruling then is that it is not independent, and no obligation is required of 
it. If, however, it is considered an independent body with a life of its own, the 
ruling of obligation applies to it, and by virtue of this, it becomes entitled to 
rights and obligations.32 Nonetheless, “given that either way cannot be deci-
sively confirmed, Muslim jurists treat the fetus as part of its mother because it 
is not fit to assume obligations, but it has also been treated as an independent 
soul with its own life, which makes it fit to undertake obligations. Accordingly, 
the embryo acquires incomplete obligations.”33 In this regard, Hanafi jurists 
define the fetus as “a faceless body” (Ibn Qudāma 1968, 8:406; Ibn Mufliḥ 1997, 
7:295; Al-Kāsānī 1986, 7:325). On this basis, it requires rights that do not need 
acceptance, such as the confirmation of lineage, inheritance and eligibility to 
endowment. Since the fetus is potentially capable of future separation and in-
dependence, only rights that do not require acceptance are recognized. The 
genetic intervention that affects its formation cannot be performed without 
its permission, which is actually impossible, or its guardian’s, which raises the 
32 See Ibn Rajab 1998, 2:225-251.
33 See Wizārat al-Awqāf (n.d.), 16:118-19.
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question of the limits of guardianship in such cases. Old jurists’ views concern-
ing «guardianship of the soul» (al-wilāya ʿalā al-nafs) involve medicating for 
therapeutic purposes and educating. Therefore, in this case non-therapeutic 
genetic interventions are not involved and the actions of the guardian are con-
ditioned by the permission of the legislator as well.
Concerning the right of parents, it is confirmed as early as the right to pro-
creation, even though there is a dispute on whether this is the husband’s right 
or it is a joint right between the spouses. This comes to surface especially when 
tackling the question of abortion of the sperm drop after it reaches the uterus 
or the case of coitus interruptus to prevent the sperm from reaching the womb 
(al-ʿazl). Shāfiʿī jurists see that it is the husband’s right, while the majority of 
jurists argue that the child is a common right between the spouses (Ibn ʿ Ābidīn 
1992, 3:175-176; Al-Buhūtī 1993, 1:122&3:44; Al-Mirdāwī 1956, 1:383).
Based on the above, the right of each party must be taken into account, 
and the rule governing genetic intervention stipulates that “no one should 
grant himself the liberty of using that which belongs to others without their 
permission” (Al-Zarqā 1989, 461). With regard to rights, the resolution of the 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy on the human genome emphasizes, “clear 
and legally valid permission is mandatory and should be solicited from the 
person himself or his legal guardian for the examination of his genetic map, 
ensuring the interests of the person concerned.” The Academy declares, “ev-
eryone has the right to decide whether he wishes to be kept apprised of the 
results or implications of any genetic test he undergoes.” This resolution also 
applies to the requirement that “all archived genetic diagnoses or those pre-
pared for other purposes like research should be subject to full confidentiality.” 
In addition, “no person should be made subject to any form of discrimination 
because of his genetic attributes, if it proves that the purpose is to compromise 
his freedom and fundamental rights and violate his dignity” (IIFA 2013, 21).34 
The International Islamic Fiqh Academy also ruled that genetic intervention is 
legal when carried out for therapeutic purposes and in compliance with spe-
cific conditions; for example, the type of treatment does not lead to greater 
harm than the harm the person is inflicted with, that the preponderant intent 
should be to heal or alleviate pain, that alternative treatment does not exist, 
that the proper and legal conditions of the organ transfer from the donor to the 
recipient should be observed, and finally that the operation is carried out by 
specialized and highly experienced staff known for their skillfulness and trust.
34 A similar resolution was adopted by the Islamic Fiqh Council, affiliated to the Muslim 
World League in Makkah 1998,15th Session.
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2.2.d Preservation of Self (ḥifẓ al-nafs)
“Preservation of self” is considered a higher objective of Islamic law and one 
of its most fundamental pillars. The concept of “preservation of self” tran-
scends the modern philosophical criticism of the meaning of “sacredness of 
life.” It differs from the expressions “appreciation of life,” “quality of life,” and 
“distinctiveness of life” which is referred to earlier. It refers to a general moral 
law agreed upon by universal proclamations, including the precise and clear 
meaning of general obligation, also their genera: care for self and for others. 
Preservation of self is based on two principles: “the first one is that which 
builds its cornerstones, establishes the rules and observes existence. The sec-
ond concerns all that can ward off disruption, existing or expected, and ensure 
its preservation” (Al-Shāṭibī 1997, 2:18). It also includes two views: preservation 
in whole and in parts. Retribution, although it entails killing a single person, 
aims for the preservation of the whole. In other words, preserving the self is an 
absolute law that takes into account the part, and brings together the norma-
tive and applied levels. The expression “preservation of self” helps us assimi-
late modern techniques and genetic engineering. Genetic manipulation, for 
example, is not an act of killing. Thus, the rule of “do not kill without justifica-
tion” is inadequate to accommodate such developments, while it is covered by 
the law of “preservation of self” from both sides of existence and nonexistence. 
This also includes the real self and the legal self, as previously explained. Some 
contemporary studies35 have underrated these meanings which concern “hu-
man interests” and their ethical dimensions.
The concept of “preservation” (ḥifẓ), therefore, helps us assess genetic inter-
vention by identifying three things: the form and nature of the intervention, 
its motives, objectives and expected outcomes. This will be based on a case-
by-case study. The International Islamic Fiqh Academy and the Makkah-based 
Islamic Fiqh Council stipulate “a prior and accurate assessment of the poten-
tial risks and benefits associated with these activities” before conducting any 
research, treatment, or diagnosis related to the genome.36
Preservation of self also includes treatment, which was debated by ancient 
jurists and considered a human rights issue in the way it is perceived in the 
modern context. The evolution of biological techniques expanded the con-
cept of medicine beyond the traditional perception of “treatment” with its six 
principles. Ibn al-Qayyim explained its six principles as: “the framework of the 
doctor’s authority is to make treatment and procedure revolve around six pil-
lars: preservation of existing health, restoration of lost health as far as possible, 
35 For example, the study by ʿAbd al-Nūr Bazā 2008.
36 See the International Islamic Fiqh Academy 2013, 21; the Islamic Fiqh Council 1998, 15.
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removal or alleviation of illness to the extent possible, identification of the 
lesser harm to remove the more harmful, and dismissal of the lower interest 
to achieve the greater one. Treatment should be carried out based on these 
six fundamentals” (Ibn al-Qayyim 1994, 4:132-133). However, the significant de-
velopment in genetic technology has revealed the need to address three is-
sues: first, all genetic diseases and malformations should be treated to meet 
the demands of a society that is illness-free but, whose configuration is hard 
to predict. Second, the genetic disease that must be treated still lacks precise 
identification: what should be considered a disease and what should not? Does 
the variation relate to customs and cultures? Third, the human race should be 
developed and enhanced, which means that the color of the skin or eyes, or the 
person’s height, will be subject to cultural influences and preferences, as well 
as the other potential and desirable qualities related to mental and physical 
abilities.37
The concept of treatment cannot be extended to encompass all these devel-
opments; thus, these matters should be accommodated under the concept of 
“preservation of self.” On the contrary, preservation of self entails the restric-
tion of interventionist practices in the human’s body and life, especially when 
some of these interventions concern the individual and his fate (somatic cells), 
while others affect him and his progeny (sex cells). The International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy has authorized the genetic treatment of somatic cells under 
certain conditions, as stated previously in this chapter, and has also approved 
genetic surveys provided that the means are permissible and safe, while pro-
tecting the confidentiality of information. What oversteps therapy, such as en-
hancement (engineering) purposes, are often practiced before fertilization or 
on the fetus at an early stage. This transcends the purpose of preservation of 
self and is rather closer to the purpose of preservation of lineage.
2.2.e Preservation of Lineage (ḥifẓ al-nasl)
The preservation of lineage is one of the five objectives of Islamic Law. The 
reproductive cells relate to sexual organs, and the ruling about sexual organs 
is prohibition. Therefore, intervention is conditioned here by the principle of 
lineage preservation, but therapeutic intervention is often dominated by the 
introduction of foreign elements that lead to confusion in lineage. According-
ly, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy decided to allow the examination 
of the sexual cells to identify diseases, but prohibited their treatment in its 
37 See Mussa al-Khalaf 2003, 84-85.
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“current form,” because this act does not take into consideration Islamic legal 
provisions, leads to the mixing of lineage and, therefore, is risky and harmful.38
On the other hand, intervention that serves an enhancement purpose when 
performed on sexual cells is somewhat problematic. The International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy and the Makkah-based Islamic Fiqh Council agreed to prohibit 
it because it interferes with the origin of the human being, tampers with the 
creation, transgresses human dignity (through the process of human engineer-
ing and experimentation), abuses the human character and his individual re-
sponsibility, and it does not respond to lawful needs and necessities.39
This kind of intervention may be viewed from the perspective of “enhance-
ment” of the body (tazyīn al-jasad), which has evolved into plastic surgery and 
then genetic improvement. Yet, genetic enhancement is different in that it 
deals with the origin of the human being and his formation, and this is subject 
to the same difference as in the case of the “sacredness” of the sperm drop and 
the embryo. Those who argue against their “independent” features will draw 
on protracted views regarding therapeutic and enhancive interventions. The 
reason put forth by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy and the Islam-
ic Fiqh Council that this matter involves an act of “changing God’s creation” 
(taghyīr khalq Allāh) is subject to several textual interpretations: does this pro-
cess include absolute physical transformation or is it specific to moral change 
(God’s religion), as reported by Ibn ʿAbbās and others? Is the change specific 
to the postpartum stage or does it include the prenatal one as well? Physical 
change (tattooing, removal of eyelash extensions and attachment of hair ex-
tensions, etc.) is a matter of disagreement among jurists, which reflects their 
different views about the cause of the prohibition of these practices. Is it a 
change in God’s creation, an act of fraud, etc.? Thus, the analogical measure-
ment of judgment on eugenics on the basis of enhancement and beautifica-
tion would involve the same discord. Unless, we argue that the improvement 
of lineage is different from the enhancement of the body for the same consid-
erations, as previously stated, in terms of time, impact, the type of intervention 
and the decision-maker in the intervention. Moreover, an enhancement-based 
intervention is analyzed based on the degree of enhancement, the part of the 
body that will be subject to such an intervention, and whether this will trans-
gress the necessities or needs of the part (the special case), or of the whole (for 
the human race), if the modification slips out of control and becomes an act of 
interference in the system of creation.
38 See the resolution of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy referred to earlier.
39 See the two resolutions made by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy and the Mak-
kah-based Islamic Fiqh Council on genetic engineering referred to earlier.
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The above considerations problematize the conclusions reached by some 
researchers. The ruling stipulates that, in origin, the enhancement interven-
tion is authorized based on the generalities of the texts that convey the need 
for strong lineage, and that the characteristics familiar to human beings are 
part of the permissible when there is no text that either proscribes it or orders 
it.40 Here, we should question the concept of strength, its nature and source, 
and whether it includes the energy desired by athletes. For example, athletes 
who should attribute their achievements not to themselves and their abilities, 
but to the modifications made onto them. Differentiation should also be made 
between the self-propelling (intrinsic) human nature and the contrived one 
(extrinsic). Al-Shāṭibī talks about the innate human characteristics, for which 
there are no provisions of order or proscription. However, the case here is that 
of a person who is in control of the nature of another person who is making 
progress as a human being and is in the process of complete development.
The elements of lineage preservation authorized by the International Islam-
ic Fiqh Academy concern premarital genetic examination, provided the instru-
ment is lawful and safe, diagnosis of the fertilized egg before implantation, 
provided that samples are not mixed and examination during the pregnancy. 
So, if a hereditary disease is detected, then the abortive procedure is permitted. 
The International Islamic Fiqh Academy and the Islamic Fiqh Council have 
even required the genetic screening of newborns for early intervention in cur-
able cases. All these practices are included in modern applications concerning 
the preservation of lineage from genetic diseases.
From the discussion above, we can identify the following axes as the subject 
matter of the contemporary jurisprudential debate with reference to genetic 
technology: first, there are interests and harms which result from the uses of 
this technology, and there should be restrictions on how to use this technology 
in “useful areas.” In this respect, there are several observations: 1) the benefit 
should initially serve to prevent, treat and improve. Much of the discussion 
actually revolves around the physical or material benefit and harm, and there 
are hardly any traces of the impact on moral considerations and the influences 
that these interventions can have on the human personality, psychologically 
and mentally, in terms of the connectedness of self-awareness and physical 
awareness. The discussion does not refer either to the ethical individual or to 
the social responsibilities resulting from the intervention, especially if the lat-
ter concerns development or enhancement. 2) The interests and harms repre-
sent different ranks; therefore, they must be brought under control based on a 
number of considerations, such as the analogical evaluation of the motive be-
40 See Tamam al-Lūdaʿmī 2006, 168-169.
hind the intervention and the actual need for it, as well as, the expected benefit 
and the distinction between the need for (correction of defects for instance) 
and the enhancive (preferential purposes).
Second, the main question of medical treatment is foundational in the field 
of medicine. The contemporary jurisprudential discussions, however, hardly 
discuss the evolution of the concept of medicine, the need to grasp the notion 
of treatment, and its criteria. Further, a contemporary jurisprudential discus-
sion on whether it is influenced by culture or if it is a normative matter.
Third, the objectives of Islamic law, especially in relation to the preserva-
tion of self, preservation of lineage, and that the means used to achieve these 
should be lawful and safe.
Fourth, the outcomes should be well considered by requiring the pre-evalu-
ation of uses, interventions, and impacts of genetic engineering, be they phys-
ical or social. This includes evaluation of outcomes which lead to discrimina-
tion or harm in contracts, such as employment, marriage, etc.
Conclusion
In general, the discussion in the context of this chapter does not concern 
the genetic technique per se, but, it does concern its uses, aims and impacts. 
Therefore, only through the position that we adopt vis-à-vis the power of ge-
netic engineering and how we monitor the possibilities it offers can we ensure 
that no ethical harm will be inflicted upon the lineage of the potential human 
being. The extent of the agreement that can be reached is the need to prevent 
diseases that are ineluctably dangerous. The philosophical debate is preoccu-
pied with the idea of elaborating convincing criteria that determine the health 
and disease of the physical body in the context of a non-mechanical relation-
ship, and the establishment of a distinct line between “lineage” whose aims are 
therapeutic and “eugenics” whose aims are developmental.
This vital and current issue has posed challenges to philosophical theories 
like Kant’s on the ethical being and Habermas on the communicative act. The 
issue at stake is urgent and affects the future of coming generations. The main 
debate has been about the ethics of self-understanding as applicable to the 
human species, but, the critical question that can be raised here is that it is 
not clear how this type of ethics can engender individual obligations that are 
threatened by genetic intervention.
The discussion on genetic intervention evokes the divide between science, 
ethics and jurisprudence in the way they look at the future. While science 
tries to understand physical reality, it rarely examines the greater questions 
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concerning existence itself. Science seeks to push for development to the far-
thest extent possible and to turn the possible into reality, which in turn opens 
an existing space for the emergence of other possibilities, and so on and so 
forth. This incremental process involves movement from the simple to the 
compound, the results of which should be dealt with by science, ethics and 
jurisprudence. Thus, Habermas tried to push philosophical thinking to antici-
pate the developments by reflecting on the principle of total development and 
predicting the course of the possible. This implies that ethical thinking should 
transcend science, keep its movement in check, and reduce its attempts to 
dominate and manipulate human nature. Instead of merely tracking it down 
and finding solutions and outcomes for the present reality it imposes. Few 
contemporary jurists show more interest in the jurisprudence of projections 
versus that of the present-day reality. Moreover, few contemporary jurists con-
sider the outcomes at both levels, the partial (individual and specific practice) 
and global (human nature).
Genetic technique is the product of Western modernity and its perceptions 
of man and the world. It raises all these philosophical, ethical, and jurispru-
dential discussions, which intersect as well as diverge. The discussion here re-
volves around issues which have long been considered central to religion, such 
as lineage and reproduction. The developments, however, have generalized the 
debate and made the discussions appeal to different branches of knowledge, 
thus involving the philosopher in discussions about biological applications 
and making him justify his participation therein, instead of, leaving the ter-
rain only to biologists and genetic engineers. These developments have equally 
prompted the jurist to interact with these same issues, even though the use of 
these techniques is still limited in the Muslim world.41 However, the significant 
legal and ethical legacies available to the jurist, as well as, the nature of his job 
and specialization, require that he be at the heart of these philosophical and 
ethical debates.
Paradoxically, the notion of “autonomy” raised by Kant and advocated by 
other philosophers, although, it was received negatively as an attempt to “de-
stroy the traditional view that defines man in terms of progeny created by 
God,” poses a serious challenge to genetic technology. It also makes us wonder 
about the concept of “individual freedom,” because the available and expand-
ing possibilities widen the extents of this freedom. Thus, Habermas found him-
self compelled to engage in this kind of debate and defend what he called a 
“justified reservation” vis-à-vis genetic technology.
41 There are several projects in the GCC countries, namely in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the 
UAE, which aim to indigenize research studies about the genome, its uses and techniques.
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On the other hand, some concepts like autonomy itself still need to be thor-
oughly examined by jurists. The Islamic debates around it have not yet been 
exhausted, especially with regards to the notion of autonomy of the fetus who 
is about to become a full-fledged being, and the extent of parental authority 
over him. It is also important to rise above the practical and partial jurispru-
dential discussion to embrace theological  discourse (kalām). This is due to the 
fact that the challenges posed by genetic technology cannot be addressed in 
isolation from the perceptions about existence and its aims, the relationship 
of self and body, and the essence of human life as divine creation. This also 
concerns the view of the body in relation to the soul, the impact of the possi-
bilities of genetic technology on the concept of “trials and tribulations,” which 
is a central concept in the Qurʾān, in the perceptions of creation and life, in 
the study of the relationship between expanding horizons and limited acts, or 
between the possible and the obligatory within the relationship between parts 
and wholes. 
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In the Beginning Was the Genome: Genomics and 
the Bi-Textuality of Human Existence
Hub Zwart1
Introduction2
The Human Genome Project (HGP) has been hailed as an important milestone, 
not only for the history of the life sciences, but even for humanity as such (Col-
lins 2006). It was presented as an endeavour that would transform the prac-
tice of medicine but also change the course of human history (Davies 2001, cf. 
Zwart 2015). And yet, although the HGP undoubtedly altered the way in which 
biomedical research is conducted (Collins 1999), the actual benefits for human 
society (notably in terms of novel treatments for diseases, for instance) have 
been limited so far (Collins 2011), so that the great expectations initially asso-
ciated with classical genomics have now been displaced to newer hype-prone 
areas of research, such as next generation sequencing (NGS), personalised ge-
nomics, precision medicine and gene editing. In this contribution I will argue, 
however, that the cultural and spiritual relevance of the HGP, has been quite 
substantial. Genomics, I will contend, has affected our self-understanding as 
‘rational animals’ and as stewards of creation (Zwart 2009). More specifically, 
the HGP revivified the (allegedly outdated) question of the soul (Ahmed and 
Suleman 2017), a key issue not only in Christian, but also in Islamic thinking; 
two intellectual traditions of global significance for which Aristotle has been 
a major source of inspiration, in combination with the Bible and the Quran 
respectively. The aim of this contribution is to assess the broader, cultural rel-
1 Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Science and Director of the Institute for Science in 
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evance of human genomics and its philosophical, spiritual and ethical ramifi-
cations by staging a mutual learning dialogue (or triangulation) between ge-
nomics research, continental philosophy and religious (notably Christian and 
Islamic) anthropology. 
First of all I will consider the way in which the cultural and spiritual rele-
vance of the HGP was addressed by Francis Collins, at the time Director of the 
International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium during the famous Press 
Conference in June 2000 when the human genome sequence was proudly pre-
sented to a global audience, but even more elaborately in his autobiographical 
retrospect (Collins 2006). Subsequently, opting for a continental philosoph-
ical perspective (notably building on the work of key authors such as Hegel, 
Teilhard de Chardin and Lacan), I will address the question whether and to 
what extent the human genome can be regarded as the “language of God” (Col-
lins 2006), or as a molecular update of the Aristotelian concept of the soul. 
Starting from the claim made by Max Delbrück that Aristotle must be credited 
with having predicted DNA, I will reread De Anima to explore whether insights 
coming from genomics indeed concur with Aristotle’s understanding of the re-
lationship between soul and life. My conclusion will be that human existence 
results from a dialectical interplay between two types of text: on the one hand 
the molecular language of DNA, on the other hand the languages of our so-
cio-cultural environments. As living beings we are susceptible to the language 
of the genome, but as cultural and spiritual beings humans are also susceptible 
and answerable to the “language of the Other”, providing a symbolic scaffold 
for moral responsibility and ethics. 
The Adoration of a Genome
Eighteen years ago, on June 26, 2000, President Bill Clinton, together with sci-
entists Francis Collins and Craig Venter, solemnly announced, from the East 
Room of the White House (urbi et orbi, so to speak), that the Human Genome 
Project (HGP) was rapidly nearing its completion. This carefully orchestrated, 
widely broadcasted press conference resembled a religious ceremony in vari-
ous ways. As if Clinton, Collins and Venter conducted a spiritual service before 
an international gathering of top scientists, journalists and politicians, congre-
gated in solemn adoration. The near-religious atmosphere was underscored 
by the fact that the addresses delivered on that occasion were punctuated by 
“blatantly religious references”, as Collins himself phrased it (2006, 2), such as 
the statement by Clinton: “Today we are learning the language in which God 
created life”; or the statement by Collins: “Today we celebrate the revelation of 
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the first draft of the human book of life” (National Human Genome Research 
Institute, 2000).
In his autobiographical retrospect, published six years after the event, Fran-
cis Collins confessed that for him, as a Christian scientist, the sequencing of 
the human genome was indeed “an occasion of worship” (2006, 3). He con-
fessed to be “in awe of this molecule” (102), this “wondrous” map, this “mirac-
ulous” code, “previously known only to God”. The process of “uncovering this 
most remarkable of all texts” held a special significance, since the human ge-
nome was “written in the DNA language by which God spoke life into being” 
(123). Therefore, the human sequence invoked in him “an overwhelming sense 
of awe” (123). 
Interestingly, however, besides an electronic screen claiming that the de-
coding of the book of life represented a milestone for humanity, there was 
nothing to be seen during the press conference, nothing visibly on display. The 
mysterious centrepiece of the whole event, the focal point of attention, was 
emphatically absent, like a spectral Lacanian “thing”. The dramaturgic mise-
en-scène revolved around a void. Not only because the sequencing process was 
still ongoing (the celebration, for various complicated strategic reasons, was 
organised somewhat prematurely), but first and foremost because a strand of 
nucleotide code can only be made visible through highly technical means. It is 
a molecularised, computerised version of what we are, rather than a portrait 
or mirror lay audiences can relate to. At best, the typical output of automated 
sequencing machines resembles modernistic (decidedly non-figurative) art. 
Similar to Holy Mass, one could argue, the presence of the object of worship 
(the human genome) had to be presupposed or envisioned by a congregation 
of committed believers. But this concurred with Collins’ conviction that the 
human code is the molecular equivalent of sacred Scripture, something that 
would be trivialised and desecrated by direct exposure to a public gaze. 
The June 2000 event has been compared with the Adoration of the Mys-
tic Lamb (Zwart 2010), a famous medieval polyptych altarpiece on display in 
Ghent’s Saint Bavo Cathedral, created almost six centuries ago (between 1430 
and 1432) by the Limburgian artists Hubert and Jan van Eyck: a highlight of late 
medieval religious art. Its central panel assembles knights, martyrs, hermits, 
pilgrims, saints, priests, burghers and nobility in a joint celebration, compa-
rable to how the White House press conference brought together scientists, 
journalists, policymakers and heads of state in a similar gathering, as repre-
sentatives (the front row as it were) of humankind, beholding a sublime, ethe-
real object. The Van Eyck altarpiece stages a culmination point, a final station 
in a collective pilgrimage. Like the lamb on the central panel, the human se-
quence is expected to deliver humanity from all kinds of evil: erasing cancer 
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and producing cures for degenerative congenital diseases such as Alzheimer’s: 
the HGP as a “soteriological” project (Song 2003). Indeed, it was claimed that, 
due to this “most wondrous map… Our children’s children will know the term 
cancer only as a constellation of stars” (National Human Genome Research 
Institute, 2000). 
But whereas human beings, trees, flowers and buildings are represented by 
the Van Eyck brothers with dexterous craftsmanship and exacting realism, the 
central figure (the mystic lamb) is an iconic, formulaic image, a screen or sem-
blance covering up an empty spot, an unconceivable, un-representable “some-
thing”, and the same applies to the dove hovering above (representing the Holy 
Spirit, the third component of the Holy Trinity). In Catholic liturgy, the Lamb 
(Jesus) is not literally visible, but present via a mystic event known as tran-
substantiation. The lamb image is inserted at the focal point of convergence 
to conceal a void, for the divine object is only spiritually perceivable (for true 
believers). Also in this respect, the late medieval artwork and the HGP press 
conference resemble one another. The focus of attention is a spectral, absent, 
imaginary entity, an adulated iconic screen covering a void, indicating the ad-
vent of something which is keenly anticipated, but not yet tangibly there. 
Genomics and Self-knowledge
The spiritual aura radiating from the HGP (as one the highlights of contem-
porary technoscience) seems at odds with the decidedly “secular” profile of 
modern scientific research. Is this a coincidence, an oddity resulting from the 
fact that one of the key players in the room (Collins) happened to be a Chris-
tian? Or should we rather see it as a symptomatic feature which points to a 
more fundamental dimension of contemporary science: an unconscious aspi-
ration, obfuscated and disavowed perhaps in normal every-day research, but 
resurging on such prominent occasions? At the Press Conference, the HGP was 
framed as a crucial station on a long journey of exploration, which began with 
the famous motto inscribed on the temple of Apollo’s at Delphi more than 
twenty-five centuries ago: “Know thyself” (γνῶθι σεαυτόν). Self-knowledge re-
mains the ultimate goal of our cupido sciendi, our “will to know”, and the HGP 
entailed the promise that we will now finally be able to know ourselves (Zwart 
2007). Venter for instance, both at the press conference and in his autobiogra-
phy (Venter 2007), describes the human genome as “our own instruction book” 
and as “the draft of the human book of life”. The human genome was regarded 
by many as our “blueprint”, and as the HGP came off ground, the twenty-five 
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century old quest for human self-knowledge seemed to be entering a decisive 
phase. 
But also in terms of self-knowledge, the HGP resulted in a disappointment, 
for in the course of the project something remarkable happened. Initially, es-
timates of the number of genes on the human genome tended to vary greatly. 
Walter Gilbert (1992) had suggested that the human genome contained some-
thing like 100.000 genes a figure widely quoted and adopted (IHGSC 2001, 
898), but James Watson (2002) even mentioned 248.000 genes as a probable 
estimate. In 2000, an estimate of 120.000 genes was still proposed (Liang et 
al, 2000). In 2001, however, the International Human Genome Sequencing Con-
sortium (IHGSC) reduced the official estimate to ~ 31.000 genes. And in 2004, 
in the landmark paper that presented the finished version, covering 99% of 
the human genome, a more or less final estimate was given of ~22.500 genes 
(IHGSC 2004, cf. van Ommen 2005, 931). This was something of a disappoint-
ment indeed, or even a narcissistic offence (Freud 1917/1947; cf. Zwart 2007)), 
not only in comparison to previous estimates, but also in comparison to the 
number of genes on the genomes of other model organisms such as Drosoph-
ila melanogaster (~14.000 genes), Caenorhabditis elegans (~19.000 genes) and 
Arabidopsis thaliana (~25.000 genes). Indeed, it raised the question “what does 
set us apart from flies and worms” (Van Ommen 2005).
Dialectically speaking, the realisation of the HGP entailed an important ex-
perience, namely that the human existence proves decidedly more complex 
than was initially expected. The HGP undermined (or “negated” in dialectical 
terms) rather than confirmed a genetic reductionist understanding of the ge-
nome as our “blueprint”. In order to know ourselves, a more comprehensive 
portrayal is required, which not only encompasses molecular genomics, but 
also envisions how we come to terms with our socio-cultural environment. We 
are not only the product of our genes, but abut forged by culture as well. Hu-
man existence results from a dialectical interplay between two types of texts: 
by the “language” of the genome, but also by the “symbolic order” (Lacan): i.e. 
the multiple (political, scientific, religious and moral) forms of discursivity 
that constitute human civilisation or Sittlichkeit (Hegel 1970). 
The surprisingly small number of genes raised the philosophical question 
how humans are able to create a highly complex, artificial environment, a tech-
nological world or “technotope”, equipped with a genome that contains such a 
small number of genes? While we are exploring and unraveling the structure 
of the universe and reshaping our environment at an unprecedented scale and 
pace, the genetic basis for our unique talents and creativity remains unclear. 
On the level of our genome, we do not seem that different at all. Our unique-
ness and otherness is hardly reflected by our genes. One conclusion may be 
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that, apparently, we are not that unique and different as a species after all. As 
Venter phrased it during his White House speech: “We […] have many genes 
in common with every species on Earth […] we’re not so different from one 
another” (National Human Genome Research Institute, 2000).
But this is not the only conclusion we might draw. Another possibility is that 
we should look for the source of our uniqueness and complexity as human be-
ings elsewhere. As the Gospel of Saint John phrases it: in the beginning was the 
word (λόγος), but DNA is not the only text which shapes human existence. Our 
intelligence and creativity also depends on our techno-cultural environment, 
on our susceptibility and exposure to culture, to words, to discursivity: to the 
symbolic order, the discourse of the Other, as Jacques Lacan phrased it (1966, 
524). 
Thus, human existence evolves at the intersection of two types of texts. On 
the one hand the molecular textuality disclosed by genomics and post-genom-
ics research, commencing from the genome (a portmanteau of gene and chro-
mosome), but closely interacting with the metabolome, the transcriptome and 
various other –omics layers (up to the exposome and the environome: Cheng 
& Cooper 2001; Miller & Jones 2014) that are studied by genomics, metabolo-
mics, transcriptomics and many other –omics fields. The understanding of the 
genome as a text or code was initiated by Erwin Schrödinger in his classic What 
is life (1944/1967), but reinforced by the discovery of DNA by Watson and Crick 
(two researchers who were explicitly inspired by Schrödinger’s book: Zwart 
2013) and its alphabet of nucleotide letters (A, C, G and T). More recently, the 
understanding of life in terms of textuality was reconfirmed by the introduc-
tion of the CRISPR/Cas9 technique, allowing gene editing “by the letter”, “letter 
by letter”, as Doudna and Sternberg (2017, p. 93) phrase it, enabling the cor-
rection of “single-letter mistakes” (p. 100) in DNA with “single-letter accuracy” 
(p. 212). The genome is the primordial layer from where multiple circuits and 
complicated networks of molecular messages pervade living organisms.
But this bio-molecular textuality is complemented by a second type of tex-
tuality: the discursivity of the socio-cultural ambiance, again a multi-layered 
and stratified phenomenon. And also with regard to the textuality of our so-
cio-cultural environment, a primordial layer can perhaps be discerned, con-
sisting of primordial or initiating texts, the equivalent of the genome in the 
field of the humanities, and likewise referred to as the language of God, namely 
key textual sources that served as grounding documents for whole cultures, for 
national languages, ranging from the Bhagavad Gita via the Hebrew Bible up 
to the New Testament and the Quran. Such documents reflect seminal efforts 
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by human authors to respond to an experience calling: the experience of being 
addressed by a voice from elsewhere, by a speaking Other.3 
Human genomics and post-genomics evolve in a world populated by 5.8 bil-
lion people (84 percent of the world population) who report themselves as 
religiously affiliated. If anything, this astonishing figure reflects a tenacious 
human predisposition or receptiveness for spirituality.4 It has been argued, by 
Hamer (2005) and others, that this worldwide susceptibility of responsiveness 
of human beings to the spiritual dimension of existence, resulting in multiple 
forms of religiosity, is based on the presence of a so-called god gene (VMAT2), 
hardwiring an inclination towards spirituality into human DNA. But regardless 
of whether a genetic susceptibility for religious experiences does exist, a num-
ber of decisive examples have been recorded where exposure to a Divine λόγος 
gave rise to experiences of awakening and conversion (or delusion, if you like), 
inaugurated by susceptible voices such as Jeremiah (626 B.C.), Jesus (30 A.D.) 
and Mohammed (610 A.D.). Such events (and the various documents resulting 
from them) seem to point to a basic human susceptibility to be addressed: by 
textuality in general, but especially by texts of a specific spiritual nature, urg-
ing us to question who we are and where we come from: the very questions 
that spurred scientists like Collins (2006) into sequencing the human genome 
in the first place. In other words, not the genome as such, but rather the quest 
for the genome, the desire to know and read the human sequence may tell us 
something about who we are.
But how should the interaction between these two forms of textuality (be-
tween bio-molecular codes and socio-cultural discursivity) be envisioned? 
As Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1955) once phrased it, scientific portrayals of 
humankind (genetic, anatomical, physiological, neurological, genetic, etc.) 
consistently seem to fall short. They seem to lack a key dimension, namely 
self-consciousness or world-openness. Humans are animals, but they also rep-
resent a leap, a discontinuity, a metamorphosis, a crisis, an awakening. And it 
is precisely here that the basic human responsiveness to λόγος, to words, to the 
word even (the calling by the Other), seems to play a decisive role. Due to this 
exposure to λόγος, for those susceptible to it, existence becomes part of a cul-
tural journey, adding an additional existential layer over and above the biolog-
ical and socio-economic dimensions of human existence. Moreover, Teilhard 
believed that, at some point in the imminent future, the current collision be-
tween science and religion will be sublated into convergence (an event which 
3 “Koranic revelation is considered to be a reception of the hyperoriginary text of the Other 
[which] had already been written” (Benslama 2009, 13) 
4 http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/global-religious-landscape-exec/
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he referred to as the Omega point). From a Teilhardian point of view, the HGP, 
focussed on the biological textuality of existence, was certainly a decisive mile-
stone on the pathway leading up to this convergence. And yet, at present, we 
rather seem faced with an ever widening split or gap between techno-scientific 
and spiritual understandings of human existence.
But maybe genomics can help us to articulate this experience of collision 
or convergence at with a higher level of resolution as it were. The phrase “In 
the beginning was the genome” resonates with the conviction that the starting 
point of life is DNA: the giant molecule which orchestrates the functioning and 
development of life on the cellular level. The nucleus of every cell, of every fer-
tilised ovum, contains a molecular text composed of sequences of four letters 
(A, C, G and T). For religious scientists such as Collins, it was via these letters 
that God breathed life into the mayhem of abiotic matter: the genome as our 
plan or programme. But the experience of the HGP confirmed that, in order to 
really come to terms with human existence, we must continue to pay attention 
to other texts as well, to other instances of λόγος; the texts of culture. In other 
words, we are products of processes of co-creation, of a dialogue involving var-
ious types of text: on the one hand the language of the genome, on the other 
hand the languages of civilisation. It is from this perspective that I will reread 
Aristotle’s De Anima. 
Rehabilitating Aristotle
In modern scientific circles, Aristotle (the proverbial giant on whose discur-
sive shoulders both Christian and Islamic medieval thinkers stood) no longer 
enjoys a good reputation.5 Notably his views on physics tend to be regarded as 
blatantly misguided. It has been claimed that the modern scientific revolution 
was only possible because researchers during the early modern period dared 
to step beyond the Aristotelian worldview. As Rovelli puts it, Aristotle’s science 
is either not considered as science at all or as a failure. 6 Psychoanalytically 
speaking, the emergence of modern scientificity required an act of intellectual 
patricide (Rovelli 2013). 
But in the era of DNA and genomics, this verdict is under reconsideration 
(Mauron 2011). Max Delbrück, one of the founding fathers of molecular biology, 
5 For a more extended analysis of the importance of Aristotle for Islamic and Christina under-
standings of the body and the tension with the modern scientific view see Zwart & Hoffer 
(1998)
6 https://www.academia.edu/5739248/Aristotles_physics
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already argued that, in retrospect, Aristotle should be credited for discovering 
“the principle implied in DNA” (1973, p. 55) and that molecular biology echoes 
Aristotelian conceptions, as is suggested by the title of his paper (Aristotle-tot-
le-totle). Aristotle, Delbrück argues, discovered DNA because he discerned that 
living beings are composite creatures, composed of form and matter. Or rather: 
they are matter shaped by (and brought to life by) form. According to Aristotle, 
the soul is the form and principle of life. But whereas Delbrück predominantly 
refers to Aristotle’s biological writings, the ancient Greek philosopher-biolo-
gist from Stagira developed his ‘hylemorphic’ understanding of life even more 
poignantly in De Anima (Περὶ Ψυχῆς), translated as On the Soul (Aristotle 1986). 
Therefore, I will briefly recapitulate this text, one of the key documents of ori-
ental and occidental metaphysics, intensely studied by both Islamic and Chris-
tian scholars, such as Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd (known in the West as Avicenna 
and Averroes) and Thomas Aquinas (1922, Prima Pars Q76).
According to Aristotle, the soul (ψυχή) is the principle (ἀρχή) of life (Aristo-
tle 1986, 402a, 415b). It is the form (εἶδος) or formula (λόγος) of living beings. All 
organisms are composite entities: fusions of form (ψυχή) and matter (ὕλη), re-
sulting in the realisation or actualisation (ἐντελέχεια, 412a) of the living being’s 
formula or plan (λόγος, 412b, 415b).7 The body is regarded as the instrument 
(ὄργανον) of the soul (415b). While plants grow and reproduce (as realisations 
of their “vegetable” soul), animals also perceive and move (as realisations of 
the sensitive part of their soul). But it is only in humans that Aristotle discerns 
the presence of a thinking soul (νοῦς). A scholarly paper, for instance, is a re-
alisation of the thinking soul, a uniquely human dimension, realising itself in 
thinking (νοεῖν), which can be both passive (receptive) and active (self-direct-
ed). 
At this point, however, a basic ambivalence seems at work in Aristotle’s 
text. On the one hand, he regards thinking as a continuation of visual per-
ception in the sense that, whereas via eyesight we perceive the things them-
selves (as compounds of matter and form), the human mind assesses their 
form (εἶδος) stripped of matter, so that thinking is a more abstract version of 
sense perception. In other words, whereas perception focusses on external 
things (πράγματα), the soul reflects on their inner images (φαντάσματα). But 
Aristotle also suggests that the thinking soul focusses, not on the visual shape 
or form, but rather on the formula (λόγος): the plan of things. Seen from this 
perspective, Aristotle argues, thinking is more similar to considering letters 
(γραμματείον) before they are actually written down on tablets (430a). In other 
7 “The soul is the first principle (ἀρχή), the realisation (ἐντελέχεια) of that which exists poten-
tially: its essential formula (λόγος)” (415b: 14-15).
212 Zwart
words, thinking (in the sense of: mentally considering formula) is comparable 
to writing a text that has not yet been written: a writing that is not yet realised 
as actual writing (on a tablet). 
The tension between these two versions of thinking, namely thinking as 
working with mental images (φαντάσματα) versus thinking as working with 
mental characters (γράμματα), corresponds with a similar ambiguity already 
described above concerning the concept of form, which may either be inter-
preted as form in the more visual, morphological sense (εἶδος), or as form in 
the sense of formula (λόγος): the plan that is realised in the actual living entity. 
This tension or difference is not clearly spelled out by Aristotle, but it is im-
portant to emphasise this in view of later developments, because in contempo-
rary philosophy the distinction between the imaginary (focussed on images or 
φαντάσματα) and the symbolic (focussed on symbols or γράμματα) has become 
quite decisive, while the textuality of life discussed above clearly builds on the 
latter rather than on the former. Aristotle notices the difference, for instance 
when he explains that, when we see a beacon, we initially recognise it as fire, 
until it begins to move, for then we realise that it actually is a signal which 
signifies something (for instance: the approach of the enemy). This distinction 
between fire as a (natural) shape (or image) and fire as a (conventional) signal 
(or symbol, i.e. an element in an alphabet of signals) is not further pursued 
by Aristotle, but it became increasingly important, not only in contemporary 
debate, but also in Western culture as such. For whereas ancient Greek culture 
was still predominantly a visual culture (even in the textual domain orient-
ed on visual, imaginative genres such as epic poetry), one could argue that 
Christian and Islamic scholars (notably during the medieval era) represented a 
much more scriptural or textual approach, so that the focus shifted from think-
ing-as-processing-φαντάσματα to thinking-as-processing-γράμματα. Thus, the 
basic tension between images and words, between imaginative and discursive 
thinking continues to run as a basic epistemological thread through the history 
of culture as such,8 and has been reinforced by decidedly scriptural (textual) 
cultures, such as Christianity and Islam.
8 Carl Gustav Jung (1911 / 2001) introduced a distinction between two modes of thinking: name-
ly imaginative and discursive thinking. Whereas the latter evolves on the basis of logic and 
the causality principle, the former relies on association. Historically speaking, Jung argues, 
discursive thinking is a fairly recent phenomenon. It was introduced by critical minds such 
as Socrates (the founding father of logic as a philosophical discipline) and further elaborated 
by Aristotle and scholasticism. Without this intellectual trend (the gradual conversion of the 
Western mind to discursive thinking), the emergence of modern science would have been 
unthinkable, Jung argues.
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A final important distinction in De Anima is the one between passive (re-
ceptive) and active (self-directed) thinking, notably because Aristotle at a cer-
tain point suggests that, whereas the passive soul is perishable like the body 
(being connected to it as its form), the supra-individual and truly actively 
thinking soul is independent from perishable living and thinking individuals) 
and therefore imperishable and everlasting (430a). This seems to suggest that, 
although no living being can sustain itself without a soul, the thinking soul 
as such may operate in the absence of a body. To what extent does Aristotle’s 
conception of the soul allow us to deepen our understanding of the human 
genome in the context of the textuality of human existence?
To begin with, I endorse Delbrück’s view Aristotle’s hylemorphic conception 
of life can be regarded as a remarkably lucid anticipation of the principles of 
genomics. From an Aristotelean perspective, the genome can be considered 
as the formula, the program or plan (λόγος) which guides the development of 
living beings from their embryonic state up to their full realisation (ἐντελέχεια) 
as flourishing, self-sustaining and reproducing adults who have fully actual-
ised their potential form (εἶδος). So, yes, from an Aristotelian viewpoint, the 
genome can meaningfully be regarded as the text of life, producing living be-
ings from the chemical mayhem of their abiotic surroundings (i.e. inorganic 
matter). And prominent genomics researchers such as Craig Venter (2013) even 
argue that, whereas no living organism can exist without its DNA, DNA can 
be isolated from living beings as pure information, the pure formula of life, 
everlasting and immortal, processed in computer systems, or even used to re-
assemble replicas of living organism elsewhere for instance: on other planets, 
so that microbes in principle can be beamed to Mars, in order to produce an 
aerobic atmosphere and terraform the planet. 
The view that DNA (as carrier of the genome) is the text of life notably ap-
plies to the vegetative and sensitive dimensions of bodily existence, however: 
to metabolism, first and foremost, albeit in continuous interaction with the 
ecosystem (life as a continuous dialectical dialogue between nature and nur-
ture). But when it comes to understanding the noetic dimension of the soul 
(the thinking soul or νοῦς), the explanatory power of the genome becomes less 
obvious. As indicated, a genetic basis for our creativity and intelligence can-
not be detected in our genome as such. Although in has been claimed that 
the human genome contains certain genes that may explain textual-cultural 
behaviour, dubbed the language gene (FOXP2) and the god gene (VMAT2) for 
instance, the presence of such genes can only account for a basic susceptibility 
or responsiveness to textuality. Our noetic or discursive existence as such can-
not be explained on the basis of genomics (‘nature’, natural textuality) alone, 
but must be prompted or activated (realised) by exposure to other kinds of text 
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as well. Our basic ability to be addressed requires something else besides the 
genome and the FOXP2 protein (depicted on the left), encoded by FOXP2 gene. 
It presupposes the existence of a world of language, a socio-cultural ambiance, 
enabling and facilitating language use, providing a scaffold for the develop-
ment of intelligent and responsive textual behaviour. This world of language 
provides a textual infrastructure, a discursive scaffold allowing cultural and 
moral existence to unfold, in response to the language of the Other, which is 
already there as a cultural ecosystem. And whereas the ability to be addressed 
corresponds with Aristotle’s concept of passive thinking, our active respon-
sive contribution to and participation in this socio-cultural world of language 
concurs with what Aristotle refers to as active thinking (discursivity as such), 
realising or actualising itself via us, but as a symbolic order which is already 
operating and will continue to function when we as individuals leave the scene 
(Lacan 1974/2005).
Thus, rereading Aristotle’s De Anima likewise prompts us to recognise the 
basic bi-textuality of human existence. Human self-consciousness emerges at 
the interface between two types of texts, namely the natural textuality of the 
body (as studied by molecular biology and genomics) and various social-cul-
tural forms of textuality (analysed by the humanities, from linguistics up to 
religious studies). In order to understand human existence, physiology must 
be complemented by philology. Ideally, a state of harmony or at least com-
patibility and mutual adaptation between both dimensions can be achieved 
(Lacan 1959-1960/1986, p. 107; Lacan 1956-1957/1994, p. 25), but from the history 
of culture it is clear that the tension between these two types of text is not 
that easily to solve, and rather gives rise to chronic experiences of frustration, 
malaise and failure. But perhaps a reframing in terms of bi-textuality can help 
us to elucidate the basic split or incongruence that runs through the human 
condition and was articulated by Sigmund Freud (1930/1948) as discontent in 
culture. The question is: how to combine or reconcile our openness to the lan-
guages of culture (our cultural or even spiritual ecosystems) with the bio-mo-
lecular languages of the genome (our biological program)? 
Civilisation and its Discontents Reframed
The phrase “In the beginning was the genome” conveys the idea of DNA as 
the commencement of life: the biopolymer which generates and orchestrates 
molecular messages. The nucleus of every cell contains a molecular text com-
posed of sequences of four letters (A, C, G and T) and via them life is breathed 
into the mayhem of entropic abiotic matter: the genome as our programme. 
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But the experience of the HGP confirmed that, in order to come to terms with 
human existence, we must pay attention to other texts, other instances of 
λόγος, as well namely oral, scriptural and digital discourses of culture so that 
we are products of processes of co-creation, and interaction between various 
different types of text: on the one hand the languages of molecular biology, on 
the other hand those of civilisation. 
Human beings are driven by two types of texts. They are continuously fuelled 
by myriads of biochemical messages produced by molecular circuits informed 
by DNA, but also relentlessly besieged by voices coming from society and cul-
ture. And this entails an existential challenge. Various filters and defence sys-
tems have evolved to allow us to cope with this unsettling over-abundance, 
and most of the interactive processing occurs unconsciously, allowing us to fo-
cus our attention on tiny samples of (internal or external) signals (Freud 1920, 
/1940, 27). Various forms of tension, contradiction and confusion may none-
theless result from our susceptibility to these incommensurable types of text. 
In the course of human history, a split or gap has evolved between our (slowly 
evolving) Palaeolithic genome and the contrasting demands of our global ci-
vilisation (evolving at a tremendous and accelerating pace), a gap which seems 
too fundamental for genome editing technologies to bridge (Stammers 2017). 
The pastoral paradise (in which genome and culture once were compatable) 
seems irretrievably lost (if it ever existed), so that we are facing a chronic in-
compatibility between the molecular information circuits of embodied nature 
and the textual cacophony emerging from our socio-cultural ambiance, giving 
rise to discontent in civilisation, as a persistent and collective human symp-
tom (Freud 1930/1948). Whatever the circumstances, humans always seem to 
be looking for something more and something else than that which is provided 
by the immediate material environment. 
In this dynamical relationship, a dialectical triad can be discerned. Initially, 
some level of coherence between genome and cultural Umwelt may have ex-
isted (first moment: M1), but at a certain point this pre-established harmony 
was disrupted: the birth trauma of human culture (M2). According to Jacques 
Lacan (1966, 1974/2005), language played a crucial role in this, introducing a 
new and perhaps uniquely human dimension: the desire for things we may 
conceive or imagine rather than see, smell or grasp. Over the past millennia, 
this has given rise to a neo-environment: a techno-sphere or socio-sphere, over 
and above the atmosphere, geosphere and biosphere. But this has failed to 
appease the tension or gap between what we seek (desire) and what we find 
(the entities, either natural or artificial, that actually surround us). And this 
explains the turbulence of human existence in a polarised force-field between 
two incommensurable types of text: the molecular code of the genome and 
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the textual codes of culture. But perhaps, by increasing our literacy on both 
sides of the equation, (that is, by simultaneously strengthening our fluency in 
molecular life science research as well as our erudition in the cultural realm) 
these two textual poles of human existence may eventually become reconciled 
again (M3)? 
As indicated, most of the interaction between these two types of texts takes 
place unconsciously. As embodied biological beings we are under the sway 
of the biological unconscious, orchestrated by the genome: a dimension we 
share with plants, animals and microbes taking care of the metabolism that 
continuously takes place, within cells as well as within the body as a whole, in 
close interaction with the environment. The extimate microbiome (both inti-
mate and external) plays an important part in this, as an organ composed of 
bacteria functioning as a “collective unconscious” (Dinan et al 2015). But over 
and above the biological unconscious, which we share with other living be-
ings, humans are also prompted by a textual unconscious, which is psychic un-
conscious, is not a fluid reservoir of bodily or animalistic drives (which would 
make it biological again), but rather textual and highly organised (1975, 79). 
The psychic unconscious is structured like a language, as Lacan (1981 and else-
where) phrases it. It is not the seat of primordial instincts, but rather consists 
of chains of signifiers (1966, 501 ff.). This unconscious is a discourse-producing 
machine speaking to us, albeit in an oblique or indirect manner. For where-
as others (children, spouses, colleagues, civil servants, etc.) address us more 
or less directly, via words and gestures, there is another ‘Other’, addressing us 
through dreams, neurotic symptoms and mistakes (slips of the pen), or via in-
ner voices (Socrates’ δαιμόνιον for instance), often articulating seemingly irra-
tional desires or incomprehensible concerns (the voice of conscience which, 
in the case of neurotic patients, may become a paralysing, over-compelling 
and over-demanding super-ego). In the case of psychotic patients, the uncon-
scious may really surface as a strange, enigmatic language: as an audible, un-
canny voice. But non-pathological individuals may likewise be overwhelmed 
by the language of the Other: by sudden artistic inspirations (the muses), or by 
scholarly brainwaves (εὕρηκα-experiences) or by religious revelations (Moses 
on Mount Sinai, Jesus in Gethsemane, Mohammed in the Hira cave).
For Jacques Lacan, the unconscious is a text-processing, “typographical” 
realm (1998, 147), but different from biological (genomic) textuality (Zwart 
2013). Whereas molecular messages coming from the convey informational 
signals, cultural languages (conveying truth and meaning) seem a uniquely 
human phenomenon. Whereas the needs, growth patterns and functions of 
the body are to a certain extern governed by biological messages and codes, 
human desire is under the sway of the language of civilisation. For Lacan, we 
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are “speaking animals”, liberated from nature to some extent, but burdened 
by language, or even sick with language (1974/2005, 90, 93; cf. 1961-1962, 42). 
And whereas in animals the genome and the environment seem fairly adapt-
ed to one another (as in expressed by notions such as fitness), in humans we 
basically see a failure to adapt, because of our exposure to conflicting messag-
es coming from elsewhere, expelling us from biological forms of existence in 
which we were once embedded (the biosphere) and opening up a cultural and 
spiritual realm of truth and meaning, – the symbolic order or noosphere, to 
use the term coined by Teilhard (1955). 
Lacan’s analysis of the story of the Sacrifice of Isaac (Genesis 22: 1-13) may 
serve as an example here (1974/2005). Abraham is not spurred on to climb the 
mountain in order to sacrifice his son by animalistic or metabolic drives (say, 
hunger). Rather he responds to a sense of calling: a Divine command, the word 
of “the Other”, not someone who is physically or tangibly present (a spouse, 
a neighbour, etc.), but a voice coming from “elsewhere”. The various physio-
logical phenomena (arousal, metabolism, etc.) that allow him to comply with 
this command are biological (and genome-based) no doubt, but the crucial 
invocation that spurs him into action is a phenomenon beyond biology. When 
he is about to sacrifice his child, however, a voice (a messenger) once again in-
tervenes, so that Abraham once again responds, this time by revoking his orig-
inal intention. Whereas predators will go for their prey without further ado, 
humans may deliberate about their sacrifices, and reconsider their choices, 
due to their openness to reason and language, to their ability to be addressed, 
by words, by λόγος. Language allows humans to transcend the biological pa-
rameters of their existence, so that the biological Umwelt is transformed into a 
literate human world, replete with language.
Basically speaking, the language of the genome (the bio-molecular mes-
sages spurring us to develop certain responses to environmental cues: M1) is 
negated, by the language of conscience and culture (M2), and this gives rise to 
various tensions and conflicts. In order to arrive at a viable situation, however, 
this negation of nature by culture must be negated or (‘sublated’) again (the 
negation of the negation, as Hegel phrases it: M3). By developing a profound 
understanding of our biological nature (starting with the human genome) as 
well as of the dynamics of human cultural existence (the spiritual dimension), 
both moments (nature and culture; nature and spirituality) may become rec-
onciled again, on a higher level over complexity, so that desire may become 




In the current era, as global mass media attention predominantly focusses on 
tensions between religion and science, between spirituality and secularisa-
tion, it seems relevant to highlight something which may easily be overlooked, 
namely a basic affinity between monotheism and the scientific world-view, 
captured by the term iconoclasm. In a religious context, iconoclasm refers to 
the tendency to discard idolatrous or iconic manifestations of religiosity (prac-
tices of producing and worshipping icons, statues, idols, etc.) in favour of scrip-
tural, symbolic sources. Iconoclasm was inaugurated by Pharaoh Akhenaten 
(ca. 1353–1336 B.C.), and subsequently transferred as a quintessential feature 
to Judaism, Islam and Christianity (notably Protestantism). 
Psychoanalyst of science Gaston Bachelard pointed out, however, that icon-
oclasm is also a distinctive feature of modern science (1947, 77; 1953, 122), in the 
sense that science not only challenges narcissistic self-images, but also disrupts 
established (imaginary) world-views. Dialectically speaking, the objective of 
science is to understand nature or natural entities (M1), but instead of letting 
nature be (as happens in the case of artistic meditation or poetic exaltation), 
Bachelard explains how science actively transforms natural entities into some-
thing noumenal and abstract (bio-chemical molecules, captured in formula, 
symbols, equations, etc.) with the help of laboratory equipment. In dialectical 
terms, the concreteness and immediacy of natural entities becomes (M1) ne-
gated or abolished (M2) by scientific knowledge production. Although research 
begins with self-constraint (letting things be, observing rather than consuming 
them), they are eventually transformed into something than can be technical-
ly manipulated. In other words, research entails negativity. The initial object 
(the natural phenomenon or Gestalt) becomes obliterated through measure-
ments and quantification, so that a noumenal (physical, chemical, molecular) 
essence is revealed. Thus, the visible Gestalt (a tree, for instance) gives way to 
chemical letters and symbols (CO2, H2O, C6H10O5, etc.), and the living organ-
ism becomes “obliterated” (Zwart 2016). The living thing is broken down into 
basic components that can be represented with the help of letters: the symbol-
ic alphabet of chemical compounds (H2O, CO2, etc.), genes (FOXP2, VMAT2, 
etc.), nucleic acids (A, C, G and T), amino acids (Ala, Arg, Asn, Asp, Leu, Lis, 
Met, etc.) and so on. Due to this symbolisation or literation of nature (or even 
obliteration) of nature, natural entities as living entities disappear from view, 
thus exemplifying the iconoclastic tendency of science. Only via iconoclastic 
symbolisation, the logic (λόγος) of scientific reason is able to reveal the basic 
textuality (λόγος) of molecular systems. 
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This example why the output of human genomics is not a recognisable por-
trait of a human being, but rather a stream of letters, something essentially 
textual: a formula, a sequence, a code. If a human genome sequence printed 
on canvas, it resembles a modernistic artwork, as we have seen. This icono-
clastic tendency, at work in modern science, but also in modernistic art, re-
verberates with monotheistic precursors. From a historical perspective, how-
ever, iconoclasm is the exception rather than the rule. Cultures tend to speak 
to their adherents not only through words, but also via images. Ancient Greek 
culture, as we have seen, was primarily a visual culture and ancient sculptures 
of Greek and Roman culture, erected in public spaces, conveyed a moral mes-
sage: become an athlete, transform yourself into a work of art, so that such 
statues actually functioned as exemplary idols. Such artworks entailed a form 
of moral propaganda (Lacan 1959-1960/1986). In contemporary commercials 
(displaying superbly healthy men and women for instance) such messages are 
still abundantly present (inciting us to become beautiful, healthy, fit, athletic, 
etc. by following a certain diets or fitness programs for instance). Monotheistic 
religions such as Judaism, Islam and Protestantism, however, are iconoclastic, 
relying on the Word (the Quran and the Bible) rather than on exemplary imag-
es. Monotheistic religions address their adepts via commandments and other 
normative, apodictic formula, while Catholicism can be seen as an intermedi-
ate form, a compromise between the imaginary and the symbolic. According 
to Hegel, Islam represents the most radical effort to abolish the imaginary and 
realise symbolic sublimity (Hegel 1970).
Modern science, however, is now reframing the normative dimension, by 
relying on high-tech forms of symbolisation, with the help of personality tests, 
IQ tests, BMI indicators, blood sample readings and so on. The idea that, in 
the near future, health science will increasingly address individuals in terms of 
personalised and digitalised data. Health gadgets will inform us whether our 
personal physiological performance (our body language, as recorded by smart 
wearable gadgets) concurs with societal expectations of normalcy: the molec-
ularised version of the super-ego (Zwart 2016). As a result, human populations 
will increasingly be governed in an algorithmic manner, with the help of health 
data: algorithmic governance as the final stage of biopower (Rouvroy & Stiegler 
2016). Although human existence continues to be bi-textual, this bi-textuality 
is being radically reframed, namely as the tension between molecular messag-
es coming from the body (transmitted by iPhones, smart watches and so on) 
and the standards of normalcy of the terabyte age, based on big scientific data 
collected by millions of citizens (Zwart 2016). Thus, the language of the Other 
(which gave rise to moral and spiritual experiences in the past) gives way to a 
secularised susceptibility to a different type of text: the super-ego of secular-
ised culture urging us to become entrepreneurs of our health data and respon-
sible managers of our personal health.
Conclusion
Human existence, we may conclude, is a dialectical interplay between two 
types of texts, biomolecular and socio-cultural ones. To deepen our under-
standing of this dialectics, a consistent dialogue between contemporary sci-
ence (genomics and post-genomics) and the humanities (including religious 
studies) is indicated. This requires a shift of focus from ethical issues in the 
applied sense of the term towards the broader cultural ambiance of the sci-
ence-society debate, for instance by reflecting on the impact of genomics on 
human self-understanding. If such a dialogue would focus solely on applied 
ethics deliberations, we may easily fall into the trap of seeing science as liberat-
ing and progressive, while metaphysical and religious world-views are framed 
as conservative and restrictive. A focus on applied ethics, moreover, may entail 
a plea for strategies of avoidance and compartmentalisation, delisting meta-
physical, spiritual and religious issues from the agenda of the debate. I would 
rather advocate a strategy of retrieval: zooming out somewhat from frontstage 
bioethical quandaries towards the more fundamental backdrop issues. This al-
lows us to discern how the bi-textuality of human existence is currently under-
going a transition, now that not only the physiological, but also the normative 
dimension is being reframed in biomolecular and terabyte terms.
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chapter 8
Creation, Kinds and Destiny: A Christian View of 
Genome Editing
Trevor Stammers1
Men ought not to play God before they learn to be men,  
and after they have learned to be men they will not play God 
(Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control, 138)
The discovery of the double helix structure of DNA by Crick, Franklin and 
Watson in 1953 caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of the nature of 
both humankind and creation as a whole. Subsequently in 2003, the mapping 
of the human genome by Frances Collins and his colleagues and the ensuing 
development of techniques to alter it, raise fundamental questions about our 
destiny – whether we ourselves can and should shape it in a way previously 
outside our ability and known only to God. 
The Christian understanding of the Fall – the movement of humanity from 
an initial state of perfection or at least of being ‘very good’ (Genesis 1v 31) in 
God’s sight, to a state of obvious imperfection - has always raised questions of 
normalcy in relation to our current ‘fallen’ state compared to what was origi-
nally intended by the Creator. This paper explores Christian visions of the eth-
ical possibilities of genome editing using Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the 
nature of the material world and the effects of the Fall upon it as a model and 
continues with an exploration of wider implications of other elements of the 
creation account. 
It will be argued that, far from supporting the popular understanding of 
genetic determinism with its implications for the concepts of both free will 
and human responsibility, our greater knowledge of genomics weakens such 
a determinist view. The paper concludes with a consideration of the telos of 
humanity in relation to gene editing and an examination of the concept of the 
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genome as a ‘secular soul’ and the religious elements of the genomic editing 
quest. 
Origins: Creation and Fall 
Christianity has its roots inextricably embedded in the Old Testament. Jesus 
either quotes from or refers to it, dozens of times in the Gospel accounts. On 
one such occasion, when responding to a question about divorce (Matthew 
19:4-6, Mark 10:6-8), Christ quotes from the Genesis creation account to answer 
his critics. The creation narrative plays a key role in the New Testament and 
in Christian theology as a whole so I begin here with an overview of the 20th 
century theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s understanding of Creation and Fall 
in his 1937 work of that title, as an example of Christian understanding of the 
nature of the world which emerges from the Genesis accounts. 
Bonhoeffer on Creation 
Bonhoeffer, writing of course prior to the discovery of DNA but post-Darwin, 
highlights several important elements of Creation according to Genesis. First-
ly, God is distinct from his creation; the creation is not a fragment of God. He 
does not give birth to the universe but speaks it into being. He creates by his 
word alone. “God is never in the world in any way except in his absolute tran-
scendence of it” (Bonhoeffer 1937, 19). 
So God speaks creation into being and sees that every element of it is ‘good’ 
(Genesis 1v25) or ‘very good’ (Genesis 1v31). Now Bonhoeffer immediately 
stresses that this does not mean, “that the world is the best of all conceivable 
worlds. It means that the world lives completely in the presence of God, that 
it begins and ends in him and that he is Lord” (1937, 22). Furthermore that 
“which is created by the Word out of nothing, that which is called forth into 
being, remains sustained by the sight of God” (1937, 23). God does not wind up 
the universe like a clock and leave it to tick on of its own accord; rather as the 
New Testament has it, “he holds all creation together” (Colossians 1v17) and “he 
sustains all things by his powerful word” (Hebrews 1v3).
God also speaks life into being. – plants and vegetation, sea life, birds and 
land animals, all ‘according to their kind’ (Genesis 1v14). Even so, Bonhoeffer 
reminds us “It is not the Creator’s own nature which he here instils in the living 
and life-creating. The living and creative is not divine: it is and remains the 
creaturely” (1937, 34). However when it comes to the creation of humankind, 
there is another element involved. “Only in something that is itself free can 
the One who is free, the Creator, see himself” (1937, 34) comments Bonhoeffer. 
“If the Creator wills to create in his own image, he must create it in freedom; 
and only this image in freedom would fully praise him and fully proclaim the 
honour of its Creator” (1937, 34). 
So we read that God does indeed create humankind in his own image, male 
and female, from the dust of the earth. The human body is fashioned out of 
earth just as the earth gave rise to other animals but God breathes his life 
uniquely into this creature and man becomes ‘a living soul’ (Genesis 2v7). Hu-
mans alone are created in the ‘image of God’ - the imago dei. 
There are many contemporary theologians who attempt to play down the 
importance of the imago dei. “The actual meaning of ‘image of God’ has varied 
so much during Christian history that no clear, single reference emerges and it 
seems to mean what people want it to mean.” (Page 2003, 71) Much the same 
could be said however of the breadth of meaning of many other terms such as 
‘human dignity’ or ‘autonomy’ but it may well be this relates to the richness of 
meaning of these concepts rather than implying they have no meaning at all.
Bonhoeffer for example, singles out two prime elements of what it means to 
be ‘in the image of God’; firstly that it means to be free and in particular, free 
to worship the Creator and secondly that it is mankind who has the delegat-
ed authority of God to rule over creation in responsible way. “I belong to this 
world completely. It bears me, nourishes, and holds me. But my freedom from 
it consists in the fact that world to which I am bound …is subjected to me and 
that I am to rule over [it]” (Bonhoeffer 1937, 78). 
How does this very brief synopsis of Bonhoeffer’s view of the creation nar-
ratives tie in with our contemporary knowledge of genomics? Surprisingly well 
in my view. The account emphasizes firstly, that all living things, including hu-
man beings, are created out of the earth. The fact then that the Human Ge-
nome Project (HGP) has shown us that there is similarity between the DNA 
of all species is no challenge to belief in a Creator. For some people, howev-
er, genomic similarity appears problematic in this regard. “Perhaps this is an 
unwelcome challenge to our opinion of ourselves. As humans we have long 
regarded ourselves as the pinnacle of creation” (Seller 2003, 340). Perhaps so, 
but the Bible certainly does not encourage us to have too high an opinion of 
ourselves (Romans 12v3) and in any case it is our ability to commune with our 
Creator that makes us special and not our genome per se. It should therefore 
not be a concern to us that as a species we share 50% of our DNA with a ba-
nana and over 98% with a chimpanzee (O’Connell 2009). We came from the 
same clay after all. 
Secondly, our physical embodied form is affirmed along with the rest of cre-
ation as being very good. It is not a mistake that we have bodies just as other 
animals do but rather this is God’s intention. Therefore we are not to regard our 
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bodies as a prison from which to escape but as a ‘temple of God’ (I Corinthians 
3v16, 6v19), through which we are to live for his worship and praise. Our bodily 
well being is therefore important and we have good reason to use wisely our 
knowledge of what makes it healthy, including the new possibilities arising 
from genomics. 
Thirdly, however, the creation account gives clear indications that despite 
our material similarities with the rest of living things, we are different. Chris-
tians, along with those of other faiths which believe humanity has a special 
relationship to God being made in his image in a way like no other creature, 
have no option but to be ‘guilty’ of speciesism. Not because we believe other 
species should be treated in any way we like – there are many scriptural warn-
ings against inhumane treatment of animals (e.g. Deut 25v4; Proverbs 12v10; I 
Timothy 5v18) – but because we alone have the freedom to rule over and care 
for the rest of creation by virtue of being made in God’s image and receiving 
his delegated authority to do so (Genesis 1v26; 2v15). How this might be rightly 
exercised in regard to genomic editing can only however be considered after 
taking into account the reality of the Fall. 
Bonhoeffer on the Fall 
Though as we have seen, for Bonhoeffer a key element of being made in the im-
age of God is the reality of our human free will, we are not entirely free to do as 
we please. God also sets a limit on that freedom with a prohibition that Adam 
and Eve were to adhere to, in the form of a tree from which they were not to eat 
(Genesis 2v17). Adam “who is addressed as one who is free, is shown this limit, 
that is to say his creatureliness, and by this prohibition is his being confirmed 
in its kind” (Bonhoeffer 1937, 51). That is to say that Adam, though in the image 
of God, is not God; temptation comes to him in due course in the voice of the 
serpent instilling first doubt - “Has God said”, then denial - “you shall not die” 
and finally defiance- “God knows when you eat it your eyes will be opened and 
you will be as God” (Genesis 3v4).
Bonhoeffer sees the Fall as a rejection of contentment with the imago dei – 
being in the image of God- resulting in an attempt to be as or like God – sicut 
deus. Prof. Neil Messer puts it like this “The attempt to be ‘like God’…springs 
from a forgetfulness or denial of our creaturely limits, an assumption we can 
and may do anything we choose. The problem with projects done in this spirit 
is not so much the prospect of failure… as the price of success.” (Messer 2011, 
38-39). The price of success for Adam is the ultimate one, as Bonhoeffer ex-
plains: “It is true that man becomes sicut deus through the fall but this very 
sicut deus can live no longer; he is dead” (1937, 70-71). Alienated from God by 
disobedience, Adam reaps the bitter consequences of human shame (Genesis 
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3v7) and banishment from the presence of God (Genesis 3v23). Not only does 
mankind undergo spiritual death – separation from God, the earth too from 
which humanity was fashioned is also cursed (Genesis 3v17). “All other crea-
tures rise up against sicut deus man, the creature that tries to live out of his 
own self ….since they are subject to man, they fall with the Fall of man. Nature 
is without a lord and therefore it is itself rebellious and desperate” (Bonhoeffer 
1937, 87).
In the light of Bonhoeffer’s analysis, one of the ways in which we might at-
tempt to discern between the ethically permissible and impermissible in bio-
engineering projects, including genome editing, is to look at whether they are 
appropriate for us to undertake as creatures made in God’s image or whether 
they extend our attempts to usurp God’s place and to be like him. Making this 
distinction however is rarely easy but may be helped by exploring a number of 
other key debates in bioethics related to genome editing to which I now turn. 
Identity, Healing and Enhancement 
“It is a profound misunderstanding of the human condition to think we can 
optimise ourselves in such a way that all human suffering is abolished”, insists 
Prof Maureen Junker-Kenny (2003, 127). Most reflective healthcare profession-
als intuitively recognise this to be true. As a physician for over thirty years, I 
would reckon that around a half of the suffering I encountered in my patients 
in general practice was existential, rather than stemming from disease. The 
grief of parents whose son was murdered, the heartache of a mother whose 
son had not spoken to here for decades are just two specific examples of the 
two main general areas of suffering highlighted by Junker-Kenny (2003, 126), - 
firstly the consciousness of human finitude, the awareness that we will die and 
secondly the heartache of unrequited recognition by others which can never 
be eased by ourselves but only in the response of others to us, which we can-
not control no matter how ‘perfect’ our genome ‘is. It is not good to be alone’ 
(Genesis 2v18) is the first thing in the creation account that God declared was 
not good. Our relationships with others remain a fundamental human need in 
spite of all our technological advances.
The Medical Model of Health 
Though questions about how we define health, disease and normalcy have 
long been a source of debate, the advent of genome editing has undoubtedly 
given them a new urgency. The medical model, championed amongst others 
by Boorse, seeks to confine such definitions within supposed objective sci-
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entific parameters. Disease is a state that “interferes with the performance of 
some natural function…characteristic of the organism’s age” and becomes an 
“illness only if it is serious enough to be incapacitating” (Boorse 1976, 61). 
This model of understanding of health is the one within which gene editing 
has already achieved early success which is likely to accelerate. However Prof. 
Richard Hare has raised several problems posed by the medical model. Firstly 
he suggests that our intuitive understanding of disease and illness is that they 
are bad for us to have. Boorse therefore has to rely on a “the rather wobbly 
notion of natural function” (Hare 1986, 178) in order to avoid the intrinsic eval-
uative element of ‘badness’ we all have. 
Once Hare’s evaluative element is allowed however, two other important 
variables arise:
1)  who is making the evaluation? An adult with Down’s syndrome for ex-
ample, may view Down’s in a very different light from the clinical geneticist 
advising a couple at high risk of the condition in their children
2)  on what grounds are they making it? An autistic adult may find the 
condition per se distressing or they may not consider autism ‘bad’ for them 
but rather the social difficulties associated with it. 
These questions are already important in the light of genetic screening but 
they will become even more so should genomic editing advance as predict-
ed. Eliminating ‘abnormality’ is already a reality (which will accelerate further 
with increasingly efficient means of detection of Down’s) but it is debatable as 
to whether this has made or will make for a healthier society. 
Views of Creation: Augustine and Wyatt 
If the medical model of health provides too narrow an understanding of dis-
ease, the well-known World Health Organisation definition of “Health is a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity” (World Health Organisation 1948) arguably offers far 
too wide a concept of health. 
Eliding health and well being in this way leads to the expectation that social 
disorder can also be eliminated through medical means. As Messer has point-
ed out in relation to genome editing, “this understanding would eliminate the 
distinction between genetic therapy and enhancement and would encourage 
us to use genetic manipulation…to address any kind of social ill” (2003, 102). 
Furthermore this would necessitate labelling social dissidents as “sick” and co-
ercion rather than compassion might become the response to sickness as a 
whole – a ‘tyranny of health’ to use Callahan’s striking phrase (1973, 77)
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Even so the distinction between therapy and enhancement is not easy to 
draw. Varying Christian attempts to do so originate from different interpreta-
tions of the creation and fall narratives throughout church history. Augustine 
of Hippo (AD 354-430) in his City of God explicates the fall as entailing the ruin 
of all humanity (as the offspring of Adam) from a state of perfection by Ad-
am’s sin of disobedience. Augustine draws not only on the Genesis account but 
also St Paul’s exposition of it in his letter to the Romans (Chap 5v12-20). This 
Augustinian schema underpins Prof John Wyatt’s analogies of the restored 
masterpiece and the Lego kit, to attempt to differentiate medical therapy from 
enhancement. 
According to Wyatt, “Our bodies do not come to us value free. They are in-
stead wonderful, original artistic masterpieces which reflect the meticulous 
design and order imposed by a Creator’s will and purpose” (2009, 98). This 
original masterpiece has however become defaced and flawed by the effects 
of the fall and Wyatt contends that the task of medicine from a biblical an-
thropological perspective is to renew the body back to the Creator’s original 
intentions, just as an art restorer does in her work on a painting. This is what 
therapy entails. It does not preclude the use of innovative technology but the 
purpose is always to restore to the original. 
Wyatt contrasts to this what he dubs the Lego kit view of humanity, which is 
very different. “There is no right or wrong way to put the pieces together. There 
is no masterplan from the designer. There is no ethical basis of Lego construc-
tion. You can do what you like. In fact, as the advert says ‘The only limit is your 
imagination’” (2009, 35). Furthermore, since there is no natural order within 
a random, mechanistic view of humanity, the difference between natural and 
enhanced becomes obliterated completely. 
Views of Creation: Irenaeus and Cole-Turner
The flawed masterpiece half of Wyatt’s analogy depends on the Augustinian 
view of the state of original perfection. A different view from Augustine’s how-
ever was taken by an earlier Christian theologian, Irenaeus (130-202 AD). Both 
Augustine and Ireneaus considered that mankind fell and is hence in need of 
redemption. However the Irenaean view on creation is that it is still a work in 
progress. The first stage of creation – that of being ‘in the image of God’ is com-
plete. However in this stage humanity is not mature. For Irenaeus, the com-
mand to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ (Genesis 1v28) implies future growth and 
development, as he explains in Against Heresies (4.11.1). He thus understands 
the description of Adam and Eve as ‘naked and unashamed’ (Genesis 2v25) 
to refer not to complete unawareness of shame in a sinless state but rather to 
their prepubescence. Hence according to Ireneus (Against Heresies 4.11.1 and 
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4.38), God made Adam good but immature so the second stage of creation 
requires us to grow into the likeness of God by exercising our free will, which 
includes the possibility of choosing evil. 
Thus for Irenaeus, God’s declaration of his creation as ‘very good’ did not 
mean the world was free from pain and suffering but that it was perfectly suit-
ed to God’s purpose of developing us into his likeness. Ironically the very thing 
that constitutes the essence of sin in Bonhoeffer’s view – mankind seeking 
to be like God – becomes the very purpose of God for mankind in Irenaean 
thought. For Irenaeus, “Adam and Eve could not have been morally and spir-
itually mature because it is in the very nature of such maturity that it cannot 
happen apart from over the course of a lifetime of moral choices and experi-
ences” (Schneider 2012: 165).
It is this model of the Irenaean Adam that has proven very attractive to 
many contemporary theologians as a path to reconciling the Genesis accounts 
not only with Darwinian evolution but also with more modern evolutionary 
theories derived from the mapping of the human genome such as that, for ex-
ample of a group of scientists who, from comparing mitochondrial DNA of 
many races, conjectured that all humans are descended from one female living 
in Africa about 240,000 years ago and appropriately called “Eve” (Cann et al. 
1987). But aside from its possible implications concerning human origins, the 
Irenaean account also leads to a very different moral viewpoint from that of 
Wyatt on the scope of genetic engineering. Such a view is exemplified in the 
work of Prof Ronald Cole-Turner.
Cole-Turner sees gene editing and synthetic biology having a naturally le-
gitimate role for mankind as partners with God in co-creating our own de-
velopment. “At the very least, the question of the human creature as creator 
(or ‘co-creator’ as some have suggested) who contributes to the divine work 
of creation through new technology remains an open question, more urgent 
than ever. Some people of religious conviction see science as a new source of 
theology and technology as a new avenue of service in the grand work of cre-
ation” (Cole-Turner 2009, 198). That Cole-Turner himself may well be one of 
those ‘people’ he refers to, appears likely from his stating elsewhere that “we 
humans do play something of a cooperative role in the creative process and… 
we should intend to do so”, though he does immediately add “Before we can 
dignify this role with the label of ‘co-creation’, however, we need to have a clear 
idea of what the creator intends for the creation” (1987, 345). 
He goes on to quote approvingly Prof Arthur Peacocke, a scientist and Chris-
tian apologist who suggests that we are “co-explorers” with God. Cole-Turner 
then suggests, “We might be that part of creation through whom God works to 
explore new possibilities as yet unknown to God ” (1987, 348). In his enthusiasm 
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to give an apparently unshackled theological mandate for scientific advance, 
he does not even seem to consider the possibility that a God who doesn’t know 
something that his creatures know, might not be God at all.
To be fair to Cole-Turner however, he does clearly acknowledge in a more 
pastorally-oriented reflection, that the hubris of unbridled confidence in sci-
entific progress is not without its dangers. His point is not that we merely “ex-
aggerate these technologies’ powers or the speed of their development, but 
that by exaggerating them we distort the limited but legitimate value of the 
technologies. They become a dangerous obsession under which our anxieties 
flourish. Thinking we are on track for a technology that can control life, we run 
the risk of losing whatever small capacity we have to live at peace with our 
uncontrolled imperfections, with illness and disability” (Cole-Turner 2002, 44).
It is indeed a difficult path to tread between on the one hand realising the 
hope of healing of disease resulting from the ethical application of new ge-
nome editing technologies and on the other hand, falling into the danger of 
thinking that we can become masters of our own destiny entirely without God 
Genes Are Us?
Christian theology in common with many other world faiths, contends that 
we are more than the sum of our constituent parts, including our DNA base 
pairs. However it is not perhaps surprising that by contrast, scientists have of-
ten given the impression that we are determined by our genes in a very mech-
anistic way. Francis Crick and James Watson, the discoverers of DNA structure, 
themselves subscribe to this view. Crick dubbed it The Astonishing Hypothesis 
– “that “You”, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, 
your sense of identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of 
a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (Crick 1994,3 
italics mine). 
As we have seen, thought differing in significant ways, both the Augustinian 
and Irenaean views of the Fall agree it involves the exercise of free will. The ad-
vent of genetic determinism is not the first challenge to the reality of free will 
that science has presented however and the type of ‘knight’s move’ involved 
in every case is exemplified in Crick’s use in the quote above of the phrase ‘no 
more than’. Certainly the ‘nerve cells and their associated molecules’ including 
those in DNA are necessary, but are they sufficient for all that Crick attributes 
to them, such as our ambitions? 
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Cybernetic Determinism 
The ‘smoke and mirrors’ intrinsic to Crick’s approach is magnificently exposed 
in another context by Hans Jonas’ in his 1966 essay on ‘Cybernetics and human 
purpose’. Norbert Weiner first defined cybernetics in its modern sense in 1948 
as “the science of communication and control in the animal and the machine” 
(Weiner 1948, 6); he proposed, “Society can only be understood through a study 
of the messages and communication facilities which belong to it” (Weiner 
1950). Jonas seeks to demonstrate that the claim of cyberneticists that purpose 
and teleology can be evolved from mechanical premises alone is “spurious and 
mainly verbal” (1966, 111). He does so by arguing that the cyberneticists mistake 
‘carrying out a purpose’ for ‘having a purpose’. Machines may (and do) carry 
out purposes but the purposes they carry out are human purposes. 
At the conclusion of his detailed argument, Jonas turns to biology. He sug-
gests that though at a superficial level, the sensory-motor pattern of behaviour 
in animals does resemble a feedback loop in a machine, it is in fact entirely dif-
ferent because living beings are creatures of need. “This basic self-concern of 
all life, in which necessity and will are bound together, manifests itself on the 
level of animality as appetite, fear and all the rest of the emotions. The pang 
of hunger, the passion of the chase, the fury of combat, the anguish of flight, 
the lure of love – these and not the data transmitted by the receptors…make 
behaviour purposive” (Jonas 1966, 126).
To have purpose, a goal, a telos requires more than mere input and output. 
Jonas’ conclusion is still strikingly relevant today in an age of genomic reduc-
tionism – “According to cybernetics, society is a communication network for 
transmitting, exchanging and pooling of information and it is this that holds 
it together. No emptier notion of society has ever been propounded. Nothing 
is said on what the information is about and why it should be relevant to have 
it” (Jonas 1966: 126).
Genetic Determinism 
A similar problem occurs in relation to the reductionist view of the transmit-
ting, exchanging and pooling of genetic information. It is fascinating to read in 
literature published before the mapping of human genome, how the concept 
of the gene defined as ‘a unit of heredity containing the information for one 
protein’ became known as the central dogma of molecular biology (Suzuki and 
Knudtson 1989, 52). At a CIBA symposium in 1989, one senior scientist working 
on genome mapping stated that “Genetics investigates the plan of the organ-
ism. The plan is embodied in the collection of genes that is handed down in 
the germ line to specify the construction of the organism ….The manifesto – if 
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not the programme - of molecular genetics must remain the computation of 
organisms from their DNA sequences” (Cited in Jockemsen 1997, 77).
With this kind of outlook, it is easy to see how genetic determinism as ex-
pressed by Crick above can take root. But even prior to human genome map-
ping, there was evidence that the relationship of the structure of a particular 
protein and the structure of a particular organ, let alone an entire organism, 
is not a direct one (Tauber and Sarkar 1992). Jockemsen points out two other 
epistemological problems of the genetic determinist view of a direct causal 
relation between gene and trait. Firstly this view elides two very different types 
of knowledge – the molecular biological knowledge with the knowledge in-
volved in recognition and judgement of clinical diagnosis. He makes the im-
portant point that observation of the correlation between gene defects and 
clinical diagnostic features does not prove genes are causally related to traits. 
“It only proves that gene defects can disturb the development of the organism. 
The gene or gene defect acquires meaning only in the context of the existence 
and functioning of the entire organism. In other words, the observation that 
concrete genetic information is a necessary precondition does not make that 
information a sufficient precondition for a ‘normal’ development.” (Jockemsen 
1997, 79). Secondly, if the DNA sequence contains a message, this presuppos-
es a meaning in the message which cannot be generated by the mechanism 
which translates it. Furthermore the DNA has not generated the translation 
mechanism since in order to be expressed it needs that mechanism. The genet-
ic message itself “needs an explanation – both a final and causal one” (Jockem-
sen 1997:79) and for people of the Abrahamic faiths, that final cause is God. 
If this were not enough in itself, new developments have given rise for even 
more reasons to be cautious about genetic determinism. Before the HGP, it 
was thought that there were around 80 000 coding genes for proteins. When 
the actual number turned out to be around 25 000, the rest of the DNA was 
initially written off as redundant and labelled as ‘junk’ (Parrington 2016, 72). 
However, the publication in 2012 of the Encyclopaedia of DNA Elements (EN-
CODE) project soon changed that. ENCODE (2012) demonstrated that 80% of 
the DNA has newly recognised biochemical functions (Parrington 2016, 91), 
many of which of are carried out non-coding RNAs (ncRNAs) which are in-
volved in regulation of protein coding genes by either facilitating or down-reg-
ulating their expression. There is also evidence that these ncRNAs and their 
effects are influenced by environmental factors including smoking (Hou et al 
2011). So with both a) the vast majority of the DNA not coding for proteins and 
b) environmental factors influencing the ncRNAs’ control of protein- coding, 
the central dogma of molecular biology looks less and less central than it did. 
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This is even without taking into account epigenetic effects. The term epi-
genetics has had various definitions. Perhaps the simplest to understand is “the 
study of mitotically and/or meiotically heritable changes in gene function that 
cannot be explained by changes in DNA sequence” (Riggs and Porter 1996, 29). 
However this definition has recently been refined in both more positive and 
comprehensive terms defining epigenetic events as “the structural adaptation 
of chromosomal regions so as to register, signal or perpetuate altered activity 
states” (Bird 2007, 398).
The key point to grasp is that changes to the DNA other than the widely 
known mutations of DNA sequencing, can influence changes in the organism, 
some of which are inheritable. These changes may entail small molecules be-
ing added to or removed from both the DNA itself and/or the histone com-
plexes, around which the nucleic acid sequences are spiraled. Environmental 
factors can also affect these epigenetic changes. 
Finally even for those genes that do code for a single protein, recent findings 
have shown that the protein is not all there is to the expression of that gene. 
The gene for enzyme monoamine oxidase A (MAOIA) provides perhaps the 
best-known example. This enzyme inactivates neurotransmitters such as se-
rotonin, which therefore accumulate when the gene for MAOA is defective. A 
Dutch study (Brunner et al 1993) of a family in which male members exhibited 
aggressive behaviour showed that using DNA mapping that the gene for MAOA 
had mutated and the resulting enzyme was ineffective so neurotransmitter 
levels were much higher than normal in these men. Women were unaffected 
because the gene is sex linked. However another study (Caspi et al 2002) exam-
ined another gene variant known as MOAO-L that produces a low functioning 
rather than non-functioning enzyme variant. Caspi’s team followed up abused 
children over many years and found that presence of MOAO-L alone was not 
associated with high levels of aggression over 25 years, unless the children had 
been subject to maltreatment themselves. In contrast, those children with 
a normal MOAO gene appeared more resistant to developing aggressive be-
haviour even if they were subject to childhood abuse. In short, MOAO research 
to date suggests that the idea of mutation leading inexorably to phenotypic 
change is rarely, if ever, all there is to human behaviour. 
Where does this then leave us theologically in relation to our human re-
sponsibility before God? It surely confirms that though our genes do influence 
everything about us, they do not determine everything we do. Our environ-
ment and our human wills also have a large part to play in what we do with our 
lives. “Our whole being is influenced by our genes. But not everything about 
us is explained by our genes. Environment and personal responsibility play 
a role. Theology has a stake in maintaining that the role played by personal 
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responsibility is genuine and significant. It is not epiphenomenal or illusory” 
(Cole-Turner 1992, 170)
The Secular Soul and Two Types of Telos
What is illusory is to place all our hopes in our genes “fueling the expectation 
that the last word about the human genome will be last word about human 
nature” (Mauron 2001). In an article critiquing the popular rise of the concept 
of the genome as the ‘secular soul’, Prof Alex Mauron writes, “the notion that 
our genome is synonymous with our humanness is gaining strength. This view 
is a kind of “genomic metaphysics”: the genome is viewed as the core of our 
nature, determining both our individuality and our species identity. According 
to this view, the genome is seen as the true essence of human nature, with ex-
ternal influences considered as accidental event” (Mauron 2001).
His article surely raises the question of whether the concept of the soul as 
a metaphor for the genome might also indicate the religious element of the 
quest to map and explore it. Demonstrating the inadequacies of genetic reduc-
tionism does not go far enough in a critique of it in that it does not consider the 
reasons why this reductionism has gained such a hold. Its historical roots may 
go back to the seventeenth century when earlier ideas of human knowledge 
as largely passive and received by illumination or rumination, began to wane. 
What is now termed a constructionist epistemology then began to emerge 
where knowledge is constructed by measurement of and experimentation 
with the world. In his seminal work on this paradigm shift, Funkenstein com-
ments, “applying knowledge-through-construction to the whole world was as 
inevitable as it was dangerous. It was dangerous because it makes mankind 
to be ‘like God knowing good and evil’ ” (1986, 290), - echoing the language of 
ancient Augustinian Fall. 
Prof Robert Song powerfully points out that the Human Genome Project is a 
game-changer in the search for eliminating human suffering. At the same time 
as it provides knowledge of how the body is constructed, it also shows how it 
might be reconstructed. He suggests the HGP has become “ a surrogate form of 
salvation, ….. It develops, for example, a doctrine of creation, which conceives 
nature as a raw material available for technological manipulation, while its an-
thropology defines human beings in terms of self-defining freedom above the 
contingencies of bodily life. It espouses eschatological hope, which lies in the 
dream of escape from finitude and locates the means of salvation to that end 
in the application of technical reason…” (Song 2003, 178-79).
Divergent Paths of Purpose 
Whilst of course there are some overlaps of this alternative secular creation 
narrative with a Christian understanding of human stewardship and author-
ity over the rest of nature, it is the means of reaching its telos or end purpose 
which makes the secular vision very different from the Christian vision re-
vealed in scripture and indeed I would suggest sets the two completely at odds 
with other. 
In an illuminating paper on how human potential relates to genetics and 
Christian theology, Lysaught makes reference to the seventeenth century para-
digm shift considered above, in pointing out that that post-Enlightenment hu-
manistic progress and Christian theology are both teleological and the intend-
ed goal in both is towards a future of wholeness and completion. However “in 
the narrative of genetic potential, the future utopia is achieved by the temporal 
eradication of human imperfection. In the scriptural vision—instantiated in 
Eden, the promised land, occasionally in Jerusalem, the kingdom of God, the 
heavenly banquet, and the new creation—communal human flourishing is 
achieved simply when individuals and communities choose to dwell with God. 
They might still be fat, not very smart, short, slow runners, or manifest myri-
ad other flaws, but when persons in Scripture choose to acknowledge God’s 
power and to live as God’s people, perfection, wholeness, goodness (holiness, 
righteousness, and justice) come to be. The definition of human perfection in 
Scripture is not perfection of mind or body but rather: being in relationship 
with God” (Lysaught 2011, 235).
Moreover, contrary to popular and persistent myths about Christianity, it 
is not the perfect whom Christ calls to be his people but rather those who ac-
knowledge their sickness (Matthew 9v12; Mark 2v17; Luke 5v31). “God chose the 
foolish things of the world to shame the wise; God chose the weak things of the 
world to shame the strong. God chose the lowly things of this world and the 
despised things—and the things that are not—to nullify the things that are” (I 
Corinthians 1 v27-28). 
Conclusions 
In deciding if various aspects of genome editing are ethical from a Christian 
perspective, there are many factors to consider. Does it increase the ability to 
view life as a gift to be received with thanks or a commodity to be grasped as 
a right? Does it acknowledge human nature as something to be restored to 
wholeness or something to be transcended by enhancement? Does it recog-
nise the limitations of its likelihood of success in changing phenotype predict-
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ably as it discovers the increasing importance of environmental factors and the 
complexity of epigenetic mechanisms? What is the telos of the genome editing 
project and perhaps most crucially of all does it reflect wise stewardship and 
care for the world as creatures made in the image of God or does it seek to en-
able us to become as God in recreating ourselves into something else? 
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chapter 9
Living with the Genome, by Angus Clark and Flo 
Ticehurst, within the Muslim Context
Ayman Shabana1 
Modern genetics has ushered a new phase in human history and revolution-
ized human understanding of how living organisms are constituted and how 
they function. More particularly, it has revealed the processes associated with 
the transmission of inheritable features and characteristics to subsequent 
generations. The new knowledge that it generates brings promises of unprec-
edented preventive as well as therapeutic possibilities, especially as far as in-
herited diseases are concerned. These unprecedented possibilities are by no 
means limited to the fields of health care and life sciences as they touch many 
other aspects of our lives. However, as much as this genetic revolution has giv-
en rise to new exciting possibilities, it has also raised important ethical ques-
tions pertaining to the production and application of genetic knowledge. It is 
within this context of the double-edged nature of modern genetics that Living 
with the Genome: Ethical and Social Aspects of Human Genetics has to be placed. 
Although published in 2006, the book still provides a useful introduction to 
the range of ethical, legal, and social implications of modern genetic research 
and technology. It comprises 42 articles on a wide range of topics, which are 
drawn from the Encyclopedia of the Human Genome (one of the co-editors of 
the book, Angus Clarke, was also the editor of the “Ethics and Society” sec-
tion of this reference work). The book is intended to enhance the readership 
of these topics by making these articles available to a wider audience beyond 
specialists in human genetics.
In terms of its basic subject matter, genetics aims to study how living or-
ganisms both change and maintain their basic characteristics over time. This 
1 Associate Research Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qa-
tar (SFS-Q), as2432@georgetown.edu. This publication was made possible by NPRP grant # 
NPRP8-1478-6-053 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). 
The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the author.
© Ayman Shabana, 2019
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the prevailing CC-BY-NC License at 
the time of publication.
| doi:�0.��63/978900439��37_0��
242 Shabana
study is undertaken at three distinct levels: life of the cell, life of an individual 
organism, and history of the population of a particular species. Genome stands 
for the entire set of genes (of an individual organism or of an entire popula-
tion) and genomics refers to the study of genes in this collective sense. Modern 
genetics traces its roots to important discoveries during the 19th century (Men-
del’s attribution of inheritance to certain particles, discovery of chromosomes, 
development of statistics and its application to hereditary processes, and 
Darwin’s theory of evolution), which inspired further developments during 
the 20th century (identification of DNA as the chemical basis of heredity and 
development of molecular biology). The past few decades have witnessed in-
creased interest in the deployment of genetics in medical research and prac-
tice with the hope of identifying genes associated with particular diseases and 
developing effective ways not only to treat but also to prevent the occurrence 
of such diseases at the individual and collective (population) levels. Genetics 
is also used in the development of new drugs as well as their administration 
for certain diseases or even tailoring them for individual patients. Use of ge-
netic examination in health care and medical practice is already replacing tra-
ditional physiological and biochemical methods and is expected to increase 
even further in the future. Important examples include confirmation of the 
diagnosis of certain diseases in individual patients and screening for certain 
disorders within particular groups or populations. Yet, as noted above, despite 
these remarkable therapeutic potentials of modern genetics, it raises a host of 
ethical, legal, and social concerns pertaining to proper use as well as implica-
tions of genetic information. The articles selected for inclusion in this volume 
explore these concerns with varying degrees of length and depth. They are 
divided into six main parts (prefaced by general editorial introductions): The 
Human Genome Project: Genetic Research and Commercialization; Genet-
ic Disease: Implications for Individuals, families and Populations; Disability, 
Genetics and Eugenics; Genetics and Society: Information, Interpretation and 
Representation; Genetic Explanations: Understanding Origins and Outcomes; 
and Reproduction, Cloning and the Future. 
The richly diverse collection of contributions that Living with the Genome 
contains offers only a glimpse of the range of concerns that biomedical tech-
nology has engendered. With the extremely fast pace of technical advances in 
this field, new discoveries or inventions spark new questions and launch new 
debates to examine their (bio)ethical implications. Still, this book remains a 
useful starting point as it captures some of the most important issues that re-
main as relevant now as they were when the book was published more than a 
decade ago. The main limitation of the book, however, is its limited scope of 
coverage as it focuses almost exclusively on the Western geographic as well as 
intellectual context, with very few exceptions (e.g. chapter on the Maternal 
and Infant Health Care Law in China, 147; brief references to discriminatory 
sex selection practices in India, 293; and Muslim ban on gamete donation, 
276). This is somehow understandable because these discussions coincided 
with the rise of the early waves of genetic and reproductive technology in the 
West, particularly in the second half of the 20th century. But, considering the 
increasingly globalized nature of our world and the global influence of West-
ern medicine, experts and practitioners worldwide are also joining these bio-
ethical discussions. At the practical level, the availability of the latest applica-
tions of biomedical technology, especially to those who can afford it regardless 
where they happen to live, has also stirred similar debates over important 
bioethical concerns. The book, therefore, calls for comparative analysis of 
the various ethical, legal, and social issues that it highlights in order to reflect 
the diversity and richness of particular societies, cultures, and religious tradi-
tions. Such comparative analysis would also highlight important parallels and 
similarities in various social and cultural contexts. One interesting example 
that the book discusses is the case of the deCODE project in Iceland (56-63), 
which can provide important lessons for countries, especially those with small 
populations. The case highlights the critical role that regulators should play in 
ensuring compliance to ethical standards and proper conduct of genetic re-
search. Another example is the successful use of genetic screening (premarital 
and prenatal) in Cyprus for inherited hemoglobin diseases (114-121). 
Within the Muslim context, bioethical debates can be traced to two main 
factors: globalization of the medical curriculum (including bioethics), and the 
arrival of various applications of biomedical technology. Bioethical delibera-
tions in the Muslim world, however, have drawn heavily on the Islamic nor-
mative tradition, particularly on the Islamic legal tradition. Researchers often 
point out that bioethical discourses in the Muslim world are dominated by the 
Islamic legal discourse, which is evident in the increasing volume of legal opin-
ions (fatwas) on almost each of the issues addressed in this book. One of the 
main problems with these disparate fatwas is lack of a consist methodology 
for the examination of bioethical issues. The past few decades have witnessed 
serious efforts on the part of jurists and medical experts to provide systematic 
examination of bioethical issues with the goal of developing guidelines that 
should inform professional practice as well as national policies and legislation. 
These collaborative efforts have been facilitated by a number of national and 
transnational institutions as well as a number of academic and research cen-
ters. Although, for the most part, the development of a comprehensive Islamic 
bioethical framework remains work in progress and the general state of bio-
ethics differs from one national context to another, empirical research shows 
243Clark and Ticehurst within the Muslim Context
244 Shabana
that in order for any treatment of bioethical issues to be taken seriously, it has 
to engage this evolving body of Islamic normative literature. The bulk of this 
literature revolves, for the most part, around some key documents in the form 
of resolutions, decisions, or institutional fatwas, particularly ones that are is-
sued by prominent national as well as transnational institutions. Below I give a 
summary of the main parts of this book together with brief comments in light 
of this Islamic normative literature. 
The first part comprises eight articles offering a historical account of the 
Human Genome Project (HGP) with a particular focus on the debate over the 
commercialization of genetic information, which was one of the driving forces 
behind this project until its successful completion in 2003 (two and half years 
prior to the scheduled deadline in 2005). This debate was fueled by two com-
peting visions for the project. The first was championed by the private sector, 
as represented by Celera Corporation, and the second was represented by an 
international consortium consisting of major public and state-sponsored re-
search entities. While the first advocated patenting and monopolizing genome 
sequencing data as new inventions, the second insisted that genomic data 
should remain freely available as a non-commercial shared human resource 
for further research and development. Other contributions in this section pro-
vide various perspectives on the rationale, objectives, and implications of the 
HGP, which overall are not quite sanguine. Contrary to the usual hype empha-
sizing the miraculous achievements of genetic technology these contributions 
identify and highlight significant issues that tend to be glossed over due to 
the usual and unquestionable embracement of technology and its equation 
with progress. Chief concerns that run through these contributions include: 
commodification of genetic data, ownership and subsequent use of genetic 
material, distinction between a novel invention and mere discovery of nature; 
implications of the control of the human gene pool for future generations; ob-
taining informed consent in genetic research; and exaggerated expectations 
of/for gene therapy. At the global level these concerns reflect larger tensions 
between multinational capitalist interests on the one hand and rights of in-
digenous people and their claim over native resources on the other. In general, 
these concerns are also echoed in normative Islamic pronouncements. While 
these pronouncements praise the remarkable potentials of genomic research, 
they urge careful evaluation of any procedure involving intervention in, or ma-
nipulation of, the human genome. They also warn against any commercial ex-
ploitation or monopolization of genetic materials. These reserved sentiments 
are reiterated in several documents such as: the recommendations of a semi-
nar organized by the Kuwait-based Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences 
(IOMS) in 1998 under the theme of “Genetics, Genetic Engineering, Human 
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Genome, and Genetic Therapy: An Islamic Perspective,” the resolution of the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), affiliated with the Muslim World League in its 
16th session that was held in Mecca in 2002, and the resolution of the Interna-
tional Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA), affiliated with the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation in its 21st session that was held in Riyadh in 2013. 
The second part of the book includes seven articles covering a number 
of ethical concerns associated with genetic counseling. The process aims to 
enhance understanding of a genetic condition and to explore possibilities to 
avoid or cope with such a condition. It is often pursued for either health risk or 
reproductive purposes. Although it focuses primarily on scientific explanation 
of a particular genetic condition, it may also address religious and metaphys-
ical questions that patients and their families feel they must address. This is 
particularly important in multi-religious or multi-cultural contexts reflecting 
various meanings for universal experiences of illness and suffering. Consid-
ering the large scope of Islamic ethical-legal regulations, which cover various 
aspects of a person’s life, including matters of health and illness, genetic coun-
seling acquires added significance within the Muslim context. Practitioners 
need to develop familiarity with distinctive religious and cultural features that 
may create potential tension with mainstream (Western) bioethical standards. 
For example, genetic counseling is guided by three main ethical principles: 
autonomy of the individual or couple, right to full information, and utmost 
level of confidentiality (p. 115). Several studies, however, point out significant 
difficulties in the implementation of autonomy in non-Western contexts, in-
cluding Muslim ones. For example, these studies show that Western empha-
sis on individual freedom might not be compatible with certain religious and 
cultural norms placing more emphasis on communitarian ethics. Moreover, 
such emphasis on autonomy may clash with particular attitudes concerning 
controversial issues such as abortion, euthanasia, or cremation. 
One of the unique consequences of genetic testing has been increasing 
public awareness of genetic risk for, or susceptibility to, particular health con-
ditions not only for the individual undertaking the test but also for close fam-
ily members. This, in turn, raises important questions on whether/how infor-
mation concerning risk for others could be communicated. Research shows 
that the perception of susceptibility to genetic diseases is dynamic and varies 
according to several factors such as family history, gender, age, or economic 
standards. Some studies even question the utility of genetic testing for cer-
tain conditions, especially when positive results may lead to a fatalistic atti-
tude of resignation rather than proactive behavioral changes (p. 105). Medical 
practitioners, therefore, should be sensitive to the religious conceptualization 
of illness as a means for spiritual refinement. In Islam, for example, illness is 
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seen as an opportunity for personal growth and also a way to gain reward in 
the hereafter. Delivery of effective genetic counseling would, therefore, require 
careful attention to contextual factors such as cultural background and reli-
gious attitudes towards certain medical conditions or procedures. 
The third part consists of five articles discussing the relationship between 
disability and genetics. Each of these contributions addresses the issue from 
a particular perspective ranging from a historical investigation of problemat-
ic precedents, lingering traces of these precedents in contemporary practices, 
distinction between Western and non-Western outlooks on this issue, percep-
tion and implications from a human rights perspective, and examination of 
particular disability groups. Historical accounts of the contentious relationship 
between disability and genetics often start with the indelible eugenic practices 
during the 20th century in Europe and the United States ranging from positive 
eugenics to enforced sterilization and even euthanasia. Some of the import-
ant traces of eugenics in contemporary research revolve around exploration 
of genetic explanation for criminal behavior as well as genetic screening espe-
cially in regions witnessing higher rates of genetic diseases due to inbreeding 
or lower rates of migration, where genes causing diseases tend to cluster over 
time. Within the Muslim context, the issue of consanguineous marriage has 
stirred extensive debates. Scriptural sources delineate certain prohibited de-
grees within close family relationships, which define the boundaries of incest. 
No categorical prohibition, however, is indicated beyond these prohibited de-
grees. Although it is generally discouraged, actual practice has always varied 
from one region to another depending on dominant cultural norms. The past 
few decades witnessed extensive efforts throughout Muslim-majority coun-
tries, with the help of international organizations, to raise public awareness 
about the significant genetic risks that consanguineous marriage involves, es-
pecially in places where it is commonly practiced. On the other hand, traces 
of positive eugenics could be found in the creation of sperm and ova banks, 
particularly ones obtained from individuals possessing desirable physical and 
cognitive traits (p. 144-145). Several Muslim countries have already established 
biobanks not only to encourage organ donation but also to facilitate the pro-
curement of tissue samples for scientific research. A significant portion of Is-
lamic bioethical discourses is dedicated to the elucidation of proper guidelines 
that should govern organ transplantation. However, in light of Islamic regu-
lations pertaining to lineage and family relationships, these guidelines often 
include specific reservations and restrictions concerning transplantation of 
reproductive organs, gamete (sperm and ova) donation, and also milk banking. 
The fourth part focuses on several social issues related to the employment of 
genetics in the creation of medical profiles. It consists of seven contributions 
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dealing with topics including emergence of the gene as a significant cultural 
icon, perception of the interplay between genetic and environmental factors, 
confidentiality of genetic information, implications of genetic data for insur-
ance purposes, and role of genetic factors in the confirmation of racial and 
cognitive stereotypes. Heightened media attention to the role of genetics in 
the definition of one’s identity has transformed the gene into a powerful cul-
tural symbol. The gene has increasingly been used as the locus of personhood 
and has almost acquired the sacred status attributed to the soul or other simi-
lar entities in different cultures. The concepts of the soul (nafs) and spirit (rūḥ) 
feature prominently in Islamic bioethical discourses, particularly on issues as-
sociated with beginning and end of human life. This is mainly due to the fact 
that Islamic scriptural sources define inception as well as end of human life in 
terms of the infusion or extraction of this metaphysical entity. Consecration 
of the role of genetics, therefore, raises questions concerning the continued 
relevance of the classical religious conceptualization of the soul or spirit as 
the primary factor to settle questions related to issues such as abortion or the 
new definition of death on the basis of brain (stem) function. On the other 
hand, some of the most important ethical concerns that modern genetics gave 
rise to are associated with boundaries of individual privacy and confidentiality 
of personal (genetic) information. The main ethical challenge in this regard 
remains how to reconcile concerns for individual privacy with others’ right to 
have access to shared genetic information. These privacy and confidentiality 
concerns may have significant social and even economic implications such as 
one’s ability to obtain affordable health insurance. This, in turn, raises ques-
tions of social justice as well as equitable distribution of social goods and ser-
vices among members of the society.
The fifth part focuses on the general theme of genetic explanations par-
ticularly of behavioral traits. It consists of seven contributions dealing with 
the manner in which genes are used for explanatory purposes within the con-
text of the HGP, evolutionary accounts of natural selection, and emergence 
of counter evolutionary accounts such as creationism and intelligent design, 
genetic reductionism and determinism, and reinforcement of racial and eth-
nic characteristics. Most of these contributions point out the limitation of ex-
clusive reliance on genes for explanatory purposes and call instead for a more 
nuanced account for the interplay of genetic as well as environmental factors. 
From a religious perspective these discussions may also inspire new reflections 
on classical theological debates on divine destiny and human freedom. While 
notions of genetic determinism can be read as a modern extension to theolog-
ical determinism, man’s role in the creation and manipulation of environmen-
tal factors can be seen as a reflection of human agency and freedom. 
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The final part, comprising eight contributions, is devoted to the interaction 
between genetics and modern reproductive technologies in terms of regula-
tion, range of choices, feminist perspectives, particular procedures, distribu-
tive justice, and impact on the future. The reproductive revolution that modern 
biomedical technology has unleashed forces a reexamination of the regulato-
ry aspects of parenthood, particularly within cultural contexts where genetic 
and social definitions of parenthood are not coextensive (p. 184-187). Countries 
vary widely with regard to the legislative model they adopt but any regulatory 
model that a country ends up choosing would depend on a number of con-
textual considerations and “nuances in tradition, religion, culture, econom-
ics, and wealth” (272). In general, while a liberal approach would issue from a 
permissibility presumption on the basis of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
a restrictive approach would be driven by concerns such as disrupting natu-
ral order and playing God. Ultimately, the range of possibilities that modern 
genetic and reproductive technologies generate would raise moral questions 
on fair distribution of benefits and burdens in society as well as on potential 
implications for future generations. In addition to these questions, ethical de-
bates surrounding assisted reproductive technology (ART) within the Muslim 
context also address questions such as inter gender interaction in the clinical 
setting and also involvement of a third party in the procreative process. Islam-
ic bioethical discourses often resort to classical ethical-legal concepts such as 
need (ḥājah), necessity (ḍarūrah), and utility (maṣlaḥah) to evaluate particu-
lar cases and scenarios. In light of these concepts a distinction is often made 
between medical (therapeutic) and non-medical uses of these technologies. 
In the case of cloning, for example, a distinction is made between therapeu-
tic cloning, which is perceived as potentially useful, and reproductive cloning, 
which is depicted as dangerous and harmful. A similar distinction is made also 
with regard to fetal sex selection, which is unanimously allowed for therapeu-
tic purposes while being permitted for family balancing only in limited situa-
tions and on an individual basis. Anthropologists also point out different views 
throughout Muslim-majority countries, which are sometimes developed along 
sectarian lines. The most famous example is the Sunnī-Shīʿī divide on gam-
ete donation, which is opposed by most Sunnī scholars while being allowed 
by some Shīʿī scholars. This distinction is rooted in the conceptualization of 
gamete donation and its analogy with adultery. While critics equate the pro-
cess with adultery, supporters limit the definition of adultery to actual physical 
contact. 
In conclusion, as its title indicates, this book introduces some of the import-
ant challenges that modern genetics create, which are here to stay. People need 
to learn how to live and cope with them. A fuller exploration of the ethical 
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and social aspects of human genetics, however, requires further comparative 
studies reflecting additional complexity and nuance associated with particular 
religious or cultural contexts. 
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والعلم  الفلسفة  في ضوء  ية: مقاربة تحليلية  البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
التجريبي والأخلاق الإسلامية
سعدية بن دنيا 1
مقدمة:
لأن  ضرورية  عودة  هي  الإنسان  خلق  أصل  لمسألة  الإسلامي  الديني  التفسير  إلى  العودة  إن 
عملية الخلق هذه لا تنتمي إلى هذا العالم ومادته ممّا يعني أن مصدر إلهي بالبديهة وقد جاء في 
الحديث النبوي، قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم »إن الله خلق آدم على صورته، طوله ستون ذراعاً« 
)البخاري/6227(، للكن بعد عملية الهبوط إلى الأرض أصبحت هذه الطبيعة البشرية داخل 
مجرى التاريخ وآثاره أي داخل محيط من القوانين الطبيعية والتحوّلات التي تخضع لها الكائنات 
الحية أثناء محاولة تكيّفها مع تلك القوانين، بدليل ما تبّقى من )الستين ذراعاً( التي خُلق عليها 
آدم أول مرة.
أّول مرة؟ سؤال  الإنسان  عليها  التي خُلق  البشرية  الطبيعة  بقي من  ماذا  لقد أصبح سؤال 
العلم وأحد أهم رهاناته وتحديّاته، وبهذا المعنى برزت النظرية الداروينية في التطور كواحدة من 
السجال  وخارج  البيولوجية،  في حدوده  الإنساني  النوع  وفهم  البشرية  الطبيعة  تفسير  نظريات 
أنها  فيها  مهّم  ما هو  فإن  النظرية،  المعاصر ومضمون هذه  الإسلام  بين  الذي حدث  والجدال 
فتحت أسئلة معرفية جوهرية حول الحياة البيولوجية للإنسان وتركيبتها والتحوّلات التي يمكن أن 
تطرأ عليها بالتناسب مع الزمن وبالتفاعل مع البيئة.
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254 دنيا بن 
الإنسان  جسم  في  البيولوجية  للرموز  دقيقة  قراءة  وضع  على  بالخصوص  الجينوم  علم  يعمل 
أو إصلاح  والتي من شأنها أن تقّدم وعوداً جادة بحّل مشكلة المرض باستباق حدوثه جينياً 
الخلل الذي يمثّل طفرة بيولوجية غير متوقعة أو تحسين البنية الخارجية والداخلية للجسد )عمليات 
التجميل، زرع الأعضاء..(، غير أن هذا التطور العلمي يواجه تحديّا أخلاقياً، سواء على المستوى 
على  أو  الإنسان  على  الإنسانية  غير  والآثار  وممارسته  الطب  بأخلاقيات  يتعلق  فيما  البيوإيتيقي 
مستوى الأخلاق الإسلامية فيما يتعلق بتغيير الخَلق الطبيعي للطبيعة البشرية المصمّمة إلهيا، وهنا 
تقدم المعرفة الفلسفية فهماً مختلفا ومتجددا يجعلنا نعيد التفكير في الطبيعة البشرية كظاهرة وليس 
كمعطى ثابت.
تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى فهم العلاقة بين الجينوم والطبيعة البشرية في ضوء القراءات الفلسفية 
الجينوم كظاهرة  لتناول  ومحاولة جعلها فضاء خصبا  الإسلامية  الأخلاق  وفي ضوء  والعلمية، 
الأخلاق  مع  الجينوم  علم  تطابق  مدى  دراسة  ليس  الغرض  إذ  والآفاق،  الأبعاد  متعددة 
الإسلامية بل إيجاد مجال معرفي يجعل هذه الأخلاق نفسها تستثمر في الجينوم وجعله أفقا علميا 
لتطور أخلاق عملية ذات أبعاد إسلامية حضارية، حيث يمكننا أن نتوقع، في ضوء التطورات 
العلمية، جينا مسؤولا عن »العنف« وآخر عن »اللكراهية« وغيرها.
ية: أولا: نظرة الفلسفة إلى الطبيعة البشر
لقد نظر الفلاسفة منذ القدم إلى الطبيعة البشرية )Human Nature( من وجهات نظر عديدة 
لما تكتسيه من أهمية بالغة، وكذا لتعقيدها والغموض اللكبير الذي يكتنف جوانبها المختلفة، وكان 
نتاج ذلك أن كانت آراؤهم وأبحاثهم متباينة، ولقد برزت في هذا الإطار مدارس كثيرة ومختلفة 
يسودها التمايز في التخصص والتوجه الفلسفي، تروم كلها الوصول إلى فهم دقيق للطبيعة البشرية 
وسبر أغوارها.
إن السؤال اللكبير الذي تطرحه هذه التصورات الفلسفية يتمحور حول تحديد ماهية الطبيعة 
البشرية وهل هي جوهر ثابت أم متغير؟ ويتصل ببحث النفس البشرية وخلودها ووحدتها وصلتها 
بالجسم، كما يتعلق في صميمه بما يجب أن يوجه إليه السلوك الإنساني، ويتوجه نحو فهم أفضل 
لطبيعة البشر. 
ية255 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
من بين أوائل التفسيرات الفلسفية الجادة والرصينة للطبيعة البشرية ما أسس له سقراط في 
فلسفته التصورية والذي عنى عناية بالغة بمسألة البحث في ماهية الإنسان، بحيث يرى أن »المعرفة 
نفسك«  إعرف  الذات-  معرفة   - للمعرفة  الأساسية  والمهمة  فقط،  النفس  معرفة  هي  الحقة 
)أوسموس 1979، 29(، فالبحث عن تفسير للعالم الطبيعي لم يكن الهم الفكري لسقراط بخلاف 
البحث عن النفس الذي استحوذ على اهتمامه وعُّد نقطة ارتكاز لجل مسائله وطروحاته الفلسفية.
يختص  جزء  للروح،  متميزة  أقسام  ثلاثة  بوجود  أفلاطون،  جمهورية  »في  سقراط،  جادل 
بالرغبة، وجزء عقلاني، وثالث أطلق عليه »تيموس« )Thymos(، وهي كلمة يونانية عادة ما 
تترجم إلى الحيوية، والتيموس هو الجانب المتكبر من شخصية الإنسان، أي الجزء الذي يطالب أن 
يعترف الآخرون بقيمة المرء« )فوكوياما 2006، 62(، وذلك مؤداه أن العقل هو الجزء الإلهي 
في الإنسان بل هو دايمون )روح خفي( )Démon( يشكل كل إنسان وبما أنه إلهي فمن صفاته 
الخلود )أفلاطون 1973، 288(.
ولئن استطاع سقراط توجيه دفة البحث الفلسفي من المسائل المادية للعالم الطبيعي إلى إدراك 
مستوى  إلى  يرتق  لم  الشأن  هذا  في  الفلسفي  البحث  مسار  فإن  طبيعتها،  في  والبحث  النفس 
تلميذه أفلاطون الذي أولى البحث في مشكلة النفس  المذهب الفلسفي الشامل إلا على يدي 
 Durozoi( »أهمية قصوى، على اعتبار أنها »الأساس الجدير لإحياء المادة بمعنى أن يعطيها الحياة
في  تكون دراستها  بل  الحياة،  مبدأ  بعامة  اليونان  تشكل عند  النفس  فلقد كانت   ،)1987, 15
نظرهم دراسة الحياة وظواهرها، وهكذا الحال عند أفلاطون الذي يميز كأستاذه سقراط بين 
النفس والجسد، فالنفس في نظره جوهر متميز عن الجسم، »إنها جوهر عقلي متحرك من ذاته 
على عدد ذي تأليف« )التكريتي 1982، 44(.
على خطى أفلاطون، مضى أرسطو إلى القول بوجود طبيعة بشرية في مقابل الطبيعة المادية 
المعارف  لسائر  بالنسبة  الأولى  المرتبة  في  دراستها  ووضع  كبيرا  اهتماما  النفس  مسألة  وأولى 
)أبوريان 1976، 118(، على أنه لم يجعل النفس مفارقة بطبيعتها كأفلاطون، بل هي عنده صورة 
للجسم متحدة به اتحادا جوهريا.
في سياق الحديث عن العدالة الاجتماعية، »جادل أرسطو بأن المعتقدات البشرية بخصوص 
الصواب والخطأ ل وهي ما نسميه بحقوق الإنسان ل كانت ترتكز في نهاية الأمر على الطبيعة البشرية 
ذاتها، بمعنى أنه بدون فهم اللكيفية التي تتواءم بها الرغبات والأهداف والسمات والسلوكيات 
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الطبيعية في كل بشري مكتمل، لن يمكننا فهم الغايات البشرية، والحكم على الصواب أو الخطأ، 
أو الطيب والخبيث« )فوكوياما 2006، 62(، وهذه النظرة سيكون لها أيضا تأثيرات كبيرة على 
المفكرين الاجتماعيين المعاصرين. 
وعموما فإن أرسطو قد أنتج، »ومن قبله سقراط وأفلاطون، حوارا حول الطبيعة البشرية 
استمر في التعاليم الفلسفية الغربية حتى أوائل العصر الحديث عندما ولدت الديمقراطية الليبيرالية« 
)فوكوياما 2006،25 (، أين استمد أفكاره العديد من الفلاسفة المحدثين وعلى رأسهم الفيلسوف 
ديكارت الذي تمثّل الدرس الفلسفي الأرسطي للكشف خبايا الطبيعة البشرية. إن المهمة التي 
الواسع  بالمعنى  الفكر  تناول كلمة  إلى  يدعونا  الفكر، وهو  نظام  »تغيير  بها ديكارت هي  يضطلع 
والذي كرسه في كتبه تأملات أو في المبادئ » )Ricœur 1967, 42(، لقد نادى ديكارت 
»بالذهن كنقطة البدء في طريق المعرفة« )الدر 1983، 20(، مستمدا في ذلك أفكار أرسطو ليعلي 
من شأن العقل وينظر إلى الإنسان على أنه فكر. 
لقد قام ديكارت بنقلة فكرية بافتراض العقل كجوهر للتفكير مستقل عن الجسد )تشومسكى، 
فوكو 2015، 29، 31(، كما أن قوله »بآلية الجسم كان فتحاً عظيماً إذ أقبل العلماء يدرسون عمليات 
الجسم الفيسيولوجية ليعرفوا كيف تعمل آلة الجسم، ولقد استفاد الإنسان من هذه الدراسات في 
طبعه وعلمه« )الدر 1983، 21(، وهكذا أفاد ديكارت الفلاسفة والعلماء على حد سواء في تفسير 
الطبيعة البشرية، وكان له من رصانة الطرح ما جعل أفكاره ونظرياته تهيمن طويلا.
كان الفيلسوف جون لوك الذي وجد في نفس الفترة الزمنية، من أشد معارضي ديكارت، 
إذ سرعان ما قاد فتحا عظيما في ميدان التجريب، وأثبت نقدا متاخما لللكوجيتو الديكارتي، فإذا 
كان ديكارت قد ركز على الفكر معتبرا العقل أساسا للمعرفة والذات الإنسانية )أنا أفكر، إذن 
أنا موجود(، فإن لوك يعتبر التجربة ينبوعا أول للمعرفة بقوله: )علينا أن نختبر ونجرب لنعرف(.
التي تشكل عقله وما يمكن أن  بيضاء، والبيئة هي  يولد صفحة  الطفل  لوك أن  يرى جون 
يتشكل لديه من آراء، يقول لوك في هذا الصدد: »إن عقل الطفل يكون خاليا تماما من الأفكار، 
قبل أن يستقبل أي إحساسات من حيث إنها نتيجة مثير لأعضائه الجسمية، فهو أشبه بخزانة 
يعني أن  77(، وهذا   ،1962 يطبع عليها شيء« )زكريا  لم  بيضاء  الأدراج أو صفحة  فارغة من 
طبيعتنا البشرية لوح فارغ تخط عليه البيئة ما تشاء، وهو بذلك يختلف عن ديكارت الذي عرف 
الطبيعة البشرية من خلال فعلي التفكير والتأمل.
ية257 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
يذهب الفيلسوف الإنجليزي دافيد هيوم مذهب جون لوك في التوجه التجريبي، ولقد بحث 
الطبيعة البشرية انطلاقاً من هذا المنهج، حيث يرى أن »الخخبرة الحسية هي المصدر الوحيد لما 
المعرفة؟  ما  بالسؤال  والانهمام  الملاحظة  »إن  يقول:  في ذلك  11(، وهو   ،2008 نعلم« )هيوم 
وكيف تعرف وتنهي النظر إلى الذات بوصفه جوهرا مفردا وتستبدله بالنظر إليه بوصفه مجرد، 
صبدجيكت )Subject( للمعرفة« )هيوم 2008، 13(، ومعنى ذلك أنه لا يوجد شيء حقيقي 
يرفض  بذلك  وأفكار، وهو  يملك من معارف  ما  التي يتشكل من خلالها  الحسية  التجربة  غير 
اعتماد أي تصورات قبلية مسبقة عن الطبيعة البشرية، ومن ثمة يطرح أفكارا فلسفية جريئة في 
مقابل المذهب العقلاني القائل بإرجاع مصادر معارفنا عن العالم إلى الأفكار الفطرية ومبادئ 
العقل القبلية.
إن المسألة الأساسية التي سيعالجها دافيد هيوم هي كالتالي: كيف يصبح الفكر طبيعة بشرية؟
يبين في  17(، كما  الوحيد« )دولوز1999،  الإنسان  الطبيعة »البشرية هي علم  يرى هيوم أن 
كتابه بحث في الطبيعة البشرية: »أن الشكلين الاثنين اللذين يتأثر بهما الفكر، هما قبل كل شيء 
الانفعالي والاجتماعي، وهذان الشكلان يتضمن أحدهما الآخر« )دولوز1999، 5(، وعلى هذا 
فقد اعتمد في تعريفه للطبيعة البشرية على المبادئ الأساسية التي توجه النفس مثل: الانفعالات 
والأحاسيس.
حسب هيوم »يمكن تناول علم الطبيعة البشرية، بمنحيين مختلفين، لكل منهما أهليته الخاصة: في 
المنحى الأول ينظر إلى الإنسان بوصفه مولودا للفعل أصلا، »)هيوم 2008، 21(، وذلك مؤداه 
أن الفلاسفة في هذا المنحى إنما ينظرون إلى الإنسان على أنه كائن أخلاقي ويبذلون الجهد الأكبر 
لتقييم ردات أفعاله وحثه على انتهاج طريق الفضيلة والابتعاد عن الرذيلة، وعلى هذا فإن الهدف 
الأسمى المرتجى في هذا المستوى هو ضبط وتقويم الأفعال الإنسانية.
أما المنحى الثاني، فينظر الفلاسفة من خلاله إلى »الإنسان بوصفه كائنا عاقلا، ويجتهدون لأن 
يصلحوا فاهمته أكثر مما يهذبوا عاداته »)هيوم 2008، 22(، وتكمن أصالة نظرية هيوم في كونها 
تجمع بين الجانبين: الأخلاقي والعقلاني وتؤكد على أهميتهما في فهم وتحليل الطبيعة البشرية. بيد 
أن هيوم لا يكتفي بهذين الجانبين ويضيف جوانب أخرى، وذلك لأنه يعتقد أن التأثر الأخلاقي 
مختلفة  زوايا  من  وتحليلها  رصدها  حاول  وقد  البشرية،  الطبيعة  من  جزء  فقط  هو  والعقلاني 
اجتماعية ونفسية وكذا سياسية، وهو ما تفرضه خصيصة الطبيعة البشرية نفسها.
258 دنيا بن 
مع أواخر القرن التاسع عشر أخذت الدراسات حول الطبيعة البشرية منعرجا جديدا كان 
البشرية وفسرها من  الطبيعة  فرويد  البارزين، بحث  أعلامه  أحد  فرويد  النفسي سيغموند  العالم 
خلال اللاشعور الذي يعني به »مكمن الرغبات المكبوتة والخخبرات الماضية« ) كردي 2015، 
26(، والواقع أن فرويد قد تابع في طرحه هذا »داروين في مقولته أن غرائز الإنسان هي الامتداد 
الطبيعي لغرائز الحيوانات السابقة له في الصعود« ) العجمي 1983، 18( غير أن فرويد يختلف 
عن داروين في نظرته حول العقل الباطن، وعموما لاقت فرضيته تطورا كبيرا وشملتها إضافات 
وتحويرات عديدة وأخذت معاني كثيرة وواسعة، أضفى من خلالها الباحثون على الطبيعة البشرية 
في علم النفس كما في الفلسفة أبعادا كثيرة كل حسب مذهبه وتوجهه.
وإذا كان فرويد وأنصاره قد ذهبوا إلى القول بأن ما يميز الطبيعة البشرية هو اللاشعور، فإن 
إنسانيته  يحقق  البشري  الكائن  أن  أي  البشرية،  الماهية  هو صميم  العمل  إن  يقولون  الماركسيين 
بالعمل. وهذا ما عبر عنه كارل ماركس نفسه في كتابه »الاقتصاد السياسي والفلسفة«، حيث 
يقول »إن كل التاريخ المزعوم للعالم ليس إلا عملية خلق للإنسان بواسطة العمل البشري« ) 
براهيم 1971، 259(، وهو ينفي في هذا السياق ل ومن منطلق ماديته التاريخية والجدلية ل أي  إ
ثبات للطبيعة البشرية، ويرى أنها في تغير مستمر)روز 1990، 91(؛ »بيد أن المادية الجدلية، وإن 
كانت تأبى أن تنسب إلى الإنسان ماهية ثابتة، إلا أنها لا ترى مانعا من القول بأن الإنسان 
براهيم 1971، 256(، ومعنى هذا أن  صنيعة الطبيعة، وأنه إلى ل حد ما ل أثر من آثار البيئة« ) إ
الموجود البشري جزء لا يتجزأ من الصيرورة اللكونية، وهو يخضع لقانون التطور الذي ينطبق على 
سائر الكائنات الحية، وبهذا فإن مفهوم الطبيعة البشرية على نحو ما تصوره الماركسيون هو مفهوم 
نسبي، ذلك أن البشرية في حد ذاتها ظاهرة متحولة متغيرة تقبل الترقي والتطور.
هذا ويذهب اللكثير من المفكرين المعاصرين »للاعتقاد بأن البشر يتمتعون بمرونة غير محدودة 
تقريبا، أي يمكن لبيئتهم الاجتماعية تشكيلهم بحيث يكون سلوكهم قابلا لكل شيء، وهذا يعني أن 
الطبيعة البشرية ليست ثابتة، وإنما هي في تغير مستمر لأنها حصيلة لمجموع الخخبرات التي يتلقاها 
الفرد، والتأثيرات التي تحيط به في البيئة الخارجية. وهنا يبدأ »التحيز المعاصر ضد مفهوم الطبيعة 
البشرية، وكثير من المؤمنين بالتفسير الاجتماعي للسلوك البشري لديهم دوافع خفية قوية، فهم 
يأملون استخدام الهندسة الاجتماعية لخلق مجتمعات عادلة ومنصفة وفقا لمبدأ أيديولوجي مجرد« 
ية259 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
)فوكوياما 2006، 25-26(، ومن ثمة فإن التبريرات التي يسوقونها لتفسير السلوك البشري إنما 
تهدف إلى تغطية مصالح سياسية خاصة، وهي نتاج لغايات اجتماعية صرفة. 
للكن لقد فات هؤلاء أنه بالرغم من »أن السلوك البشري مرن ومتباين، فهو ليس كذلك 
على نحو لا نهائي« )فوكوياما 2006، 26(، فعند مستوى معين تقوم الغرائز الطبيعية والعناصر 
المتأصلة في الطبيعة البشرية بإعادة إثبات ذاتها لتؤكد أن جوهر الطبيعة البشرية إنما هو السجية 
الداخلية الثابتة، ومن ثمة فإن التفاعل الخارجي والاستعداد الطبيعي الأصيل هما معا من أسس 
الطبيعة البشرية. 
وهكذا نجد أن محاولة معرفة الطبيعة البشرية قاسم مشترك بين مختلف المدارس الفلسفية على 
بالتحليل  المفهوم  لهذا  وتعرضت  البشرية،  الطبيعة  الفكرية، فجميعها درست  توجهاتها  اختلاف 
الحديثة  الفلسفية  المدارس  حاولت  للإنسان.  الداخلية  الطبيعة  كنه  إدراك  بغية  والتفسير، 
والمعاصرة تقديم تصور جديد للطبيعة البشرية على نحو أدق يتجاوز القضايا الفلسفية الكلاسيكية 
كمسائل الوجود والميتافيزيقا، فأغلبها يتساءل عن عناصر تكوين هذه الطبيعة، وأيها الذي يمثل 
تأثيرا أقوى، وتأتي الإجابات وفق الخلفية الفلسفية التي تتبناها هذه المدرسة الفلسفية أو تلك، 
فهي عند البعض عناصر فطرية لا تتغير، وعند البعض الآخر مفهوم يحيل إلى التطور أو مفهوم 
نسبي متغير.. إلخ، ومن ثمة لم تنجح في تقديم تفاسير حاسمة للسلوك الإنساني.
ومنه فإن مفهوم الطبيعة البشرية ذو طبيعة إشكالية )concept problématique(، يتضمن 
جوانب عديدة نأمل في الإمساك بها، للكن الغموض والتعقيد يشوبها، ومن ثمة تنفتح على عدة 
قراءات و تأويلات، ذلك أن الفلسفة إنما تنظر إلى الطبيعة البشرية على أنها ظاهرة وليس كمعطى 
ثابت وهذا يدعم أن الطبيعة البشرية في حد ذاتها متغيرة، وبصفة عامة فإن الفلسفة تساعدنا على 
إعادة النظر في معاني الإنسان والحياة والموت والمصير والجسد واللكينونة. 
ية: ثانيا: المنظور البيولوجي للطبيعة البشر
السائدة في الأروقة  الفلسفية  المدرسة  البشرية عند حدود  اللكبير حول الطبيعة  لم ينته الجدل 
الفكرية، وإنما تعداها إلى فضاءات العلم والبيولوجيا التي تشهد تطورا مذهلا لعلوم الفيزيولوجيا 
والأبحاث البيوطبية، ، وفي هذا السياق نجد تضاربا واسعا بين المفكرين والعلماء حول المضامين 
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المكتنفة لمفهوم الطبيعة البشرية، وهو جدل أكاديمي من نوع خاص يجمع بين النظرة العلمية الثاقبة 
والمنهج التجريبي الحيوي، ليؤسس لطرح علمي يسعى إلى فهم العلاقة القائمة بين الفرد البشري 
والطبيعة وتفسير السلوك البشري، فكيف نظر علماء البيولوجيا إلى مفهوم الطبيعة البشرية؟ وما 
والتطورات  الوراثة  علوم  إنجازات  في ظل  المفهوم  لهذا  البيولوجية  العلمية  المقاربة  هي حدود 
الحاصلة في علوم الحياة؟ ثم ما هي أهم الإشكاليات التي يطرحها العلماء في هذا الشأن؟
دراسة  نحو  العلمي  البحث  وجه  الذي  البيولوجيا  علم  مبعث  عشر  السابع  القرن  شهد  لقد 
الكائنات الحية بعد أن كانت تقتصر على دراسة المادة الجامدة، وكانت الجهود الأولى المبذولة 
تهدف إلى القيام بالتجريب على الكائن الحي وفق أسس علمية وتقنية مضبوطة، غير أن أطماع 
العلماء سرعان ما توسعت نحو البحث عن إمكانية تغيير فيزيولوجيا الطبيعة البشرية. 
بنظريته  داروين  استطاع  أن  إلى  محتشمة  الإطار  هذا  في  المحصلة  العلمية  النتائج  بقيت  لقد 
في التطور أن يعمق دراسة الكائنات الحية على أساس مبدأ التنوع، بحيث يرى أن »الصفات 
الوراثية تنتقل إلى الأبناء ليس بفعل العوامل البيئية فحسب و إنما عن طريق الوراثة أيضا« ) 
حسنين 2004، 110(، وذلك راجع في رأيه إلى »أن كل أشكال الحياة مرتبطة ببعضها البعض« 
) Watson, Andrew 2003, 14(، وهذا يعني أن الصفات الوراثية الموجودة في الآباء تمتد 
إلى أبنائهم، ومن ثمة فإن العوامل البيئية ليست العامل الحاسم في التركيبة البشرية كما كان يعتقد 
سابقا، بل ثمة عناصر وراثية تقف معها جنبا إلى جنب في تحديد سلوكات الإنسان.
إن داروين بطرحه لفكرة الارتقاء يحدث تحولا كبيرا في فهم الطبيعة البشرية، إذ يقصي تمايز 
الإنسان ورقيه عن سائر الكائنات الأخرى، ويهوي به إلى الدرك الأسفل، عندما يساوي بينه 
يتعلق ب  فيما  إلى طرح قضية مهمة دقيقة وخطيرة جدا  افتراضاته  وبين الحيوان، ولقد أدت 
»حيونة« الإنسان، من خلال طرح السؤال التالي: »هل الإنسان ينحدر من القرد أوعلى الأقل 
من أحد الحيوانات القديمة القريبة له؟« ) بوكاي، 113(، الأمر الذي أفضى إلى إثارة تصادم 
كبير بين العلماء ورجال الدين حتى عدت هذه القضية من أهم المسائل الخلافية بين العلم والدين 
لما لها من علاقة بقضية الخلق.
لم  افتراضاته  إلا أن  الوراثة،  الطريق أمام علم  الإنسان  لقد مهدت أفكار داروين عن أصل 
تتأكد إلا عندما » قام راهب يسمى جريجور مندل سنة 1867 بسلسلة من التجارب على النباتات 
الوراثة الحديث )Moore 2015, 28(، ولقد أفاد هذا الاكتشاف  الباب لعصر  والتي فتحت 
ية261 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
أساسية  إيجاد عناصر  ثمة  والتعبير عنها، ومن  الوراثية  الصفات  انتقال  فهم عملية  في  الباحثين 
لتفسيرات وراثة الكائن الحي.
لم تتأكد أبحاث مندل ل على الصعيد العلمي ل إلا سنة 1900 عندما أعاد عدد من علماء النبات 
اكتشاف القوانين العامة ذاتها في ظروف أخرى، والتي بدأ معها علم الوراثة، ولقد كان الدانماركي 
ولهلم جوهانسن هو من أطلق في 1905 اسم الجينات على عوامل مندل )أوفراي 2012، 16-15(، 
وبذلك تم معرفة أن الجينات كائنات غير مرئية تتكون منها التركيبة الوراثية، كانت البحوث 
الأولى تقتصر على الحيوان والنبات » أما الإنسان ل الذي يتصف تكاثره بالبطء والاستقلالية 
والخصوصية ل فلم يكن المادة الطيبة للبحث العلمي« )كيفلس، هود 1997، 14(، للكن بمجرد 
إعادة اكتشاف القوانين المندلية بدأت الجهود تتجه صوب » الطبيعة البشرية، أي تلك الخصائص 
النمطية للنوع والمشتركة بين جميع البشر بوصفهم بشرا، وهذا هو، في النهاية، ما يتعرض للخطر في 
خضم ثورة التقنية الحيوية« ) فوكوياما 2006، 131(.
قاطعة  مؤشرات  ظهرت   1944 سنة  ومنذ  فشيئا،  شيئا  تتقدم  الجخين  على  التجارب  بدأت 
تظهر أن الدنا هو الجهاز الجيني الذي يحمل مخطط الحياة العضوية كاملة، للكن بنية الدنا بقيت 
مع ذلك مبهمة وأثارت العديد من التساؤلات، لم يكن للعلماء معطيات كافية لتفسير كيف 
يمكن لهذه المعلومة كلها أن تكون مخزنة في سلسلة وحدات كيميائية مرتبطة ببعضها البعض، 
كما لم تكن هناك إجابات واضحة تبين كيفية انتقال المعلومات الوراثية إلى الأبناء عندما تنقسم 
الخلايا )Watson 2003, 15-16( ، ومن ثمة بقي السؤال ما هي طبيعة الشفرة الوراثية غامضا 
ومستعصيا على الإجابة.
فرانسيس  والبريطاني  الأمريكي جيمس واطسن  بالطبع اكتشاف  البارز هو  الحدث  للكن 
كريك عام 1953 لبنية الدنا )Moore 2015 ,28)، إذ توصلا إلى أن الجينات عبارة عن لولب 
مزدوج من جديلتين من الحمض النووي الديوسكي ريبوزي )الدنا( الذي يحتوي على الصفات 
الوراثية، ثم تواصلت جهود العلماء نحو البحث عن تحديد أكثر دقة لهوية الدنا وطبيعة الجخين، وهو 
يليا شيمكوف بتحديد تموضع  ما تحقق بالفعل عندما قام دانيال كوهن وعالمه الجينومي المفضل إ
 ،)Rabinow 2000, 77( الجينات ونشر خريطة فيزيائية كاملة لللكروموزوم 21، في مجلة الطبيعة
ومن ثمة تأكد أن »الدنا تحمل المعلومة الجينية لدى كل الكائنات كما أن الشفرة الوراثية كونية« 
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)Jordan 2007, 31(، أي أن المعلومات الوراثية التي يحملها الدنا تحكم في وراثة كل الكائنات 
الحية، كما أن الجينات مخزن المعلومات الوراثية.
في خضم هذا اللكشف العلمي الهائل نتج جدل2 علمي كبير حول دور الجينات في تحديد 
السلوك البشري، تتمحور إشكاليته المركزية حول نصيب كل من الموروث والمكتسب في الخصائص 
التي تحملها الطبيعة البشرية، وهو يرتكز أساسا في السؤال عن سبب كون البشر على ما هم عليه من 
صفات وسلوكات؟ أيرجع إلى محددات وراثية بيولوجية أم إلى عوامل بيئية ثقافية؟ وهو جدل 
لا يزال قائما حتى اليوم بين أنصار الحتمية البيولوجية و الحتمية الاجتماعية.
يرى الحتميون البيولوجيون أن الجينات هي العامل الحاسم في تشكيل السلوك البشري، حيث 
أن »حيوات البشر وأفعالهم هي نتائج محتومة للخصائص البيوكيمياوية للخلايا التي تكون الفرد، 
وفي  فرد  يحملها كل  التي  الجينات  مكونات  منفرد  نحو  على  بدورها  تحددها  الخصائص  وهذه 
النهاية، فإن السلوك البشري ل وبالتالي المجتمع البشري ل محكوم بسلسلة من العوامل المحددة تجري 
من الجينات إلى الفرد حتى مجموع تصرفات كل الأفراد« )روز 1990، 18(، وذلك مؤداه أن 
بيولوجي محض أن  يعني من منظور  مما  الإنسان،  تكوين شخصية  في  الحاسم  العامل  الوراثة هي 
الإنسان يملك طبيعة بيولوجية فطرية ثابتة لا تتغير.
وفي مقابل هذا الطرح »ثمة دعوة نقيضة كثيرا ما تقوم في مواجهة الحتمية البيولوجية، وهي 
أن البيولوجيا تتوقف عند الميلاد لتحل الثقافة محلها بعد ذلك« )روز 1990، 23(، ويمثل هذا 
الموقف أنصار الحتمية الاجتماعية الذين يعتقدون أن خصائص الشخصية لا تورث، كما أنها تكون 
غير موجودة البتة عند الولادة )آدلر 2005، 163(، فهي ليست تعبيرا عن قوى أو ميول وراثية، 
وإنما يتم اكتسابها بفعل التربية والبيئة الاجتماعية التي ينشأ فيها الفرد.
فالحتميون البيولوجيون يرون إذن أن »الطبيعة البشرية مثبتة بجيناتنا« )روز 1990، 18(، وكل 
التحديد الجيني، وعلى العكس من ذلك تذهب الحتمية  سلوكاتنا قد وضعت شفرتها سلفا في 
الاجتماعية »إلى النظر إلى الطبيعة البشرية وكأنها تكاد تقبل التشكل إلى حد ما لا نهائي« )آدلر 
تعود الجذور الأولى لهذا الجدل العلمي إلى بدايات علم الوراثة أين انتقد العديد من علماء البيولوجيا   2
والأحياء ل ومنهم عالم الأحياء الأمريكي توماس مورغان ل قوانين مندل، ورفضوا في البدء التسليم بأن 
انتقال الخصائص الوراثية يتم عبر عامل داخلي جيني، معتقدين أن انتقال الخصائص عبر الأجيال إنما 
يتم بفعل أثر البيئة المحيطة أنظر: شارل أوفراي،، ص17 وما بعدها.
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2005، 23(، من منطلق أن الوراثة لا تلعب أي دور مهم في التأثير على نفسية الفرد وشخصيته، 
فسلوكاته لا تورث أبدا، وكل ما في الأمر أنها تبدأ في التشكل في مرحلة مبكرة، ولهذا تبدو كما 
لو كانت مورثة.
والاعتراف  البيولوجيا،  إنكار   « إلى  الاجتماعية  الحتمية  أصحاب  يذهب  نفسه  السياق  وفي 
تسميات  مجرد  الشيخوخة...إلى  ووهن  الطفولة  عجز  تحول  وهكذا  الاجتماعي فحسب،  بالتكوين 
تعكس التفاوت في القوة« )روز 1990، 23(، بحجة أن ثمة أوجها من السلوك البشري يمكن 
تفسيرها بمعزل عن الجينات.
والواقع أن كلا الفريقين قد وقع في أخطاء فادحة نتيجة الاحتكام إلى أحد العاملين الوراثي 
أو الاجتماعي والابتعاد عن الأسباب العلمية، فقد أثبتت اكتشافات البيولوجيا في النصف الأول 
من القرن العشرين » أن الحياة نتيجة لامتزاج دينامي بين البيئة المحيطة ومكونات الأجسام الحية، 
ومن بينها الحمض النووي والجينات التي يحملها، وهي تضطلع بدور مهم، وللكن ليس في عزلة عن 
غيرها من العوامل والمكونات، بل في تفاعل وتعاون معها« )أوفراي 2012، 65(، وهو جزء من 
سوء فهم عام عن الجينات، وهذا بالضبط هو السبب في وجود مثل هذه الصعوبات العميقة في 
مفهوم »الطبيعة البشرية.. فهي طبيعة يتم بناؤها بيولوجيا واجتماعيا في الوقت نفسه« )روز 1990، 
26(، ذلك أن الإنسان نتاج الوراثة والبيئة معا، ويتضمن ذلك كلا من جيناته والبيئة الفيزيائية 
والاجتماعية التي يوجد فيها.
من  عددا  التي حققت  الحياة  »علوم  وبالضبط  العلم،  في  الحاصلة  اللكبيرة  التطورات  ومع 
التجارب أن  130(، دلت   ،2006 البشرية« )فوكوياما  الطبيعة  المهمة بخصوص  الاكتشافات 
الجينات، وفضلا عن تحديدها للاستعدادات الوراثية، تلعب أيضا دورا مهما في تحديد اللكثير 
الوراثة إلى حقيقة علمية مؤكدة مفادها  النفسية والاجتماعية، وعليه توصل علماء  من الصفات 
»أن الجينات تحمل برامج العمل الفعلية للحياة البشرية« )فوكوياما 2006، 98(، حيث أنها »تحمل 
مخطط الحياة العضوية كاملة« )Watson 2003, 15(، وذلك يعني أن الجينات هي مفتاح الطبيعة 
البشرية، وهي مكمن الهوية الحقيقية للإنسان بالمعنى البيولوجي.
الأحياء  علم  و«أخذ   ، الوراثة  بعلم  الخاصة  التطبيقية  المجالات  في  العلمية  الفتوحات  توالت 
الحديث في نهاية الأمر يعطي محتوى تجريبيا ذا معنى لمفهوم الطبيعة البشرية« )فوكوياما 2006، 
25(، إذ اتجهت الاهتمامات البحثية نحو البحث عن معرفة أدق للطبيعة البشرية، بالاستناد إلى 
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أسس تجريبية كيميائية حيوية، »وهذا يعني أن مهمة العلماء لا تقتصر على فهم العالم والإنسان، وإنما 
يهتمون أيضا بتغييره وتطويره« )صبحي 1993، 148(، من خلال فهم عمل جيناته وتفصيلات 
تراكيبه الوراثية بالأساس، بغية الاستفادة منها عمليا في معرفة الأبعاد العميقة للعضوية البشرية، 
ودراسة إمكانيات تغييرها وتعديلها نحو الأحسن.
وأن   ،)27 )دولوز1999،  البشرية“  الطبيعة  هو  للعلم  الحقيقي  »الموضوع  أن  إذن  ظهر  لقد 
مفهوم الطبيعة البشرية عينه مفهوم ذو نظرة معقدة، مستعصية، ومتدرجة قد تطور من المفهوم 
التقليدي إلى المفهوم البيولوجي أي الخصائص العضوية، وإن كنا نرى أن تحديد هذا المفهوم أمر 
بالغ الصعوبة، إذ يوجد توتر جدلي كبير بين الفهم التصوري والفهم التجريبي.
وأن تطور العلوم قد أعطى الطبيعة البشرية معنى ذا طبيعة تجريبية، وأنه كلما ازداد ما يخخبرنا 
للكن غير  البشري علمية، دقيقة،  العضوي  بالبناء  البشرية، كانت معرفتنا  الطبيعة  العلم عن  به 
محدودة بدرجة مذهلة. غير أن السؤال الذي يطرح نفسه وبإلحاح بين ثنايا هذا التحليل هو: هل 
يمكن تعديل الطبيعة البشرية أو تغييرها فعليا بإقامة التجارب على البشر في المخابر أم أن ذلك لا 
يعدو أن يكون مجرد فرضية علمية؟
ية: ثالثا: سؤال الجينوم والطبيعة البشر
الطبيعة  مفهوم  حول  والعلمية  الفلسفية  الأوساط  ساد  الذي  النظري  السجال  عن  بعيد  غير 
البشرية، أدت التقنية الحيوية المعاصرة إلى الاقتراب كثيرا، وبطريقة جد مبتكرة، من بيولوجيا 
أنها  البشرية، غير  البيولوجية  الطبيعة  العديد من أسرار  اللكشف عن  للعلماء  أتاح  مما  الإنسان، 
طرحت تساؤلات مهمة وخطيرة حول تداعيات التجريب على البشر، وإمكانية تعديل الجينات 
الموجودة في الدنا البشري، ومن ثمة القدرة على تغيير الطبيعة البشرية ذاتها، وفي هذا السياق 
جادل البعض بأننا »لا نمتلك الآن القدرة على تعديل الطبيعة البشرية بأي طريقة ذات شأن، 
وقد نكتشف أن الجنس البشري لن يتوصل إلى هذه القدرة على الإطلاق« )فوكوياما 2006، 
109(، في المقابل أبانت اكتشافات الهندسة الوراثية البشرية والتجارب العلمية الخاصة بمشروع 
الجينوم البشري عن تطور كبير وغير مسبوق في امتلاك تقنية جد متطورة قادرة على إحداث 
تحويرات عميقة في صلب الطبيعة البشرية، وبأن إمكانيات تعديل البشر وراثيا باتت أمرا واقعا، 
ية265 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
فهل سيحطم العلم الحياة ويفسد الطبيعة؟ هل يمكن لتطبيقات الجينوم أن تطمس هوية الإنسان 
وتخل بطبيعته البشرية؟ أم ثمة إمكانيات لأن نستثمر في مشروع الجينوم البشري ونزيد من فرص 
تعديل وتحسين الطبيعة البشرية بصورة واعية بدلا من أغراض الهدم وآثار الترويع؟
ية: أبحاث الجينوم وهندسة الطبيعة البشر أ.    
بعد اكتشاف جيمس واطسن وفرانسيس كريك لشفرة الحياة الدنا، »صارت الجينات رسميا 
كائنات مادية تضطلع بمهمة نقل المعلومات الوراثية من جيل إلى جيل« )أوفراي 2012، 26(، 
أعقب ذلك تجارب واكتشافات عديدة للكن ظلت الشفرة نفسها، أي اللغة التي يعبر بها الجخين 
عن نفسه تحتفظ في عناد بغموضها. كان السؤال الأساسي الذي يراود العلماء في هذا الشأن هو 
»كيف تسهم الجينات في اشتغال الأجسام الحية عبر التدخل في ظهور الخصائص التي ترتبط 
في الغالب بالبروتينات من قبيل الإنزيمات والهرمونات؟« )أوفراي 2012، 27(، بقي الغموض 
يكتنف هذه الجزئية المهمة من البحث إلى أن توصل كريك بمساعدة مجموعة من الباحثين سنة 
في  النكليوتيد  ثلاثة  في سلسلة من  الترتيب  بين  تقابل  بد من »وجود شفرة  لا  أنه  إلى   1960
)أوفراي  البروتينات«  تكون  التي  العشرين  الأمينية  الأحماض  من  وبين كل  النووي،  الحمض 
 RNA( أو ما يسمى أيضا رنا الناقلRNA 2012، 27(، هذه الشفرة الجينية هي جزيء الموائمة
transfer( )ريدلي 2001، 63( الذي يربط بين عالمي الدنا والبروتينات في نقل المعلومات داخل 
المادة الحية.
ومع تطور العلوم الطبية والبيولوجيا الجزيئية أصبح الاستكشاف في وراثة الإنسان يقدر من 
أجل ذاته، فلقد أدرك العلماء مدى الحاجة إلى تطوير علم راسخ يوفر عناصر أساسية للتغيرات التي 
تخص الكائن البشري على أسس علمية دقيقة، ومن ثمة أنشأت معامل تتعلق بوراثة الإنسان، 
كانت اللكشوف الوراثية تتوالى بسرعة وكانت »تعبر عن قدرة الإنسان اللكبيرة على السيطرة على 
الطبيعة، والطبيعة الإنسانية بوجه خاص« )صبحي 1993، 148(، وهكذا أدت التجربة الوراثية 
إلى تغير مفاهيم الجخين، ليطرح السؤال الجوهري: هل في مقدورنا أن نفهم كل الجينات التي 
تكون التركيبة البشرية؟
لقد أدت هذه التطورات إلى ثورة، ليس في الهندسة الوراثية فحسب بل ثورة في علم الأحياء، 
ومع زيادة النظم »التجريبية للكائنات والتقنيات التي يتبعها الوراثيون تغيرل خلال ثلاثة أرباع 
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القرن مفهوم الجخين وتعمق، ومعه بالتكامل الخرائط الجينية والتتابعات« )كيفلس، هود 1997، 
50( وبذلك طرحت فكرة إنجاز خريطة وراثية للإنسان من خلال مشروع علمي ضخم وكبير جدا 
.)Human Genome project( هو مشروع الجينوم البشري
يعد مشروع المجين البشري جهدا علميا هائلا مولته الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وحكومات 
أخرى لفك شفرة المتوالية الكاملة للدنا البشري، وكذا فك شفرة متوالية دنا كائنات أدنى)فوكوياما 
2006، 98(، وهو في الأصل يجمع تطور علم الوراثة منذ تحول القرن العشرين بل هو نتيجة هذا 
التطور، بدأ العمل فيه 1990 للاقتراب من الطبيعة البشرية بشكل دقيق )مصباح 1999، 67(، 
فهو تطبيق تكنولوجيا علمية للوصول إلى هدف معين هو المحتوى المعلوماتي للجينوم، بالبحث عن 
الجينات ومعرفة ما تفعله بالكائن الحي بعامة وفي البشر بخاصة، ومن ثمة التعرف على المعلومات 
الكاملة عن شفرة الجينات البشرية.
لقد فتح هذا الإنجاز العلمي آفاقا واسعا لمعرفة الطبيعة البشرية عن كثب، ذلك أنه سيوفر 
الجينية الجسدية وهندسة الخط  المعالجة  للغاية من خلال  نافعة  التطبيقات  بالفعل حصيلة من 
 eugénisme((الجيني، كما طرح إمكانيات تحسين الصفات البشرية في إطار ما يسمي إجينيا
العلماء من معرفة دور بنية الجينات في تطور الأمراض  Pastermak 2003, 13(( ، ومّكن 
الوراثية وكذلك في ظهورها، وكيف تسهم الجينات في تسبب الأمراض النادرة، ومن ثمة سيرفع 
من نوع الحياة بالتقليل من تفشي العديد من هذه الأمراض المؤلمة للعائلات والمكلفة للمجتمع 
)كيفلس، هود 1997 ،26؛40(.
للكن على الرغم من هذه الإيجابيات اللكثيرة وغيرها، طرحت أبحاث الجينوم البشري اللكثير 
من العقبات البيولوجية والمشاكل الأخلاقية، كون الجينوم البشري، وفي غضون تطور التقنية 
وكون   ،)18  ،2006 البشرية)فوكوياما  للطبيعة  الوراثي  التغيير  إلى  سيهدف  الجارف،  الحيوية 
الهندسة الوراثية البشرية الثاوية تحت إطاره ستؤدي إلى عواقب وخيمة من خلال فكرة »تعديل 
العلماء  من  العديد  وسمها  السياق  هذا  وفي   ،)248  ،2008 العلي  )درويش،  وراثيا«  البشري 
ورجال الدين بأنها أبحاث منافحة عن اللكرامة الإنسانية، ولأن »البشر لا يولدوا إلا بشرا )...( 
حسب القاعدة الشيء يولد الشيء نفسه« )Pastermak 2003, 05(، طرح جدل كبير حول 
إذا ما كانت أبحاث الجينوم ستغير من طبيعة الكائن البشري جوهريا، وكذا حول إن كانت هناك 
دواعي دفينة يحملها هذا المشروع للسيطرة على الطبيعة البشرية بسبب الطموح، وما ستؤول إليه 
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هذه التقنيات؟، وسواء كانت العواقب مقصودة »أو غير مقصودة، والتكاليف غير منظورة، فإن 
عمق المخاوف التي تغري الناس بخصوص التقنية ليس خوفا نفعيا على الإطلاق، للكنه الخوف 
من أن تتسبب التقنية الحيوية، في النهاية، في أن نفقد بشريتنا بصورة ما« )فوكوياما 2006، 130-
131(، ونفقد معها مقومات وجودنا الإنساني الأخلاقية والدينية. وبذلك كان الهاجس الرئيس 
الذي يصاحب مشروع الجينوم البشري هو الخوف من أن تناط أبحاثه وتطبيقاته بتغيير الطبيعة 
البشرية، وأن تستخدم في غير مصلحة الإنسان وحياته الوجودية والقيمية، وهو ما يعني إخراج 
الأخلاق  وفلسفة  للفلسفة  الأوسع  الدائرة  إلى  للعلم  الضيقة  الدائرة  من  البشري  المجين  سؤال 
التطبيقية بالخصوص.
التحكم فيه على  لتعديل السلوك البشري أو  المشروع  التي سيحملها هذا  فما هي الاحتمالات 
المستوى الكلي؟ هل ستؤدي تقنياته إلى نتائج دراماتيكية أم ثمة احتمالية لأن تسثمر بصورة فاعلة؟
ية: تطبيقات3 الجينوم البشري البحثية والطبية وعلاقتها بالطبيعة البشر ب.   
يوجينيا )تحسين( الطبيعة البشرية: 
إن فكرة سلسلة الجينوم البشري هي بأبسط معنى محاولة لتحديد الجينات التي تجعل منا بشرا، وفي 
هذا الإطار ركزت الجهود العلمية الأولى لمشروع الجينوم على تحسين النسل من خلال البحث 
جينيا عن كل ما يساهم في تحسين النوع الإنساني، وترجع هذه الفكرة في أصولها إلى الفيلسوف 
اليوجينيا  فهو  العلم  لهذا  المطور  المفهوم  أما   ،)2007،14،93 هود  أفلاطون)كيفلس،  اليوناني 
)eugenics( وقد صاغه فرانسيس جالتون، ويرتكز على فكرة الاستيلاد المتعمد للناس من أجل 
صفات وراثية منتقاة.
لقد طرحت اليوجينيا إمكانات رفع الجينات الإيجابية والبحث في الصفات الجيدة وخفض 
معدل الصفات السلبية لاستيلاد سلالات بشرية أفضل، للكن »الإنسان هو أكثر من جيناته..، 
بل أكثر كثيرا من أن يكون مجرد شفرة جينية« )ريدلي 2001، 10(، أو عينة تجربة في معامل 
الوراثة التحسينية، ولهذا أثارت بحوث اليوجينيا »قضية إن كانت الهندسة الوراثية المحسنة للسلالة 
للجينوم البشري عدة تطبيقات من أهمها تطبيقات الطب الشرعي كالبصمة الوراثية، علم مجخين الدواء،   3
تطبيقات الأمراض الوراثية...إلخ، غير أننا سنقتصر في هذا الشق من البحث على التطبيقات التي لها 
علاقة جد مباشرة بالطبيعة البشرية.
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أو المخلة بها قد تصبح يوما ما واسعة الانتشار لدرجة أن تؤثر في الطبيعة البشرية ذاتها« )فوكوياما 
2006، 106(، كما وتسببت في قدر »هائل من الخلاف لأنها تتحدى مفاهيم راسخة عن المساواة 
البشرية«  والهوية  للشخصية  فهمنا  وستغير  الأخلاقي،..  الاختيار  على  القدرة  وعن  البشر  بين 
)فوكوياما 2006، 109(، وأكثر المخاوف شيوعا في هذا الصدد أن تؤدي فكرة تحسين الصفات 
الجسمية والفكرية للأجيال اللاحقة إلى تصادم اجتماعي وأخلاقي ل ديني بين طروحات العلماء 
الرامية إلى تحسين البشر وراثيا وبين العقائد الدينية المسيحية والإسلامية التي تعتقد أن الله خلق 
الإنسان فقط على صورته )الحفار 1984، 29(، وهو موضوع جدلي كبير أفرز اعتراضات كبيرة 
على اليوجينيا من عدة نواحي دينية وفلسفية.
ية: العلاج الجيني للطبيعة البشر
يسعى العلماء من خلال علم الجينوم إلى معرفة الجينات التي تسبب الأمراض الوراثية وتحديد 
هوية زمرة كاملة من الجينات التي تؤثر في نمو الجسم أو عجزه عن أداء وظائفه، ومن ثمة إصلاح 
الخلل في الجينات أو تطويرها أو استئصالها تحت إطار العلاج الجيني القائم على استخدام الجينات 
التي يتكون منها الجينوم البشري للإنسان )الخادمي 2013، 286( لمعالجة العديد من الأمراض 
الشائعة، وكذا الوقاية من الأمراض المحتملة والمتوقعة.
إلى  مورثات سليمة  إدخال  على »عملية  والتداوي  العلاج  في  الجديد  الأسلوب  يعتمد هذا 
الخلايا لتصحيح عمل المورثات غير الفعالة بغية علاج المرض« )باشا، 67(، وإزالة الاخلال 
الوراثية الناجمة عنه. وعلى الرغم من أن العلاج الجيني لا يزال في مراحله المبكرة، إلا أنه قدم 
للبشرية منافع كبيرة نذكر منها الاكتشاف المبكر للأمراض الوراثية وبالتالي تفادي وقوعها من 
الأصل أو الإسراع في علاجها، ومعرفة التركيب الوراثي بما فيه القابلية لحدوث أمراض معينة 
كضغط الدم والنوبات القلبية ونحوها )القره داغي 2006، 314(، للكن على الرغم من كل 
هذه المنافع وغيرها تثير هذه التقنية عقبات بيولوجية وأخلاقية، حيث أنها تعرض حياة الإنسان 
المحتمل  73(، ومن  )باشا،  الفيروسية  الناقلات  في تحضير  الحالات خاصة  في بعض  للمخاطر 
كذلك أن تؤدي إلى تعريضه إلى نكسات نفسية واجتماعية من خلال قراءة جينومه الخاص 
واللكشف عن بعض الأمراض الوراثية، مما قد يؤثر فعلا على عمله الوظيفي وعلى زواجه وعلى 
كثير من أموره الخاصة )القره داغي 2006، 315(.
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وهكذا إذن تثير هذه السلبيات تساؤلات واضحة حول إمكانات اعتماد العلاج الجيني دون 
آثار جانبية، ومدى مشروعيته بمعزل عن الأضرار، لا سيما أن الإنسان لا يريد أن يحافظ على 
صحته فقط، بل يطالب بصحة أفضل )super santé(، ولهذا لم تتأكد بعد نجاعة هذا النوع من 
العلاج الذي لا يزال في أطواره الأولى مثل اللكثير من المحاولات العيادية البشرية التي لا تزال 
في مرحلتها التجريبية.
ية: التعديل الجيني للطبيعة البشر
بعد الألق اللكبير الذي حققته تطبيقات الجينوم البشري في مجال العلاج الجيني، لم يعد شفاء 
المرض هو الذي يستأثر بتفكير الإنسان وخياله فحسب، بل أيضا التحكم في شكله ومميزاته، ومن 
ثمة )ستكون ملامح الإنسان وأوضاعه الذهنية قابلة للتعديل والتغيير، وسيتأثر الذكاء والصفات 
بالوسائل اللكيميائية« )الحفار، 262(، وهو التحدي العلمي الذي فرضه أسلوب التعديل الجيني 
البشري، والذي ينشأ عنه »تعديل الخلايا في الجنين المبكر، ما قبل الزرع، أو عن طريق إدخال 
مورث جديد في بويضة الأنثى أو الحيوان المنوي للذكر« )درويش، العلي 2008، 247(، وهو لا 
يختلف عن العلاج الجيني للخلايا الجسدية إلا من حيث كونه علاجا جينيا لنوع آخر من الخلايا 
الجنينية والجنسية، وكلاهما يتم بالمستويات التقنية نفسها من إصلاح أو إضافة أو استئصال أو 
استبدال )أبو جزر 2008، 66(.
غير أن التعديل الجيني للخلايا الجنسية لا يقتصر تأثيره على الخلية المعالجة، وإنما يؤثر على الذرية 
بعد ذلك )أبو جزر 2008، 66(، »بحيث يصبح هذا التغيير المورثي مسجلا في الخلايا الجنسية 
وهو ما من شأنه أن ينتقل إلى الأجيال اللاحقة.. وهو في هذه الجزئية أكثر فعالية من العلاج 
بل سيخلص  علاجه،  تم  الذي  الشخص  تقف عند حدود  لا  تأثيراته  لأن  الجسدية،  بالخلايا 
المريض وسائر نسله من هذا العيب الوراثي« )درويش، العلي 2008، 247-248(، الأمر الذي 
سيؤدي إلى التخلص من اللكثير من حالات تشوه المواليد.
للكن على الرغم من كل هذه المزايا أثار التعديل الجيني جدلا كبيرا لجملة من الاعتبارات 
أهمها أنه يمكن التلاعب جنينيا بالخلايا الجنينية البشرية لإدخال الجينات العلاجية، »لقد تعودنا 
الاحتياجات  هوى  استنساخها حسب  سلبية  تنتظر  وصفات،  أنها  على  الجينات  في  نفكر  أن 
الجماعية للكائن ككل، أي أن الجينات خدم للجسد، أما هنا فنحن نلاقي حقيقة مختلفة، فالجسم 
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هو الضحية والألعوبة وميدان المعركة ووسيلة النقل لطموحات الجينات« )ريدلي 2001، 129(، 
وأخطر تهديد تمثله هذه التقنية في هذا الصدد »هو احتمالية تغيير الطبيعة البشرية، وبالتالي تنقلنا 
إلى مرحلة »ما بعد البشري« من التاريخ« )فوكوياما 2006، 18(، مع ما يترتب على ذلك من 
انعكاسات أخلاقية واجتماعية، وانزلاقات دينية وقيمية.
ية: التغيير الجيني للطبيعة البشر
في نطاق تحسين النسل في إطار هندسة الجينات مكنت أبحاث الجينوم الباحثين من استنساخ 
فصائل جديدة من النبات ومن »استنساخ حيوانات ثديية من الخلية الجسمية، وإنتاج نسخ طبق 
الأصل من هذه الحيوانات« )الحفار 1984، 262(، لتتوجه الأطماع العلمية بعد ذلك إلى البحث 
في إمكانيات معالجة الجينات الموروثة لخلق نسخ جديدة معدلة من الذوات البشرية من أجل 
تكاثر نوع مختلف وأفضل من البشر.
لقد أتاح الاستنساخ في مجال الحيوان إنتاج العديد من الأدوية ومن أهم ما تم في هذا المجال 
استنساخ الجخين المسؤول عن الأنسولين في جسم الإنسان، كما فتح الاستنساخ في مجال النبات 
المجال أمام برامج عديدة لزيادة تكاثر أنواع من النبات المعرضة للانقراض )مصطفى 2012، 288، 
290(، وعلى ضوء التجارب الناجحة في استنساخ أجنة الحيوان، فإن استنساخ الإنسان لم يعد 
مستحيلا )القره داغي 2006، 377(، إذ يأمل الباحثون في علم الهندسة الجينية تنشئة أجيال 
جديدة من البشر، أجناس متفوقة ومختلفة على حد سواء، وعلى الرغم من أن ذلك لم يتم إلى 
الآن، إلا أن عملية الاستنساخ البشري قد قطعت نطاقا واسعا فيما يمكن أن نسميه تكنولوجيا 
فيسيولوجية  تغييرات  تجريبيا من خلال  البشري  الكائن  تغيير صفات  إلى  تتجه  والجهود  النسل 
ووراثية وباستعاضة بعض أجزائه بالآلات )الحفار 1984، 118(، مما يعني نهاية الإنسان كإنسان، 
وخلق فصيلة جديدة من قبله هو بالذات، إن الإشكاليات التي يثيرها استنساخ البشر عويصة 
والنزاع على أشده فعلا بين علماء الأحياء وعلماء الدين، لأنه مسخ للجينات وطمس وتغيير نهائي 
للطبيعة البشرية.
لقد أفضت تطبيقات الجينوم البشري والتطورات التي أفرزها التطور البيولوجي ل الطبي في 
العموم إلى طرح معضلات أخلاقية كثيرة وإشكاليات جديدة تتعلق بالتلقيح الاصطناعي، زرع 
الأعضاء البشرية، تغيير الجنس، الإجهاض، الموت الرحيم )الأوتانازيا( )ديران 2015، 32(، 
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كما طرحت مفاهيم وتقنيات جديدة مثل إطالة الحياة، النسالة البشرية، الأطقم الوراثية، أطفال 
الأنابيب، الأمهات الحاضنات، كراء الأجنة والجراحة التجميلية، وكل هذه المسائل التي هي 
ليست محل إجماع، عجلت بالمطالبة الأخلاقية لعلوم الحياة والطب بشكل عام ولأبحاث الجينوم 
الإنسان، واستنهاض مجال  العلمية وتوجيهها نحو مصلحة  النتائج  ترشيد  بوجه خاص من أجل 
حيوي إنساني يضمن سلامة الحياة البشرية.
المساءلة الفلسفية والأخلاقية لأبحاث الجينوم: ج-   
حقل  في  العلمي  التقدم  أفرزها  التي  للنتائج  وسياسية  أخلاقية  مساءلة  البيوإتيقا  قدمت  لقد 
البيولوجيا، فهي »تشير إجمالا إلى التفكير المهيمن منذ عشرين سنة، على مختلف الحقول الفرعية، 
البيوطبي« )ديران 2015، 35(، وهي حاليا من أهم  التقدم  المطروحة من قبل  المسائل  حول 
الفروع المعول عليها في نقد وتقييم النتائج العلمية والتقنية الحاصلة في علم الوراثة الجينية وعلم الجينوم 
وانعكاساتها على كرامة الذات الإنسانية والواقع البشري الجديد.
يتيقية مهمة حول التقدم العلمي المذهل  من جهة أخرى قدمت الفلسفة المعاصرة تساؤلات إ
الجينومية  التقنية  الأبحاث  تهذيب  خلالها  من  الفلاسفة  حاول  البشري،  الجينوم  لتطبيقات 
والمساهمة في إيجاد حلول للمشكلات العويصة الطارئة التي أصبحت تهدد حياة الإنسان وتخدش 
قيمه وكرامته. ومن أبرز الإشكاليات المطروحة في هذا السياق البحث عن أنسب تعريف للطبيعة 
البشرية بما يتواءم مع مصلحة وقيمة الفرد البشري، وكذا ترشيد وأخلقة هذا الواقع في ظل جموح 
المتخصصين في علم الجينوم إلى إجراء المزيد من التجارب على الإنسان وتطبيق أحدث التقنيات 
العلمية.
يعد الفيلسوف الألماني يورغن هابرماس )1929( من أبرز الفلاسفة المعاصرين الذين قدموا 
المضمار من أجل الوصول إلى حل للمشكلات الأخلاقية الجديدة التي  جهودا رصينة في هذا 
الطبيعة  مستقبل  الشهير  مؤلفه  في  وبالضبط  هابرماس  تطرق  البشري،  الحال  تؤرق  أمست 
الوراثة  في مسائل  الجينوم  لثورة  التقني  التطور  وإفرازات  نتائج  إلى  ليبرالية  نسالة  الإنسانية: نحو 
الحيوية ونتائجه الوخيمة.
إنسان  ابتداع  أنه مسألة معقدة ستفضي إلى  النسالي ورأى  التدخل  جادل هابرماس بشأن 
عمق  إلى  بتأثيراته  يمد  الجينومي  البحث  يجعل  ما  وهذا   ،)20  ،2006 )هابرماس  هجخين  مشوه 
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المستوى  على  خطيرة  إنزلاقات  إلى  بدوره  ويؤدي  هيدجر4،  قول  حد  –على  الذاتية  كينونتنا 
القيمي والإتيقي، كما تطرق أيضا إلى مسألة تطبيق التكنولوجيا الجنينية، وإلى الجدل اللكبير حول 
استخدامات الجينوم البشري والمشاكل الأخلاقية التي خلفها لاسيما في مجال الخرطنة الجينية 
و البرمجة الوراثية )هابرماس 2006، 22(، وهو في ذلك يشدد على ضرورة إعادة النظر في هذا 
الفضاء العلمي والتقني لاسيما بعد الإخفاق اللكبير الذي حازه الدين والمجتمع وتراجعهما الشديد 
في ترشيد الحياة الإنسانية.
فما هي نظرة الأخلاق الإسلامية للجينوم البشري وتطبيقاته؟ وما هي التحديات المعرفية التي 
ستطرحها –بالموازاة مع الأخلاقية الفلسفية- في عصر ما بعد الجينوم؟
ية إسلامية(: رابعا: الجينوم والطبيعة البشرية )رؤ
الكتاب  في  الشرعية  النصوص  عن  »موروث«  البشرية  للطبيعة  المعاصر  الإسلامي  التصور  إن 
النابعة من  الإسلامية  للفقه وأصوله، أي تصورات الأخلاق  التاريخية  المصادر  والسنة، وعن 
رؤى فقهية وأصولية، وعن الأدبيات التراثية التي تربط الروح و الجسد كقاعدة أساسية لكل 
الكائن  ما يحرك  في كل  الروح جوهرا  أو جعل  والنفسية  البيولوجية  في طبيعته  للإنسان  فهم 
الإسلامية، بل  الغرض ليس دراسة مدى تطابق علم الجينوم مع الأخلاق  بيد أن  البشري، 
إيجاد مجال معرفي يجعل هذه الأخلاق نفسها تستثمر في الجينوم وجعله أفقا علميا لتطور أخلاق 
عملية ذات أبعاد إسلامية حضارية.
ومن ثمة فإن السؤال المطروح في هذا العمق هو: هل سيصمد هذا التصور أمام ثورة العلم وعلم 
الجينوم بالخصوص، هل سيغير علم الجينوم نظرتنا إلى الطبيعة البشرية فيصبح ما نسميه »تعديلا 
جينيا« هو من صلب تلك الطبيعة نفسها؟
لقد تساءل هيدجر عن ما الشيء الذي أصاب عمق كينونتنا الذاتية، كي يصبح العلم موضوع شغفنا،   4
المعاصر ليس إلا طريقة خاصة في التعامل مع الكائن  ليستطرد بأن النشاط العلمي الكاسح في العالم 
البشري والبحث في مكوناته الجوهرية.
ية273 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
ية: نظرة الإسلام إلى الطبيعة البشر أ.    
لقد اختلف الفلاسفة والعلماء في تحديد ماهية الطبيعة البشرية لشدة تعقيدها، ولاقتصار كل 
واحد منهم على جانب من جوانبها، أما الإسلام فقد قدم لنا تصورا شاملا عن الحقيقة الطبيعية 
البشري  الكائن  بين كل جوانبها، ونتيجة لذلك يتفرد  التكامل  للإنسان، يقوم على أساس من 
بخصائص وصفات تجعله يتمايز عن غيره من الكائنات.
إن الإسلام يرفع بعمق من شأن الطبيعة البشرية، فلقد خلق الله تعالى الإنسان وفضله على 
سائر المخلوقات بأن نفخ فيه روحا شرفها بأن نسبها إلى نفسه، »وإذ قال ربك للملائكة إني خالق 
بشرا من صلصال من حمإ مسنون، فإذا سويته ونفخت فيه من روحي فقعوا له ساجدين« )سورة 
الحجر/ الآية 28، 29(، كما حباه بالعقل وهو البعد الجوهري في طبيعته البشرية، به اختص بأمانة 
التكليف واستحق الاستخلاف ووهب قابلية التمييز بين الخخير والشر، وهو الجوهر الذي يتفرد به 
عن سائر الكائنات من جماد وحيوان.
المادي  الجانب  فأما  والروحية،  المادية  بين خصائصه  بالتكامل  أيضا  الإنسان  جوهر  يتحدد 
فيقصد به التكوين العضوي »ويتمثل في التراب والماء أو ما يتركب منهما، وهو الطين وقد نتج 
عن ذلك التكوين البيولوجي للإنسان المشتمل على أجهزته وحواسه وأعضائه وحاجاته الأساسية« 
) يوسف 2013، 13(، قال تعالى »ومن آياته أن خلقكم من تراب ثم إذا أنتم بشرا تنتشرون« 
)سورة الروم /الآية 20 (، وقال أيضا: »وهو الذي خلق من الماء بشرا فجعله نسبا وصهرا وكان 
ربك قديرا« )سورة الفرقان/ الآية 54(، في حين أن الجانب الروحي »هو الذي تتحقق وتتسم به 
وظيفة الإنسان الوجودية، والصحة لا تعتبر كاملة إذا فقدت بعدها الروحي« ) يوسف 2013، 
ارتفاع  الماديون- إحدى وسائل  بها  يؤمن  لا  -التي  الروح  تعالى أن تكون  الله  13(، فقد شاء 
الإنسان بالحياة )العجمي 1983، 63(.
إن اللكرامة عنصر رئيس أيضا في تركيبة الطبيعة البشرية، قال تعالى: »ولقد كرمنا بني آدم 
وحملناهم في البر والبحر« )سورة الإسراء/الآية 70(، وإنما تشريف وتكريم الله للبشر في خلقهم 
على أحسن هيئة وأكملها )ابن كثير 2002: 5(، قال تعالى: »يا أيها الإنسان ما غرك بربك اللكريم 
الذي خلقك فسواك فعدلك، في أي صورة ما شاء ركبك« )سورة الانفطار/الآية 08(.
وإذا كانت الاتجاهات العلمية والفلسفية قد شهدت نشاطا هائلا من الجدل والمناقشة حول 
تأثير البيئة والوراثة في الطبيعة البشرية، وأيهما أقوى في تحديد السلوك البشري، فإن الإسلام يقر 
بأهمية وتأثير كلا العاملين كمحددات أساسية لسلوك الإنسان وتشكيل شخصيته، وفي هذا الإطار 
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الماء بشرا فجعله صهرا ونسبا وكان ربك قديرا«  اللكريمة »هو الذي خلق من  يراد الآية  إ يمكن 
)سورة الفرقان/ الآية 54( وقد جاء في تفسير القرطبي بأن المقصود بالماء في هذه الآية اللكريمة 
هو النطف، وقد أثبت العلم الحديث أن النطفة تحمل الخصائص الوراثية التي يتأثر بها الإنسان في 
مختلف مراحل عمره، كما جاء في التفسير المقصود بالنسب جهة الأب، والمقصود بالمصاهرة جهة 
الأم، ومن ثمة فإن الآية اللكريمة تجمع بين الإشارة إلى الجانبين البيولوجي )الوراثي( والاجتماعي 
)المصاهرة(.
فإلى جانب التأثير المهم للوراثة، فإن الإسلام يولي أهمية كبيرة لتأثير البيئة في تشكيل الطبيعة 
فأبواه  الفطرة،  على  يولد  إلا  مولود  من  »ما  الرسول )ص(:  يقول  الصدد  هذا  وفي  البشرية، 
يهودانه، أو ينصرانه أو يمجسانه«، بيد أن هذا لا يعني بأي حال من الأحوال أن الإسلام يميل 
إلى الحتمية الاجتماعية، حيث أن للوراثة دوراً فاعلاً لا ينكره الإسلام، كما للبيئة والاكتساب، 
دورهما المهم أيضا، فللفطرة دورها المؤثر، غير أنها قابلة للتعديل والتغيير بالإيمان والعمل، يقول 
الله تعالى: »إن الله لا يغير ما بقوم حتى يغيروا ما بأنفسهم« )سورة الرعد/ الآية11(. 
ولما كانت الطبيعة البشرية حاملة لقيم اللكرامة فطرة وجبلة، ومخلوقة على أحسن تقويم وأعدله، 
أمرنا الله بصونها وحفظها والإبقاء عليها عل نحو ما هي عليه من دون تغيير أو تحويل عما فطر 
الله »لا تبديل لخلق الله« )سورة الروم/الآية 30(، فالأولى إذن أن يرتفع الإنسان ويسمو عن 
بالمحافظة على حياته وسلامة جسمه، خصوصا في ظل  أو يفسد خلقته  يعيب طبيعته  كل ما 
التطور العلمي الحديث.
للكن ما مدى إطلاقية هذا التصور في خضم ثورة الجينوم؟
المنظور الفقهي والأخلاقي للطبيعة البشرية في ضوء تطبيقات الجينوم البشري: ب.  
الجينوم  تغيير  حول  خطيرة  تحديات  يطرح  اليوم  الجينوم  علم  يشهده  الذي  الهائل  التطور  إن 
البشري، ومن ثمة إمكانية »تغير وتحول الطبيعة البشرية«، وهي إشكاليات مركزية تتجاوز الأبعاد 
نتائج خطيرة وهي  أفرز  الجينوم قد  تطبيقات  فمجال  الأخلاقي والأنطولوجي،  البعد  إلى  العلمية 
تتناقص مع الأغراض الإنسانية والقيمية المعلن عنها في البداية، وتأسيسا على ذلك سنتطرق فيما 
يلي إلى انعكاسات تطبيقات هذا المشروع على الطبيعة البشرية وفق منظور الأخلاق الإسلامية.
ية275 البشر والطبيعة  الجينوم 
لقد أصبحت الطبيعة البشرية موضوع رهان بين العلم وتقاناته الحديثة، وأضحى التحول يتهددها، 
سيما بعد أن بلغت التقنية شأواً عظيماً في عصر الجينوم وتطبيقاته، حيث أن ثورة الجينوم تطرح 
اللكثير من الإشكاليات المعقدة التي تمتد بتأثيراتها إلى عمق المسائل الدينية والأخلاقية للمجتمع 
البشري.
الاختلالات  تلك  توقع  على  اليوجينيا  علم  في  تساعدنا  أن  يمكنها  اليوم  الجينية  الخريطة  إن 
فالهندسة  أفضل،  بمواصفات جينية  وتعديلها  الطبيعة  تلك  يمكن من »تحسين«  بما  البيولوجية، 
الوراثية،  العيوب  من  خاليا  »يكون  الطلب  حسب  جيل  بتصنيع  وعدا  قطعت  قد  الوراثية 
وسيحاط المشتري مقدما بلون عيني الطفل، وشعره، وجنسه وبالمعلومات الخاصة عن احتمالات 
حجمه ونضجه ودرجة ذكائه...« )الحفار 1984، 114(، في هذا الإطار تأتي قرارات مجمع الفقه 
للعبث  ووسائله  الوراثية  الهندسة  علم  أدوات  من  أي  استخدام  »جواز  عدم  لتؤكد  الإسلامي 
بشخصية الإنسان، ومسؤوليته الفردية أو التدخل في بنية المورثات )الجينات( بدعوى تحسين 
السلالة البشرية« )القره داغي 2006، 325(، لأن »في ذلك تغيير لخلق الله بالتدخل في التركيب 
الوراثي للإنسان« )الألفي 2012، 24(، فهذا الأمر من المنظور الفقهي مرفوض شرعا لما فيه 
من مخاطر تتعلق »باللكرامة والحقوق الإنسانية والفضائل الأخلاقية وذلك من خلال التلاعب 
بالرصيد الوراثي للإنسان وتحويل البشر إلى آلات وأجهزة يتلاعب بها حسب الأهواء والرغبات« 
)الخادمي 2013، 288(، ولما فيه من أضرار ومفاسد »قد تؤدي إلى تغير البنية الأساسية للبشر 
التلاعب  بشكل دائم إذا ما استخدمت مورثات من أعراق أخرى« )باشا، 72(، حيث أن 
بشفرة الجينوم يمكن أن يوجد نسلا غامض الهوية ضائع النسب.
للكن ألا يمكن من وجه ما اعتبار تفصيل اليوجينيا لأطفال ذوي بنية قوية وطول فارع عَودٌ 
إلى الطبيعة البشرية في جبلتها الأولى؟ فقد ورد في الحديث النبوي الشريف قوله صلى الله عليه 
وسلم: »إن الله خلق آدم على صورته، طوله ستون ذراعا« )البخاري/6227(، كما ورد في القرآن 
اللكريم أن قوم عاد كانوا أطول من الأجيال التي سبقتهم يقول الله تعالى: »أوعجبتم أن جاءكم 
ذكر من ربكم على رجل منكم لينذركم واذكروا إذ جعللكم خلفاء من بعد قوم نوح وزادكم في الخلق 
بسطة فاذكروا آلاء الله لعللكم تفلحون« )سورة الأعراف/الآية69( كما كان طالوت أطول وأضخم 
من جيله زمن سيدنا داوود عليه السلام فالله يقول عنه: »إن الله اصطفاه عليكم وزاده بسطة 
في العلم والجسم« )سورة البقرة/ الآية 24(، مما يدل على أن البشر في فترات معينة، عبر التاريخ، 
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كانت قاماتهم أطول مما هي عليه الآن، وأجسامهم أكبر حجما بما يوحي بأن تغيرات بيولوجية هائلة 
قد حدثت على الجنس البشري، مما يعني كذلك أن الجينات البشرية نفسها تكون قد »تلاعبت« 
بالطبيعة البشرية وغيرت مسارها نحو جهات بيولوجية غير متوقعة، وقد ذكر الله تعالى أن هذا 
الاختلاف في الألوان البشرية هو من آياته اللكونية فقال سبحانه: »ومن آياته خلق السماوات 
والأرض واختلاف ألسنتكم وألوانكم إن في ذلك لآيات للعالمين« )سورة الروم/الآية22(. 
مثلا  بتنحية  وأخلاقيا،  اجتماعيا  سلوكهم  تحسين  إلى  وراثيا  البشر  تحسين  أدى  لو  ماذا  ثم 
جينات )العنف واللكراهية(، وتعزيز جينات )السلم والمحبة(، أتصور أن ذلك سيؤدي إلى تقليل 
العدوانية في مجتمعاتنا العربية المسلمة، والأمر نفسه ينبغي أن ينسحب على السلوكات الأخلاقية 
وتوقع شخصية  البشرية  الطبيعة  بفهم  المتعلقة  الأسئلة  أجوبة عن  يقدم  الجينوم  علم  إن  وغيرها، 
الإنسان وفهم سلوكه المستقبلي في صورة المعلومات المخزنة في الجينات المرتبطة بتلك السلوكات 
وغيرها، وعلينا أن نستثمر ذلك بما يعود بالنفع على مجتمعاتنا وديننا الحنيف وعلى الإنسانية جمعاء.
من جهة أخرى أجاز الفقهاء العلاج الجيني إذا لم يترتب عليه الإضرار والمفاسد من تخليط 
تصحيح  يؤدي  أن  احتمالية  ومن  الخلقية  الوراثية  الصفات  لتغيير  بعضها  مع  ودمجها  للجينات 
المورثات المصابة إلى إحداث تكوين طفرات وراثية تمتد آثارها إلى الأجيال القادمة، ووضعوا 
له شروطا وأحكاما خاصة بحسب كل نوع من هذا العلاج، وتستثنى منه الجراحات التي تخرج 
الجنس،  تغيير  عمليات  من   )326  ،2006 داغي  )القره  السوية  خلقته  عن  العضو  أو  بالجسم 
تبارك  الله  لخلق  تغييرا  ذلك  في  لأن  ممنوعة  فهي  اللون،  وتغيير  التجميلية كالوشم  والجراحات 
الله«  يقاع الناس فيه قال تعالى »ولآمرنهم فليغيرن خلق  وتعالى الذي يحرص الشيطان على إ
)سورة النساء/الآية119(. وروى البخاري )4507( عن عبد الله بن مسعود رضي الله عنه قال: 
»لعن الله الواشمات والموتشمات، والمتنمصات والمتفلجات للحسن، المغيرات خلق الله«.
كما أجاز أكثر الفقهاء والعلماء العلاج الجيني المتعلق بنقل الجخين إلى الخلية الجسدية، »لأنه 
يعيد العضو إلى أصل خلقته القويمة التي خلقه الله عليها«، فما كان لإزالة تشوه أو عيب ناتج عن 
حادث أو مرض فهو جائز، لما روى أبو داوود )4232( عن عبد الرحمن بن طرفة »أن جده 
عرفجة بن أسعد قطع أنفه يوم الكُلَاب، فأتخذ أنف أنفا من ورق )فضة( فأنتن عليه، فأمره 
النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم فاتخذ أنفا من ذهب«، مما يعني أن علم الجينوم لا يعدل الطبيعة البشرية 
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ولا يغيرها بل يعيدها إلى طبيعتها، إذا ما فهمنا أن تلك الطبيعة »مخلوقة« على »أحسن تقويم« ، 
»لقد خلقنا الإنسان في أحسن تقويم« )سورة التين/الآية 04(.
فأكثر أهل العلم يرون عدم جوازه »للحصول على صفات  أما تعديل الطبيعة البشرية جينياً 
أحسن لأن في ذلك عبثا بمكونات الإنسان الوراثية وفقا لشهوات الناس وأهوائهم دون حاجة 
إلى علاج أو وقاية من الأمراض أو غرض صحيح شرعا« )الألفي 2012، 24(، ولما يمكن أن 
الدنا  المخاوف هو أن هناك احتمال ضئيل بوصول  يترتب عليه من عواقب وخيمة وأحد هذه 
إلى الخلايا التناسلية مما يؤدي إلى إحداث تغييرات قابلة للتوريث )باشا، 73(، وبالتالي »لا يؤثر 
مجموع  ثمة على  أيضا، ومن  لذريته  الوراثي  المخزون  الشخصية، بل على  الوراثية  المادة  فقط على 
الصفات الوراثية للبشرية جمعاء« )درويش، العلي 2008، 249(، ومن أخطر الأضرار في ذلك 
ضياع الحصيلة الإرثية التي تتضمن الصفات العامة التي يشترك فيها سائر المجتمع البشري، وتجب 
المحافظة عليها كما هي دون تعريضها لأي تعديل سواء كان تعديلا متعمدا أو عشوائيا )درويش، 
العلي 2008، 249(، وقد كانت مسألة حق الكائن البشري في أن يولد بالإرث الوراثي الخاص 
الدينية حول  الفلاسفة والهيئة  بين  نقاشا كبيرا  التي قادت  القوية  المسائل  به دون تعديل من 
مسألة التدخل في الطبيعة البشرية، على أن السؤال الرئيس هنا هو من له الحق في تعديل أو تغيير 
مجخين طفل لم يولد بعد؟ ومن له حق الموافقة؟
ولما كان التعديل الجيني، بل وأي صورة من صور التدخل الوراثي المباشر، يؤثر في طبيعتنا 
تتعلق  السياق مفاسد أخرى  250(، ظهرت في هذا  العلي 2008،  البشرية الحيوية )درويش، 
أنتج سجالات  بالتدخل في خلق وتغيير خليقته من حيث الطول والقصر ونحو ذلك، وهو ما 
كثيرة تتعلق بصعوبة الفصل بين ما هو عادي طبيعي فطري بذاته لا يتعدى حدود التدخل في 
خلق الله، وبين ما هو محور ومعدل وراثيا وبالتالي غير عادي يدخل في باب تغيير خلق الله.
وهو ما لم تفصل فيه الأهداف اليوجينية فيما يتعلق ببحوث الجينوم، حيث أنها لم تسفر بعد 
عن تحديد دقيق للتراكيب الوراثية لأفراد من البشر بين ما هو الطبيعي فيها وما هو غير الطبيعي، 
الرفض  إلى  برامجها  تعرضت  ثمة  42( ومن   ،1997 المقبول )كيفلس، هود  وغير  منها  المقبول 
والتقييد. 
كما أن احتمال استخدامها في تعديل أو تعزيز القدرات البشرية قد يفضي إلى إشكاليات معقدة 
حول حدود استخدام هذا العلاج في تصميم أشخاص لهم قدرات بدنية وعقلية مبرمجة كالذكاء 
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والقدرات الرياضية لدى العباقرة والعدائين، مما يؤدي إلى تفاوت غير طبيعي بين الذوات البشرية 
في التركيبة العضوية والخصائص البيولوجية وكذا في القدرات الذهنية والسيكولوجية، وبالتالي 
ظهور نوع جديد من الطبقية يصبح الامتياز فيه موفرا للغني وصاحب النفود فحسب.
وللكن السؤال الآن: هل يمكن وضع حد فاصل بين ما هو علاج وما هو تعديل ومن ثمة 
قبول الأول ورفض الآخر؟
ينبغي أن نعترف بأن التمييز بين العلاج الجيني والتعديل الجيني للطبيعة البشرية مهمة صعبة، 
فهذا المعيار سيتغير تبعا للتقدم العلمي والتقاني، فما نراه الآن تعديلا قد يعتبر غدا علاجا وما هو 
تعديل في مجتمع ما قد يكون بالنسبة إلى مجتمع آخر علاجا ومن هنا يمكن إدراج هذه الظاهرة 
ضمن الشواهد على التعددية الثقافية أو التنوع الثقافي )الألفي 2012، 25(، ثم ما المانع إذا تمكنا 
من جعل أطفالنا أكثر صحة وعافية أو موهوبين بشكل أفضل؟ وعلى هذا أجاز بعض الفقهاء 
التعديل الجيني »لأن تحصيل الصفات الحسنة من الأمور المحمودة شرعا، ولا مانع من طلبها 
بالطرق المباحة، فالمؤمن القوي خير وأحب إلى الله من المؤمن الضعيف والله تعالى جميل يحب 
الجمال« )درويش، العلي 2008، 257(، وقد وهب الطبيعة البشرية هذه القوة والمسحة الجمالية، 
وهذا ما يدفعنا إلى إعادة النظر مجددا في مسألة التطابق مع ما نفترض أنه تعديل طبيعي للنوع 
عن  توضحه  أن  للفلسفة  يمكن  بما  الجينوم  علم  ربط  في  يكون  هنا  المعرفي  الرهان  إن  البشري. 
الطبيعة البشرية بدءا بالفصل بين ثبات النموذج البشري عبر التاريخ، والذي يمكن لعلوم أخرى 
كالأنثروبولوجيا أن تحلله )أعمال كلود ليفي شتراوس مثلا(، حيث أن بنية العقل البشري ثابتة 
منذ ما قبل التاريخ، وبين ما يذكره التاريخ الإسلامي من تحول للطبيعة البشرية.
لخلق  »تغيير«  لأنه  تحريمه  إلى  الفقهية  الأحكام  فتذهب  البشري،  للاستنساخ  بالنسبة  أما 
 ،381  ،2006 تمييع ذاته وتغيير هويته )القره داغي  للإنسان من حيث  الله يحمل مخاطر ذاتية 
390(، حيث أن النسخ البشرية المستحدثة قد تحوي عيوبا مطمورة لا تظهر إلا بعد أجيال كما 
أن النسخ المنتقاة لاستيلاد السلالات قد تحمل مورثات العنف والإجرام، ولما فيه من أخطار 
على الأخلاق والإنسانية، حيث أنه يفضي إلى تغيير العلاقة القديمة بين الرجل والمرأة ومن ثمة 
تختلط الأنساب وتضيع القيم التي قامت عليها البشرية، كما أن نقل الجينات معمليا يؤدي إلى 
تدمير الروابط العائلية المقدسة بين الأبناء وآبائهم )خطاب )د.ت(، 73(، والتعدي على كرامة 
الإنسان من حيث بيع الأجنة وإنشاء بنوك خاصة لتخزين الحيوانات المنوية، إضافة إلى أنه يفتح 
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آمالا لتخليق كائنات خرافية وتصنيع عضويات جرثومية ويؤدي إلى تغيير الأطقم الوراثية، ومن 
ثمة هدم التنوع الإنساني الذي أراده الله سنة إلهية. 
البشرية  الطبيعة  إلى  الإسلام  يتوافق في عمومه مع منظور  الجينوم  وهكذا إذن نجد أن علم 
أن  حيث  نفسها،  الطبيعة  تلك  صلب  من  هو  وتعديل  تحسين  من  يحدثه  ما  أن  حيث  من 
الأخلاق الإسلامية تتعامل بقدر كبير من المرونة والانفتاح مع القضايا العلمية والمشاكل التقنية 
والأخلاقية التي يفرزها هذا العلم من خلال الأبعاد الإنسانية والأخلاقية التي تتحراها الفتاوى 
الفقهية، بخلق توازن بين الأضرار والفوائد المحتملة من التقنيات المتوفرة لدينا، وهي إنما تسدد 
الاعوجاج وتصلح الخلل الطارئ وتعيد الفرع إلى أصله بالنظر الفقهي القويم. 
ومن ثمة وجب إحاطة علم الجينوم البشري بالضوابط الشرعية الإسلامية التي تنص على منع 
المفاسد على المصالح وغير ذلك من  الضرر ابتداء وعدم رفع الضرر بمثله أو أشد وتقديم درء 
وتنزيل  الإنساني جملة،  البدني  في  والتدخل  والتداوي  العلاج  باب  التي تحكم  الشرعية  القواعد 
قواعد الشرع العامة ومقاصده وكلياته بحسب مجالاته واستخداماته ومآله، فينظر في هذا كله لتزل 
القواعد على الوقائع )الألفي 2012، 25(، مع »رعاية المآلات والغايات والنتائج والآثار المترتبة« 
)الخادمي 2013، 290(، والموازنة بين المصالح والمفاسد والضرورات واللكماليات لتحدد منافعه 
وأضراره )القره داغي 2006، 323( من حيث اتصاله بكرامة الإنسان وبقيم الدين وثوابته، وبأمن 
الدول والشعوب لمنع البشرية من السقوط على مستوى أخلاقها )النشمي 2013، 174(، للكن 
هل يمكن للأخلاق الإسلامية أن تجيب عن كل الإشكاليات المتشعبة والمفصلية التي يطرحها 
هذا العلم ومن ثم فتح أفق جديد مبتكر فيما يخص معنى الإنسان؟ 
خاتمة:
إن الطبيعة البشرية ذات قيمة وجدارة غير أنها تواجه في سياقات التطبيقات التقنية لعلم الجينوم 
قضايا أخلاقية جديدة لم تكن مطروحة من قبل على منظومة القيم والأخلاق الإسلامية، ومنها 
الجدل حول ما يظل من الحق الطبيعي في الحرية لمن تكون حياته ومستقبله محددة جينيا سلفا؟ 
هل هو مخخير أم مسير؟ ووفقا لأي قدر وراثي محتوم؟ وتعمد إنجاب اليتامى بالإنجاب الاصطناعي 
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في حالة تخصيب زوجة بمني زوجها بعد وفاته وما يترتب عن ذلك من قضايا مستجدة في تقسيم 
الميراث بين الأم والأبناء، وتغيير جوهر الطبيعة البشرية بتغيير الجنس واستبدال الأدوار الطبيعية.
كما تطرح مسائل الاستنساخ وإطالة الحياة والموت الرحيم وغيرها المزيد من الأسئلة الأخلاقية 
حول ما يمكن أن نسميه شذوذا في الطبيعة وتصرفا في الجسد، مما يعني ضرورة إعادة النظر 
في عوائد ومفاهيم درج عليها البشر لآلاف السنين مثل مفهوم الإنسان، الحياة، الموت، مفهوم 
العائلة نفسه في هذا النوع الجديد من التشكل البشري، بل ينبغي إعادة النظر في مفهوم الطبيعة 
البشرية عينه الممزق بين نزعة العلم الجامحة إلى الاستزادة والنزعة الشمولية لمبدأ الإتيقا، وهنا توفر 
الأخلاق الإسلامية قدرا كبيرا من الحلول المثلى لضبط هذا العلم وترشيده وتهذيبه وتنقيحه مما 
علق به من الأضرار والمفاسد، كما تضمن الشريعة الإسلامية في هذا الإطار الحماية الشرعية للجسم 
البشري مما يضمن له الحفظ واللكرامة الآدمية، غير أن ثمة قضايا تتجاوز النظر الفقهي والمقاصدي 
ومن ثمة وجب ربط علم الجينوم بالقراءات المعاصرة للتراث الإسلامي واستثمار علومه المختلفة 
كالأدب والتاريخ والفلسفة، والاستعانة بالتخصصات المعرفية الأخرى.
إن الجينوم البشري في الواقع تراث مشترك للإنسانية، وترشيد أبحاثه وتقنياته يتطلب توافقا 
عادلا بين جميع أعضاء الأسرة البشرية لحفظ كرامة البشر الكاملة وتنوعهم، وأخلقة هذا الحقل 
العلمي تقتضي تظافر مختلف الميادين المعرفية كالبيوإيتيقا، الفلسفة فضلا عن الدور اللكبير الذي 
ينبغي أن يؤديه رجال الدين وعلماء الاجتماع والنفس والأخلاق الدينية، الأخلاق الإسلامية 
بالخصوص للبث في إشكالياته وقضاياه بدلا من فرادة وجهات النظر.
والأخلاقي  والروحي  المادي  بشقها  حضارية  معرفية  حقيقة  يشكل  البشري  الجينوم  إن 
والإنساني وهو يشكل تحديا معاصرا ومطلبا عاليا من حيث استثماره والنفع به ومن ثمة وجب على 
المجتمعات العربية الإسلامية أن تسارع للانخراط في توجهاته اللكبرى، على أن يحتكم مجال العمل 
إلى المرجعية والأخلاق الإسلامية، في سياق تتماشى فيه قوة اللكينونة الإنسانية مع مستجدات 
ونوازل التكنولوجيا العلمية حتى يكون القادم العلمي أفضل للبشرية جمعاء. 
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الفصل 11
في  معرفية  دلالية  مقاربة  والأخلاق:  الخِلْقة  بين  الجينوم  سؤال 
أخلاقيات علم الجينوم من منظور إسلامي
عباس أمير1
أولاً: مقدمة منهجية في مشكلة البحث ومساراته:
الغاطس المعرفي الذي يشّكل القضية الرئيسة ومتغيرها المعرفي، في البحث، هو؛ الصلة الكائنة بين 
النمط الظاهري والنمط الجيني، لسؤال الجينوم، لا من حيث البعد المادي لتلك الصلة، بل من 
حيث البعد المعنوي أو الأخلاقي. والذي يفترضه البحث أصالة، ويسعى إلى التدليل عليه، هو 
أن ثمة علاقة وطيدة بين الخلقة والأخلاق، صلة تجعل أية تغيير نوعي ومهم، في الأخلاق يعني 
تغييرا في الخلقة -وإن على المدى البعيد-، والعكس صحيح.
وللكي يدلل البحث على صدق فرضيته الأولى، يلجأ إلى إثارة سؤال رئيس، مفاده؛ ترى 
العلم-علم  ذلك  نسخ  من  نسخة  فأي  ذلك،  له  تم  وإن  الجينوم،  علم  الأخلاق  علم  يضبط  هل 
الأخلاق-، كافية لضبط الإجابة عن سؤال الجينوم؟ أو، لا، وإنما الذي يضبط علم الأخلاق 
بمرجعياته التاريخية السابقة لثورة البيولوجيا الجزيئية وتقانات الأحياء المعاصرة وكشوف الجينوم، 
والذي يدفع به إلى الأمام، هو ما رشح عن بحوث الجينوم وتجاربه من معطيات جديدة، فرضت 
نسخة أخرى لعلم الأخلاق ذاك وسمها المعنيون، هكذا؛ )البويوطيقا(؟ وإن كانت الأخيرة، فأي 
)بويوطيقا( هي؟ وهل بالإمكان صناعة بويوطيقا منضبطة بضابط ديني إسلامي؟
عباس أمير، أستاذ ورئيس قسم علوم القرآن، كلية التربية بجامعة القادسية، العراق  1
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ولتحقيق ما يمكن تحقيقه من إجابات عن تلك الأسئلة، اتخذ البحث لنفسه مسارا تطوريا، 
الخلاصات  دعته  ثم  الفرضية،  لتلك  والحضاري  الثقافي  السياق  عند  ابتداء  التوقف  إلى  دعاه 
المعرفية التي انتهى إليها من خلال توقفه عند العتبة الثقافية لسؤال الجينوم إلى التوقف عند البعد 
الأخلاقي للجينوم في ضوء البويطيقا الإسلامية المقترحة.
ومن أجل التدليل على تلك الصلة الكائنة بين البعدين البروتيني والأخلاقي للكائن الجينومي 
إلى  لجأ  الدين،  بضابط  الجينومية  الحيوية  الأخلاق  بحوث  إمكان ضبط  على  التدليل  ثم  أولا، 
تأكيد هذا الدليل من خلال الممايزة بين المشتركات الجينية للكائنات الحية قبل تشّكل المفاهيم 
الأخلاقية لديها مجتمعة أو كلا على حدة، وبين الخصوصية الفردية لكل فصيلة من الكائنات 
ثم لكل كائن، ورحلة للكن، بعد تشّكل المنظومة الأخلاقية، وهذا ما جرى بسطه ضمن محور؛ 
أن  أهمية  البحث  لدى  ترّشح  وهكذا  الفردية.  الخصوصية  إلى  اللكونية  المشتركات  من  الجينوم 
ليؤكد مرة اخرى  النمط الجيني والنمط الظاهري،  بين  التوازن والاعتدال  يتوقف عند علاقات 
وثاقة تلك العلاقات، سواء ضمن البعد البروتيني أم ضمن البعد الأخلاقي، وهذا ما يقوي فرضية 
البحث الأولى مرة أخرى.
ولقد كان البحث ضمن مساره ذاك يؤمن بمفهوم النص، وينتهج منهجا نقديا تحليليا، يستعين في 
أثنائه ببحوث الأبستمولوجيا والسيمياء والتأويل، خاصة وهو يقارب موضوع بحثه مقاربة دلالية.
ثانيا؛ المسار التطوري لسؤال الجينوم، منظور ثقافي:
لعلنا لا نجافي الحقيقة إذا قلنا إن المنظور الثقافي للعلم يتأثر بالتصور الحضاري السائد في اللحظة 
التي يشكل فيها العلم ملامحه ورؤاه ومعطياته. وإن المتأثرين بهذا المنظور، العلماء أنفسهم، فضلا 
عن أولئك الذين ينظرون إلى العلم من خارج المؤسسات العلمية، ذلك أن »التصور السائد في 
حضارة ما هو الذي يحّدد معالمها، ويشّكل اللحمة بين عناصر معارفها، ويملي منهجيتها، ويوجه 
تربيتها. وهذا التصور يشّكل إطار الاستزادة من المعرفة والمقياس الذي تقاس به« )أوغروس، 
ستانسيو 1989، 15(.
ومن هنا فإن وقفة منهجية أولى عند العتبة الثقافية والحضارية للحظة التاريخية التي يشّكل فيها 
سؤال الجينوم معالمه وملامحه الأولى هي وقفة فاعلة ومؤثرة في النظر إلى الرائز الذي تراز به 
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بحوث الجينوم وتساؤلاته المعرفية. فاللحظة تلك، بكل ما لها من مستندات معرفية، لحظة فاعلة 
بان ترسيم معالم سؤال الجينوم ومقاصد بحوثه التي ما زالت تشّكل قلقا معرفيا وحضاريا، وللكن  إ
تلك اللحظة التاريخية–حقا-ستكون منفعلة بعد حين من الدهر يفقد في خلاله سؤال الجينوم قلقه 
الحضاري ويرضى أن يكون بديهيا. وللكننا الآن نعيش اللحظة التي تسبق، أو على الأكثر، نحن 
نعيش اللحظة البرزخية الكائنة بين كينونة الجينوم تساؤلا وبين كينونته إجابة. ومن هنا تتأتى أهمية 
أن تملأ هذه اللحظة التاريخية ومراحلها الأولى بإجابات وافية، بما في ذلك الإجابة الأخلاقية. 
بالضد من بحوث الجينوم بقضّها وقضيضها، وللكنها تجهد في  ويقينا إن هذه الإجابة لا تقف 
تفكيك حمولتها المعرفية والثقافية، وما يترتب على تلك الحمولة من تهديد براغماتي للنوع البشري 
وأنساقه الثقافية، مقصودا كان ذلك التهديد أو غير مقصود، إن أحسنّا الظّن.
على كل حال، يعلمنا تاريخ العلوم أن إدراك العلاقة بين المعلوم تماما والمجهول تماما إدراك 
متقلّب، » وعندما يأخذ المرء بالتفكير في أنه استنفد كل ما هو ممكن أن يعرف، سرعان ما 
يدرك أن ما يمكن أن يعرف هو أوسع بكثير مما كان يتخيل. وينتج نوع من الانقلاب-وهي 
حالة علم الجينوم الذي أثار إحساسا بالانفتاح وبالإمكانات المتجددة. ويجب على هذا الإحساس 
بالانفتاح أن يدفعنا إلى التفكير، ليس فقط على المديين القريب والمتوسط، بل على المدى البعيد 
أيضا. إن التفكير في شيء، وليس التفاعل معه، هو نوع من الاستباق التأملي« )دوبرو 2007، 
512(. وعلى هذا يبدو أننا ملزمون بنوع من الاستباق التأملي الذي ننظر من خلاله إلى سؤال 
لنا مزيدا من  له يحّقق  البحث الأخلاقي، حتى نشيّد فهمما آخر  الجينوم، وللكن من على شرفة 
الوعي به وبمضامينه الثقافية والحضارية، بما يعمل على تخّطي مشكل )اللبرلة( المادية للوعي إلى 
فضاء آخر يسمح لنا بالانخراط في فهم مشروع الجخين، وللكن، دونما مجافاة المحددات التاريخية 
هب كائنا أخلاقيا.
ِ
بعّد والأنساق القيمية للإنسان، ب
وتأسيسا على ما سبق يبدو واضحا السبب الكامن وراء الاختلاف في النظرة الحضارية لعلم 
الجينوم من حيث القبول التام أو القبول المشروط. أما الاتفاق على قبوله فمردّه إلى الاتفاق على 
ألمه وتعاسته. وبدليل  به سعادته وتجنيبه  الإنسان كماله، والبلوغ  ببلوغ  المعلنة، متمثلة  مقاصده 
قول المسلمين في موضوع علم الأخلاق، إنه؛ »الملكات النفسانية من حيث تعديلها بين الإفراط 
والتفريط )...( ومنفعته أن يكون الإنسان كاملا في أفعاله بحسب الإمكان ليكون في أولاه 
سعيدا وأخراه حميدا« )زاده 1998، 90-91(. فإذا ثبت لنا أن غاية علم الأخلاق هي الوصول 
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بالإنسان إلى مرتبة اللكمال، »لأنه لا يمكن في شيء من الأشياء أن يتشوّق ما ليس من طباعه 
وطبيعته، ولا أن ينصرف عما يكمّل ذاته ويقوّم جوهره« )ابن مسكويه 1985، 7(، محققا ذلك 
بلا روية ولا اختبار مرة، وبالرياضة والاجتهاد مرة أخرى2، إذا ثبت لنا ذلك، خلصنا، إلى أن 
محاولات تأسيس علم أخلاق حيوي هي محاولات مقصودة لذاتها ولغيرها، لأنها هي الأخرى 
تجهد، في أصلها الموضوعي السابق للأدلجة، من أجل إيصال الإنسان إلى كماله. والمشكل إذاً 
ليس في الأصل، وإنما في الذي تطوّر عن الأصل، وفي اللكيفية التي ينتهي بموجبها الإنسان 
إلى كماله، ثم في الحدود الضابطة لمفهوم اللكمال من وجهة نظر الباحثين في البيولوجيا المعاصرة 
وأخلاقياتها، ومن وجهة نظر أولئك الباحثين، وللكن ضمن الضابط الإسلامي لذلك النظر. 
ولعلنا لا نبتعد عن الحقيقة كثيرا، إذا قلنا إن علم الأخلاق نفسه خاضع لهذا المنطق المعرفي، 
أدبياته، ذلك أن مائز  فيها  تتشّكل  التي  الفلسفات والأيديولوجيات  إليه، على ضوء  ننظر  حينما 
اللكمال الأسمى أو الخخير الأسمى، مما يختلف فيه المختلفون، »فمنهم من يراه في تحصيل اللذة ومنهم 
من يراه في تكميل النفس بل إنهم ما يزالون مختلفين في تعريف الخخير مطلقا، والشر من الأفعال، 
والصواب والخطأ من المناهج« )دني 2012، 10(. ولهذا تعددت المذاهب الأخلاقية بناء على 
أو  الفطري  المذهب  فثمة  الإنساني،  السلوك  إلى  النظر  في  منه  تنطلق  الذي  المعرفي  الأصل 
الوحياني، ومفاده أن الأفعال تكون حقا إذا هي طابقت معايير وقيم سابقة متفق على معياريتها 
الفردية  اللذّة  إلى  أدى  إذا  بالحقانية  الفعل  يسم  الذي  اللذّّي  المذهب  وهناك  واجتماعيا،  دينيا 
أو الغيرية، مع غض النظر عن معيارية الفعل ومجتمعيته أو وحيانيته، أما المذهب الثالث فهو 
المذهب النشوئي، ومفاده أن الفضيلة نتاج سياق تدريجي من النشوء والتطور، وهي لأجل هذا 
مرهونة بسياقها التاريخي )دني 2012، 12(. 
والذي لنا بناؤه، بلحاظ ما سبق، هو أن النظرة إلى بحوث الجينوم ومعطياته والآثار المستقبلية 
الأخلاق وعلم الجينوم ينطوي  المذاهب. وأن كلا من علم  تلك  تبتعد أخلاقيا عن  لتقانته لا 
على معايير أولى وأصول سابقة تؤسس لكل منهما التأسيس القابل لأن يتفرع منه علم أخلاق 
)جينومي(. أما النظر في كل منهما بمعزل عن الآخر، أو النظر في رابطة واحدة تربط بينهما 
قانونية أو فقهية فهذا اختزال تام للحقيقة.
انظر: )حاتم، عدّي 1985، 47(.  2
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له  الجينوم، وإن تم  علم  الأخلاق  إلى تساؤل مهم، مفاده؛ هل يضبط علم  يقودنا  وهذا ما 
ذلك، فأي نسخة من نسخ ذلك العلم كافية لضبط الإجابة عن سؤال الجينوم؟ أو الذي يضبط 
المعاصرة  الأحياء  وتقانات  الجزيئية  البيولوجيا  لثورة  السابقة  التاريخية  بمرجعياته  الأخلاق  علم 
من  وتجاربه  الجينوم  بحوث  عن  رشح  ما  هو  الأمام،  إلى  به  يدفع  والذي  الجينوم،  وكشوف 
معطيات جديدة جاست خلال الديار التي لم تسكن من قبل إلا ما استطاعه العقل البشري ما 
قبل عصر الجينوم، متمثلا بإضاءتها تصوريا وتأمليا؟ ومن ثم هل صالح أن نقول إن البيولوجيا، 
وما له صلة بها ممثلا بكتاب الجينوم هو الأصل الذي تنبني عليه فصول كتاب الأخلاق، أو إن 
الأخلاق المنضبطة بضابط الدين والخخير الأسمى هي البوصلة التي تضبط حراك بحوث الجينوم؟ 
أو إن كلا من الكتابين أصل وأن لا علاقة لفحوى كل منهما ومؤداه بفحوى الآخر ومؤداه؟
وهاهنا، ثمة الرؤية الكانتية لللكمال الإنساني، وهي تدفع بعيدا كل إرادة خيرة خارج حدود 
كتلة البروتين المسمّاة؛ الإنسان، إذ يقول؛ »افعل الفعل بحيث يمكن لمسلمة سلوكك أن تصبح 
مبدأ تشريع عام« )كانت 2002، 11(، وهذا –وبتعبير استعاري مقصود- ما يجعل من كتاب 
الأخلاق وكتاب الجينوم ضمن مستودع واحد، وبفهرسة واحدة. والواضح أن هذه الرؤية ستشّكل 
الرؤية  هذه  تشّكل  ذلك،  وقبل  الحاضرة،  الجينوم  لأيديولوجيا  التحتية  والبنية  المعرفي  الأس 
الوجودية  العلقة  بعيدا  تنحّي  التي  الأخلاقية  للمذاهب  مستندا شرعيا، فضلا عن رؤى أخرى، 
والمعرفية الكائنة بين الدين والأخلاق. وللكن، لنتفق، على حقيقة مفادها؛ أنم ليس ثمة كالدين 
يقصد البلوغ بالإنسان كماله الأسمى، وليس ثمة كالجنبة الأخلاقية من جنبات الدين ميدانا رحبا 
لتحقيق ذاك اللكمال، وللكن بلحاظ أن الدين ينظر إلى ديمومة الحياة بعد الموت، على حين يقتصر 
الماديون المخالفون للدين والتدين على اللكمال ما قبل الموت. ولعله من المفيد تماما أن نخلص في 
نهاية المطاف إلى أن الفرق بين أصلَي الأخلاق السابقين، فرق بين الموضوعي والذاتي معرفيا، 
بين  التمييز  التمييز، وبموازاته يجري  بين تفسيرين؛ ميتافيزي وآخر وضعي. وبمعية هذا  وهو كائن 
بين مدخل أخلاقي ديني ثم إسلامي، جينومي، ومدخل مادي، كيما لانحمّل الأدوات المادية 
والتقانات المعاصرة مسؤولية الشطط في وضع المقدمات واستخلاص النتائج.
والآن، لنخط خطوة قصيرة إلى الأمام، فنقول؛ حقا، هي مفارقة لافتة، أن يقترح سؤال 
الجينوم الغربي ضمن مفهوم )الحتمية الوراثية( إجابة تتنافى مع مسلّمات ذلك الغرب، بكل ما 
لتلك المسلّمات من بعد فلسفي وثقافي مادي. فالديباجة الفلسفية الغربية ومنهجها العلمي التجريبي 
يذهب إلى أن البعد المعنوي للإنسان نتاج البيئة الثقافية واللحظة التاريخية. وهنا تبدو مضامين 
العصر الجينومي مفارقة لتاريخ العلم الحديث ومسلماته التي جهدت في تجريد الإنسان من بعده 
المعنوي الغيبي. وهذا ما يدعو إلى القول؛ إن مضامين العصر الجينومي، في جانب من جوانبها، 
للنَُخب  الثقافي  للفضاء  تمثل خيانة عظمى  إنها  لم نقل؛  تمثل نكوصا معرفيا وثقافيا غربيا، إن 
الغربية...!
ولعل هذا النكوص المعرفي والثقافي الذي يرجع بمسلمات الحضارة الغربية المادية القهقرى، 
وهي تجهد اليوم في القول؛ إن البعد المعنوي للإنسان نتاج المادة- البروتين← القواعد النتروجينية، 
لعله لا يمكن تفسيره، في جانب من جوانبه، إلا ونحن نستحضر القولة الفلسفية المتداولة شعبيا؛ 
)كل شيء زاد عن حّده انقلب إلى ضّده(. وطبعا، لا بد بعد ملامسة الضّد الضّدَ من العود 
إلى )الوسط الذهبي الأرسطي( ثانية، فيصير البعد المعنوي للإنسان نتاج عالم الغيب وعالم المادة، 
تترجمه - مع غض النظر عن كفاءة الترجمة- الوراثة والثقافة إلى حقيقة معيشة، وهو ما خلص 
إليه المسلمون منذ قرون عديدة.
من جهة أخرى، تبدو امتدادات الفكرة النيتشوية القائمة على إرادة القوة و )موت الإله( 
وعدمية الأخلاق3، واضحة بارتداداتها وانعكاساتها المضمرة ومَُصاداتها المتعددة في عصر الجينوم. 
حدود  تبدأ  جديدا  إلها  وتتويجه  الألوهية،  وسام  الجينوم  تقليد  ضمنا،  ذلك  على  ترتّب  والذي 
بتدبير شؤون  الإنسان، وتنتهي عندها، ومن ثم، مطالبته  المسمّاة؛  البروتينية  الكتلة  ممللكته بهذه 
تلك الممللكة...! 
ولا نختلف بعد هذ وذاك، على أن سؤال الجينوم سؤال متشّظ فلسفيا وثقافيا، ولعلّنا لا نعدو 
الواقع، قولنا ؛ إن تشّظيه، راجع في  بعيد عن  إنه متشظ علميا أيضا. وغير  قلنا ؛  الحقيقة إذا 
جانب منه، إلى تشّظي السياق الثقافي الذي تشّكلت فيه بحوث الجينوم، غير غافلين عن الأصول 
العلمية الموجهة لتلك البحوث، التي تشّكل البيولوجيا التطورية ضابطها. ومن هنا يبدو، أنه مهم 
جدا تفسير سؤال الجينوم على ضوء البعد الأخلاقي الذي له الأولوية في ترسيم فردية تلك الكتلة 
البروتينية، المسمّاة؛ الإنسان، مقارنة ببقية الكائنات الحية.
من هنا، نقول؛ إن التأسيس الأمريكي لمشروع الجينوم البشري، وما تلاه من تجارب شرق 
آسيوية وأسترالية وكندية وإسرائيلية مرة، وأوربية- محدودة- مرة أخرى، وما يُعّد تتمة له متمثلا 
انظر؛ )نيتشه 2011(.  3
والأخلاق289 مقة  بل الخ بين  الجينوم  سؤال 
290 مير أ
خضوع  من  تبعه،  وما  التأسيس  هذا  إليه  يحيل  وما   ،2008 عام  الأعلى(  )الجينوم  بمشروع 
الحضارة الأمريكية لمذهب البراغماتية الأخلاقية وضابطها اللذّّي أو النفعيّ، ضمن فضاء معولم 
ثقافيا، وحر اقتصاديا، يعني أننا بإزاء تفسير جديد لمفهوم الأخلاق سيلقي بظلاله الوارفة على 
منَن( بيولوجيا،  مفهوم الإنسان الجديد. ومن هنا، وللكي نفهم محددات هذا الإنسان الجديد ال)ُمجَي
و)المُعوملَم( ثقافيا، لا بد لنا ابتداء من إعادة قراءة فهمنا لإنسان ما قبل )الجينوم(. على أن لا 
ننسى أن الخطورة الكامنة في بحوث الجينوم تتجلى في قدرة هذه البحوث المستعينة بتقانات العصر 
على التأسيس لل )براديغيم( علمي جديد يؤسس هو الآخر لأفعال تتواتر حتى تصير عادات فتصير 
العادات سلوكا مرغوبا ومشروعا ثم يصير السلوك خلقا جديدا. إنه )براديغيم( خلقي ناشئ في 
رحم )البراديغيم( العلمي ابتداء ثم متناغم معه بما يشّكل فضاء جدليا لحاضر علمي و أخلاقي 
جديد يضطر منظومة الأخلاق القديمة إلى أن ترتدي طوعا أو كرها ثوب الجينوم الفضفاض 
تماما...!
ية الشخصية: ثالثا: البعد الأخلاقي للجينوم بين الأمن الديني والحر
إن التلاقي الكائن بين الوراثة والتنشئة في النمط الظاهري للجينوم، وهو عينه التلاقي الكائن في النمط 
العميق، على الرغم من اللكثير من المحاولات الغربية الحثيثة لتنحية ذلك التلاقي عند الإجابة عن 
مق )بسكون اللام(/ البعد البروتيني للجينوم،  سؤال الجينوم، يكشف عن تداخل عميق بين الخل
العربي الذي يفارق  اللسان  التنويه بأن  المعنوي. وهنا، لا بد من  البعد  اللام(/  ُلُق )بضم  والخ
مق(، بسكون اللام، وصيغة )الخلُق( بضم اللام، يجمع بينهما بصيغة )خليقة(،  بين صيغة )الخل
»فالخليقة تدل على ))المخلوق(( كما تدل على ما خلق به من سجايا؛ من هنا، يصح أن نقول بأن 
مقي [ كل تشّكل في الخلق يقترن به تهيؤ في الخلُق [بضم اللام]، وأن كل زيادة في التشّكل الخل
بسكون اللام]، تقارنه زيادة في التهيؤ الخلُقي [بضم اللام]؛ والعكس أيضا صحيح، فكل نقص 
في التشكل يقارنه نقص في التهيؤ« ، وهذا يعني أن )الخلق الآدمي( ليس ظاهرة متمتعة بالحياة 
فقط، وإنما هو ظاهرة قيمية أخلاقية )عبدالرحمن 2012، 273-274(. ولا شك أن حرية الإرادة 
مظهر مهم من مظاهر تلك الظاهرة الأخلاقية، المسماة؛ الإنسان. 
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ولا شك أن المسؤولية الأخلاقية لذلك الكائن بشّقيه؛ الظاهري والعميق، مشروطة بقدرة 
الباعث [على  المحرك  التصرف، »إذ لا يصح طلب شيء من غير إرادة، إذ هي  الإرادة على 
المصرفة لعامتك« )ابن عربي 2003، 46(، وإلا  البحث] والتفتيش، والإرادة من خاصتك 
يفتقد فيه ذلك  الذي  الوقت  السيء مثلا، في  فكيف نجخيز لأنفسنا أن نسأل شخصا عن فعله 
الشخص امتلاك قراره الشخصي وإرادته الحرة؟ ومن هنا نقول مع أحد الدارسين؛ »ما دامت 
حرية الإرادة شرطا أساسيا للمسؤولية الأخلاقية، فلا بد أن نكون على يقين من أن نظريتنا في 
حرية الإرادة تقدم لنا الأساس الكافي لهذه المسؤولية. وعندما نقول إن فلانا مسؤول عن أفعاله 
ُمتدح،  ي أو  يُلام  يُثاب،  أو  يُعاقب  أن  يمكن  فلانا هذا  أن  يعني  فإن ذلك  أخلاقية،  مسؤولية 
بحق، على ما يقوم به من أفعال. للكن ليس من الإنصاف معاقبة انسان على فعل لم يكن في 
استطاعته أن يمتنع عنه« )ستيس 1989 ،295-296(. وللكن ، وبالمقابل، لا يمكن القول إن 
الحتمية تتناقض مع المسؤولية الأخلاقية، »فأنت لا تلتمس الأعذار لرجل لفعل خاطئ ارتكبه 
لأنك تعرف شخصيته. أو لأنك تشعر عن يقين أنه سوف يقوم به مقّدما. كما أنك لا تحرم انسانا 
من المكافأة أو الجائزة، لأنك تعرف جانبه الخخيّر، أو قدراته، أو لأنك تشعر عن يقين مقّدما أنه 
سيفوز بهذه الجائزة« )ستيس 1989، 96(. وهكذا يتضح أن الحرية شرط المسؤولية الأخلاقية، 
ويبدو أن الأخيرة تتطلّب الحتمية، »فالافتراض الذي يقوم العقاب على أساسه هو أن السلوك 
البشري محتوم سببيا. فإذا لم يستطع الألم أن يكون السبب في قول الصدق، فلن يكون هناك مبرر 
على الإطلاق لمعاقبة الكاذب« )ستيس 1989، 97(.
من جهة أخرى، يبدو أن الميل التام إلى إحدى الجنبتين؛ الحرية أو الحتمية يعني، مما يعني، 
تفكك مبدأ التوازن الضامن ديمومة التنوّع والاختلاف مرة، وانهيار الصفة المجتمعية مرة أخرى. 
نعم إن ديمومة المنظومة الأخلاقية تستلزم الإعلاء من شأن الحتمية الأخلاقية المجتمعية، وللكن، 
وبالقدر نفسه، تستلزم المسؤولية الأخلاقية الإعلاء من قيمة الحرية الفردية. وللكن الذي يجري 
في عصر الجينوم هو إرادة عولمة الأخلاق، وتشكيل منظومة أخلاقية جديدة تتحول معها المعايير 
الأخلاقية القارّة للشعوب إلى أعراف وتقاليد ليس إلا، وهذا ما يحكم عليها بالنسبية، ويسمح 
بعدم ثباتها، ما يعني اختلاف الحكم على طبيعة الفعل الأخلاقي الواحد باختلاف الزمان والمكان 
النسل مستحبّا والإجهاض مباحا في عرف  الاجتماعية، وهكذا يصير تحديد  التركيبة  وطبيعة 
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المجتمعات التي تعلي من شأن الحرية الفردية غير المنضبطة بضابط سماوي، ويصير تحديد النسل 
عيبا والإجهاض جريمة في المجتمعات المحافظة أو القليلة الكثافة )ماير 2002، 284(.
ولنستعن بأسلوب إثارة السؤال، ونحن نجهد في إضاءة القضية إضاءة جديدة، فنقول؛ ترى 
هل التعديل الاضطراري السابق للصفات الوراثية من )اللكسب(؟ وكيف يحاسب من عّدلت 
صفاته الوراثية المتعلقة بالذكاء مثلا، فتصرّف بتلك الإمكانات بعد بلوغه سن التكليف تصرفا 
سالبا؟ وكيف يحاسب من عُّدلت صفاته الوراثية الجسمانية، فامتلك بذلك التعديل وسامة بالغة، 
ثم حينما بلغ سن التكليف انتهى به ذلك التعديل إلى فتنة الإغواء فأغوي بسبب وسامته؟ ترى 
هل من العدل أن يحاسب كما يحاسب دميم الخلقة ضمن هذه الحيثية؟
الزيادة  هذه  ضمن  فارتكب  عمره،  فطال  الوراثية  صفاته  عُّدلت  من  يحاسب  كيف  ترى 
العمرية المعاصي؟ ترى هل من العدل أن يحاسب كما يحاسب لو إنه بلغ من عمره ما كتب له 
قبل التعديل ثم قضى؟
لا شك أننا لا نقبل تلك المساواة على مستوى الحواسيب المبرمجة والأخرى غير المجهزة بعّدة 
برمجية، فكيف نقبلها للإنسان؟
فإن قيل، إن الانسان أصالة لا يمتلك الخيار في صفاته البيولوجية في كل الأحوال، قلنا، 
وللكن الذي منحه صفاته الأصيلة عادل يتجلى عدله في أن الجزاء عنده على قدر العطيّة.
فإن قيل، وللكن صفاته التي اكتسبها بعد تعديله ليست من كسبه، فلا يجازى عليها خيرا أو 
شرّا، قلنا، فيُجازى من تولى تعديله إذن، ومن رضي بتعديله ترتّبا. وهكذا نجدنا نقوّض مسلّمة 
بينَةٌ﴾)المّدثر؛38(،  بمَا َكسَبَتم رَه اللكسب الذاتي، ونصير غرضا للآية التي تقول؛ ﴿كُّلُ نَفمٍس ب
ونبتعد كثيرا عن مفهوم )اللكدح( الإنساني الذي تؤكده الآية المباركة مشيرة إلى أن صناعتنا 
ذاتية  الإنسانية هي صناعة  إلى مستوى  البشرية  بنا من مستوى  ترتفع  التي  لأنفسنا  الشخصية 
بها من خلال بذل المزيد من  مرهونة بمدى قدرتنا على المحافظة على معنوياتنا النفسية والسموّ 
الجهد في اكتشاف النفس وممارسة النشاط العقلي البناء وترجمة كل ذلك بالعمل الصالح، بدليل 
بيهب﴾)الانشقاق؛6(...! َك كَدمحًا فَمُلَاق
ِ
ّ ََّك كَادبٌح ِإلَى رَب مسَانُ ِإن هَا المِإن قوله تعالى؛ ﴿يَا َأّيُ
ولعلنا، ومن زاوية أخرى، نواجه هاهنا فكرة النسبية الأخلاقية، ونحن نحاول أن نجيب عن 
السؤال الآتي؛ ترى هل، حقا، أخلاقنا نحن- النوع البشري- نتاج سلوك النمط البشري الذي 
نشأ، كما يقول علماء الأحياء التطورية، خلال حقبة التكيّف التطوري قبل نحو100,000 سنة، 
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وهل نحن –النمط البشري- متكيفون أخلاقيا مع العالم الخارجي، التكيف الذي يحقق لنا كرامة، 
هي ببساطة نتاج تغيرات بيئية )فوكوياما 2006، 191-192(؟ وهل فعلا، يستطيع الإنسان أن 
يمنح نفسه معايير أخلاقية جديدة للحياة اللكريمة في أوضاع جديدة؟ وهل لنا أن نخلق معايير كرامة 
إنسانية جديدة غير تلك التي انتهت إلينا عبر التاريخ المادي والمعنوي للبشرية؟
ورد عن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وصحبه، قوله في محاسن الأخلاق ومكارمها؛ »إّنَ هذه 
بعبٍد خيراً مَنَحَهُ منها خُلُقاً  حُ يمنُحها الله عّزوجّل مَن يشاءُ من عبادبهب فِإذا َأرادَ اللهُ ب الَأخلاَق مَنَائب
َصالحاً« )ابن أبي الدنيا، 26(، وعلى هذا، وقبل الإجابة عن التساؤلات السابقة، لابد من تقرير 
حقيقة مهمة، بالإفادة من الحديث الشريف، مفادها بالنسبة لنا نحن المؤمنين بالغيب، أن اللكرامة 
وأخلاقها أصالة، منحة وليست نتاج اجتهاد أوغنيمة، وهنا نجدنا نقول، مع من يقول؛ » يجب 
على طبيعة الأخلاق بدورها أن تحرّض على الفعل وتحرّكه من أجل خير الجميع، كما يجب عليها 
المهمة  متوافقين. وتكمن  الاثنان  يسير  أن  الآخر، بل يجب  يلغي  لا  منهما  فالواحد  أن تحكمه، 
السياسية، المهمة الصعبة إذا كانت كذلك، في تعريف نقطة التوازن« )دوبرو 2007، 515(. 
ونقطة التوازن، هاهنا، تكمن في اللحظة التي يصير فيها الثابت الأخلاقي عبدمل اللكرامة الإنسانية، 
فيكون المتغيّر منضبطا بضابطه ومُمَّسكا بعروته الوثقى، حتى لا تنفلت الموازين أخلاقية كانت أم 
كيميائية، وتحصل القطيعة بين المتحرك وثابته. فإذا كان ذلك كذلك، انسجم المتغير الأخلاقي 
اللكسب  وامتلك  الأخلاقية،  الحتمية  سطر  على  الفردية  الحرية  خطوات  واتسقت  ثابته،  مع 
البشري صفات حسنه أو قبحه على ضوء تلك الموازنة.
التحكم  ثم  ومن  للإنسان  الجينومي  البعد  في  السلبي  التدخل  محاولة  تبدو  هذا،  على  وتأسيسا 
في سلوكه، محاولة مخادعة من محاولات سلبه إرادته، تحت عنوان تحريره من ميثولوجيا الدين، 
وإن أمكن إضافتها إلى تلك المحاولات ذات الصبغة الدينية الجخبرية التي شهدتها حقب تاريخية 
سابقة. وللكن الأبعد غورا من سلب الحرية المترتب على التدخل الجينومي، هو عدم إمكان ضبط 
المستقبل البشري، وفقدان القدرة على التنبؤ بما سيترتب على محاولات )اللكولجة( و )المونتاج( 
الوراثي الناشئ من عمليات التركيب الجيني الجامع بين الأنواع. 
يبدو أننا ليس لنا أن ننحّي المستند الأخلاقي في مقاربة سؤال الجينوم، ذلك أن المستند المذكور 
نعم إن  الإنسان وامتيازه وكرامته وإرادته،  السؤال بشخصية  يستمد مشروعيته من صلة ذلك 
التحوّلات الاجتماعية تنحو بالمجتمع البشري منحى جديدا يجعله غير آبه كثيرا بالمعايير الثابتة التي 
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ورثها من أسلافه المتفلسفين والمتدينين، لأنه ما عاد يؤمن بغير القيمة الذاتية للحياة، وما يترتب 
على تلك القيمة من تضحية بالمعايير الجمعية. وللكن مجرد اختيار معايير بعينها للكائن الجديد، كائن 
المستقبل الذي لم يشعر بذاته لحظة اختيار مواصفاته يعني التضحية التامة بالفردية التي يسعى إنسان 
المستقبل إلى عيشها. ومن هنا، نقول؛ ما زال سؤال الجينوم لم يستكمل إجابته، وما زالت فروضه 
غير مستوفية نصابها، وهذا يعني أن إمكان تقدير نتائجه تقديرا دقيقا مرهون بمدى التزامه بعديد 
الأبعاد التي تتشّكل منها الحقيقة الإنسانية، فضلا عن الحقيقة البشرية البيولوجية، وإلا فإن مجافاة 
تلك الحقيقة يعني الخلوص بنتائج تلك البحوث إلى مثابة الجور على الشخصية الإنسانية من خلال 
الانكفاء بها إلى حيث مستواها البشري الذي لا تنماز فيه من غيرها من الكائنات ذات البعد 
البيولوجي، فضلا عن ظلمها الاجتماعي والحضاري الذي انضبطت مقاصد الشريعة بضابطها الكلي 
الأول بغية دفعه، » وذلك مؤذن بانقطاع النوع البشري، وهي الحكمة العامة المراعاة للشرع في 
جميع مقاصده الضرورية الخمسة: من حفظ الدين والنفس والعقل والنسل والمال« )ابن خلدون 
2004، 479(. ومن مظاهر ذلك الظلم –وما أكثر تلك المظاهر- الذي اتضح بعد مرور أقل من 
عقدين –ليس إلا- على الفراغ من مشروع الجينوم البشري، ما يترتب على الفحص الجيني وهو 
يتعامل مع حامل المرض بعّده مريضا، وهو ما لا يتماشى مع مراد الشريعة أخلاقيا. ويتنافى مع 
فقه الأسرة وفقه العقود في أغلب الأحوال، ذلك أن الذي نفيده من منطق الآية المباركة التي 
بيفًا﴾ )النساء؛ 28(، يخلص بنا إلى حقيقة  مسَانُ َضع بَق المِإن م وَخُل ُ مك َف عَن
ِ
هُ َأنم ُيخَّف َّ بيدُ الل تقول؛ ﴿يُر
مفادها، أن الإنسان –أّي إنسان-، مستعد للإصابة بالأمراض كلها أو هو حامل للأمراض، ما 
ظهر منها وما بطن، وهذا يعني أن تحميل إنسان بعينه دون الآخرين تبعات كونه حاملا للمرض 
مجافاة لمنطق العدالة والمساواة، ودليل على غرور علمي، فاسد.
رابعا: رحلة الجينوم من المشتركات اللكونية إلى الخصوصية الفردية:
ما بين القول بكمال الخلقة الأولى دينيا أو القول بتطورها عبر الدهور والأزمان وصولا إلى كمالها 
ماديا، ثمة مساحة للقول، مفادها؛ أن الخلقة الأولى الجامعة لكل الأنواع غير المتميز بعضها من بعض 
مَاوَاتب  َّ بيَن َكفَرُوا َأّنَ الس م يَرَ الَّذ َ في حقبة )الرتق( وما يرتبط بها من حالات المادة السائلة، ﴿َأوَل
 َأفَلَا يُؤممبنُونَ﴾)الأنبياء؛30(، إن 
ٍ
ءٍ حَيّ ممَاءب كُّلَ شَيم منَا مبَن ال نَاهُمَا وََجعَل مقًا فَفَتَقم وَالمَأرمَض كَانَتَا رَت
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في خلالها  يتميز  التي  والمظهرية  النوعية  غاياتها  لبلوغ  التكويني  استعدادها  امتللكت  الحقبة  هذه 
كائن من كائن عبر الزمان والمكان وما يرتبط بهما من ظروف وأحوال بيئية نشأت بعد تميّز 
الأرضي من السماوي بعد تحقق )الفتق(. والذي جرى ويجري بعد تمام حقبة )الفتق( هو حركة 
المخلوقات، وما زالت  للكثير من  تطورية مقصودة، وذات معنى، وليست )صدفوية(، جرت 
تجري لغيرها مما لم يخلق بعد. وهذا يعني أن الغايات كائنة بالخلقة وقبلها، وأن أي خروج عليها 
يعني خروجا على المقادير التكوينية ومقاصدها. وللكن الإيغال في سحر البحوث الجينية، بما يعمل 
على تجاوز الغايات التكوينية للمخلوقات يعني التمرّد على التقدير التكويني الأول وموازينه الضابطة 
وغاياته المقصودة. أما استغلال مرانة التكوين البيولوجي للخلق وليونته أمام البحث العلمي فلا يعني 
ضعفا في بناه التكوينية وفقدانا لوضوح مقاصده وغاياته المركوزة فيه، بل يعني تسخيره للبحث 
مَل  بهب قَب بيَك ب ب َأنَا آَت َا بت مك مدَهُ عبلممٌ مبَن ال العلمي وتطويعه لإرادته، تحقيقا لقوله تعالى؛ ﴿قَاَل الَّذبي عبن
فُرُ وَمَنم  م َأكم كُرُ َأ بي َأَأشم ملُوَن بيَب ي ل
ِ
ّ لب رَب مدَهُ قَاَل هَذَا مبنم فَضم ا عبن ًّ بر تَق ا رَآَهُ مُسم َّ مفَُك فَلَم مَك َطر َأنم يَرمتَّدَ ِإلَي
ي غَنبيٌّ كَربيمٌ﴾)النمل؛40(.
ِ
ّ هب وَمَنم َكفَرَ فَِإّنَ رَب بنَفمسب كُرُ ل مَا يَشم َّ َشكَرَ فَِإن
يعني تجريدها من  فيها  المركوزة  وغاياتها  للخلائق  التكوينية  الطبائع  على  التمرّد  فإن  هنا،  ومن 
خصوصيتها وتعميتها وسلبها تمايزها المادي والمعنوي، وصولا إلى كائنات مشوّهة، نعم تتطاول 
وقد  المريع  انهيارها  يعني  ما  والتكوينية،  التحتية  بناها  متانة  تفقد  بالمقابل  وللكنها  الفوقية  بناها 
إلى  الأنواع  تسوق  التي  الإكراهية  المداخلات  تلك  بسبب  الظاهرة  وصلابتها  منعتها  بدت  ُأفق
يتماشى مع صالح مقاصد الخلقة وغاياتها  لها سوقا شديدا عنيفا لا  غاياتها أو إلى غايات ليست 
الموزونة بوازن العدل والقدرة والتأنّي. فالتدخل الجيني العلاجي أو التحسيني باستخدام وسائل 
التكنولوجيا الحيوية، وتطبيقات ذلك التدخل على الخلايا الجنسية، ومدى محافظة ذلك التدخل 
أو  مصدرها-  عن  النظر  غض  خارجية-مع  مورثة  تقحم  حينما  خاصة  الأنساب  على  الجيني 
تطبيقات ذلك التدخل على الخلايا الجسمية لا ما كان تصحيحا لتشوّه أو شذوذ بل ما كان 
داخلا في دائرة اتباع الهوى، كل ذلك يجري بعيدا عن الهّم الأخلاقي غالبا، ما يعني مداخلة 
الشريط/ السطر الصبغي بما لا يتماشى مع الإرادة التكوينية وغاياتها، وبالمحصلة، انتزاع ما يجب أن 
لا يُنتزع من استعدادات الخلقة، ذلك أن انتزاعه كذلك من طريق شريط/سطر صبغي مختلف 
عن إمكاناته الجينية يعني الخلوص به إلى وجهة غير وجهته. نعم قد تبدو مداخلة بعض الكائنات 
البيولوجية ممكنة لبساطة تركيبها ومحدودية غاياتها، وللكن مداخلة الشريط/السطر الجيني البشري 
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مداخلة مختلفة، يرجع اختلافها إلى ارتباطها الوثيق بجهازه العصبي المتطور مرة، وببعده المعنوي 
شخصية  من  تختلف  البشري  الصبغي  السطر  الشريط/  مداخلة  إن  بل  أخرى،  مرة  الأخلاقي 
انسانية إلى أخرى، خاصة ما يتعلق بالشخصية الأخلاقية التي تميز هذا الإنسان من ذاك، كأن 
يكون )س( معتقدا بالغيب موحّدا، و )ص( منكرا )لاأدريا(، وهذا يعني أن المنظومة الجينية 
لل)س( تختلف كثيرا-على مستوى البنية التحتية- عن )ص(، وهو ما نأمل أن يتحّقق المعنيون 
من صدقيته...!
ولعلنا، بعد هذا وذاك، نجخيز لأنفسنا القول؛ إن الانخراط التام في عملية الاحتيال على التركيبة 
د بموجبها أنفسنا لمآلات ذاك الاحتيال الذي سيمّكن 
ِ
ّ الجينية لن ينتهي بنا إلا إلى خديعة كبيرة نُعب
وبما يجعل من  الإنسان...الخ،  والآلة من  العدالة،  المتفردة من  والسلطة  الحقيقة،  الخيال من 
البيولوجيا الإنسانية مصنعا ومختبرا لخيالات فاسدة هنا وهناك. وحينها، وبأثر من ذلك الجنون 
العملاق، ليس ثمة إلا أحد خيارين؛  المال  ببراءات الاختراع ومساندة رأس  المأخوذ  العلمي 
استكانة الانسان وقبوله قدره الجديد، قدر الطواعية التامة وفقدان الإرادة، أو رفض الطبيعة 
الإنسانية محاولات التدخل في خصوصيتها وميزتها، الرفض الذي سينتهي بالبشرية إلى تدمير ذاتها 
بذاتها بعد غير قليل من الصراع عبر معدود من الأجيال، إن لم يكن ذلك بعد جيل على الأكثر.
وبهدمٍي من آية الرتق والفتق، وما يتعلق بها من ارتباط الخلق بالتدبير، فلا فكاك بينهما، ذلك 
أن القدرة على إظهار الخلق تستبطن قدرة كمثلها على التدبير، ولهذا تستنكر الآية أن يجعل أولئك 
الكافرون أن الذي خلق إله، والذي دبّر إله غيره4. بهدمًي من ذلك، هاته وقفة من جنبتين؛ 
أولا؛ لا شك أن علماء البيولوجيا الغربيين لا يزعمون أنهم خلقوا الحياة بنمطيها الجيني والظاهر، 
وإنما هم يزعمون، بلحاظ النموذج المادي في تفسير ظاهرة الحياة عندهم، أن المادة خلقت نفسها 
بنفسها، وأن فكرة اللكرامة أو حرية الإرادة محض وهم، » وأن جميع عمليات اتخاذ القرار يمكن 
عزوها في نهاية المطاف إلى أسباب مادية« )فوكوياما 2006، 190(. وإذن، ومع غض النظر 
عمّن خلق، الله سبحانه أم المادة، فالذي لا ينكر هو أن الذي له الخلق، له التدبير أيضا، فليتركوا 
المادة تدبّر نفسها بنفسها، وإلا فإن إرادتهم القفز على ترميمها والتماشي مع إرادتها إلى تدبيرها، 
وإكراه مجّساتها على الاستجابة لتدبيرهم يعني الانتهاء إلى تدميرها. ذلك أن الذي وصل بالمادة 
انظر؛ )ابن كثير 1999، 5: 339-338(.   4
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إلى هذه الرتبة من اللكمال في الخلق لا يباريه أحد في تدبير شؤون الخلق. أما نحن فلننظر في تدبير 
فهمنا لذلك الخلق، بضابط من بيان خالق الخلق...!
ثانيا؛ يؤكد بيان الآية أن الحالة التكوينية الأولى للسماوات والأرض كانت حالة لا يتمايز فيها 
والتصاق، وأن الجميع متصل بعضه ببعض، متلاصق  أرض من سماء، وإنما الحالة حالة تضامّ 
متراكم بعضه فوق بعض، في ابتداء الأمر، ففتق هذه من هذه، فبان كل منهما من الأخرى، 
وامتازت أبعاض كل منهما من أبعاض الأخرى5. والذي نفيده من هذا البيان هو أن الأصل 
التكويني للموجودات الحية كان أصلا جامعا لا ميزة فيه لموجود من آخر، بل إن إمكان الوجود 
وشرائط اللكينونة الحية موزعة بالتساوي في تلك الحقبة التي مازالت فيها الطبائع ملتئمة، وهذا 
يعني أن العّدة الجينومية هي فلا ميزة لعّدة موجود على عّدة غيره طالما أن التمايز النوعي والمظهري 
بأنواعها  الموجودات  وتشّكل  الفتق  وبعد تحقق  أخرى،  للموجودات. ومن جهة  بعد  يتحقق  لم 
ومظاهرها عبر التاريخ، صار لكل موجود هويته الجينية، كل حسب استعداده وكفاءته ووظيفته، 
دونما تخّل للموجودات جميعا عن عّدتها الأصل المشتركة الجامعة، وهذا ما يفسّر وجود ذلك 
المشترك الجيني-على اختلاف-بين الموجودات الحية.
أمر آخر مفاده؛ أن ذلك التمايز الذي جرى فتقا بين السماوات والأرض لم يعدم كمون الصفة 
الأرضية في السماوات كما لم يعدم الصفة السماوية في الأرض، وأن تبادل الصفات ذاك وتناوبها 
ظل جاريا في الموجودات جميعا، وظلت مظاهره تتسلسل ماديا ومعنويا، لتتمظهر مادة وطاقة، 
ليلا ونهارا، صلابة وسيولة، حياة وموتا، روحا وجسدا، ذكورة وأنوثة، صغيرا وكبيرا، وصمتا 
وكلاما...وهكذا، يتماهى الرتق بالفتق ظهورا لصفة وبطونا لأخرى. ولعل نظرة سريعة إلى الشريط 
الجيني تكشف عن تمثل تلك الحقيقة فلسفيا ومختبريا. 
تعني،  الجيني  السطر  على  تتوزع  وهي  والآخر  الجخين  بين  الكائنة  البيولوجية  الحزوز  تلك  إن 
على ضوء مبدأ التوازن الزوجي للموجودات أن آلية الرتق والفتق هي هي على مستوى الصغير 
والخفي والعميق، وأن استقاء المعرفة الجينومية الحق كائن عند هذه الربيطة التي تصل الناطق 
بل)اللصامت(، والبروتين بالجينوم. وللكن الذي يجري في التجارب العلمية هو حزّ الجخين وقطعه 
دون أصله والاكتفاء به ميدانا للمعرفة والتجريب، والحق أن الصمت الجيني الفاصل بين جين 
مشّفر وآخر يتلوه لا يعني صمت العدم، كما لا يعني؛ عدم تدخّل ذلك الصمت في تنظيم معنى 
انظر: )ابن كثير 1999، 5: 339؛ ابن عجيبة 1999 ،3: 457؛ البقاعي، 12: 412(.  5
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الكلام، وإنما هو صمت ضابط لتوسيع دلالة الجخين وتغييرها، وفاعل في محوها إن استلزم الأمر، 
وما فاعليته تلك- ونحن نتذكر )الفتق والرتق( - إلا تمثل لفاعلية تلك الحالة اللكونية الأولى، حالة 
المشتركات الجينية التي تتحدث عنها آية الرتق والفتق.
خامسا: علاقات التوازن والاعتدال بين النمط الجيني والنمط الظاهري:
مقة التي بموجبها يصير ظاهر  بل لعلنا لا نجافي الحقيقة إذا قلنا إن ثمة صلة كائنة بين الأخلاق والخ
الخلقة ونمطها البروتيني معادلا موضوعيا لباطنها ونمطها المعنوي، أي، التي يصير بموجبها النمط 
مق لصورته  الخل بمنزلة  الباطنة...  الإنسان  فالأخلاق )لصورة  الجينومي،  للنمط  الظاهري صورة 
معةب  صن ابتداءَ  مع  ب »والّطَ مع(،  )طب الأخلاق  أخرى،  جهة  ومن   .)1993 منظور  )ابن  الظاهرة( 
بّاعُ الذي  معاً صاغَه والّطَ بَعُه طب معاً وَطبَع الدرهم والسيف وغيرهما يطم بنَ طب ب َّ الشيء تقول طبعت الل
باعةُ وَطبَعمُت 
ِ
ناناً َأو نحو ذلك وصنعتُه الّط يناً َأو سب
ِ
ّك بَُع منها سيفاً َأو سب يْأخذ الحديدةَ المستطيلة فَيَطم
مت« )ابن منظور 1993(. والبادي من الاستعمالات الاجتماعية الواردة في  بل عَم ةً  من الطين جَرَّ
للتشّكل  القابلة  الأولى  والمرونة  والتقدير،  والتهيؤ  الاستعداد  معنى  هو  والإيجاد  مق  الخل معاني 
والإملاء والإنزال بتوفر الظروف والدواعي. وأن تطبيع الشيء بغية مناسبته الخلقة المبتدعة أصالة 
مريُن من ذلك أن تقول للذي قد  َّم َلاقة وهي الت على مثال بعينه لم تسبق إليه يستلزم خلاقة )الخ
بَف شيئاً صار ذلك له خُلُقاً أي مَرَنَ عليه( )ابن منظور 1993(. وهذا يعني أن الصورة الظاهرة  َأل
امتداد مناسب للصورة الباطنة، وأن هذا الامتداد مناسب ومنسجم عند تحقق )التمرين(، وغير 
مناسب عند عدم تحققه. وأن مجافاته تعني قطع الامتداد بين النمطين أو تشويهه، وبالنتيجة إعاقته 
من بلوغ غاياته، على أن ذلك البلوغ مشروط ب)الخلاقة( أو التمرين أو التطبّع.
إليه  توّصل  الذي  الامتداد  بذلك  معرفة  بعيد  عن  يكشف  بما  الآتيين،  النصين  في  ولننظر 
المسلمون، مؤكدين فكرة الامتداد الكائن بين الصورة الباطنة والصورة الظاهرة، وبين الأخلاق 
ُلُق كاشف عن نقاوة العرق؛ »حسن الأخلاق برهان كرم الأعراق«  مقة. فمرة ُحسمن الخ بل والخ
)الآمدي 1992، 189(، ومرةً، وُسوم أحسن الخلُق )بضم اللام( منكشفة بعلامات أحسن 
مق )بسكون اللام(. »فالفراسة أكرمك الله، نور من أنوار الله عّز وجل، يهدي بها عباده،  الخل
مق؛ جرت الحكمة الإلهية بارتباط مدلولاتها بها )...( فاعلم يا أخي،  ولها دلائل في ظاهر الخل
والأخلاق299 مقة  بل الخ بين  الجينوم  سؤال 
وفقنا الله وإياك، أن أحسن الهيئات وأعدل النشآت الذي ينبغي لك أن تتخذه سفيرا وليلك سميرا 
ولملكك وزيرا، من ليس بالطويل ولا بالقصير، ليّن اللحم رطبه، بين الغلظة والدقة، أبيض مشوب 
بحمرة وصفرة، معتدل الشعر طويله...« )ابن عربي 2003، 58(، أما تفسير ذلك كله، فل«اعلم 
رحمك الله ونوّر بصيرتك أن عالم المللكوت هو [المحرك لعالم] الشهادة، وهو تحت قهره وتسخيره 
حكمة من الله تعالى لا لنفسه استحق ذلك؛ فعالم الشهادة لا تصدر منه حركة ولا سكون ولا 
أكل ولا شرب ولا كلام ولا صمت إلا عن عالم الغيب. وذلك أن الحيوان لا يتحرك إلا عن 
قصد وإرادة وهما من عالم القلب وهو من عالم الغيب، والحركة وما شاكلها من عالم الشهادة« 
)ابن عربي 2003، 65(.
والمهم في تلك المقابلة بين النشأة الطينية الجسمانية والنشأة المعنوية الروحانية، وصيرورة النشأة 
تعالق منضبط  النشأتين من  بين  ما  في  النظر  على  وباعثا  الروحانية،  النشأة  على  دليلا  الجسمانية 
بضابط العدل والاعتدال، المهم في هذا الترابط الكائن بين الأخلاق والخلقة، على الرغم من أنه 
قابل للاستثناء، هو أن النظر في النمط الظاهري للخلقة البشرية لا يتوقف عند الطبيعة البروتينية، 
والأبعد من ذلك، أن ذلك النمط لا ينسج في النمط الجيني المقروء، وإنما هو يتجاوز ذلك إلى 
غير المقروء. والمهم جدا هو النظر في منطقة ما بين الجخين والجخين، لأنها نقطة الوصل بين عالم 
المللكوت وعالم الشهادة، على مستوى الصغير )الكايوسي(، حيث لا يمكن التنبؤ بمسارات النظم 
الجينومية دونما نظر في ذلك البعد الخفي الذي يشّكل المعطى الأولي لحساب النتائج.
إن هذا الفضاء السيميائي المرئي من على كتلة البروتين تلك، المشروط باعتدال الهيئة المظهرية 
القائمة على أساس علاقات التناظر والتقابل والانسجام، بين المادة والصورة، وبين الطبع والتطبّع 
»فما في الطبع هو العدل« )الفارابي، 157(، وهو، من حيث كونه فعلا واعيا مرادا، نتاج ما 
في الطبع، فضلا عن اللكثير من علاقات التفاعل والتواصل الكائنة بين الوراثة والتنشئة، وبين 
الأخلاقية  الجنبة  بين  الكائنة  الصلة  تبدو  هنا  ومن  والخلقة.  الأخلاق  وبين  والحرية،  الحتمية 
والجنبة التطورية البيولوجية للإنسان صلة بنيوية. ويبدو المدخل الأخلاقي للنظر في سؤال الجينوم 
ليس مدخلا افتراضيا مقحما كرها، وإنما هو مدخل تكويني تماما، يعنى بالطريقة التي تنسخ فيها 
مق ترابطا  الجينات معلوماتها الوراثية وهي تخضع لمبدأ الانحياز الانتخابي، مؤكدة ترابط الخلُق والخل
لا يقبل التفريق، ومن هنا يتكّشف لنا أهمية الربط بين بحوث الأخلاق وبحوث الجينوم، ومن 
ثم، يبدو لنا أهمية أن نطرح تفسيرا أخلاقيا لحركية الجينوم، لا أن نكتفي بطرح الحكم الشرعي 
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من هذه الفكرة الجينية أو ذلك المقترح الوراثي. ولعلنا بعد ذلك كله نجخيز لأنفسنا أن نفترض 
أن تلك المنطقة الصحراوية والصامتة المتوسطة بين جينين ناطقين هي الجنبة الأخلاقية في سطر 
الجينوم، وهي الصغير الذي لا بد لانتظام اللكبير على وفقه، من تعليق اللكبير به، وتأّخره عنه في 
تَطَرٌ﴾)القمر؛  بيرٍ مُسم بيرٍ وََكب الرتبة، وانتظامه معه على سطر واحد، بدليل قوله تعالى؛ ﴿وَكُّلُ َصغ
53(. أما المنطقة المشفرة، والمقروءة، فهي اللكبير الخلقي، على أن الذي هو باطن اليوم وارد فيه 
أن يكون ظاهرا غدا، وكمثله، الذي هو صغير اليوم بإمكانه أن يكون كبيرا غدا في حال تم تجاوز 
عتبة المجهول بوساطة التقانات العلمية. وفضلا عما سبق، تخلص بنا مقاربة الآية المباركة إلى ظّن 
راجح مفاده؛ أن العمليات التأليفية التي تتوالى بموجبها انتظامات الخرائط الجينية سواء كانت على 
مستوى الجخين أم على مستوى الخلية، ذات ترابط وثيق لا بد من مراعاته في كل مرة نحاول 
من خلالها أن نفكك او نركب تلك الجمل المتوالية حيويا، وإلا فإن عملية تقطيع أوصال تلك 
المنظومة بما لا ينسجم وإرادة الاستطار اللكوني تعني نشأة اخرى فيها من الفوضى أكثر مما فيها 
من الانتظام، وهذا يعني في الأفق المستقبلي فناء مقصودا للكائن. 
وتأسيسا على ما سبق كله، ينهض لدينا، أن العلاقة بين الصغير/ النمط الجينومي، واللكبير/ 
للمخلوقات  الأخلاقية  والجنبة  الخلقية  الجنبة  بموجبها  تصير  استطار،  علاقة  الظاهري هي  النمط 
-بلحاظ أن الأخلاق بمعناها المقصدي سعي الكائنات إلى المحافظة على كمالها التكويني جينيا، 
لل )سطر( جينومي واحد، على  استعادته- وجهان لحقيقة واحدة؛ وجه خفي وآخر ظاهر  أو 
منَا  مزَل اختلاف بين الأنواع والأفراد والأمم، في اللغة والمنهج والشرعة، بدليل قوله سبحانه؛ ﴿وََأن




حَّق بالم َاَب ب بت مك مَك ال ِإلَي




حَّق ا جَاءَكَ مبَن الم َّ م عَم ُ بللعم َأهموَاءَه ب َّ تَت
م  متُم بمَا ُكن م ب ُ ئُك
ِ
ّ بيعًا فَيُنَب م جَم ُ جبعُك ب مَرم ه َّ مرَاتب ِإلَى الل خخَي بقُوا الم تَب م فَاسم ُ بي مَا آَتَاك م ف ُ ملُوَك بيَب وَاحبدَةً وَللَكبنم ل
بفُونَ﴾ )المائدة؛48(. ومن منظور الأممية البشرية الذي تتحدث عنه الآية المباركة، وبقرمن  متَل بيهب َتخ ف
الآية بأختها، نقول؛ إن التكوين الأممي البشري ممتد في المخلوقات، فالأخيرة خاضعة لمثل ذلك 
م  ُ مثَاللُك ا ُأمَمٌ َأ مهب ِإلَّ جَنَاَحي برٍ يَطبيرُ بب بي المَأرمضب وَلَا َطائ ةٍ ف َّ التكوين، بدليل قوله تعالى؛ ﴿وَمَا مبنم دَاب
مشَرُونَ﴾ )الأنعام؛38(. م ُيح ب ه
ِ
َّ ِإلَى رَّب ءٍ ثُم ب مبنم شَيم َا بت مك بي ال نَا ف طم َّ مَا فَر
بقَدٍَر﴾)القمر؛19(، نملك مزيدا من  نَاهُ ب ءٍ خَلَقم ا كُّلَ شَيم َّ ولعلنا، ونحن نستنطق قوله تعالى؛ ﴿ِإن
الثقة بفرضيتنا العلمية التي تقول؛ إن جنبة الممكن والمحتمل في المستوى الجزيئي العميق للكائن 
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للتغيير، وإن محاولة تغيير ذلك الثابت تعني مجافاة  جنبة مرتبطة أصالة بجنبة الثابت غير القابل 
حكمة القدر والتقدير وإلغاء عامل المقايسة والتقييس النوعيين، وبالمحصلة، إلغاء الذاكرة الجينية، 
وتعطيل عنصر التوقع الذي ينبني عليه أفق المستقبل الشخصي بالنسبة إلى الكائن. ومن هنا يبدو 
بلحاظ  للكائن،  الأصيل  الخلقي  التقدير  بمراعاة  مشروط  الجينية  للممكنات  الأخلاقي  البعد  أن 
جنبتي الجخبر والتفويض معا، فلا إمكان أخلاقيا للتحكم بالجهاز الوراثي البشري بعيدا عن تلك 
القدرة وذلك التقدير. ويتضح لنا، بناء على ما سبق، أن ثمة ثقلا اعتباريا للممكنات الجينية، لا 
ُلق المعنوي تعييرا موزونا كيميائيا ضمن ثابت كيميائي  بد أن يراعى فيه تعيير الخلق البايولوجي بالخ
منَا  مبَت بيَ وََأن بيهَا رَوَاس منَا ف مقَي رصين، وصبغة معنوية ثابتة، بدليل قوله تعالى؛ ﴿وَالمَأرمَض مَدَدمنَاهَا وََأل
ءٍ مَومزُوٍن﴾ )الحجر: 19(، وهذا ما ينتهي بنا، ونحن نستدل بالنص اللكريم، إلى   شَيم
ِ
بيهَا مبنم كُّل ف
أن ثمة ملازمة كبيرة بين الجنبتين لا بد من مراعاتها بغية تحقيق التوازن الجيني أخلاقيا، وما 
يترتب على تحقيق ذلك التوازن من أمن اعتباري إنساني، ممثلا بحرية الاختيار، وأمن بيولوجي، 
مَوَاتب  مُق الّسَ بهب خَل بنم آيَات ممثلا بتعدد الهويات المظهرية والألسنية للكائن الحي، بدليل قوله؛ ﴿وَم
بينَ﴾ )الروم:22(، أما أن يجري  بم معَال بّل بَك لآيَاٍت ل بي ذَل م ِإّنَ ف ُ بك موَان م وََأل ُ بك نَت مسب بلاُف َأل ت وَالَأرمضب وَاخم
التغيير دونما مجافاة ذلك التوازن الجزيئي الذي ينعكس في الواقع على شكل كيان متوازن، فذاك 
مما لا باس فيه.
وبنظرة أخرى إلى ما يؤكده اللسان العربي من فارق صرفي بسيط بين الجنبة الخلقية )بسكون 
اللام( والجنبة الخلقية )بضم اللام(، مفاده سكون لام الخلق أو ضمها، يتكّشف لنا، أن النظام 
التأليفي لمجموع الكتلة البروتينية للكائن لا يبعد كثيرا عن النظام التأليفي للغة الكائن. وعلى هذا، 
يلجا  أما أن  تغيير وارد فلسفيا وأخلاقيا،  البيولوجية  بنيته  توازن  للكائن على  تغييرا يحافظ  فإن 
البحث العلمي إلى عولمة الجخين وفتح الحدود وضرب مبدأ السيادة الجينية، فهذا مما لا يمكن 
قبوله والاطمئنان إليه.
البيولوجي  الباطن  إن  نقول؛  ومقاصده،  البحث  هذا  مقاصد  وباستدعاء  ما سبق،  وبلحاظ 
لذلك  الظاهري  بالنمط  متمثلا  الظاهر  الأخلاقي يحرك  البعد  الجيني ذي  بنمطه  متمثلا  للإنسان 
وتوسعته  الظاهر  وللكن-إسلامياً-صيرورة  الباطن،  على  الظاهر حجة  إن  نعم  البايولوجي،  الكائن 
المادي/  المعاصرة إلى قطع صلة  البيولوجيا  الباطن. وللكن أن تسعى  أمران مرهونان باستمداد 
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البروتيني، بالمعنوي/ الأخلاقي، ومن ثم، السعي إلى إنفلات التضام البنيوي والجدلي بين ذينك 
البعدين، فهذا يعني صناعة بيوطيقا أو علم أخلاق حيوي فاقد لهويته الإنسانية المائزة.
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إن رغبة البشر في حياة مديدة وشباب دائم هي رغبة نابعة من أمل فطري في البقاء والتشبّث 
ببقايا الوجود الذي يبدأ في التصّدع على أعتاب الشيخوخة؛ وهو الأمل الذي حوّلته اللكيمياء 
ر عنه في ذاك العقار الأسطوري »إكسير الحياة«  َّ القديمة إلى مشروٍع لصناعة »ترياق الحياة« المُعب
)Elixir of life(، في سعٍي لشفاء جميع الأمراض وإطالة الحياة إلى أبعد مدى، ولم يتوقف 
هذا السعي بل ظّل حاضراً في تاريخ العلم وفي إرادة بشرية عميقة في مقاومة آثار التقّدم في العمر 
وتجاوز لحظة الانهيار البيولوجي الذي يسحب معه كينونة نخَرَها الزمن من الداخل؛ فالشيخوخة 
تجربةٌ إنسانية للعيش بجسٍد لا يستجيب لتطلّعات صاحبه بل يصبح عبئاً ثقيلاً عليه؛ وهنا تصبح 
مشاهدة الحياة من داخل جسد واهن وضعيف أمراً مرهقاً.
يُبشّر اليوم  ءَ تجربةب الشيخوخة بمزيٍد من الحياة وضخّها بزمٍن أطول هو مشروعٌ علمّيٌ  إن مَلم
بآماٍل كبيرة، غير أنه ينطوي على مخاوف حقيقية تُنذر بحدوث انفلاٍت »للكائن الأخلاقي« 
من حدود الطبيعة البشرية المحروسة بمفاهيم »الطبيعي«، »العادي« و«الأصلي«..، ويُراهن هذا 
المشروع على فكرة أنه يمكن للجسد البشري أن يُصلح نفسه بنفسه ليستمر في الحياة، بما يمللكه من 
مَلَكات بيولوجية داخلية تحمل شيفرات البقاء وهذا عبر وسيط التقنية الحيوية، غير أن هذا يعتمد 
على تصوٍّر عميق لمفهوم الحياة ذاتها وهو التصوّر الذي يضمن تماسك ماهية »الإنسان« وتناغم 
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تركيبته البيولوجية مع هويته الأخلاقية؛ وهذا ما يضع العلم )البيولوجيا خصوصاً( أمام المسؤولية 
ُمثّله تراٌث من القيّم اللكونية التي يصطبُغ بها  الأخلاقية لحماية الرأسمال الرمزي للإنسان الذي ي
تسرّب  يمنع  ثقافي  ومزوَّدة بجهاز  بيئة مصطنَعة حضارياً  المتحرّك داخل  البشري  تاريخ الجسد 
الحياة خارج مجال العيش المشترك للمجموعة البشرية.
م علم الجينوم، اليوم، مَطلَب تمديد الحياة على أنه »حّقٌ« إنساني »طبيعي ومشروع«، إذ 
ِ
يُقّد
توجد إمكانية تقنية لل«تحرير« رسالة جينية تستطيع أن تُعّدل بعض ما ُكتب فيها لتكتَب من جديد 
ما يُفيد بأنه يوجد في جسد الكائن الحي ما يسمُح له بالتمّدد في الزمن البيولوجي متخطياً حواجز 
المرض، وأنه يمكن مَنح الإنسان زمناً إضافياً »للعيش«، وأّنَ ما كنّا نعتقد أنه حياة ليس إلا 
جزءاً منها، بما أن مفهومنا للحياة نفسها بدأ يتغيّر بعد أن أدركنا أن ما ُيحّدد شكل الحياة في الكائن 
الحي هو المعلومة الجينية وليس المادة الحاملة لها.
وللكن ما شكُل الحياة التي يهدُف علم الجينوم إلى تمديدها؟ ما الذي يُبرّر شغف الناس بمزيٍد 
من الحياة؟ هل هو طول الحياة أم جودتها؟ وكيف ستتفاعل المجتمعات الإسلامية أخلاقياً مع 
مشروع تمديد الحياة باستخدام التقنية الحيوية للجينوم؟ 
أولاً: شكل الحياة: من الجينوم إلى ما بعد- الجينوم. 
أن  يمكن  ما  وتوقّع  الحدث  في هذا  ما يجري  بفهم  بيولوجياً«  بوصفها »حدثاً  الحياة  فهم  يبدأ 
بالاقتراب من »ظاهرة« الحياة في مادتها  المورفولوجي في الزمن، أي  إليه خلال تطوّره  يؤول 
ُمثّل مصدر تَشّكلها؛ وفي هذا السياق يمكننا العودة إلى الفيزيائي النمساوي  الحيوية الأولى التي ت
»ما  كتابه  في  صاغه  الذي  السؤال  لطرح   )Erwin Schrödinger( شرودنغر«  »إرفين  الشهير 
الحياة؟«: »كيف يمكن للأحداث المكانية والزمانية التي تجري في الحدود الفضائية للكائن الحّي 
أن تتمثّل بواسطة الفيزياء واللكيمياء؟« )Schrödinger 2006, 03(، وتقوم البيولوجيا المعاصرة 
بمَهمّة الإجابة عن هذا السؤال الجوهري بالربط بين شكل الحياة وبنيتها الفيزيائية واللكيميائية، 
حيث وَضع »اكتشافُنا للDNA نقطة نهاية لنقاش قديم حول الجنس البشري: هل للحياة ماهية 
سحرية أو لغزية، أم أنها، مثل أيّة ردّة فعل كيميائية درَسها تلاميذٌ في حصة الكمياء، من نتاج 
عمليات فيزيائية- كيميائية عادية جداً؟ وهل توجد في قلب الخلية شرارة إلهية تنفخ فيها الحياة؟« 
)Watson 2003, 14( حيث ليس لاكتشاف DNAهذا أهمية في فهم الترابط الجيني للكائن 
البشري فقط بل له أهمية في فهٍم أكثر عقلانية لماهية الحياة ومصدر تشّكلها ومن ثمة أمكن 
تصور »التاريخ« المُدمج في الخلية والذي يُعبّر عنه بيولوجياً بالقدرة على البقاء على قيد الحياة.
بفهم ما يُوقفها ويكبح قواها  إن فهم ما يدفع الحياة ويُطوّرها في الكائن الحّي يسمح أيضاً 
الطبيعية في التطور، وهو ما يعني أن مفهوم »الطبيعة« نفسه قد تغيّر ولم يَعد يشير إلى الثبات تحت 
الكلمات  لعبة  أو  بسيطاً كحديث  نشاطاً  يقولون أن  الجزيئية  البيولوجيا  صفة »العادي«، »فعلماء 
المتقاطعة يُعّدل الحالة البيوكيميائية للدماغ« )Rogers 1995, 106(، وبهذا تكون مَهمّة البحث 
التي  واللكيميائية  الفيزيائية  القاعدة  عبر ضبط  للحياة  المشتركة  الأشكال  إيجاد  محاولة  في  الجيني 
تشكل وسيط الحياة بين الكائن الحي والنشاط المتغيّر لوجوده.
لقد أشار أحد مكتشفي بنية الل DNA جيمس واطسون )J.D.Watson( إلى أنه »منذ سنة 
1944 ظهرت المؤشرات القاطعة التي تُظهر أن DNA هو الجهاز الجيني الذي يحمل مخطط الحياة 
العضوية كاملة، للكن لم تكن لأحٍد الإجابة عن سؤال كيف يمكن لهذه المعلومة كلها أن تكون 
ببعضها  مرتبطة  كيميائية  وحدات  سلسلة  في  أي   ،)Polymère( كيميائي  مُركب  في  مخزّنة 
البعض )les nucléotides(، لم يعلم أحدٌ كيف يمكن للمعلومة أن تنتقل إلى الأحفاد عندما 
تنقسم الخلايا« )Watson 2003, 15(، وبهذا بدأت مرحلة البحث في قراءة فيزيائية وكيميائية 
يؤدي  التي  القواعد  من  طويلة  سلسلة  في  البشري  الكائن  تصميم  يخختزل  الذي  الجيني  للترميز 
َلقية وحتى النفسية والسلوكية،  التبادل الوظيفي فيما بينها إلى »صناعة« الصفات والخصائص الخ
حيث »إن المعلومة الوراثية التي انتقلت إلينا بواسطة آبائنا يتمّ تخزينها في جزيئات DNA، وفي 
مليار   3,5 بمعدل  مشفرة  المعلومة  هذه  فإن  أبوينا،  من  استقبالها  تمّ  التي  اللكروموزومات  عمل 
بتصنيع  الخاصة  التعليمات  المعلومة كمجموع  اعتبار هذه  للDNA، ويمكن  القاعدية  الأزواج  من 
الفيزيائية-اللكيميائية  الطبيعة  الكائن البشري« )Edelstein 2002, 59(، وهذا ما يفسر نسبياً 
للجينات وطريقة تخزينها للمعلومة الوراثية ضمن مرحلة مُهمّة من مراحل تطور البيولوجيا الجزيئية 
الأشكال  في  البحث  مسألة  التجريبية  أهدافها  بين  من  تضع  والتي   )Molecular Biology(
الجزيئية المشتركة لجينات الكائن الحي بما يسمح بوضع المقاربات الوظيفية والتحويلية بينها.
ُمكن للجينوم، مَسمكن الجينات )gene’s home(، أن ُيجيبنا عن أسئلة مثل: »مَن نحن؟  ي
من أين حصلنا على ما نحن عليه؟ أّيُ قدَر محتوم لنا قبل حتّى أن نولد؟ أسئلة ُطرحت قبل أن 
نتمّكن من ترجمتها جينياً )..( فأصبح لدينا جينات للأمراض، جينات للميول، جينات للسلوك، 
صر لنا 306ا
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الحيوان(« )Pouteau 2007, 08(، وقد  الزوجي )لدى  الوفاء  باكتشاف جين  علمنا  وحديثاً 
مّكنت عملية السَلسَلة )Sequencing( الكاملة للجينوم البشري من وضعه على عتبة مشروع أكثر 
 )post-génome( »تطوراً في مدخل القرن الواحد والعشرين، في ما يُسمّى عصر«ما بعد الجينوم
حيث أمكننا التمييز بين مرحلتين من مشروع الجينوم البشري:
المرحلة الجينومية: أ.    
وهي المرحلة التي »بدأت سنوات 1980 واكتملت في نهاية سنوات 1990 والتي تميّزت بتطور 
النظرية الداروينية الجديدة )neodarwinism( للتطور والبيولوجيا الجزيئية، حيث تحقق علماء 
 Perbal 2011,( »البيولوجيا من أن وراء التنوع الهائل لأشكال الحياة تختبئ هوية جزيئية فائقة
35(، وهي المرحلة التي فتحت الباب البيولوجي أمام سؤال شرودينغر »ما الحياة؟« عبر الإجابة 
 DNA عن أسئلة أساسية: »ما طبيعة الشيفرة الوراثية؟ وبأية آلية يمكن للمعلومة الواردة في سلسلة
أن تنطبع على سلسلة بروتينية؟ ما دور RNA )الحمض النووي الوسيط في تركيب البروتينات( 
 Watson( »هذا المركب اللكيميائي اللغز والذي يتم استقلابه بشكل سريع جداً في الخلايا النشطة
19 ,2003(، وأدّت هذه الأسئلة إلى توسيع دائرة فهمنا للعالم المتشّكل بواسطة البنية الجزيئية 
لخصائص الكائن الحي المنطبعة على »بروتين الحياة« والتي تترجم إلى خرائط جينية »تُستخدم في 
تحسين الأنواع الحيوانية والنباتية وكذا في مجالات مختلفة من البحث البيولوجي )..( عبر تحديد 
وضعية الجينات في الجينوم سواء من خلال المسافة الفيزيائية أو من خلال وضع مبني نسبياً على 
تعالقات فيما بينها« )Gibson 2004, 02(، فمعرفة عدد الجينات وأبعادها ومواضعها والمسافات 
الرابطة بينها تعني الحصول على معلومات مهمّة حولها كأن نعرف خطط إنتاج البروتينات المخزّنة 
ُمّكن من قراءة تاريخ المرض ومستقبله أو تحديد شكل  للنظام التطوري للكائن البشري والذي ي
النمو والطفرات التي تطرأ عليه. 
تشّكل  والتي  كاملة   DNA سلسلة  تحديد  هو  الأول  بطورين:  الجينومية  المرحلة  مّرت  لقد 
التي   DNA سلسلة  أجزاء  على  التعرّف  فهو  الثاني  الطور  أمّا  البشري،  للكائن  الجيني  التراث 
على  يحتوي  لا  البشري  للجينوم  الكاملة   DNA سلسلة  من  الأكبر  الجزء  »لأن  الجينات  توافق 
 DNA قواعد  من   3% إلا  تحتّل  ولا  الكاملة،   DNA سلسلة  على طول  مبعثرة  فهي  جينات؛ 
ة علماء البيولوجيا الجزيئية في البحث عبر سلسلة DNA عن  (Edelstein 2002, 60) فتكون مَهمَّ
308 صر لنا ا
المواضع الجينية ومسافاتها، وبالفعل فقد »قام جون دوسيه )Jean Dausset( ودانييل كوهن 
الجينوم من نفس  بجخين وكذا تحديد سلسلة  الجينات جيناً  تموضع  بتحديد   )Daniel Cohen(
الكامل  التسلسلي  النظام  إلى معرفة  التوّصل  يعني  العائلات« )Rabinow 2000, 59(، وهذا 
المُركّبات  بها  تُنتج  التي  الطريقة  على  للتعرّف  الكافية  البيولوجية  المؤشرات  يقّدم  والذي  للجينوم 
هذه  البيوتكنولوجية  التقنيات  تُطوّر  حيث  نفسها،  البروتينات  والحيوان  الإنسان  بين  العضوية 
المعلومة وتحوّلها إلى معلومة علاجية.
:)post-génomique( المرحلة ما بعد- جينومية ب.  
وهي المرحلة التي بدأت »بفّك شيفرة الجينوم بشكل شبه كامل )%99( في شهر جوان من سنة 
2000، بفضل آلات قوية وجديدة واستراتيجيات مبتكرة« )Edelstein 2002, 59( ومع اعتبار 
هذه النتيجة حدثاً مهمّاً إلا أنها لا تمثّل إلا البداية لعصر جديد من مشروع الجينوم الذي بقّي 
اللكثير من ألغازه غامضاً وبحاجة إلى المزيد من الأبحاث المخبرية »فما تمّ فّك شيفرته في الجينوم 
البشري هي »الحروف« »الأبجدية« الجزيئية للتراث الجيني للإنسان، للكن معنى تلك الحروف 
واستخدامها يبقى أمراً غامضاً« )Hervé 2006, 50(، لأن التفسير العلمي الذي تُقّدمه البيولوجيا 
الجزيئية حول الطبيعة الفيزيائية والكميائية للجينوم البشري لا يُبرّر اللكثير من العلاقات الوظيفية 
ل نشر التسلسل الكامل للجينوم البشري منعطفاً كبيراً للبيولوجيا، إلا  َّ بين مكوناته، فبقدر ما »مث
أن هذا »النص« الطويل بثلاث مليارات حرف، المستخدم لتهجئة من أربع جزيئات، مرمّزة 
بالحروف A,T,G,C، لا يكشف شيئاً كبيراً عن الكائن البشري وهو يُضاعف المشكلات أكثر 
ممّا يحلّها« )Pouteau 2007, 07(، إذ يظهر أن ما يدفع الحياة في بنية الكائن الحي أعمق من 
أن ُيخختزل في رموز حرفية في صلب الجينوم وهذا يعني المرور إلى تفسيرات ما بعد- جينومية لما 
إليه البيولوجيا الجزيئية  يحدث في التركيبة الجينية ضمن حركة تطوّرية لشكل الحياة الذي تستندُ 
لتفسير الروابط الأكثر عمقاً بين التراث الجيني للإنسان وتكوينه النفسي والسلوكي، إذ »إن اشتغال 
حياتها  أشكال  إلى  يرتّدُ   )life-forms( باستمرار  الحي  الكائن  تُنتج  التي  الأشكال  على  العلماء 
)forms of life( أي إلى طريقة َسَكنها للعالم« )Rabinow 2000, 12( فاللكشف عن حياة 
الجينوم لا يعني اللكشف عن جينوم الحياة بشكل كامل أي أن فك شيفرة سلسلة DNA، لا 
يُفسر شيفرة الحياة كاملة لأن أشكال الحياة لا تخضع لذلك النظام الداخلي للجينات ولهذا طرح 
بول رابينو )Paul Rabinow( فكرة أن »تحديد هوية اللDNA مع »الشخص الإنساني« هو تحديدٌ 
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»روحي«« )Rabinow 2000, 38(، كما أن العديد من علماء البيولوجيا ينسبون تكيّف أنواع 
الكائنات الحية إلى قوة روحية كونية. 
في المرحلة ما بعد- جينومية تتجاوز التفسيرات البيولوجية البنية الفيزيائية- الكميائية إلى البنية 
السلوكية لتطور الكائن الحي؛ كما أنه »في عصر ما بعد- الجينوم تتطور المفاهيم المفتاحية للبيولوجيا 
البرنامج الجيني« )Perbal 2011, 15(، وهو تطورٌ  المعلومة أو  الجزيئية فيما يتعلق بمفهوم الجخين، 
يستجيب  لا  ما  بمعرفة  تتعلق  التي  الإبستيمولوجية  التحّديات  ليتكيّف مع  نفسه  العلم  لبراديغم 
مثل:  فسؤاٌل  معين،  عقلاني  لمنطق  يخضع  ولا  المعروفة  العلمية  التجارب  أو  المنهجية  للطرائق 
»كيف تتحوّل المعلومة المتواصلة في DNA جينٍ ما إلى سلسلة أحماض أمينية لأنزيم ما أو لسلسلة 
البحث في  ممّا يستدعي   )Pastermark 2003, 15( »بروتينية أخرى، يبقى سؤالاً دون إجابة
ُأطر أخرى يُنتج داخلها النظام الجيني الكائَن الحي مثل البيئة والتي تمثّل مصدراً لأشكال الحياة 
من خلال السلوكات التي تعكس ارتباط الشيفرة الجينية بتلك الأشكال وهو ما يسمح بتفسير 
بعض الظواهر البيولوجية التي عجز عن تفسيرها مشروع الجينوم في مرحلته الأولى وعلى رأسها 
طبيعة المعلومة أو الرسالة المنتقلة عبر الجينات بما يرسم خيطاً للحياة، إذ قد بدأنا نُدرك أن »خيط 
الحياة ليس خيطاً مادياً، إنه رسالة، رسالةٌ وراثية متشّكلة عبر الزمن. كل جيل يُرسل رسالة 
إلى الجيل الذي يليه، إنّه يُكلّمه، بطريقة ما، للكي ينقل إليه طريقته في العيش. إذا أردنا البحث 
عن هذه الرسالة فيمكن أن نجد آثاراً لها في DNA كروموزوماتنا، في بنية أنظمتنا البيئية أو في 
 Dessalles( »المحادثات بين البشر، للكن هذه الرسالة لا ُتخختزل إلى آثاٍر مادية سريعة الزوال
02 ,2016(، فتفسير حياة الكائن الحي، إذن، يتجاوز المعطيات المادية التي يُقّدمها مشروع الجينوم 
ر عنه الأبعاد والمنظورات العقلانية للإنسان والمندرجة ضمن تاريخٍ 
ِ
ّ إلى المعطى اللاّمادي الذي تُعب
ع. َّ من اللاّمُبرَمج واللاّمتوق
ثانياً: جين الشباب: تمديد الحياة ضد الشيخوخة. 
العلاجية  الأهداف  متجاوزةً  والبيولوجية  الطبية  العلوم  في  العلمية  التطورات  تسارعت  لقد 
والعمليات التجميلية وعمليات زرع الأعضاء والتعديلات الجينية التقليدية كالاستنساخ وغيرها 
العمر لدى  المسؤولة عن إطالة  بالبحث عن الجينات  إلى عمليات ذات »رفاهية« عالية تتعلق 
الإنسان وتحريرها بيولوجياً أو تطعيم الجينوم البشري بجينات تمديد الحياة الموجودة لدى كائنات 
310 صر لنا ا
العلمي  »الدليل  بدأ  وقد  وقوعها..؛  قبل  علاجياً  وتعديلها  بالأمراض  الجيني  التنبؤ  أو  أخرى 
للتلاعب الجيني لتمديد الحياة، مع أندريه بارتك )Andrzej Bartke( وزملاؤه في مقالهما سنة 
 Genes that prolong life and relationships of growth hormone( :2001 المعنون
بين هرمون  للعمر والعلاقات  المُطيلة  and growth to ageing and life span( ]الجينات 
الخميرة،  على  المقامة  الدراسات  بأن  فيه  والذي صرّحا  الحياة[  الشيخوخة ومدة  والنمو مع  النمو 
الحياة«  وطول  بالشيخوخة  تتحكم  جينات  وجود  على  أدلة كثيرة  وفّرت  قد  والذباب  الديدان 
)Struckelberger 2008, 101(؛ ويُعيد هذا الدليل النظر في تصورنا لمفهوم الشيخوخة نفسه 
المرض  بين  يجمع  نفسي  أفق  في  انتظارها  يتمّ  التي  الشيخوخة  تلك  الحياة ككل،  مفهوم  وكذا 
للموت. إن »الشيخوخة  العضوي والعقلي والنفسي كمقدمة سريعة ورهيبة  والضعف والانهيار 
ظاهرة بيولوجية تختلف بطريقة مدهشة من نوع إلى آخر؛ لنلاحظ مثلاً، عند الثدييات، الفرق 
الموجود بين الفأر والإنسان. معّدل مدة الحياة عند فأر المخبر العادي تمّ توقّعه، في دراسة حديثة 
حول الشيخوخة بل761 يوما، وعند الإنسان، في البلدان التي تتمتّع بمعايير عالية للصحة، فإن معدل 
لظاهرة  البيولوجية  الطبيعة  فإن  وعليه  )Edelstein 2002, 85(؛  سنة«   75 حوالي  هو  الحياة 
الشيخوخة تسمح بإمكانية التدخل الجيني في مسارها والقيام بعمليات »تلاعب« جيني بالكائن 
البشري في هذه المرحلة العمرية »لمكافحة« الشيخوخة أو تأخيرها.
تعتمد مسألة تمديد الحياة وإطالتها على مؤشرات ديموغرافية تتعلق أساساً بل »تضاعف أمل 
الحياة عند الولادة على مدى القرنين الماضيين، لدى الشعوب الأكثر حظاً، مدعوماً بالتناقص 
اللكبير في الوفاة المتعلقة بالولادة وتطور التلقيحات. حالياً في فرنسا يستمر أمل الحياة عند الولادة 
النساء« )Klarsfeld 2000, 51(؛  الرجال و82 سنة عند  74 سنة عند  ليتجاوز  الارتفاع،  في 
وتدّل هذه المؤشرات أيضاً على أن الشيخوخة ظاهرة متغيّرة عبر التاريخ بفعل العوامل الوراثية 
العوامل  تلك  التدخل في  تمديدها وتأخير »أعراضها« بفضل  بالإمكان  أنه  المختلفة أي  والبيئية 
وتغيير طريقة تفاعلها داخل أشكال الحياة التي يمكنها أن تتطور خطياً دون أن تفقد القدرة على 
ثباتها البيولوجي.
تواجه فرضية إطالة الحياة البشرية وتمديدها بتأخير الشيخوخة سؤالاً مُهمّاً: هل يمكن إيجاد 
حدوث  دون  الجينات  بتلك  التلاعب  بالإمكان  وهل  العمر؟  إطالة  عن  مسؤولة  جينات 
انتكاسات بيولوجية ونفسية وأخلاقية؟ تعتمد الإجابة عن هذه الأسئلة على مدى التحوّل في 
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الشيخوخة  الآن أن  نعرف  بستيمولوجياً، ولذلك »نحن  إ فيها  الشيخوخة والتحكم  تناول ظاهرة 
توجد بوصفها ظاهرة منفصلة، وبدأنا نفهم ذلك، ونحن نريد بطبيعة الحال أن نرى ما إذا كنا 
 Leonard( »هيفليك »ليونارد  بارز هو  عالم شيخوخة  قال  فقد  العملية،  بتلك  العبث  نستطيع 
Hayflik(: »الشيخوخة منتوٌج من ُصنع الحضارة« )Hall 2003, 04(، ومن ثمّة أمكن إدخال 
»القيام  تمّ  فقد  الحيوانات،  على  الجينية  التجارب  على  العمل  عبر  المخبر  إلى  الشيخوخة  ظاهرة 
بخمس عشرة عملية تلاعب جيني مختلفة لحث إطالة أمد الحياة في الكائنات الحية مثل ذباب 
الفاكهة والديدان الخيطية والفئران، وهو ما يعني أن الزيادة في متوسط العمر المتوقع في النماذج 
الحيوانية يمكن أن يتحقق جينياً« )Struckelberger 2008, 102( وهذا يعني أن هذه النماذج 
تمتلك القابلية الجينية لطول العمر وتأخير الشيخوخة، وبهذا تتوقف عملية التعديل الجيني لطول 
تمّ  للخميرة  العمر  لطول  جين  »أول  كان  وقد  الإنسان،  لدى  الجينية  النظائر  إيجاد  على  الحياة 
 LAC1 سنة 1994، وتمتلك الخميرة نظيراً لهذا الجخين يسمى )LAG1 )D’mello et atوصفه هو
Jazwinski(( سنة Jang et at( ،1996( )سنة 1998(، وقد تمّ استنساخ نظائر هذا الجخين لدى 
 Hekimi( »الإنسان، إذ يمكن للنظير البشري أن ُيحّسن من وظيفة جين طول العمر في الخميرة
26 ,2000(؛ كما تحّدثت سينثيا كينيون )Cynthia Kenyon( عالمة بيولوجيا جزيئية كبيرة في 
جامعة كاليفورنيا، عن »عملها في تحديد »الجخين الحاصد« )grim-reaper gene( و«جين نافورة 
الشباب« )Fountain of youth gene( في الديدان الخيطية، حيث توقعت أن يكون تمديد 
 Hall 2003,( »حقيقة في القرن الواحد والعشرين )life-span extension( العمر الافتراضي
08(؛ إذ يمكن إيجاد نظائر جينية لدى الإنسان لإطالة الحياة عبر التلاعب الجيني بخريطة الجينوم 
البشري لتصبح الخلايا قادرة على تجديد نفسها لمدة أطول ممّا هي عليه في العادة، وهذا يؤّخر 
مظاهر العجز في الأعضاء ويؤجّل بعض الأمراض الأكثر شيوعاً والمرتبطة بمرحلة الشيخوخة. 
ثالثاً: التمديد الجيني للحياة: حدوده وآثاره. 
ّج  يُبشّر التعديل الجيني بتمديد عمر البشر من خلال إسكان روح الشباب في وظائفهم الحيوية لتتوه
شرارة الحياة في خلاياهم فتتأجل آثار الأمراض المتوقعة، إذ »حتّى عملية الشيخوخة يمكنها أن 
تستمر بمساعدة التلاعب الجيني كما يمكن إلغاء الموت نفسه« )Hervé 2006, 51( وللكنها لا 
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تستمر دون مرافقة علاجية لما ُيخلّفه تقّدم العمر من تآكل في البنية البيولوجية للجسد وانهيار 
للوظائف العضوية وانحساٍر للقوة المناعية للجسم، ولهذا »تبدو فكرة الشفاء بواسطة الجينات فكرة 
مغرية وطبيعية )...( ولذلك تستخدم كثيراً عبارة »DNA الدواء« والتي تعبّر جيداً عن هذا 
تعبيرها  في  بعملها«  »تقوم  الخلوية  الميكانزمات  فإن  الجخين،  إدخال  بمجرد  أنه  فكرة  في  الأمل، 
وتعديلها، منتجة البروتين العلاجي« )Jordan 2007, 10(؛ ويتدخّل في هذه العملية علمان آخران 
ملي والثاني بَعدي هما: الأول قب
:)Eugenics( اليوجينا أ.    
 Francis( غالتون  فرانسيس  طرف  من   1883 سنة  المطوّر  المصطلح  وهو  النسل،  تحسين  علم 
النوع  تحسين  في  تساهم  أن  التطورية  العملية  على  يجب  أنه  فكرة  إلى  يستند  والذي   )Galton
إزالة كل »ضعف« وكل مرض،  »إمكانية  من خلال  وذلك   ،)Perbal 2011, 22(الإنساني
الصفات«  بواسطة اختيار أفضل  البيولوجي  بنائها  بالناس« وتحسين  المضرّة  وتقليص »الجينات 
َلقي للجهاز  )Hervé 2006, 50(، وُتجرى هذه العملية قبل الولادة أي قبل اكتمال التشكيل الخ
بنائية معقدة من  النمو حيث تشارك الجينات في عملية  لطبيعة  الذي يخضع  للإنسان  البيولوجي 
التفاعلات الخلوية؛ ولهذا يتمّ مثلاً »استباق ولادة طفل حامٍل لمرض وراثي بل »تصحيح« الجخين 
الذي به عيب قبل الولادة« )Beland 2006, 42( وهذا يؤدي إلى استباق لتطور المرض، في 
مرحلة الشيخوخة، إلى أمراض أكثر فتكاً وهو ما يعني نظرياً تأخير عملية الشيخوخة وتمديد العمر 
بتجاوز الأمراض التي تُعّطله. 
:)Epigenetics( الإيبيجينا ب.   
الكائنات والناجمة عن تعديل الجينات بدلا من  التغيّرات الحاصلة في  العلم الذي يدرس  وهو 
تغيير الشيفرة الوراثية نفسها )Moore 2015, 08(، وهو من علوم مرحلة ما بعد الجينوم أي 
فيما بعد التعديل الجيني وما يرافقه من تغيّرات فيزيولوجية على مستوى الوظائف الحيوية وآدائها 
والتفاعلات بين الجينات.
 )Behavioral Epigenetics( يندرج تحت علم الإيبيجينا علم آخر هو علم التخلّق السلوكي
»والذي يدرس تأثير علم التخلّق على العمليات السيكولوجية مثل الانفعالات الشعورية، الذاكرة 
والتعلم، الصحة العقلية والسلوك« )Moore 2015, 08( لأن الأمر لا يتعلق لطول الحياة فقط 
بل بجودتها كذلك، فالأمل في تمديد العمر يمكنه أن يتوقف أو يتراجع أمام التهديدات الصحية 
الأكثر قساوة والتي تصاحب فترة التمديد الجيني للحياة البشرية.
إذ »قد  الجيني،  بالعلاج  الشيخوخة  العيادية لطب  للتجارب  الفعلي  التحقق  الرغم من  على 
بدأت بعض العيادات المتخصصة في محاربة الشيخوخة في توفير جواز سفر جيني لمرضاها لزيادة 
 :)Gene Predict Clinic( »نسبة نجاح التدخّلات العلاجية عبر ما يسمى »عيادة التنبؤ الجيني
»نحن ندعوك للحصول على جواز سفرك الجيني- الملف الشخصي- والذي من شأنه أن يؤدي إلى 
علاجات مصمّمة خصيصاً لك، وأدوية ذات فعالية )دون آثار جانبية( وإلى شيخوخة متباطئة 
في إحدى أأمن الدول وأكثرها سرية )سويسرا(« )Struckelberger 2008, 105(، إلا أن هذا 
المشروع ما بعد الجينومي يواجه مشكلات تقنية متعلقة بالأبحاث الجينية وعوائقها الإبستيمولوجية 
إلى  تؤدي  والتي  المشروع  لهذا  الإيتيقية  بالانزلاقات  متعلقة  واجتماعية  أخلاقية  ومشكلات 
انثقاب كينونة الإنسان وتسرّب أشكاله الجوهرية المتماهية مع الحياة في نواتها الأنطولوجية: 
أ. المشكلات التقنية:
تعترض عمليات التعديل الجيني المستهدفة للعلاج الجيني وتأخير الشيخوخة، عوائق مرتبطة ببنية 
الجينات نفسها وعلاقتها ببعضها، إذ »في الواقع، على الرغم من أن الجخين يمكنه أن يندرج فعلياً 
في DNA الخاص بالخلايا المستهدفة، إلا أن مجرد وجوده في اللكروموزوم لا يضمن أن يتمّ التعبير 
عنه آلياً )أي ترجمته إلى شكل من أشكال البروتين(: حيث في الحقيقة، حسب المكان الذي 
يحتله على اللكروموزوم، فإن التعبير عنه في شكل بروتين سيكون أكثر أو أقل كثافة، فيكون من 
الضروري إذن إجراء أبحاث جديدة لمعرفة وضع الجينات المحوّلة على أجزاء اللكروموزومات والتي 
تؤدي إلى التعبير عنها بأكثر فعالية« )Edelstein 2002, 26(، لأن عملية إنتاج البروتين المعبّر 
عن اللكروموزوم المعّدل بجخين جديد هي عملية غير متوقعة النتائج وليست دقيقة مخخبرياً حيث إن 
المشكلة قائمة في التعارض الذي يحدث بين البروتينات »الأصلية« الناتجة عن التكوين البيولوجي 
لحظة الولادة والبروتينات الناتجة عن جينات معّدلة وهذا ما يؤدي إلى تحفيز الجهاز المناعي ضد 
الجينات المعّدلة )كما في بعض حالات زرع الأعضاء( لأن »النظام المناعي مؤسس على مفاهيم 
»الذات« و«اللاّ- ذات« وبالتالي فإنه في ما يأتي من الحياة، إذا دخل عامل غريب إلى الجسم 
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أو إذا بدأت خلايا الجسم في إنتاج بروتين شاذ، فإن النظام المناعي يحّث على مهاجمة بروتينات 
بالتموضع  مرتبطة  ليست  بروتين  إلى  الجخين  فترجمة   ،)Edelstein 2002, 35( ذات««  »اللاّ- 
داخل اللكروموزوم الحامل له والمراد علاجه أو تحسين الصفات التي يحملها فقط بل هي مرتبطة 
بالعلاقات بين الجينات ببعضها، ولهذا فإنه »في اللكثير من الحالات العيادية البشرية، لا تخخبر 
 Pouteau( »المعرفة بالسلاسل الجينية إلا باحتمال المرض دون يقين يتعلق بحدوثه أو خطورته
08 ,2007(، إذ لا يمكن التنبؤ بما يمكن أن يحدث في اللكروموزوم الحامل للمرض الذي يمكن 
أن يختفي في المستقبل أو يبقى في حالة كمون أو وجود بالقوة، وهذا ما نستطيع تسميته بل »الجخين 
الخامل« والذي قد يؤدي تعديله علاجياً إلى إنتاج أمراض أخرى غير متوقعة وغير مُسيطَر عليها، 
 Pastermark( »ًولهذا »تبقى الطبيعة الحقيقية للعلاقة بين الجخين المتضرر ومرٍض ما لغزاً كبيرا
14 ,2003(، وهذا يدعو إلى البحث في الجزيئات المتحكمة في إنتاج البروتين انطلاقاً من الجينات 
وفهم آلية التعبير عنها بالميكانزمات غير التقليدية للبيولوجيا الجزيئية. 
ُمثّل عملية التدخّل الجيني المتعلق بإطالة العمر، إذن، تحّدياً أمام العلاج الجيني للشيخوخة لأنه  ت
»عكس الخلايا الدموية، فإن أغلب الأنواع الأخرى من الخلايا يصعب عزلها أو انتقاؤها بواسطة 
هة معينة، وأكثر من ذلك، في بعض الحالات، تصدر ردّة فعل مناعية ضد الفيروس، 
ِ
قوة موّج
ممّا يحّد من إمكانيات الاستخدام، ففي بعض المحاولات العيادية الحديثة للأمراض الجينية في 
الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، فإن بعض المرضى كانوا قد توفّوا« )Edelstein 2002, 26(، ممّا 
يدل على وجود علاقات وظيفية بين الجينات أكثر دقة ممّا هي عليه التوصيفات البيوتكنولوجية 
الحديثة كما أن درجة التشفير في الجينات هي أعلى ممّا تمّ فكه إلى غاية الزمن الحاضر بالإضافة إلى 
صعوبة تطبيق ما تمّ التوصل إليه في هذا المجال لدى الحيوان على الإنسان، إذ »على الرغم من أنه 
تمّ تحديد الجينات ]المسؤولة عن طول العمر[، إلاّ أنه ليس من الواضح كيف تشارك البروتينات 
لأن   )Struckelberger 2008, 102( »العمر تحديد طول  في  الجينات  بواسطة هذه  المشفرة 
تمييز  يمكن  لا  ثمّة  نفسها ومن  الشيخوخة  لا تختلف عن أعراض  العمر  تمديد طول  أعراض 
مسؤولية الجينات المعّدلة بغرض العلاج في إطالة العمر لأن ذلك لا يُعرف إلا من خلال عملية 
واسعة على عدد معتبر من الأفراد الذين يمللكون المعطيات الصحية والعمرية والجينية نفسها. ومع 
ذلك توجد »اليوم، آماٌل في تلاعب جيني مُراقب ومخصوص والذي ينشأ مع إمكانية استخدام 
الجينات  لإدخال  الخلايا  بهذه  التلاعب جينياً  يمكن  البشرية، حيث  الجنينية  الجذعية  الخلايا 
والحياة315 الجينوم 
للانقسام  القابلية  له  الخلايا  من  النوع  هذا  لأن   )Struckelberger 2008, 102( العلاجية« 
المتجدد بالجينات العلاجية المدمجة فيه بما يساعد على إنتاج بروتينات من الأصل.
إن توجّه البيولوجيا الجزيئية إلى الخلايا الجذعية الجنينية البشرية يأتي بعد الإخفاقات الناتجة 
عن الحدود المخبرية التي تحّد الخلايا العادية، »ففي سنة 1961 اكتشف هيفليك )Hayflik( أن 
الخلايا البشرية العادية المزروعة في المخبر لها مدة حياة محدودة أي أنها مبرمجة لتنقسم إلى عدد 
 Hall 2003,( »)»ثابت من المرات ثمّ يتوقف الانقسام المتكرر، )وهو ما يُعرف بل »حّد هيفليك
04( حيث يقّل عدد الانقسامات الخلوية كلما تقّدمت الخلية في العمر أي أن هناك حّداً لحياة 
هذه الخلايا، »ويوجد عدد من النظريات التي تفسّر سبب ما يُدعى »حّد هيفليك«، حيث ترى 
انقسام  الخلايا، إذ مع كل  أثناء نسخ  لتلف جيني عشوائي  النظريات بوجود تراكم  تلك  أهم 
خلوي يمكن للعوامل البيئية مثل الدخان والإشعاع ومواد كميائية تدعى جذور الهيدروكسيل 
لل DNA من جيل خلوي إلى جيل خلوي  الحرة والنفايات الخلوية، أن تعّطل النسخ الدقيق 
يليه. ولدى الجسم عدد من الأنزيمات التي تقوم بإصلاح DNA والتي تشرف على عملية النسخ 
والتدخل لإصلاح مشكلات النسخ عند بروزها، وللكنها لا تنجح في اكتشاف جميع الأخطاء 
وتحديدها. ومع استمرار نسخ الخلايا، يتراكم عطب الل DNAبداخلها، ممّا يؤدي إلى إنتاج بروتيني 
خاطئ وخلل وظيفي، وتمثّل هذه الاختلالات والأعطاب سبب الأمراض الخاصة بالشيخوخة 
مثل تصلّب الشرايين وأمراض القلب والسرطان« (Fukuyama 2002, 58 - 59)، ويظهر أن 
هذا الحّد غير قابل للاختراق الجيني كلياً لأنه يمثّل التوازن الحيوي للكائن البشري كما يعبّر عن 
التعرف على تسلسلها  التشّكل الجيني؛ إذ إن »أكثر من 200 جين بشري تمّ  تاريخ طويل من 
ظهرت ناشئة بشكل مباشر عن بكتيريا معادلة لها، وعليه فقد استمد الجينوم البشري جزءاً كبيراً 
من معلومته القاعدية لللDNA من بكتيريا عمرها آلاف السنين« )Mattei 2001, 26( ممّا يجعل 
جينات إطالة العمر وتأخير الشيخوخة في مواجهة هذا التاريخ من المعلومات التي حافظت على 
المناعي  الجهاز  تحريك  وما  والنفسية؛  الجسدية  وصفاتهم  وخصائصهم  للبشر  الجوهري  الطابع 
لهذا التاريخ ضد المؤقت والطارئ؛ وعليه فإن هذه  لمهاجمة هذه »الجينات الغريبة« إلا حشداً 
الحدود التقنية لمشروع إدخال الشيخوخة إلى المخبر وعلاجها جينياً تمثّل حدود الطبيعة البشرية في 
حّد ذاتها وكل تجاوز لها يؤدي إلى انتكاسات بيولوجية للجسد البشري ممثلة في الأمراض المؤثرة 
على سلامة الدماغ والأعصاب والقوى الحركية والقلب..وغيرها.
316 صر لنا ا
ب. المشكلات الأخلاقية والاجتماعية:
لا يقتصر التلاعب بالجينوم البشري بغرض إطالة العمر ومحاربة الشيخوخة على تغييرات بيولوجية 
بل يتعّداه إلى التلاعب بالبنية الأخلاقية  تطرأ على الكائن البشري والتي يمكن مراقبتها مخخبرياً 
والاجتماعية لهذا الكائن لأنه سيندمج بهذه التعديلات الجينية في مجموعته الاجتماعية التي ستتعرض 
بقاء أجساد البشر  لانزلاقات أخلاقية غير معتادة حيث »تقتصر قدرة التقنيات الطبية الراهنة على إ
على قيد الحياة، وللكن بجودة حياة رديئة كثيراً، ولهذا برزت في السنوات الأخيرة- في الولايات 
المتحدة الأمريكية وغيرها- قضايا مثل المساعدة على الانتحار والقتل الرحيم، وفي المستقبل، من 
المحتمل أن تعرض علينا البيوتكنولوجيا صفقات تُفاضل فيها بين طول العمر وجودة الحياة، فإذا 
 )Fukuyama 2002, 69( »ما تمّ قبول تلك المفاضلات، فستكون الآثار الاجتماعية مأساوية
لأن إطالة العمر باستخدام تقنيات التعديل الجيني تعني مزيداً من »الأعباء« الإضافية على الحياة 
اليومية، إذ سيرافق تمديد الحياة الفردية للبشر تمديداً لمشاكلهم اليومية ولروتين عملهم ومسؤولياتهم 
الاجتماعية والمهنية وما يتبع ذلك من تراكم للمشاكل النفسية.
إن النظر إفي المشكلات الأخلاقية التي تعيشها المجتمعات المعاصرة اليوم يشير إلى أن إطالة 
المشكلات وليس حلّها، حيث  العمر في متوسط معدلات الحياة فيها لا يعني إلا تفاقم تلك 
سيزداد العمر الافتراضي لارتكاب الجريمة أكثر من المعتاد بسبب تمديد الحالة الصحية للمجرمين 
سنوات إضافية مما يعني مزيداً من الجرائم وتكرارها، كما أن تزايد الأمل في الحياة يعني تزايد 
فيها  يرتكب  التي  المرحلة  والتي هي  الشيخوخة،  مرحلة  لأن  الجرائم  من  المزيد  اقتراف  فرص 
الناس جرائم أقل بسبب ضعف أجسادهم وكثرة أمراضهم، في الأعمار العادية، ستوافق مرحلة 
اللكهولة في الأعمار الممّددة؛ كما أنه لا يمكن التنبؤ بالحالات النفسية المصاحبة لذوي الأعمار 
الممّددة جينياً إذ يمكن أن يقع انفلاٌت أخلاقي بسبب الفترة الممّددة من حياتهم والتي تُضاعف 
بنشاطهم  سيحتفظون  الناس  كان  إذا  »فيما  التفكير  يكون  وحينها  والتوتر  القلق  حالات  من 
البدني والذهني طيلة فترات الحياة الممّددة، وما إذا كان المجتمع سيتحول تدريجياً إلى ما يشبه 
داراً ضخمة للعجزة« )Fukuyama 2002, 67( بما ينذر بتصّدع العلاقات الأخلاقية بين الآباء 
والأبناء، خصوصاً في المجتمعات الإسلامية التي تعتبر المرافقة الصحية والاجتماعية للآباء في فترة 
الشيخوخة واجباً أخلاقياً مقدساً بل عبادة من أعظم العبادات.
والحياة317 الجينوم 
على  مأساوية  آثاراً  بالبيوتكنولوجيا  العمر  لإطالة  »ستكون  فإنه  الاجتماعي  المستوى  على  أما 
البنيات الداخلية للمجتمعات، وأهمها تلك المرتبطة بتدبير السلاسل الهرمية الاجتماعية )..( إذ 
سيُلحق تمديد العمر أضراراً كبيرة بتلك السلاسل المنتظمة حالياً حسب العمر، وتفترض هذه 
العليا  المناصب  المتنافسين على  مجموعة  يُصّفي  الموت  تقليدي، لأن  بنية هرمية بشكل  السلاسل 
ويغربلها« )Fukuyama 2002, 64 - 65( لأن الموت يمثل بالنسبة للأعمار الحالية »عتبة طبيعية« 
لتطورات اجتماعية وتنظيما »عادلاً« لإعادة »تدوير« البنى الاجتماعية ودمجها في مسارات متجددة 
من العمل والثقافة والحضارة، حيث »إن أشكال الاختفاء بالموت »الطبيعي« تقدم تنوّعاً هائلاً، 
الموت في الأعمار  الإنتاج« )Klarsfeld 2000, 59( وهو ما يعني أن  بإيجاد أشكال لإعادة 
الممّددة سيكون ظاهرة »غير طبيعية« لأنه سيُعتبر »حدثاً اجتماعياً« ينتهي معه شكل من أشكال 
الهيمنة الهرمية غير العادية، فمع نهاية الجسد تنتهي الحمولة الاجتماعية الرمزية التي يمثّلها، ولهذا يقول 
عالم الاجتماع لوبرتون )D. Le Breton(: »يبقى الجسد مادة متاحة بصعوبة لأنه محمّيٌ بمقاومات 
شعورية )وكذلك لا شعورية( لجزء كبير من الجماعة الاجتماعية« )Cadré 2001, 104(، فما إن 
الآثار  لصاحبه وستكون  مبلكاً  فإنه لا يصبح  لمجتمع ما  الهرمية  السلسلة  الفرد في  يدخل جسد 
الاجتماعية جزءاً من الآثار المَرَضية التي تلحق به مع تقدم العمر.
في  البقاء  مدة  تمديد  وإلى  العامة  الوظائف  في  التقاعد  تمديد سن  إلى  الأعمار  تمديد  يؤدي 
المناصب والهيئات الاجتماعية ممّا يؤدي إلى تأخير سن العمالة وإلى تراجع الدور الاجتماعي للفئات 
الشابة حيث »إن فكرة بقاء اللكفاءات مناسبة على امتداد حياة العمل متواصلة لخمسين أو ستين 
بين الأجيال إلى الصراع  للعقل بشكل كبير )..( وستُضاف الحرب  سنة، هي فكرة مناقضة 
الطبقي والعرقي، كعامل فاصل في المجتمع. وستتحول عملية إزاحة الشباب لمسنين إلى صراع 
أساسي، وقد تضطر المجتمعات إلى طرق غير شخصية مبنية على أنماط من المؤسسات العمرية في 
عالم مستقبلي يكون فيه العمر المتوقع أطول« )Fukuyama 2002, 67(، فيظهر أن عملية إطالة 
العمر ُتخّل بالتوازن الاجتماعي الذي يقتضي تداول فئات عمرية معينة على هرم النظام الاجتماعي 
التقليدية  البنيات  استمرارية  الصراع ويحافظ على  يدفع  بما  المختلفة  النظامية  والهيئات  العمل  في 
للمجتمع. 
318 صر لنا ا
رابعاً: الإسلام والتمديد الجيني للحياة: 
القرآن وإمكانية تمديد الحياة:  أ.    
يفتُح القرآن مجالاً للإمكانات الإنسانية والطبيعية التي قد تتعارض مع التصورات المألوفة وللكنها 
لا تتعارض مع طبيعة العلم نفسه لأن العلم نفسه يندرج ضمن إمكان الخلق الإلهي، وبهذا المعنى 
فإن ما نعتبره معجزة لا يعني أنه غير قابل للفهم أو أنه لا يمكن التعبير عنه بالدقة العلمية التي 
تتطور عبر التاريخ ليظهر أن ما يوصف بل »غير الطبيعي« متضمّن في »الطبيعي« نفسه، وفي هذا 
السياق يمكن الحديث عن إمكانية »تمديد الحياة« في القرآن والتفسير الذي يرافقها، حيث »إن 
الإمكانية »غير الطبيعية« لحياة مديدة ليست مقصورة في القرآن على الأنبياء كنوح، فقد أشار 
القرآن إلى قصة أهل اللكهف الذين هربوا إلى كهف« )Maher 2009, 125(، ممّا يعني أن تهيئة 
َلَكات الجسم التي يمكن من  الأسباب لتمديد الحياة تتجلّى في الطبيعة البشرية كتخطيط مسبق لم
خلالها أن يتجاوز حدود الطبيعة التي تعني الثبات وللكنه ثبات في زمن محدود غير أن طول هذا 
الزمن يوحي بعدم إمكانية تغيّر المعطيات البيولوجية.
لقد أورد ابن قيم الجوزية في تفسير قوله تعالي »إنه على رجعه لقادر« )سورة الطارق، الآية 
8(: »قال مقاتل: »إنم شئُت رَددته من اللكبر إلى الشباب ومن الشباب إلى الصبا، ومن الصبا 
إلى النطفة« )الجوزية )د.ت(، 164(، وهذا يعني أن الكائن البشري يتوفر على القابلية للعودة 
إلى الشباب بفضل تخليق ذي دافعية مسبقة »ولو ُكشف لك الغطاء لرأيت التخطيط والتصوير 
يظهر في النطفة شيئاً بعد شيء من غير أن ترى المُصوّر ولا آلته ولا قلمه، فهل رأيَت مصوّراً لا 
تمّس آلته الصورة ولا تلاقيها؟« )الجوزية )د.ت(، 608(، وهذا يشير تماماً إلى البرمجة الجينية 
للإمكانات الطبيعية وغير الطبيعية التي يمكن أن تكون عليها بيولوجيا الجسد البشري ومنها إمكانية 
تمديد الحياة، وبهذا »يقّدم القرآن للمسلمين معاني لفهم إمكانية تمديد الحياة، ويرى المسلمون أن 
العلاقة بين العلم والدين تدعم قبول هذه الإمكانية« )Maher 2009, 125(، ما دام تمديد الحياة 
على  مخاطر  التجربة دون  ليُجّسد هذه  للعلم  واسعاً  الباب  يفتح  فإن ذلك  القرآن  في  ممكنا  أمراً 
التركيبة الفيزيولوجية للوظائف الحيوية للكائن البشري. 
والحياة319 الجينوم 
طول العمر ومسوّغاته في الإسلام: ب.   
ر فيها وبما يتمّ إصلاحه من أخلاق وعمل، ولأن الإسلام  إن الحياة في الإسلام ذات شأن بما يُعمَّ
دين فطرة فإن كراهية الموت، بما هي فطرة بشرية، لا ُتخالف المقاصد اللكبرى للدين ولا تعني 
فساد نفس المسلم، فحُب الحياة ليس هو نفسه ُحب الدنيا المذموم، فالحياة تجربة إنسانية محايثة 
التجربة بإغراءاتها وغوايتها؛ فقد  تلك  تُثقل  التي  المادية  الحمولة  الدنيا هي  بينما  الإنسان  للكينونة 
جاء في الحديث النبوي »عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: إن الله قال: 
مَن عادى لي وليّاً فقد آذنته بالحرب. وما تقرب إليّ عبدي بشيء أحب إليّ ممّا افترضته عليه. 
وما يزال عبدي يتقرب إليّ بالنوافل حتى ُأحبه، فإذا أحببته كنُت سمعَه الذي يسمع به وبصره 
الذي يُبصر به ويده التي يبطش بها ورجله التي يمشي بها، وإن سألني لأعطينّه، ولئن استعاذ بي 
لأعيذنّه. وما تردّدُت عن شيء أنا فاعلهُ تردّدي عن نفس المؤمن يكرَه الموت وأنا أكره مَساءته« 
)صحيح البخاري 2002، 1617: 6502(؛ فقد أثبت هذا الحديث أن كراهية الموت فطرة حتى 
في نفس المؤمن الذي ُيحبّه الله وقد أتى بما يتقرّب به إليه، ويستلزم عن هذا حب الحياة وطولها 
إلا إذا جاء ما يُفسدها ويُفقدها طابعها الجوهري ويَلبس عليها كالفتن فتتحوّل كراهية الموت 
إلى محبّته، فل«عن أبي هريرة عن النبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: »لا تقوم الساعة حتى يمرّ الرجل 
بقبر الرجل فيقول: يا ليتني مكانه« )صحيح البخاري 2002، 1759: 7115(، وليس هذا حبّاً في 
يمان المؤمن الذي يكون كالقابض على جمر من شّدة  الموت بل كُرهاً للفتن وكثرتها وتأثيرها على إ
ما يُلاقي منها.
القيام بواجب اجتماعي هو  لمّا عُلبم من محبّة الإنسان لطول الحياة فقد ُجعلت كمكافأة على 
صلة الرحم فل«عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه قال: سمعُت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يقول: 
مه« )صحيح البخاري 2002،  ميصل رَحب مَن سَرّهُ أن يُبسط له في رزقه، وأن يُنسأ له في أثره فل
1503: 5985(، وهذا يعني أن الإنسان ُيحب أن يطول عمره وتتأخر شيخوخته بما يمثّل خاصية 
بشرية لم يُكرّهها الدين الإسلامي بل ذهب، على العكس من ذلك، إلى النهي عن تمنّي الموت 
)مجرّد التمني(، فقد قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: » لا يتمنى أحدكم الموت إمّا ُمحسناً فلعلّه 
يزداد، وإمّا مُسيئاً فلعلّه يستعتب« )صحيح البخاري 2002، 1788: 7235(؛ فطول العمر مرغوب 
ُلق متى ما طال بهما  ُلق الحسن، لأن هذا العمل وهذا الخ إذن بشرط ربطه بالعمل الصالح والخ
الزمان كان ذلك خيراً لصاحبه وللناس من حوله وأثراً لما بعده ومَدَداً لأهل الأخلاق الحسنة 
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في مواجهة أهل السوء، فقد قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: »خيرُ الناس من طال عمره 
وحسُن عمله« )الإمام النووي 45: 108(، ولهذا فإن طول العمر هو من الخخيرية إذا ارتبط بحسن 
العمل  ذاك  ديمومة  يقطع  لأنه  الموت  معه كراهية  وتزداد  الغرض  لهذا  مطلوباً  فيكون  العمل 
فيحبسه عن الناس. 
يتبيّن من خلال ما سبق أن طلب تمديد الحياة والأعمار ليس مذموماً، كما أنه طلٌب قديم منذ 
آدم عليه السلام، فعن أبي هريرة أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال: »لما خلق الله آدم مسح 
ظهره، فسقط من ظهره كّل نَسَمة هو خالقها إلى يوم القيامة أمثال الذرّ، ثم جعل بين عيني كل 
إنسان منهم وبيصاً من نور، ثم عرضهم على آدم، فقال: يا رب من هذا؟ فقال: هذا ابنك داود، 
يكون في آخر الأمم. قال: كم جعلَت له من العمر؟ قال ستين سنة، قال: يا رب زبده من عمري 
أربعين سنة، فقال الله تعالى: إذاً يُكتب وُيختم فلا يُبّدل.
فلمّا انقضى عُمر آدم جاءه ملَك الموت. قال: أو لم يبق من عمري أربعون سنة؟ فقال: أوَ لم 
تجعلها لابنك داود؟ قال: فجحدَ، فجحدت ذريته، ونسي فنسيت ذريته، وخطئ فخطئت ذريته«. 
)..( وزاد محمد بن سعد: »ثم أكمل الله لآدم ألف سنة، ولداود مائة سنة« )الجوزية )د.ت(، 
455-456(، فطلُب الزيادة في العمر لا يتناقض مع الأقدار والآجال والسنن الإلهية في تحديد 
يستقدمون«  ولا  ساعة  يستأخرون  لا  أجلهم  جاء  فإذا  أجل  أمة  »ولكل  تعالى  لقوله  الأعمار، 
)الأعراف، الآية 34(، أو لقوله تعالى: »وما يُعمّر من معمّر ولا يُنقص من عمره إلا في كتاب« 
)فاطر، الآية 11(، لأنه إذا كان تحديد الأعمار أمراً غيبياً فهذا يعني إمكانية زيادة بعض الأعمار 
أو نقصانها دون أن يكون للبشر علمٌ بذلك؛ وعليه فإنه إذا كان طلب تمديد العمر وزيادته بالدعاء 
لا يتعارض مع القدر أو الشرع فإن طلبه بالطرق التقنية الطبية والعلاجات المختلفة يدخل ضمن 
اللاتعارض نفسه. 
لقد حّدد الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم متوسط أعمار أمته، فعن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه، 
قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: »أعمار أمتي ما بين الستين إلى السبعين، وأقلّهم من يجوز 
ذلك« )الترمذي )3550(، وابن ماجه )4236((، وتتفق أغلب شروح هذا الحديث على أن 
هذا التحديد العمري هو تحديد أخلاقي بالأساس أي دفعاً للبطر والاستكبار، فقد جاء في »فيض 
القدير« للمناوي: »أعمار أمتي ما بين الستين إلى السبعين وأقلهم من يجوز ذلك«، قال الطيبي هذا 
محمول على غالب بدليل شهادة الحال فإن منهم من لم يبلغ ستين وهذا من رحمة الله بهذه الأمة 
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ورفقه بهم أّخرهم في الأصلاب حتى أخرجهم إلى الأرحام بعد نفاد الدنيا ثم قصّر أعمارهم لئلا 
يلتبسوا بالدنيا إلا قليلا فإن القرون السالفة كانت أعمارهم وأبدانهم وأرزاقهم أضعاف ذلك كان 
أحدهم يعمّر ألف سنة وطوله ثمانون ذراعاً وأكثر وأقل وحبّة القمح ككلوة البقرة والرمانة يحملها 
عشرة فكانوا يتناولون الدنيا بمثل تلك الأجساد وفي تلك الأعمار فبطروا واستكبروا وأعرضوا 
عن الله »فصّب عليهم ربك سوط عذاب« فلم يزل الخلق ينقصون خلقاً ورزقاً وأجلاً إلى أن 
قليلة بأبدان ضعيفة في مدة قصيرة كيلا يبطروا  صارت هذه الأمة آخر الأمم يأخذون أرزاقاً 
فذلك رحمة بهم« )المناوي 1972، 11(، فإطالة العمر أو تقصيره مرتبطان بالعمل المنجز فيهما 
وليست إطالة العمر لذاتها بل لما يتحقق بها من أخلاق وإصلاح في الأرض ولما تكون لها من 
فعالية على المجتمعات.
أما ذمّ طلب تمديد العمر وتمنيّه فيكون في من أفسد وأراد المزيد من الحياة هروباً من عقابه، 
فقد جاء قوله تعالى: »ولتجدنهم أحرص الناس على حياة ومن الذين أشركوا يودّ أحدهم لو يُعمّر 
ألف سنة وما هو بمزحزحه من العذاب أن يُعمّر« )البقرة، الآية 96(، وقد جاء في تفسير هذه 
الآية قول الطبري: »وإنما وصف الله جل ثناؤه اليهود بأنهم أحرص الناس على الحياة، لعلهم 
بما قد أعّد لهم في الآخرة على كفرهم« )تفسير الطبري 2001، 276(، وهو على قول ابن كثير: 
»أي أحرص الخلق على حياة أي: على طول عمر، لما يعلمون من مآلهم السيئ وعاقبتهم عند الله 
خاسرة، )..( فهم يودون لو تأخروا عن مقام الآخرة بكل ما أمكنهم« )تفسير ابن كثير1999، 
الأخلاقي(  البيولوجي( والغرض منه )المعنى  العمر )بالمعنى  بين طول  334(، ففي هذا فصٌل 
ولذلك ذكر الطبري قول أهل التأويل في »«أن« التي في قوله »أن يعمّر« بمعنى: وإن عُمّر« )تفسير 
الطبري 2001، 280( أي في إمكانية التعمير البيولوجي دون التعمير الأخلاقي.
ولذلك  وثباتاً،  عمقاً  الأكثر  الإنسانية  الانفعالات  أحد  هو  الموت  من  »الخوف  فإن  وعليه 
يكون مفهوماً الاحتفاء بكل تطور في التقنيات الطبية والذي من شأنه أن يُبعد شبح الموت عنّا« 
)Fukuyama 2002, 67(، ولأن هذه التقنيات المتعلقة بالعلاج الجيني للشيخوخة وإطالة العمر 
ستكون متوفرة في العالم الإسلامي مثلها مثل العمليات التجميلية أو زراعة الأعضاء والتخصيب 
الاصطناعي.. فإنها ستكون في ُصلب النقاش الديني والأخلاقي، لأن المسألة، كما تقدم، مرتبطة 
بالقيم الأخلاقية المرافقة لكل تطور طبّي والتي هي من معالم الدين وركائزه.
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ج- النظر الفقهي والأخلاقي في التعديل الجيني:
تعتبر الشيخوخة وما يؤول إليه صاحبها من عجز بدني وتراجع في القدرات العقلية والنفسية سنة 
إلهية ثابتة لقوله تعالى: »الله الذي خلقكم من ضعف ثم جعل من بعد ضعف قوة ثم جعل من بعد 
قوة ضعفاً وشيبة يخلق ما يشاء وهو العليم القدير« )الروم، الآية 54( أما بالنسبة للعلم فإن علماء 
البيولوجيا »يميلون للاعتقاد بأن الشيخوخة هي نتيجة للتفاعل بين عدد كبير من الجينات، وعليه 
فإنه لا توجد طرق جينية مختصرة لتأجيل الموت« )Fukuyama 2002, 58(، ومنه فإن العلم 
لا يُعارض السنن الإلهية بل يتحرك داخل مجالها المحدد ويوافق ما هو متاح فيها من إمكانيات، 
لأنه لا شيء في الطبيعة البشرية يخضع للعلم إلا إذا كان مخلوقاً بهذه الإمكانية ومجبولاً على إظهار 
ما يمتللكه من معلومات جينية مشفرة، غير أن الخوف المشترك بين العلم والدين هو أن »يؤدي 
 Hervé 2006,( »التلاعب بالجينوم البشري إلى آثار كارثية هي مقدمة سيناريو نهاية الإنسان
49( أي نهاية الطبيعة العادية للإنسان واختفاء ملامحه التقليدية ليتحول إلى مخلوق ممسوخ مشوه 
وهذا ما يدعو إلى البحث في الطابع الأخلاقي للتعديل الجينومي المؤدي إلى إطالة العمر وتأجيل 
الشيخوخة من منظور الأخلاق الإسلامية.
من حيث الأحكام الفقهية المتصلة بجواز نقل الجينات أو عدمه فإن »منهم من منع نقل 
الجخين إلى الخلايا الجسدية، لأن في ذلك تغييراً لخلق الله بالتدخل في التركيب الوراثي للإنسان، 
ولأن هذه العمليات لا تخلو من أضرار ومفاسد، ودرء المفاسد مقدم على جلب المصالح؛ وأكثر 
العلماء والباحثين أجازوا عمليات نقل الجخين إلى الخلية الجسدية، على ألاّ يؤدي ذلك إلى ضرر 
أعظم من الضرر الموجود فعلاً وألاّ تكون هناك وسيلة أخرى لعلاج المرض« )الألفي 2012، 
على  تترتب  التي  المفاسد  زاوية  من  العمر جينياً  إطالة  لمسألة  الفقهي  التقدير  يكون  24(، وهنا 
ذلك وعلى رأسها التمديد في عمر الظالمين فيزدادوا ظلماً أو ما يكون من طمع في الحياة بمزيد من 
الشهوات وكثير من الخطايا التي يجلبها طول العمر والتأخر في الشيخوخة بما يوهم ببُعد الموت 
وطول الحياة الدال على الخلود »الرمزي«؛ أما من زاوية المصالح فيكون على سبيل العلاج المفيد 
بحيث »أن التحكم في صفة وراثية تشتمل على خلل أو مرض وراثي أو مرض ناتج عن خلل في 
المورثات )..( أمٌر جائز شرعاً لأنه من باب العلاج الذي شرعه الله تعالى يدل عليه قوله صلى 
الله عليه وسلم: »تداووا عباد الله، فإن الله تعالى لم يضع داء إلا وضع له دواء غير داء واحد: 
الهرم« )أبو يحيى 2011، 31(، إلا أن هناك مشكلة علمية وأخلاقية هي: هل إطالة العمر وتأجيل 
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الشيخوخة يدخلان في باب العلاج أم لا؟ لأنه يظهر من معنى الحديث السابق أن الشيخوخة 
المُعبّر عنها بلفظ »الهرم« تعتبر »داءً«، وأمّا أنه ليس لها دواء فمعناه ليس لها دواء يقضي عليها أمّا 
ما دون ذلك أي في إمكانية تأجيلها فأمر ممكن.
قرار  صدر  فقد  النسل،  تحسين  العمر،  إطالة  إلى  المؤدي  الجينومي،  التعديل  من  فُهم  إذا 
من المجمع الفقهي التابع لرابطة العالم الإسلامي، يرى بأنه »لا يجوز استخدام أي من أدوات 
علم الهندسة الوراثية ووسائله للعبث بشخصية الإنسان، ومسؤوليته الفردية، أو للتدخل في بنية 
المورثات )الجينات( بدعوى تحسين السلالة البشرية« )القرة داغي 2006، 325( لأن هدف 
غير مبرر طبياً،  العلاج غير متوفر وهذا ما يجعل التعديل الجينومي بغرض تحسين النسل أمراً 
وللكن ماذا لو أدّى تحسين النسل جينياً إلى تحسينه أخلاقياً أو تغيير بعض الطبائع المشينة التي 
اكتسبها وراثياً أو بيئياً وهذا إذا نظرنا إلى هذه المسألة بناءً على قاعدة المآلات، لأن »النظر في 
مآلات الأفعال معتبر مقصود شرعاً سواء كانت الأفعال موافقة أو مخالفة، وذلك أن المجتهد لا 
يحكم على فعل من الأفعال الصادرة على المكلفين بالإقدام أو بالإحجام إلا بعد نظره إلى ما يؤول 
إليه ذلك الفعل مشروعاً لمصلحة فيه تستجلب أو مفسدة تدرأ، وللكن له مآل على خلاف ذلك، 
فإذا أطلق القول في الاول بالمشروعية فربما أدّى استجلاب المصلحة فيه إلى مفسدة تساوي 
المصلحة أو تزيد عليها. فيكون هذا مانعاً من إطلاق القول بالمشروعية، وكذلك إذا أطلق القول 
في الثاني بعدم المشروعية ربما أدى استدفاع المفسدة إلى مفسدة تساوي أو تزيد فلا يصح القول 
بعدم المشروعية« )القرة داغي 2006، 323(، إذ يمكننا أن نبني على هذه القاعدة ما نستطيع 
تسميته بل »أخلاق المآلات« أي تلك الأحكام الأخلاقية المتعلقة بأغراض التعديل الجينومي 
والتي تنظر في ما يؤول إليه هذا التعديل وليس لما يكون عليه في الحاضر.
وجَب النظر إذن إلى ما سيتغيّر في الإنسان عند إطالة عمره جينياً، هل يتغيّر خَلقه أم يتمدد 
فقط؟ هل هو من باب تحسين الصفات أم مجرد تأجيل لمرحلة محتومة من حياة الإنسان وليس 
للحصول على صفات مرغوبة؛ لأن  الخلية الجسدية  إلى  الجخين  نقل  تغييرها؟؛ هناك »من أجاز 
تحصيل الصفات الحسنة من الأمور المحمودة شرعاً، ولا مانع من طلبها بالطرق المباحة، فالمؤمن 
القوي خير وأحب إلى الله من المؤمن الضعيف، والله تعالى جميل يحب الجمال« )الألفي 25، 
2012(، وعندئذ يكون طول العمر من قوة المؤمن وجماله وهو مَطلب غير محّصل بتغيير خَلق 
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ُلق فطري لأن طول العمر لا يُغيّر الصفات أو ُيحّسنها بل هو تمديد للحياة في  ظاهر ولا تشويه لخ
الزمن بما لا يتناقض مع أجَل الموت، أي أنه تمديدٌ لقدَر إلى قدَر آخر.
الأعمار  إن  الإسلامية؟  المجتمعات  على  جينياً  العمر  لإطالة  الأخلاقي  التأثير  يكون  كيف 
الحالية متأقلمة مع تطور المجتمعات المعاصرة لأنها من صناعة الحضارة أي أنها مرتبطة بتطور 
الغذاء وجودته وتطور  العمل ووفرة  الاجتماعية وتحّسن ظروف  الرعاية  النظام الصحي وتزايد 
الدواء وتقنيات العلاج الجسدي والنفسي وكذا نمو أشكال الرفاهية، وقد استفادت المجتمعات 
له  الأعمار ستكون  في معدل  تغيير سريع  الحضارية، غير أن كل  المظاهر  الإسلامية من هذه 
بعاد الوالدين إلى دور العجزة والذي يُعّد  عواقب أخلاقية متسارعة، فإذا كنا نشهد اليوم حالات إ
عملاً غير أخلاقي لأنه من العقوق فإن تمديد الأعمار سيزيد من هذه الحالات بما يُشّكل ظاهرة 
دراماتيكية في المجتمعات الإسلامية. 
السيطرة  في  إنسانية  غير  أطماع  أمام  الباب  الإسلامية  المجتمعات  في  الأعمار  إطالة  ستفتح 
والقيام  المسؤوليات  تسلّم  الدنيا من  الأعمار  مما سيحرم  للأسرة  الاجتماعية  السلسلة  في  والتحكم 
على  )الصراع  الصراع  ج  ّ سيؤ ممّا  التقليدية  الأعمار  المتداولة ضمن حدود  الأخلاقية  بالوظائف 
الميراث مثلاً( كما أن الموت المرتبط بالأعمار الحالية يُنهي بشكل آلي بعض المشكلات الاجتماعية 
والأخلاقية والتي ستطول مع طول الأعمار.
يؤدي تمديد الحياة وإطالتها إلى مزيد من طول الأمل المذموم لقوله تعالى: »فذرهم يأكلوا 
ويتمتّعوا ويُلههم الأمل فسوف يعلمون« )سورة الحجر، الآية 3(، وقد جاء في رياض الصالحخين 
الحديث الشريف: »عن ابن مسعود رضي الله عنه قال: »خّط النبيّ صلى الله عليه وسلم خّطاً 
مربعاً، وخّطاً في الوسط خارجاً منه، وخّط ُخططاً صغاراً إلى هذا الذي في الوسط من جانبه 
الذي في الوسط، فقال: »هذا الإنسان، وهذا أجله محيطاً به- أو قد أحاط به- وهذا الذي هو 
خارج أمله، وهذه الخُطط الصغار الأعراض، فإن أخطأه هذا، نهشه هذا« رواه البخاري وهذه 
صورته )الإمام النووي 184(: 
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أي أن تمديد الشيخوخة وتأجيل أعراضها يدفع إلى الوهم بالخلود ويترتب على هذا الوهم تأجيل 
الواجبات الأخلاقية الضرورية بسبب وهم القيام بها في المستقبل كما يختل التوازن الاجتماعي 
باختلال التوازن الطبيعي للبيولوجيا البشرية حيث إن »توازن الطبيعة يقتضي أن تختفي كائناٌت 
بيولوجية  مادة  ليس  الجسد  لأن   )Klarsfeld 2000, 59( »أخرى لتظهر كائنات حية  حية 
السن،  الاجتماعية )كسلطة كبار  للتمثّلات  أنه خاضع  أي  أيضاً  اجتماعية  خالصة بل هو مادة 
أو التقدير الاجتماعي لهم، أو الأولوية التي يكتسبونها في المؤسسات السياسية...( كما أنه فاعٌل 
في  الشيوخ  أجساد  وصورة  الشباب  أجساد  صورة  تأثير  بين  الفرق  )مثل  المجتمع  حركة  في 
المخيال الاجتماعي..(، لُيشّكل الجسد »ثقافة« خاصة، »ثقافة يكون فيها الجسد في التقاطع بين 
الشعور الحميم بهوية الأشخاص وتحقيق مشاريع عقلانية، أي بين الموضوعية والبُعد الرمزي للجسد« 
)Cadré 2001, 105( ومنه فإن تمديد الأعمار يعني تراجع البُعد الرمزي للجسد وُخفوته في كثافة 
على العلاقات  إضافياً  اليومية والفضاء العام ممّا يشّكل ثقلاً  ل لصاحبه في الحياة  المُطوَّ الحضور 
الاجتماعية التي تبدأ في التصّدع والتفكك.
خامساً: نكسة الجينوم: من الإنسان إلى ما بعد الإنسان. 
بتمديد الحياة بصفة  المتعلق  لثورة الجينوم بصفة عامة، وللتعديل الجينومي  البُعد الأخلاقي  ُمثّل  ي
كائُن  هو  بما  الإنسان  بماهية  تتعلق  وتعديلاته  الجينوم  مسألة  لأن  وإنسانياً  علمياً  تحديّاً  خاصة، 
الأبعاد، ولذلك فإن السؤال الذي يُطرح في سياق تمديد العمر وتأخير الشيخوخة هو: أّيُ إنسان 
هو ذاك الذي يبقى حيّاً بعد عمره التقليدي؟ أيّة حياة تكون في الأعمار الممّددة؟ ما الذي يتغيّر 
في القيم الأخلاقية الحالية وما مصيرها في المستقبل؟
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يمكننا أن نمثّل إخفاق التعديل الجيني المؤدي إلى تمديد الحياة بل«إخفاق تيثونوس«2 والذي 
والتي  الناس  حياة  من  جينياً  الممّددة  المرحلة  في  الشيخوخة  آثار  على  السيطرة  فقدان  يعني 
ستظهر عليهم بشكل أكثر حّدة ممّا يجعل تمديد الحياة مشكلة أخرى، »لأن الناس ينتابهم القلق 
أيضاً حول جودة حياتهم وليس حول طولها فقط« )Fukuyama 2002, 67(، وتنشأ هذه 
المشكلة من الصناعة الجينومية لإنساٍن يشترك في خصائصه البيولوجية مع بقية الناس وهذا ما 
والأرض  السموات  آياته خلق  تعالى: »ومن  لقوله  التنوع،  على  المبنية  يهدم خصوصية كينونته 
نعتبر أن  الآية 22(، وحينها  للعالمين« )الروم،  واختلاف ألسنتكم وألوانكم إن في ذلك لآيات 
المتعّدد في جوهره والمتنوع  التوحيد الجيني( هو ضد الإنسان  )بفعل  بيولوجياً  الموحّد  الإنسان 
بيولوجياً حيث إن »التطور هو خاصية للحياة وليست هذه العملية ممكنة إلا لأن كل فرد يمكنه أن 
يكون مختلفاً عن الأفراد الآخرين من جنسه. للكن مع اكتشاف جزيء DNA والشيفرة الجينية 
اللاّتنوع مفهوماً مركزياً« )Perbal 2011, 43(، فاللاتنوع يعني  اللكونية )تقريباً( أصبح مفهوم 
صناعة منمذجة للإنسان بواسطة المخبر العلمي الذي تغّطي سلطته المعرفية على الأبعاد الأخلاقية 
للإنسان والتي تتجاوز حدوده البيولوجية وُتحّدد وضعه البشري.
عن  نسخة  نريد  هل  نكون؟  أن  نريد  ماذا  هو:  مهمّاً  سؤالاً  الشيخوخة  تأخير  عملية  تواجه 
تيثونوس هي الأكثر تشويهاً؟ أم إنساناً هو ما بعد إنسان؟ أو »هل من المشروعية »في ذاتها« أن 
للإنسان  المكونة  والنفسية  واللكيميائية  الفيزيائية  »الممتلكات«  تشوّه  التي  العلمية  التجارب  تُقام 
وتقوّض إنسانية الإنسان؟ إن فرضية السؤال هي أنه توجد طبيعة إنسانية لها طابع دائم، »نواة 
أنطولوجية صلبة«، وتشويه هذه النواة يتضمن خطراً جذرياً، هو التراجع نحو شكل أدنى من 
الحياة أو الوجود، التطور نحو أشكال الحياة غير الإنسانية، الخروج من الإنسانية، »القفز خارج 
 Beland 2006,( »َلَكات التي تؤسس خصوصية الإنسانية وكرامته ماهية الإنسان«، فقدان الم
البيولوجي  التطور  تتضمن  التي  للإنسان  الصلبة  الأنطولوجية  النواة  من  جزء  فالشيخوخة   ،)61
- نسبة إلى الأسطورة اليونانية التي تتحدث عن تيثونوس )Tithonus( ابن ملك طروادة الذي أحبّته   2
يمنح  أن  واحدة هي  أمنية  لها  يحقق  أن   )Zeus( من زوس  فطلبت  الفجر(  )آلهة   )Eos( إيوس 
تيثونوس حياة خالدة، فاستجاب لها زوس )الغيور( مبتسماً، للكنها نسيت أن تطلب له الشباب الخالد، 
فبدأ تيثونوس يشيخ ويضعف ويهرم، فوضعته إيوس في حجرة، ثم حوّلته إلى حشرة هي جندب الحقل. 
)Turner 2009, 27( :أنظر
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الجينومي  التوجيه  ُيحّدده  الذي  البيولوجي  الثبات  عكس  الزمن  في  البشري  للجسد  »الطبيعي« 
للصفات الإنسانية أي تلك »الآلة الثابتة التي تربط النمط الجيني )génotype( بالنمط الظاهري 
 Pouteau 2007,( »)ضمن الصيغة )النمط الظاهري= النمط الجيني+بيئة )..( )phénotype(
المرحلة  وهي  للإنسان  إنسانية  بعد  ما  المرحلة  إلى  الدخول  إلى  هذه  الثابتة  الآلة  وتؤدي   )08
التي يميّزها التحوّل الأخلاقي للحياة اليومية التي تحّدُ أنطولوجياً الإنسان من الخارج وتحافظ على 
نواته الأنطولوجية الأصيلة ولهذا فإن »المرور من الإنساني إلى ما بعد إنساني ليس قراراً خاصاً 
بالعلم، وللكنه خاٌص بالأخلاق)ethics( وبالسياسة« )Beland 2006, 90(، وعلى رأس هذه 
المتنوعة  البيولوجية  بنيتها  المعطاة في  الإنسانية  الطبيعة  يرتكز على  الذي  المسؤولية  الأخلاق مبدأ 
وكّل تشويه لهذه الطبيعة بالتلاعب الجيني هو تخريٌب لمبدأ المسؤولية وإفقادٌ لطابعها الأخلاقي.
ما »فضائل« تمديد الحياة جينياً؟ أيّة »سعادة« أو »لذّة« يمكن الحصول عليها لحياة ممّددة؟ هل 
لو عاش بعض البشر زمناً أطول سيزدادوا خيراً أكثر مما فعلوا أو ازدادوا شراً أكثر ممّا اقترفوا؟ 
سيكون تمديد الحياة تمردّاً على الحياة نفسها وخرقاً »للالتزام« البيولوجي بعمر معيّن، ضمن حدود 
التناهي الإنساني، الحياة كتجربة إنسانية تَعتبر الموَت جزءاً مهمّاً من تلك التجربة وبهذا فقط تُعتبر 
إنسانية، كما أن الإنسان خالدٌ ضمن حدود حياته والزمن المستنفد فيها ومصادر تلك الحياة العميقة 
والتي تستمّدها من الفناء، لأن الإنسان عندما يولد في الحياة يولد معه موته، لقد قال شرودينغر 
)Schrödinger(: »الكائُن خالدٌ، بالنسبة للقوانين التي تحتفظ بكنوز الحياة التي يرتسم بها اللكون 
منبعها،  إلى  ويعود  الحياة ذاتها  نواة  يتدفق من  فالخلود   ،)Schrödinger 2006, 19( »ًجمالا
والحياة لا تتمدد ولا تطول وإنما توجد وفقط وتلك غواية الحياة ذاتها ومصدر الفضائل فيها. 
في المستقبل القريب، سيعود إلى ساحة النقاش الفلسفي والعلمي سؤال: ما الإنسان؟ بأكثر 
حّدة، لأنه السؤال- المفتاح إلى إعادة تحديد وضبط مفهوم الطبيعة البشرية، وإعادة طرح هذا 
السؤال تعكس الهاجس الوجودي للكينونة كائن تتمفصل حياته بين منظور علمي ينظر إلى تلك 
الحياة كجسد معزول يمكن مراقبته عن قرب وتثبيته في إطار فيزيائي- كيميائي ومنظور اجتماعي 
أخلاقي ينظر إلى الحياة بوصفها حياة يومية أي ككينونة مندرجة في الصيرورة التاريخية بحيث 
لا يمكن التعالي على هذه الصيرورة كما لا يمكنها أن تكون معزولة خارج نفسها.
يمكن  بحيث  الحياة  تلك  آخر حصون  وليس  للجسد  الداخلية  الحياة  من  الجينوم جزءاً  يمثّل 
جعله مُفسّراً وحيداً لما »يحدث« في الإنسان أو لما سيحدث فيه وله، فدَرُس »التناهي« الإنساني 
328 صر لنا ا
يجعل كل طرح بيولوجي بخصوص الحياة البشرية أو تمديدها وإطالة شيخوختها هو طرٌح محدودٌ 
أنطولوجياً أي أنه لا يقترب من قاعدة الوجود التي يُبنى عليها تصوّر خالص لمفهوم »الإنسان«؛ 
ولبنية  البشري  الكائن  لماهية  مقنعاً  تفسيراً  الإبستيمولوجي،  المستوى  العلم، على  يمثّل  وبقدر ما 
الحياة ذاتها، إلا أنه، على المستوى الأنطولوجي، يُعبّر عن تآكل البناء التاريخي والثقافي للإنسان 
في صورة الانهيار القيمي- الأخلاقي لمنظومة عيشه. 
إن تجربة »العيش« في الحياة اليومية ليست تجربة علمية محضة، فحتّى العلوم تجد حدودها في 
الحياة اليومية، كما يرى الفيلسوف الألماني هيدغر، وهو ما يجعلنا نطرح السؤال: ما الذي تبّقى 
يتيقي تستمرّ  من الإنسان؟ كيف تتفوّق بيولوجيا الجسد المحدود على الأبعاد غير المحدودة لكائن إ
»حياته« الأخلاقية بعد موته أي بعد النهاية البيولوجية لجسده؟ ولسنا هنا بصدد مواجهة بين العلم 
والأخلاق وللكننا بصدد مواجهة بين الإنسان واللاّإنسان، بين الجوهر والعَرض. 
م إنها غواية جديدة بعد تلك التي  هل يمثّل تمديد الحياة جينياً انتصاراً للإنسان على الحياة؟ أ
عاشها آدم في الجنة؟ هل انتصر »الشيطان« من جديد )الشيطان بالمعنى الديني وبالمعنى الأخلاقي 
للكلمة( وها هو يريد أن ُيخرج بني آدم من الأرض كما أخرج أباهم من الجنة؟ تمثّل هذه الأسئلة 
ما بعد علمية مقدمةً لفهم الإنسان في أبعاده غير التقليدية أي لفهم صورة كائن ما بعد »عودة 
إلى طرق مسدودة،  الجدال  انتهى هذا  أن  بعد  والفلسفي،  العلمي  الجدال  ُصلب  إلى  الديني« 
وهي عودة تمّت عبر نافذة الأخلاق التي تشّكل اليوم المدخل إلى مستقبل الإنسان المهّدد بل 
»الانقراض الرمزي« أي بالتحوّل إلى كائن »يشبه الإنسان« وللكنه غريب عنه. 
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